A-10 Advance Rates in Combat.

A-55 Casualty Forecasts, Attrition Anderson’s War Toll Estimate Wildly Inaccurate. Published in The Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1990.

A-80 Compiling Engagement Data for the Arab-Israeli Wars (with Col. John A.C. Andrews).

A-110 Armaments; Nuclear & Chemical Weapons in the XXth Century; Political and Strategic Aspects.

A-120 Thoughts on an Arab Peace Initiative.

A-130 Artificial Intelligence for the Armed Forces. Published in Army, Feb. 1984 under the title “Military History Is Key.”

A-185 New Attrition Methodology for Combat Models.

A-190 A New Attrition Methodology for Models of On-Ground Combat (with James G. Taylor).

A-200 Some Facts About Attrition in War.

A-210 Tactical Automation – Achilles Heel of the US Army. Published in Armed Forces Journal, Feb. 1981 under the pen name Alexander Ross.

B-10 A New Approach to Battle Termination Methodology.

B-20 Battlefield Interaction of Weapons, Tactics, and Doctrine.

B-21 Battlefield Management; The Historical Legacy.

B-30 Military Analysis of the Bekaa Valley Battle.

B-70 US Defense Budgets — The Right Priorities? Published in Armed Forces Journal International, Apr. 1982.

B-100 The Fundamental Information Base for Modeling Human Behavior In Combat.

B-120 Avoiding the Bosnia-Herzegovina Quagmire.

B-125 Future, Present and Past Wars.

B-127 Military Options in Bosnia.

B-128 Military Intervention in Bosnia; A Piece of Cake? Published in The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 20, 1992, under the title “The Way to Win the War in Yugoslavia.”

B-130 Are We Helpless Against Bold Aggression? Implications of Failure in Bosnia.

C-0 The Calculus of Battle.

C-5 The Military Historian As A Domain Specialist for Case-Based Reasoning.

C-20 Julius Caesar (lecture paper).

C-60 The Element of Chance in Combat Models.

C-70 China, December 1945.

C-80 Civilian Control and Military Professionalism: A Systemic Problem. Published in Strategic Review, Winter 1980.

C-100 Clausewitz’s Deterministic, Predictive Theory of Combat.

C-120 Clausewitz and Military Theory.

C-128 Combat Effectiveness.

C-140 Combat Effectiveness and Characteristics of Society.

C-145 Using the Concept of Relative Combat Effectiveness for Military Analysis.

C-160 A Methodology Consistently Relating Combat Power Ratios to Battlefield Results.

C-180 Criticisms of Combat Models Cite Unreliability of Results. Published in Army, Mar. 1985.

C-190 The Phenomenon of Combat Effectiveness.

C-240 In Search of an American Philosophy of Command and Control.

C-270 “Competition” Is Driving National Defense Out of Its Mind. Published in Army, Sept. 1985, under the title “Misapplied Proposal Regulations Hurt Defense Efforts, Business.”

C-300 From Continental Army to Global Superpower; 200 Years in Defense of Freedom.

C-320 Military History and Case-Based Reasoning: A New Approach to the Application of Artificial Intelligence to Battlefield Decision-Making.

C-370 A Promise Fulfilled in the CBI (with R. E. Dupuy).

C-375 Why American Military Capability is Not Good Enough.

D-1 Criteria for Defeat in Battle (with Robert McQuie, Charles B. MacDonald and Hugh M. Cole).

D-10 The Problem of Defining Models, Simulations and Games For Military Purposes.

D-20 Yes Indeed; What About the Draft?

E-1.1 Mearshimer. Published in International Security, Summer 1989.

E-2 An Assessment of Joshua Epstein’s Monograph: “The Calculus of Conventional War.”

E-10 Quantifying Combat Effectiveness of Divisions in World War II.

E-30 Electronic Warfare and the Battle of Kursk. Published in Armed Forces Journal International, Feb. 1979

E-40 Even Your Best Friends.

E-50 The US 88th Division in WWII; A Case in Study in Combat Performance Excellence (with Gay Hammerman). Published in Military Review, Oct. 1987.

F-10 Flags and Patriotism.

F-30 Force Ratios and Behavioral Considerations in Ground Combat Models.

F-31 Outnumbered and Winning; Force Multipliers in History.

F-32 Yes, Virginia, There Really Are Multipliers!

F-40 Report on Pre-War Forecasting: Accuracy of Pre-Kuwait War Forecasts.

