Mystics & Statistics

The Russians are continuing to advance in Ukraine

The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.

In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).

Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian. 

Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.

In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):  

Summation (195 engagements):

Outcome              Failed       Advances   Penetrated
                               III             IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              54                71                33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             2.98            1.20             0.83

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.62             2.96            6.40

Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).

The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).

Post-World War II (61 engagements):

Outcome              Failed      Advances    Penetrated
                               III            IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              14               8                 33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             3.20            1.60             1.36

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.80             4.83           15.10

Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:

Outcome            III      IV        V

  Cases                 10       29         21

  Force Ratios    1.80    2.69     2.75

  Loss Ratios      1.66    1.51      0.64

Note the same loss pattern exists here.

Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.

Outcome                    III        IV       V

Italian Campaign     0.74     1.76     2.53

Ardennes                   0.45     3.71     5.00

Kursk                         0.58      5.18   11.43 

So……

  1. The advance rates in Ukraine are pretty much in line with outcome III and IV engagements. 
  2. The advance rates are fairly low compared to the other cases we have.
  3. Will discuss casualties later.

This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).

August’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024

The third HAAC is coming up in less than three months. The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: revised 31 August 2024

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930   Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030   Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130   Slouching Towards Wabash: The Withering of Historical Analysis in the American Profession of Arms – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1130 – 1230   Redux: Quantifying Warfare – Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

1230 – 1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire  

1500 – 1600   Validation Challenges in Wargaming: What’s Real Here? – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700   New Findings on Artillery Suppression – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1700 – 1800    Gun, Baby, Gun – Dr. Iain Overton (AOAV) – virtual

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – Rangos

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000   Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100   Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere – Dr. Christopher Davis

1100 – 1200   Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1400 – 1500   The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism – Dr. Christopher Davis

1500 – 1600   The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University)

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

1700 – 1800   The Impact of Horses on Native Americans – Dr. David Cuberes

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – BJs

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   The Debate over French Armored Warfare Doctrine 1935 to 1940 – Dr. James Slaughter

1000 – 1100   Summoning the specter of “Beweglichkeit”: A critical analysis of the U.S. Army’s new FM 3-0 Operations and observed Ukrainian battlefield trends – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1100 – 1200   Ground Warfare in 2050: How it Looked in 2017 – Dr. Alexander Kott

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500   Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano

1500 – 1600   Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott 

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

Evening:   Happy hour – Rangos 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 Morning Day 1: Naval Warfare Analysis

0930 – 1030   A Naval Power Index: The U.S. Navy vs three challengers – Imperial Japan, USSR and PRC China – Geoffrey Clark

1030 – 1130   U-boats in the Atlantic: The Unseen and Unheard – Dr. John Magill – virtual

1130 – 1230    The WW2 USAFF Strategic Bombing Campaign: Strategy and Operational Imperatives – Dr. Sorin Adam Matei (Purdue University)

Afternoon Day 1: Air Warfare Analysis

1400 – 1500   Dogfight: Were US pilots in Korea really better than those in Vietnam?  – Chip Sayers

1500 – 1600   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire 

1600 – 1700  “VPAF Aces:  As good as they claimed? – Chip Sayers

1700 – 1800   Reserved

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat – mostly virtual

0900 – 1000   Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1000 – 1100   Beaches by the Numbers – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec) – virtual

1100 – 1200   Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual

1400 – 1500   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600   Salvation only in arms: A critical historical analysis of operational maneuver during the 1814 campaign in France – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1600 – 1700   Theory of Victory: The Ideas, Doctrine and Education of the U.S. Army from 1814-1941 – Dr. Michael Bonura (CGSC) – virtual

1700 – 1800   Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare – LtC. Nathan A. Jennings (CGSC) – virtual 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Force Ratios – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100   The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1100 – 1200   Analyzing Barbarossa: By the Numbers – Dr. Robert Kirchubel (LtC, US Army, ret) 

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   Future of Maneuver Warfare – Dr. Amos Fox (Arizona State University) – virtual

1400 – 1500   Chernobyl compromised: The story of a Russian cyber attack – Joseph Weiss (Applied Control Solutions, LLC) – virtual

1500 – 1600   Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700   Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual

 

Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). –  we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).

Front Line Traces in Ukraine

With the help of some volunteer labor, we have produced a more precise set of front-line traces. I have done a couple of quick and dirty estimates before, but I never took the time to measuring it up right. Now we have done something a little more exacting. The google maps with the borders that we used is here: Google Earth. Clicking on the left hand menu will allow one to see how the border was measured. This was the work of Jack Flairty.

1. Length of the front line on 1 January 2014: This is land border of with Russia.

  • 1,974 kilometers
  • 1,227 miles

2. Length of the front line 2016-2021: The border of the LPR and DPR and Ukraine.

  • 336 kilometers
  • 227 miles

3. Length of the front line 24 February 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia, 2) part of the border with Russia from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy to Kharkiv, 3) the border of the LPR and DPR, 4) the border with Crimea.

  • 1,706 kilometers
  • 1,060 miles

4. Length of the front line 1 March 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia (they did expand it), 2) the front line trace from Kyiv to Chernihiv, to Sumy, to Kharkhiv down to Izyum, 3) the front line trace down to Mariupol. 4) the front line trace through Zaporizhzhia and Kherson province.

