Mystics & Statistics

The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships

We state is our post yesterday that “China has the ability land over 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan on the first wave.” Now three different people in our conference on 13 November independently did counts. They all ended up in the 20,000 to 25,000 range. Here is my count:

  • 4 landing ship dock
    • 28 helicopters each
    • 800 troops each
  • 12 amphibious transport docks
    • 8 Yuzhao class (25,000 tons)
      • 800 troops each
  • 32 landing ships tanks
    • 15 Yuting III class (4,800 tons)
      • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
    • 10 or 11 Yuting II class (4,800 tons)
      • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
    • 3 Yukan class (4,170 tons)
      • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
    • 33 landing ship medium
      • 10 Yunshu class (2,000 tons)
        • 500 troops or 5 to 10 tanks
      • 1 Yudeng class (1,850 tons)
        • One platoon and 4 tanks
      • 11 Yubei class (700 tons)
        • 250 troops
      • 12 Yuhai class (700 tons)
        • 350 troops or 2 tanks
      • 1 Yulu class (800 tons)
        • 200 troops


Some math:

  • People: 21,750
    • 4 x 800 = 3,200
    • 8 x 800 = 6,400
    • 10 x 500 = 5,000
    • 11 x 250 = 2,750
    • 12 x 350 = 4,200
    • 1 x 200 = 200
  • Vehicles: 284
    • 15 x 10 = 150
    • 10 x 10 = 100
    • 3 x 10 = 30
    • 1 x 4 = 4

Now, carrying vehicles versus personnel is an either-or proposition. You could choose to carry more people and less vehicles. It is a tradeoff. I made some assumptions, as modern armies don’t like to go to war without vehicles.

Now, all these calculations are too high. You will also want to land supplies and support material in the initial wave. This is not an insignificant portion of the load. In some operations, it has made up to half the load of the initial wave. So, the figure of 20,000 is an upper limit. If they actually did it, the real figures will probably be lower. 

This also assumes that the initial landing wave is not intercepted, attrited, or otherwise seriously attacked. This is hard to do in the current intelligence environment, especially with U.S. support. It is hard to believe that a hostile incoming amphibious wave would not be hit by volleys of missiles and drones.

Further posts will address the rest of the PLA’s amphibious assets.

The Chinese amphibious lift capacity

During the Third HAAC a discussion developed over what is the amphibious lift capacity of the armed forces of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This is, of course, directly related to the issue of whether China can successfully invade and conquer Taiwan. We then held follow-up discussions with some the HAAC attendees on the subject.  This is going to generate some new posts to the blog detailing out what we explored. But, let me summarize the tentative conclusions of the discussion here.

First, China has the ability to land over 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan on the first wave. This is not much considering the defending Taiwanese ground forces consist of over 100,000 active troops. China maybe be able to supplement that with 10,000 airmobile troops, but this is risky in a strong anti-air environment. They may be able to add other troops by use of commercial shipping and other means, but this is pretty uncertain.

Obviously on subsequent days, they can land another 20,000 or more troops, but we are looking at a week to build up an army capable to fully engaging the Taiwanese Army. In the meantime, Taiwan can mobilize hundreds of thousands of reserves. Added to that, Chinese reinforcements and resupply are subject to interdiction. While China has a lot of aircraft and missiles, so too does Taiwan if it is properly backed up by the United States. This invasion does not appear to be an “iffy” proposition, it appears to be one that will most likely fail.

Now, if China can directly seize a port and/or an airfield, then possibilities develop, but if Taiwan properly defends these locales, this is also a long shot. 

To successfully invade Taiwan China will need to be able to land a whole lot more troops on the first and subsequent waves. Nominally it has that capability with a large number of 50-year old landing craft. These are mostly not active and some are in civilian use as tugs and ferries. Furthermore these small landing craft have to traverse 100 miles of ocean at a speed of 8-12 miles per hour in a hostile environment. This is not promising. There are other options, like using merchant ships (and running them aground?), fishing fleets, etc. None of these are particularly promising for a modern mechanized army. 

