

# Transformation or Troop Strength? Early Accounts of the Invasion of Iraq

By W. Shane Story

Rick Atkinson, *In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat*. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 319 pp., cloth, 2004, \$25; paper, 2005, \$14.

Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Washington: CSIS Press, 2003, 572 pp., \$25.

Michael DeLong with Noah Lukeman, *Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq*. Washington, D.C.: Regency Publishing, 2004, 222 pp., \$24.95.

Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier*. New York: Regan Books, 590 pp., cloth, 2004, \$27.95; paper, 2005, \$16.95.

Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scates, Jr., *The Iraq War: A Military History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 312 pp., cloth, 2003, \$25.95; paper, 2005, \$16.95.

Jeffrey Record, *Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004, 203 pp., \$24.95.

Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, 467 pp., cloth \$28, paper \$14.

The most contentious military debate surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq centered on the size of the forces required for the operation. The debate turned on the effects of changes in the U.S. armed forces, ranging from the fielding of new technologies to the reorganization of tactical units and higher headquarters. In planning for Iraq, traditional advocates of robust land power stressed that these changes enhanced the nation's military superiority but did not alter the nature of war or the importance of ground troop strength. On the other side, "transformationalists" argued that advanced technologies had made small forces operating jointly with air power both decisive and efficient. This debate went public before the invasion of Iraq as traditionalists and transformationalists diverged sharply on the size of the force that should be employed.<sup>1</sup> Privately, Secretary of State Colin Powell encouraged Army General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command, to insist on using overwhelming force. Franks dismissed Powell's concerns, explaining to the National Security Council that "we are moving into a new strategic and operational paradigm" that justified a small invasion force.<sup>2</sup> Although problems during the invasion brought the debate back into the headlines, with critics assailing the Pentagon for invading with too few troops, Baghdad's swift fall appeared to vindicate the small-force strategy.<sup>3</sup>



*Satan's Sandbox* (above) and *Street Fight*, both by Sté. Elzic Golden



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


*Soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division prepare for an enemy counterattack in southern Iraq, 24 March 2003.*

peared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hailed the way victory was won in Iraq as a triumph of transformation.<sup>4</sup> Some analysts accepted Rumsfeld's thesis and gushed about the Pentagon's new small-force, high-tech strategy and its ability to produce fast, decisive results.<sup>5</sup> Rumsfeld's arguments likewise shaped one of the first books on the war, *The Iraq War: A Military History*, by emeritus Ohio State University history professor Williamson Murray and retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scates Jr. Murray and Scates describe a conflict that began with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The dictator survived his 1991 defeat because of American "mistakes," which the United States rectified in the brilliant campaign of spring 2003. Murray and Scates offered the public its first overview of the ground war in southern Iraq, the air war, the British campaign, and the capture of Baghdad. Finishing the book quickly, however, precluded significant research, and the content and depth of the final product resembled that of a two-hour CNN special. In lieu of an original thesis, Murray and Scates re-

peated the Pentagon's emphasis on information technology, special operations capabilities, and enhanced training. According to the authors, the campaign foreshadowed a future of "smaller, leaner, brigade-sized units that can deploy more quickly and fight independently." (p. 243) Murray and Scates wrote late enough in 2003 to acknowledge that Iraq was not yet stable, but this did not raise questions for them about the campaign's transformational success. Nothing that they had not undertaken an academic effort, Scates and Murray dispense with documentation and offer sparse information about the enemy. Written in the afterglow of victory, *The Iraq War* little appreciates the invasion's greatest problems, however, including fractured mobilization and deployment process, logistics stretched beyond the breaking point, and the lack of a post-hostilities strategy.

National security analyst Anthony Cordesman's *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*, an extensive study covering 572 pages, appeared almost simultaneously with Murray's and Scates's work. Cordesman seems to have relied heavily on the armed services' initial reports of lessons



*Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division use High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles with mounted machine guns to guard an intersection in Mosul, Iraq, August 2003.*

As occupation problems and a burgeoning insurgency increasingly undermined the transformation thesis in 2004, Rick Atkinson's *In the Company of Soldiers* offered a fresh perspective on the ground campaign in southern Iraq. Atkinson's division-level view stresses the non-transformational effects of a micromanaged deployment process. A Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and historian, Atkinson accompanied Maj. Gen. David Petraeus's 101st Airborne Division command post for six weeks beginning in late February 2003. Petraeus's war was an act of

*Capt. Paul Stanton, left, accompanies General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army chief of staff, and General Petraeus on foot patrol in Mosul, Iraq, August 2003.*



Using its helicopters and rationing its trucks, the 101st provided rear security along V Corps's vulnerable lines of communication, seeing action in a number of cities before Baghdad fell. With the collapse of the regime, the 101st occupied part of northern Iraq. Believing the first thirty days of the occupation would be crucial, a brief honeymoon in which to win the peace, Petraeus had the 101st launch an ambitious stabilization campaign.

