So, How Long A War?

So, how long will this war last? It has already gone on for more than seven weeks. There are no ongoing negotiations, with the president of Russia saying that peace talks are at a “dead end.” It is clear this is going to drag on for weeks, or months, or even years. Which is it?

There are many possible scenarios:

  1. Peace talks will restart in the near future and this war will be over in May.
  2. This war will continue throughout the summer campaign season with a possible ceasefire or negotiated settlement in the fall (making for 6 month or longer war).
  3. War will continue through at least the next summer (making for at least a year and half long war).

Added to that, it may end in a peace treaty with the exchange of land and some form of permanent settlement, or it may end in a cease-fire with the war to potentially restart at some point in the future.

There are several things driving the length of the war:

  1. Actions on the ground (what is taken, retaken, and not taken).
  2. The Russian economy (price of oil and gas is a big deal here).
  3. War weariness in Russia.
  4. War weariness in Ukraine.
  5. Regime or leadership change in Russia.

Let us discuss the actions on the ground. I am assuming Mariupol will soon entirely be in Russia’s hand. So, the drivers in my mind are:

  1. Whether Russia can take Sloviansk (pop. 106,972), Sievierdonetsk (pop. 101,135), Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084), Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Lysychansk (pop. 95,031) and surrounding areas, securing all of Lugansk and Donetsk provinces.
  2. Whether Russia can threaten or take Kharkov.
  3. Whether Ukraine can threaten or take Kherson.
  4. Significant successful Russian advances towards other parts of Ukraine.
  5. Significant successful Ukrainian advances toward other parts of Ukraine.

Now, my suspicion is that points 2, 4 and 5 are not really going to happen. I tend to think that Kharkov is now secured, but there is no guarantee. I suspect the focus of this summer’s fighting will be Donetsk and Lugansk provinces and Kherson. If Russia can take the rest of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, it will hold an advantage going into any peace negotiations. If Ukraine can retake Kherson, then it may have some leverage in any future peace negotiations, especially is they can keep advancing across Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces. I am guessing at this point, there will no significant major new military operations until May, when the weather improves.

While there could be several big game changers, the one under control of Russia is their degree of mobilization. If they suddenly decided to add a couple of hundred thousand troops to their army, then they could hold an advantage on the battlefield in six months. The fact that they have not done so now, indicates that is it not going to be factor for this summer. So going into the summer campaign, it looks like both armies are fielding ground forces of roughly equal manpower. Russia may decide to seriously mobilize if it looks like the war is going to continue into 2023. 

This is not an equal fight (see below). If Russia were to fully mobilize, this would clearly be a losing fight in the long run for Ukraine. It appears that Russia is not mobilizing and is barely increasing its forces (+60,000?). I suspect the concern is over public opinion and potentially draft protests. Draft protests could quickly spire out of control into general protests against the government. With the Russian economy stagnated since 2014 and now in decline, the potential for protests turning into the government being overthrown is present. See: Why Are We Still Wondering Why Men (And Women) Rebel? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Anyhow, a statistical comparison:

                                   Russia                              Ukraine                            Ratio

Population                145,478,097 (2022)           41,167,336 (2022)           3.5 

GDP                            $1,710 Trillion (2021)      $ 181 billion (2021)         9.4

Per capita                  $11,654                              $4,380                             2.7

Per capita (PPP)       $29,485                             $14,150                            2.1

 

Army size                     280,000 (2020)                169,000 (2016)              1.7   

Armed Forces Size   1,014,000 (2021)               245,000 (2022)               4.1

Budget                       $61.7 billion (2020-2021)    4.6 (2020)                   13.4

% of GDP                     4.3% (2021)                        3% (2020)                    1.4

       

Note: the population figures include Crimea and Sevastopol’s 2,423,460 people in the Russian total.

So, my conclusion is that this war will either 1) end in May, 2) end in the fall, or 3) continue well into 2023. I suspect it is more likely to end in an armistice, vice a real peace agreement, so will have the option to restart at some point. If it does end in an armistice, then NATO should probably seriously consider immediately adding Ukraine as a full member so as to forestall a restart, assuming this option is not negotiated away in some armistice agreement.

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
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Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
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His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
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Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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3 Comments

  1. A little bit different approach to the analysis:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEpk_yGjn0E&t=2239s

    As long as western counrtries economically support Ukraine, your table will change dramatically, or more on the point: Is there the willingness of western countries to use their economic strenght to weaken Russia significantly? Russia has – at the strategic level – painted herself in a corner and has created a situation in which western strength can be put against Russian weaknesses.

  2. Russian policy/law, which they have not disowned, is that conscripts are not used except in defense. So it is limited what they can do with conscripts, beyond even the fact that they are conscripts, without stirring up a lot of potential problems. I did see recently a US Intelligence assessment that Putin was not getting good information. One of the cases they specifically mentioned was that he was not told that there were cases were conscripts were used.

    The other way Russia can push its weight is economic warfare. There is a lot of concerns about them cutting undersea cables. They could also use their little subs to lay small naval mines (like the CIA did to Nicaragua back in the day) as a harassment technique. None of this is riskless, but the Russians may come to a point where they feel have more to lose by staying with the status quo.

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