Now China does have dozens of large roll-on, roll-off ferry ships that could be used to supplement their amphibious operations, but, they usually need a dock to unload at. This implies that any amphibious operation will have to start by seizing a port, which can be defended, and if taken, can be denied immediate use. These are really not first wave assets. Nominally they can provide additional over-the-beach lift capacity for an initial wave by loading them up with small landing craft and unloading the small craft offshore at sea, but there are still two limitations here: 1) they need small landing craft or amphibious vehicles, and 2) because they are in commercial use, activating them will give Taiwan weeks, if not months of notice. Taiwan’s reserves are 2.3 million people. See: China’s Secret Weapon in the Invasion of Taiwan: RoRo Ferries

It is clear that while China has maintained a modern Marine force with amphibious capability, they had not maintained the amphibious capability to invade Taiwan. Their Marine force is structured for use elsewhere, not Taiwan. It is clear, based upon their military capabilities, that they currently have no real plans to invade Taiwan.

This, of course, can change if the United States does not continue to support Taiwan or if Taiwan loses the desire to defend itself, but right now, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not really practical given the limited Chinese first wave lift capacity.

We will be discussing the details of this on subsequent days: 

  • Tues: The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships
  • Wed: Other Chinese landing craft
  • Thu: The RoRo Ships
  • Fri: The Chinese fishing fleet as an amphibious asset

 

Our expanded media outreach

We have typically only cross-posted this blog to Twitter (now X). We sometimes cross posted to Facebook and Linkedin, but have not been able to do that regularly.

We are trying to expand out media outreach, especially as it is clear that there is not a single central town square. So our social media outreach includes:

X: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) (@dupuyinstitute) / X

Bluesky: @dupuyinstitute.bsky.social — Bluesky

Threads: (2) Christopher Alan Lawrence (@dupuyinstitute) • Threads, Say more

Facebook: (20+) Facebook

LinkedIn: The Dupuy Institute | LinkedIn

Right now, we are regularly cross posting to X, Bluesky and Threads. We may expand that.

EMA versus RMA

Working on more than two books at the moment (not sure this is the best idea). Just proofing a chapter in one book on the Russo-Ukrainian War and noted the following paragraph I had written about the war. Is this meaningful dialogue or am I just stepping in it?


It has been claimed by one the authors that “Any war that lasts longer than six weeks becomes a war of attrition.”[1] This appear to be the case with this war. Six weeks of the dynamic maneuver warfare that made this modern military campaign looks vaguely like the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that some theorists had postulated. It had now ended. We now had transitioned into the next stage of the war, which looked much more like the typical day-by-day grind between extended front lines that more defined World War II. Eventually this would devolve down to something that looked more like World War I, leaving the RMA theorists surprisingly silent.[2]

 

[1] See Battle for Kyiv, page 204.

[2] Having worked in the U.S. defense analytical community for decades, we were all too familiar with the claims of the RMA theorists and their willingness to declare that warfare of the future was going to be nothing like the warfare of the past. As our specialty at The Dupuy Institute was analysis of historical data, this was particularly frustrating as they seemed dismiss the 3,300 years of military history as irrelevant, replaced by their appreciation of new technology and its proposed revolutionary impact on the battlefield. If anything has been established by the now extended war in Ukraine, is that there has not been a revolution in military affairs. New technology is clearly a factor in the war, but it is, shall we say, an evolution in military affairs (EMA) vice an RMA. As the author Jim Storr stated in a conversation in 2023 “Much of the story of the war in Ukraine is a story of old lessons learned again.”

Now, the shop inside the pentagon that supposedly taking the lead on the RMA was OSD Net Assessment, under the leadership of Dr. Andrew Marshall. The Dupuy Institute was contracted to them to evaluate some aspects of the RMA and did a study for this office on “Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (2004).” This was a study of the combat effects of superior situational awareness based upon a detailed examination of 295 World War II division-level engagements. So at least Andy Marshall (nicknamed “Yoda”) had not dismissed the value of historical analysis and was willing to fund such work. Many of the other RMA theorist did not show such wisdom. Our report on situational awareness is available from The Dupuy Institute and is also summarized in two chapters in the book War by Numbers (2017).  

 

The Five TMCI Reports

The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) was founded in 1979 by Trevor N. Dupuy, Dr. Donald S. Marshall at University of California, Berkely, and General George S. Blanchard. These guys: Trevor N. Dupuy – Wikipedia and George S. Blanchard – Wikipedia.

