I try to stay out of the discussion of the political issue of the day. Needless to say, discussions of Gaza and Iran tend to immediately get political. I am hesitant to express my opinions, because honestly, I really don’t want to waste my time arguing in the invariably testy exchanges that will follow. There are better things I could be doing with my time (like getting my next book complete).
Anyhow, other people I know are more than willing to wade into the debate and as they referencing my work on counterinsurgencies, so it is hard to ignore it entirely.
This is the latest article from Douglas A. Samuelson in RealClearDefense: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/07/06/mission_indecipherable_1192703.html
He does reference his previous article in September 2025 that also references my work on counterinsurgencies: Assessing Israel’s Approach in Gaza | RealClearDefense
His first point is that the U.S. and Isreal have nowhere near the ten-to-one force ratio that appears to be essential to success. Specifically, my studies focused on needing a four-to-1 to ten-to-one ratio to “win” an insurgency depending on insurgent cause. This is discussed in this blog post TDI Friday Read: How Many Troops Are Needed To Defeat An Insurgency? – The Dupuy Institute and A Force Ratio Model Applied to Afghanistan – The Dupuy Institute among other places (like my book America’s Modern Wars). This is a ratio of counterinsurgents (which usually does not include police) to insurgents (including part-time players). I have no idea nor have I examined how many insurgents Hamas and other Gaza groups are capable of fielding. If it is thousands, then Israel probably has the forces to control, contain and eventually defeat the insurgency. If it is tens of thousands, they have a problem. The Wikipedia page on the Gaza War gives Hamas and Palestinian allies a strength of 20,000 to 40,000. I have no idea if that is correct, or if that is correct now. My focus recently has been on Ukraine, not Gaza.
His second point is that U.S. and Isreal do not appear ready to commit to involvement lasting ten or more years….
Now, my studies appear to the source of the DOD quote that insurgencies last an average of ten years. That is an average and includes a number of one-sided cases that were over in four years or less. Furthermore, about a third of the cases were cases where the insurgents won, and on the average they tend to be shorter than those cases where the counterinsurgent won. What this means is that to win a counterinsurgency you must be prepared and willing to stick is out for 20 or more years. It some cases it will go longer than that (i.e. Northern Ireland, which lasted about 30 years).
If you want a single line quote, then if you want to win a counterinsurgency be prepared to go strong and go long. We did not do that in either in Vietnam or Afghanistan and lost the Vietnam War after 10 years and Afghanistan after almost 20 years.
In a later part of the article, does a direct comparison of the population the U.S. versus Iran. Now, what matters is the force ratio of counterinsurgents versus insurgents. If the U.S. went into Iran and there was not much resistance, only a few thousand people, then we could successfully conduct a counterinsurgency with tens of thousands. On the other hand, if the factions of the Iranian people are able to raise tens of thousands, then our level of commitment wou9ld have to noticibly higher. The IRGC supposedly consists of 150,000 active personnel. As it is, I don’t think anyone is seriously contemplating any long term ground commitment in Iran.
Anyhow, back to working on my book(s) on the Russo-Ukrainian War.