F-50 Forecasting on the Basis of Historical Combat Trends.

F-60 Friction in War.

F-70 The Frustrations of a Military History Analyst.

F-80 Introduction for Japanese version of Future Wars.

G-1 History, Reform, and General Staffs.

G-10 The Current Implications of German Military Excellence. Published in US Strategic Review, Fall 1976.

G-20 Prussian-German General Staff.

G-50 Assessing the War in the Gulf.

G-51 Estimates of Possible Casualties in a War Between United Nations Forces and Iraq (with Curt Johnson).

H-1 History, Mysticism, and the Holy Grail.

H-5 Technology and The Human Factor In War.

H-10 Renegade or Patriot? The Case of Major Haddad of “Free Lebanon.”

H-30 The Hexagon in Combat Simulations.

H-40 Relevance of Historical Combat Data to Future Tactical Nuclear Warfare.

H-50 Historical Military Operations in the Middle East.

H-60 History and Modern Battle. Published in Army, Nov. 1982.

H-70 The Uses of History.

H-80 Human Factors Without Human Experience: A Case Study in Combat Simulation Unreliability.

H-85 Budget Implications of Human Factors and Technology in Modern War.

H-90 Combat Hypotheses Derived From Military History Analysis.

I-1 The INF Treaty and the Quantified Model.

I-10 Measuring Combat Intensity.

I-20 Thoughts on Tactical Intelligence.

I-30 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, 13 Dec. 1990.

J-1 The Characteristics of JTLS.

J-20 A Possible Iraqi Invasion of Jordan.

K-2 New Perspective on the Security of Korea.

K-5 Are We On The Brink of War With Korea?

K-8 Kuwait War: A Preliminary Assessment.

K-10 Kuwait War: How the War Was Won. Published in National Review, Apr. 1, 1991.

K-11 Kuwait War: The Way of the War. Published in National Review, Mar. 18, 1991.

K-20 Liberating Kuwait: Not Easy; Not Formidable; But Necessary.

L-10 LNK Paradigm, Comments, “A Design for a Battlefield Situation Assessment System.”

L-30 Basic Concepts of Land Combat.

L-40 Analysis of a Land Warfare Data Base.

L-50 Landpower – Its Historical Importance.

L-60 Laws Governing Combat (with Janice B. Fain). Published in National Defense, Nov./Dec. 1975.

L-70 Leadership, Politics, and Cowardice.

L-80 Is American Military Leadership Pedestrian and Unimaginative?

L-85 The Failure of American Military Leadership.

L-90 Players and Kibitzers; The Complexities of Withdrawal of Occupation Forces From Lebanon.

L-100 The War in Lebanon: In Search of Truth In Reporting (with Paul Martell).

L-110 Weapon Lethality and Effective Firepower on the Modern Battlefield. Published in Army, Feb. 1979 under the title “Military Weaponry: How Lethal?

L-115 Could Lee Have Won At Gettysburg?

L-120 Weapons Lethality and the Nuclear Threshold. Published in Armed Forces Journal International, Oct. 1978.

L-130 Churchill and Liddell Hart; Civilian Writers Who Have Influenced Military Affairs. Published in Army, Aug. 1966 under the title “The Selective Memoirs of Liddell Hart.”

L-140 Can America Fight a Limited Nuclear War? Published in Orbis-A Journal of World Affairs, Spring 1961.

L-150 Reflections on the Louisiana and Other Maneuvers.

M-1 Maneuver Lessons: The Arab-Israeli Wars.

M-20 Measures of Effectiveness.

M-30 For Men Only. Published in The Field Artillery Journal, Sept. 1942.

M-40 How to Lose – Or Win – Friends and Influence in the Middle East.

M-50 Middle East Peace is Possible.

M-60 A Proposed Step Toward Middle East Peace. Published in Strategic Review, Fall 1981.

M-70 A Case Study in Military History.

M-80 An Introduction to Military Historical Analysis.

M-100 Military History; The Essence of Military Science.

M-120 Military History: Laboratory of the Soldier; Empirical Basis for a Theory of Combat.

M-130 The Practical Relevance of Military History to Problems of Modern Combat.

M-140 The Relevance of Military History.

M-150 Why We Do Not Learn From Military History.

M-170 Military Service in a Democracy: The Obligation to Serve vs. the Voluntary “Tradition”?