  • 3,011 kilometers
  • 1,871 miles

5. Length of the front line 1 April 2022.

  • 2,333 kilometers
  • 1,450 miles

6. Length of the front line 1 May 2022: This no longer includes Belarus.

  • 2,144 kilometers
  • 1,332 miles

7. Length of the front line 1 June 2022

  • 2,418 kilometers
  • 1,503 miles

8. Length of the front line 1 July 2022

  • 1,900 kilometers
  • 1,180 miles

9. Length of the front line 1 August 2022

  • 1,753 kilometers
  • 1,089 miles

10. Length of the front line on 1 June 2024.

  • 1,633 kilometers
  • 1,015 miles

 

Previous posts on the subject:

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute

Length of Front Line Trace in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

We have sold out of Attrition

Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War is no longer for sale by The Dupuy Institute. We sent out our last two copies last week. We still hold copies of everything else listed here: Books – The Dupuy Institute

If you want Attrition, it is available on Amazon.com, but at a hefty price of $180: Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War: Dupuy, Trevor N.: 9780963869234: Amazon.com: Books. We sold our copies for $19.95.

There is little chance we will publish it again. The rights are held by the Dupuy family, not us. We sold 54 copies over the course of 9 years. This hardly justifies a new print run.

You were warned: We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute. We did sell those 16 copies in 9 months.

Aces at Kursk is for sale on Amazon.com (U.S.)

It looks like Aces at Kursk is for sale in the U.S. on Amazon.com. The link is here: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books

Yesterday they were reporting 19 in stock, this morning it was 16. So it does look like they were selling and shipping. Let me know when someone sees copies in the book stores.

 

I was in Liverpool

My grandfather was born in Rhyl Wales and grew up in Liverpool England. Here is a copy of his shipping record during the Great War. He did five voyages during the war. He did a voyage to Murmansk afterwards during the Russian Civil War (which I have blogged about twice: see Murmansk – The Dupuy Institute and  Mutiny in Murmansk – The Dupuy Institute).

The first two voyages were on the SS Adriatic. I think this is it: RMS Adriatic (1906) – Wikipedia. My grandfather had just turned 15 when he went on his first voyage. Both voyages were to New York and back.

Next voyage was in the SS Cedar Branch.  I think this is it: SS Aenos (1910) – Wikipedia. It is listed in the log book at 2222 tons and 404 HP. She is listed in Wikipedia as 3,554 GRT and 2,222 NRT. The voyage was to Gallao or Callao. Callao is the main port for Peru. 

His fourth voyage was with the Maria de Larrrinaga. Don’t have a Wikipedia link to that ship, but it was 2678 net tons and 429 HP. It is listed here:  Larrinaga Line (theshipslist.com). The destination is listed as OHMS (On His Majesty’s Service).

His fifth voyage was with the Dictator. I do not have a link to here. The number 3149 is written in the lower right corner of the ship listing. The voyage was to Gibraltar and the U.S.A.

The war ended on 11/11/18 (now Armistice Day). On 14/11/18 he went to sea on the Nigeria. This is the ship that brought him to Murmansk. The number 2590 is written in the lower right corner of the ship listing. The destination is listed as OHMS.

July’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024

Had an informative, interesting and enjoyable visit to York, UK to attend the Niall MacKay organized HADSS: Final Schedule for HADSS 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

Good stuff and a wonderful city. My understanding is that the next HADSS will be held there in 2026.

Meanwhile, the third HAAC is coming up in less than three months. The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: revised 23 July 2024

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930   Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030   Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130   Slouching Towards Wabash: The Withering of Historical Analysis in the American Profession of Arms – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1130 – 1230   Redux: Quantifying Warfare – Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

1230 – 1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire  

1500 – 1600   Validation Challenges in Wargaming: What’s Real Here? – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700   open

 

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – Rangos

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000   Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100   Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere – Dr. Christopher Davis

1100 – 1200   Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism – Dr. Christopher Davis

1400 – 1500   The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University)

1500 – 1600   Open

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

 

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – BJs

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1000 – 1100   The Debate over French Armored Warfare Doctrine 1935 to 1940 – Dr. James Slaughter

1100 – 1200   Ground Warfare in 2050: How it Looked in 2017 – Dr. Alexander Kott

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500   Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano

1500 – 1600   Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott 

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

 

Evening:   Happy hour – Rangos 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Air Warfare Analysis

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire 

1600 – 1700   open

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat – mostly virtual

0900 – 1000   Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1000 – 1100   Beaches by the Numbers – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec) – virtual

1100 – 1200   Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual

1400 – 1500   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600   New Findings on Artillery Suppression – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1600 – 1700   Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare (LtC. Nathan A. Jennings) – virtual 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   The Impact of Horses on Native Americans – Dr. David Cuberes

1000 – 1100   The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1100 – 1200   Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1200 – 1300   Lunch    

1300 – 1400   Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600   open

1600 – 1700   open

 

Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). –  we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).

Definition of Limited War

Just for the record, here is the definition of a “limited war” from The Dictionary of Military Terms, by Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson and Grace P. Hayes (1986). page 137.

Limited war – 1) A war looked upon by one or more of its contestants as not involving its own sovereignty or most vital interests, and as being limited in at least one respect, as, for example, to a particular geographic area, to the employment of certain resources, or to the number of contestants. 2) A war considered by a detached observer as relatively limited in some key respect, especially with regard to political objectives. 
 

This is still the best dictionary of military terms out there. Vastly superior to what is published by the Pentagon.