The TMCI closed shop in 2020, in part due to its membership aging out: TMCI is officially closing this year – The Dupuy Institute

 

We have blogged about them before:

The Three TMCI Reports – The Dupuy Institute

Two other TMCI Reports – The Dupuy Institute

They did publish five reports. We have posted the links to four of the reports on this blog. The fifth one was just forwarded to me by someone who follows our blog. It is a 22-page paper called “The Classics of Military Thought: Appreciations and Agenda” by John E. Tashjean. It is here: Defense Analysis 1987-sep vol 3 iss 3 Tashjean John E – The classics of military thought_ Appreciations and agenda_ 1987 101080_07430178708405304 – libgenli

The TMCI is the inspiration behind the HAAC:  October’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute and HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

The Fourth HAAC is tentatively scheduled for 21-23 October 2025.

The Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024

Continuing with a weekly post from Geof Clark, an American currently residing in Japan:

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Title: Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024


Image credit @AfbR681dzgszG1a
https://twitter.com/AfbR681dzgszG1a/status/1858810386805649512/photo/4

Recently, I attended an airshow at the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF) air base in Gifu Prefecture. According to the JASDF, about 65,000 people attended. This included many interesting aircraft, including F-15Js & F-2s fighters, KC-767 tanker, C-1 & C-2 cargo aircraft, and a USMC F/A-18C from the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, among others. It was very impressive, however, the majority of these aircraft are decades old, and while they have been modified and improved over the years, the fundamental capabilities are unchanged. The JASDF and Japanese Maritime SDF (JMSDF) have both invested in F-35A and F-35B stealth aircraft in more recent years, but these were not on display in Gifu.

Perhaps the most modern kit on display was probably the XASM-3. This is a standoff anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) which allows the F-2 aircraft to launch a maritime strike on enemy vessels from outside of their air defense envelope.

“Japan started full-scale development of a missile called XASM-3 in FY2010 that can be operated by (JASDF) F-2 fighter jets. The XASM-3 was an air-launched anti-ship missile (ASM) that cruised at supersonic speeds (above Mach 3) thanks an Integral Rocket Ramjet engine. It had a range of about 200 km (108 nautical miles).”


Four J-20s banks left of the show center. (Image credit: Rin Sakurai)

In contrast, the annual Chinese airshow at Zhuhai this year was very impressive. According to CCTV (the state-operated military news outlet), 600,000 people attended, and new contracts worth 280 billion yuan (about $38.6 billion) were signed. On display a number of impressive new aircraft and capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), from Russia, and available for possible export. The Aviationist has a good list of capabilities revealed. The following list & commentary is by no means exhaustive, but it gives an idea of these capabilities:

• PLA Air Force (PLAAF) – The Shenyang FC-31 prototype has been accepted by the PLAAF and commissioned as the J-35A stealth fighter. A smaller and probably less expensive stealth fighter to complement the J-20A, which is already in service. Is this part of a “high/low mix” with Chinese characteristics? Some claim that some smoke plumes seen illustrate the ongoing challenges China faces trying to match Western & Russian engine capability & quality.
• PLAAF – a J-20 “four ship” (four aircraft) put on a great flying demonstration, and a twin seat J-20S mock-up was on display. I saw one comment on X (twitter) claim that this was the first 5.5 generation fighter, as it is the first twin seat stealth fighter, which purports to better enable the concept of operations (CONOPS) of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). These are the fancy U.S. terms for the rear seat occupant managing flights of drones that accompany or are in close proximity (i.e. line of sight) to the J-20S aircraft. The USAF is progressing with plans for CCA, to be used with the F-22, F-35, possibly F-15EX and ultimately the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) “family of systems”. How much will a second person in the cockpit matter?
• Rosoboronexport (Russian state owned enterprise for arms exports) – an Su-57 (well, actually a T-50 prototype, thanks Millenium 7 …) gave an impressive flight display, complete with stunning acrobatics. The export statistics brochure data for both Su-57E and Su-75 Checkmate are linked here. There was also an announcement that the Su-57E has its first export contract, and speculation that Algeria is the most likely purchasing country, although others are possible … and indeed it might be the next in a long line of contracts that did not materialize …
• The Russian Knights put on an impressive display, returning to Zhuhai after an eight year absence. They flew in formation and solo demonstrations of Su-30SM and Su-35S. While this was certainly impressive, the Flanker family has had some challenges in Ukraine, and we will explore this in detail in a separate blog post soon.
• The PLAAF displayed their J-16D variant of the Flanker, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) displayed a similar J-15D, both of which are dedicated electronic warfare (EW) variants. Many military analysts comparing these to an EA-18G Growler, which might be apt for the J-15D, since both are carrier-borne, but the J-16D is a dedicated EW platform for the PLAAF, and the last time the U.S. Air Force (USAF) has such a platform was the EF-111A, which was retired in 1998.
• PLAN also displayed the J-15T naval variant, now equipped to be launched by catapult by the PLANS-18 (CV-003) Fujian aircraft carrier (CV), and probably future PLAN CVs, as well as being backward compatible with the existing ski-jump CVs. This will provide the capability to launch more rapidly with a much greater payload weight, possibly heralding a maritime strike fighter role, in addition to the air defense role. Other elements of the future air wing are expected to include a naval version of the J-35A mentioned above, and a fixed wing airborne early warning and control (what the U.S. calls AWACS) aircraft with the possible designation of KJ-600 As a side note, the Fujian has departed for sea trial number 5.
• A plethora of un-crewed platforms that were also on static display including …