M-180 Combat Models: “About Right” vs. “Precisely Wrong.”

M-190 The Defensive Might of Infantry; Contribution of Combat Multipliers.

M-200 Coming to Grips With Battlefield “Multipliers” – By Use of the Quantified Judgement Model.

M-205 Outnumbered and Winning; Force Multipliers in History.

M-210 A Practical Approach to Force Multipliers.

M-220 Let’s Get Serious About Combat Multipliers.

M-240 Mobile Defense, Forward Strategy, and Military Reform; Confusion Among the Critics.

M-250 The Problem of Defining Models, Simulations and Games for Military Purposes.

M-275 Combat Models – Military History and Validation of. Published in Army, Feb. 1984.

N-1 National Guard; Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.

N-10 The New Debate: NATO’s Deep Strike; Strategy For Victory or Defeat?

N-20 The Problem of NATO Forward Defense.

N-30 The Nondebate Over How Army Should Fight. Published in Army, Jun. 1982.

N-35 Prospects for a North-South War.

N-40 Comments on Gold-Struve Article: “The Nuclear Battlefield.”

N-70 Preservation of the North Anna Battlefield.

O-1 A Military Analysis of the October War.

O-10 The War of Ramadan: An Arab Perspective of the October War. Published in Army, Mar. 1975.

O-20 Preliminary QJMA Analyses of October War Data.

P-1 Pearl Harbor: Who Blundered? Published in America in World Affairs: 1898-1945.

P-10 Perceptions Of The Next War: Historical Perspective on Adjustment of Doctrine and Tactics to Weapons. Published in Armed Forces Journal International, May 1980.

P-20 The Pied Pipers of “Maneuver-Style” Warfare. Published in Armed Forces Journal International, Nov. 1981.

P-30 The Nature of Military Power.

P-35 Report on Pre-War Forecasting.

P-40 The Principles of War.

P-50 Some Thoughts on Combat Principles.

P-60 The Crisis in American Professionalism: Accusations and Remedies.

P-75 A Question of Professionalism in Today’s Army. Published in Army, Jul. 1982, under the pen name Alexander Ross.

P-90 A Comparison of the Combat Potentialities of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Q-10 Quantitative Analysis of War Experience.

Q-20 Quantitative Historical Analysis to Determine the Influence of Behavioral Factors on Combat Outcomes.

Q-110 A New Attrition Methodology for Models of Air-Ground Combat (with James G. Taylor).

Q-130 Mythos or Verity? The Quantified Judgment Model and German Combat Effectiveness.

Q-140 The Quantified Judgment Model: A Conceptual Approach.

Q-160 The Quantified Judgment Model: Observations and Descriptions.

Q-260 The Quantified Judgment Model; A Theory of Combat.

R-1 Thoughts on the Road Problem in a Future War in Europe.

R-10 Analysis of the Russo-German War, 1941-1945. Published as a chapter in the book War in the East: The Russo-German Conflict, 1941-45, 1977.

R-15 Using the Concept of Relative Combat Effectiveness for Military Analysis.

S-20 The Scherhorn Episode.

S-30 The Soviet Second Echelon: Is This a Red Herring? Published in Armed Forces Journal International, Aug. 1982.

S-40 ‘War-Fighting’ With ‘Shrapnel.’ Published in Army, Jan. 1980.

S-60 A Summary of the Status of Combat Simulation in the US and NATO in 1982.

S-70 At Last! Systematic, Reliable Simulation of Combat

S-80 A Fallacy of American Combat Simulations; Rates of Advance Are NOT Proportional to Force Ratios.

S-90 Preliminary QJMA Analysis of Six-Day War.

S-100 U.S. Military Strategy Has Been Getting a Bum Rap. Published in Army, Sept. 1980.

S-110 In Defense of American Military Strategists.

S-120 A New Square Law?

S-130 Strategy For Victory of Defeat? Published in Air Force Magazine, Apr. 1983.

S-140 Across the Suez (Operation “Strongheart.”)

S-160 Realistic Simulation of Suppression and Attrition Effects of Artillery and Air-Delivered Firepower.

S-170 Observations on Suppression in Combat.

S-180 Historical Literature and Data on Suppression in Combat.

S-190 A Quantifiable Variable: Predicting the Element Of Surprise in Combat. Published in Army, May 1977.

S-200 Significance and Effects of Surprise in Modern War.