o CH-7, a peer competitor to US-made RQ-180, “ready to meet navy’s demand for maritime missions”. With a “debut at the airshow in 2018, it was being designed to be a stealth armed reconnaissance UAV that can play a strategic role in combat, so it was bigger and able to conduct strike missions to eliminate a strategic target. However, six years on, the CH-7 project has experienced a change … to [an] advanced tactical drone that is able to conduct various missions due to the development of modern warfare and the changing demand of clients”, Cao Ran of Aerospace CH UAV told the Global Times at the airshow.
o CH-9, a larger sized armed reconnaissance drone
o CH-3D, a smaller, lower cost drone
o CH-YH-1000, a cargo drone
o SS-UAV, or “Smart configuration Support Un-crewed Aerial Vehicle”, is a large, modular drone which according to Jane’s Defense might “undertake multiple missions, including maritime strike, long-range cargo transport, and surveillance.” There was speculation that it might also act as a mothership for multiple “attritable” drones in a swarm.

There are other systems which play a big role in aerial warfare, including the HQ-19 and DF-1000, which we will blog about soon!

Thanks for reading and for your comments!

Ukraine’s nuclear weapons

My primary focus at the moment is writing books, currently wrapping up two and well into the next. A chapter in the new book on the Russo-Ukrainian War is called Defense Budgets and International Aid. It starts as follows:

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          The United States and other members of NATO started providing military and financial aid in small amounts to Ukraine from the moment in declared its independence. Private aid agencies also did, including George Soros’ Open Society Foundation. Ukraine actually declared its independence in August 1991, but the government of the Soviet Union was still officially ruling over all fifteen nations in the Soviet Union. That Soviet government collapsed on 25-26 December 1991, ending the almost 70 year existence of the Soviet Union. Ukraine was clearly a free and independent county at that point.

            Ukraine had considerable armed forces at that time, inheriting its share of the large Soviet Army and even inheriting a nuclear force of 176 ICBMs and 33 heavy bombers with a total of 1,734 nuclear warheads. It was the third largest nuclear power in the world. The break-up of the Soviet Union had left behind four nuclear armed states: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. It became the policy of the west disarm these three new nuclear armed states (but not Russia) and it was in the interest of Russian to also do so. As a result, in 1994 Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and on 5 December 1994 Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. It was also signed by the two major nuclear powers, the United States and Russia and also the nuclear power United Kingdom. The other two nuclear powers, China and France. provided weaker individual assurances in separate documents. The end result was that between 1993 and 1996, the three former Soviet states gave up their nuclear weapons, mostly passing them back over to Russia.