S-210 Thoughts on Surprise Scenarios for a Future War in Europe.

S-220 The Synergism of History and Operations Research: A Case Study: German Combat Performance in Two World Wars.

T-10 A Theory of Combat.

T-35 Tank Loss Exchange Ratios.

T-40 Toward a Viable Doctrine of Tactical Nuclear Combat. Published in Ordnance, Nov./Dec. 1968 under the title “Tactical Nuclear Combat.”

T-60 Some Observations on the “Target-Rich” Environment of Contemporary and Future War.

T-70 The Influence of Technology on War Since 1945. Published in Marine Corps Gazette, Sept. 1983.

T-90 Interaction of Technology and Human Factors in War.

T-95 Technology and the Human Factor in War.

T-100 Modern Weapons Technology and the Simulation of Modern Combat in the 1980s.

T-110 Weapons, Technology and the History of Tactical Innovation.

T-120 Testimony of T.N. Dupuy Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, Aug. 4, 1965.

T-140 Analyzing Trends in Modern Ground Combat.

U-1 Understanding War From Historical Experience (with Arnold C. Dupuy.) Published in Phalanx, Dec. 1984.

U-10 Does Army Thinking on Tactical Air Violate Unity of Command? Published by Air Force Magazine, Nov. 1955.

U-40 The Gulf War and The United Nations.

V-0 Military History and Validation of Combat Models.

V-1 The Timeless Verities of Combat.

V-10 Veterans Day.

V-20 Victory in 1945 – Lessons For the Cold War? Published in The Retired Officer, May 1985.

W-15 War, Civilization, and History. Published in the Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1992, under the title “We Are Less Warlike, if Not Kinder and Gentler.”

W-20 War Since 1945.

W-50 The Warrior and Morality in War.

W-70 Washington and Greene.

W-80 Thoughts on the Effect of Weather on Combat Outcomes.

W-90 The West and the Tide of History.

W-100 Women in Combat: The Challenge of the 1980’s: Are Women Combat-Ready?

W-110 Women In Military Combat: A Historical Survey.

W-130 World War I.

W-140 The War Against Japan.

NB-1 Estimates of Possible US Casualties in a War Between United Nations Forces and Iraq (with Curt Johnson.)

NB-2 Estimates of Possible US Battle Casualties in Three Excursions of Gulf War Scenarios (With Curt Johnson and David L. Bongard.)



U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE, By Gen. Dale O. Smith, Little, Brown, NY, 1955.

NO VICTOR, NO VANQUISHED; The Yom Kippur War. By Edgar O’Ballance, Presidio Press, 1978.

ON THE BANKS OF THE SUEZ: An Israeli General’s Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War. By Avraham Adan, 1980. The Middle East Journal, Washington, DC, 1981.

THE CROSSING OF THE SUEZ. By Lt. Gen. Saad el Shazly, 1980. The Middle East Journal, Washington, DC, 1981, and Armed Forces Journal International, Oct. 1981.

FIGHTING POWER: GERMAN AND U.S. ARMY PERFORMANCE, 1939-1945. By Martin van Creveld. Army, Aug. 1983.

THE LIBERATION OF JERUSALEM; THE BATTLE OF 1967. By Gen. Uzi Narkiss. London, 1983.


FIREPOWER; BRITISH ARMY WEAPONS AND THEORIES OF WAR, 1904-1945. By Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham. London, 1984.

CLAUSEWITZ, PHILOSOPHER OF WAR. By Raymond Aron. Prentice-Hall, NJ, 1985.


The Washington Times, Sept. 5, 1985.

HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL HISTORY: Vol IV, The Modern Era. Hans Delbruck, Translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., Greenwood Press, Conn., 1985.

COMMAND IN WAR. By Martin van Creveld, Harvard, Cambridge, Mass, 1985.

THE WAR OF THE TWO EMPERORS: THE DUEL BETWEEN NAPOLEAN AND ALEXANDER: RUSSIA 1812. By Curtis Cate. The Washington Times Magazine, Mar. 17, 1986.

THE THIRD WORLD WAR; THE UNTOLD STORY. By Gen. Sir John Hackett, Macmillan, NY, 1986.


DESERT VICTORY; THE WAR FOR KUWAIT. By Norman Friedman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md., 1991.

ON STRATEGY II: A CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE GULF WAR. By Col. Harry G. Summers Jr. (Ret.). The Washington Times, May 14, 1992.