            The signatories to the Budapest Memorandum also agreed that (to quote directly from the treaty, the bolding is ours):

  1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
  2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, and the United Sates of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
  3. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the Principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

There were three other related points 4) addressing enforcement through the security council, 5) a commitment not to use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state, and 6) that the signatories will consult if a situation arises. [1] The memorandum was signed by Leonid D. Kuchman (Ukraine), Boris N. Yeltsin (Russia), John Major (UK) and William J. Clinton (U.S.). Needless to say, from 2014-2024, Russia has not adhered to these first three points.

 

[1] The text of memorandum is here: volume-3007-I-52241.pdf (un.org)

 

Ukraine to develop nukes ?

Ukraine once had nukes. It gave them up in the 1990s in exchange for an agreement with the U.S., Russia and UK securing their borders and sovereignty. That did not work out so well (will probably do a post on this later).

Now, Zelenskyy has recently talked about Ukraine developing a nuclear weapon. It was supposedly first addressed in his meeting with Donald Trump on 27 September. It was also addressed in at a European Council summit in Brussels on 17 October.

See:

Ukraine capable of developing nuclear weapons within few months

Zelenskyy: We need NATO or nukes … and we want NATO – POLITICO

Ukraine Issues Nuclear Ultimatum to NATO – Newsweek

Later discussion:

Is Ukraine ‘months away’ from building a nuclear bomb? – Firstpost

Under what conditions Ukraine could raise its nuclear status and attempt to defend itself? — Popovych

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry denies that Ukraine plans to make nuclear weapons

Could Zelensky use nuclear bombs? Ukraine’s options explained

May post more on this later.

Modern Air Combat Data

We are going to hand the forum over to Geoffrey Clark for one day a week. Mr. Clark has posted here before and presented at the last two HAACs. He will end up doing a series of posts each Wednesday on Modern Air Combat Data. This is his introductory post:

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Air Combat Data, modern Air Warfare, Ukraine and AI

Many are following the war in Ukraine, with intense detail. I have attempted to gather meaningful statistics for a cliometrical analysis, to add some analytical rigor to the debates about the relative effectiveness of the new F-16 aircraft recently deployed by the Ukrainian Air Force. I’ve been looking at the sources available for this type of analysis, for example the Wikipedia page, or the Statista comparison page, and I have been sorely disappointed in what is currently available.  There is a wealth of information available about what was lost, including serial numbers, etc., but the process by which it was lost, or the why, is so far simply not available. This type of information is typically not shared at all for years or decades after a conflict, as it might compromise the effectiveness of the related Air Forces in a future conflict. This is why there remains ongoing analysis of the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, as new information emerges, and allows for the better correlation and cross-checking of Claims and Losses.

I’m following in the footsteps of John Stillion, referencing his famous RAND “clubbing baby seals” brief on the F-35, as well as his more accessible work at CBSA, Trends in Air-to-Air Combat (2015). I’ve been gathering the detailed claims and losses data for air combat in the jet age. Sometimes, this data is made openly available by the participating Air Forces and Air Defense Forces, but often comes from some less than official sources, like hobbyist websites, or even ejection seat manufacturer websites. Nonetheless, with proper scrutiny and comparison across sources, it can produce some important insights into the air combat process, and thereby give some predictive power for future conflict in the air.

It is also important to get the first-hand narratives by the pilots, airmen and soldiers involved in the conflict. I believe this is exceedingly important to understand the context of the combat situation and what was known at the time that decisions were made, and how this led to the outcomes. The idea that AI based on LLMs with a lot of data (from the internet? From a bunch of air combat games or simulations?) can produce a fighter pilot like capability to make decisions in the heat of battle … is fraught at best. A clean, curated, reliable, accurate dataset is needed now more than ever. I’ve recently watched a presentation by Admiral Grace Hopper from 1982, excellent foresight into data processing and information flows! In order to train future AI agents effectively, the relative value of actual combat data from real war must be prioritized much more than data from exercises, and especially above simulation data, and “internet” data, whatever that is.

Therefore, I’ll start a series of blog posts to explore this topic, as I progress through the analysis of data available on various conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries. I’ll develop some primitive AI agents for air combat and simulate air combat based upon this solid data foundation. I’ll also postulate various what-ifs and wargame scenarios, both in the air domain, and multi-domain combat scenarios.

I’m pleased this year to be able to attend in person the HAAC 2024 conference to present these ideas and get some insight and support from the other attendees. 

Thanks for reading, and for your comments!