Atkinson's book ends with the beginning of the occupation. While recognizing faults in the soldiers and leaders he encountered, Atkinson also admires them as both humane and fierce. Petraeus stands out as a commander and an intellect, both driven and thoughtfully cautious. On the other hand, Atkinson has no sympathy for the strategic planning or the conceptions of warfare that shaped the invasion, and the rhetoric of transformation finds little reflection on the battlefield he describes. Even the fall of Baghdad fails to impress Atkinson. An old Arab told him the city had been conquered thirty-one times. "Now," Atkinson dryly adds, "the count was thirty-two." (p. 278)

Atkinson's sober account accompanied growing concerns about American operations in Iraq, worries that two recently retired generals try to allay with insiders' versions of the campaign. Rejecting criticism of the invasion in his memoir *American Soldier*, General Franks claims that the invasion was both brilliant and transformational, but he sidesteps critical issues. Instead, he uses some 200 pages to describe what he learned while growing up not-quite-poor in west Texas, enjoying a bacchanalian freshmen year at the University of Texas at Austin, flunking out and enlisting in the Army, attending officer candidate school, serving in Vietnam, and rising steadily through the ranks. Franks took over Central Command in 2000. Regarding Iraq, Franks was unhappy about the United States' failure to safeguard the pilots enforcing U.S. containment policy from the risks posed by Iraqi missiles. He determined





Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division mingle with Iraqis while on patrol in Mosul, 24 April 2003.

that the United States "needed a new policy" on Iraq but believed that more time and study were needed to determine options for either squeezing Saddam harder or backing off. (p. 200)

Rather than a new policy, what came next was 9/11, operations in Afghanistan, and renewed planning for operations in Iraq. Franks dismissed the existing Iraq plan, which detailed all the "requirements for a major operation," as too conservative, unimaginative, and unsuited to the strategic situation. (p. 331) The plan was too big because it used 500,000 troops and too slow because it required six months for deployment. Moreover, the plan did not account for technological advances and the lessons of Afghanistan. Franks's rejection of the Iraq plan he had inherited initiated the force requirements debate on Iraq in 2002, pitting minimalists, who wanted to invade quickly with only 50,000 troops, against traditionalists who insisted that only an overwhelming force of hundreds of thousands of troops could mitigate the risks of the operation. A compromise "Hybrid Plan" gradually emerged. A small force, conceivably a reinforced division, would launch a surprise attack to seize immediate objectives, while follow-on forces would deploy to complete the mission.

(pp. 475-77) Information operations—a euphemism for propaganda—fascinated Franks, but he did not recognize their limits. He claims to have slyly deceived Saddam Hussein with a ruse about a northern attack, and he cites personal warnings from Jordan's king and Egypt's president as proof that Iraq had chemical weapons. (pp. 418-19) Unwavering self-confidence likely made Franks a better commander in many ways, but it left him oblivious to the dangers of Iraq's weapons programs was sparse, the dictator's back-channel warnings of chemical warfare—apparently an attempt to deter an attack—only emboldened Franks to invade because they "proved" Iraq had such weapons. Franks claims credit for successes but denies responsibility for post-invasion chaos. He expressed little concern over reports of disorder in Basra after being assured that "it looks like looting, but it's actually revenge." (p. 520)

Franks's most important contribution to the transformation debate is the considerable attention he gives to other factors that shaped the campaign. He shows that the campaign plan did not result from some automatic war making process, but rather from the difficult interactions of complex bureaucracies, marked by personal rivalries and strained relationships. Franks lauds the secretary of defense and himself but subjects other officials outside his control to unwavering, unsubstantiated criticism. For Franks, the most significant contribution of General Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was keeping a lid on the service chiefs while Rumsfeld and Franks carried on the business of war. Franks repeatedly belittles the service chiefs, describing them as "inflexible bean counters" and "Chihuahuas," and he reports exonerating them to Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. (pp. 207, 275-78, 301, 383, 440) The *coup de grâce* came in a memo lacking "sufficient joint background or understanding to be operationally useful." (p. 441) In marginalizing and then



General Franks

silencing the chiefs, however, Franks also made the Pentagon's support planning and execution more difficult.

After Baghdad fell, Iraq's problems dwarfed Franks's expectations. Having fought two campaigns in three years and extended his command tour once, Franks had seen enough of military challenges and decided to retire rather than accept Rumsfeld's offer to serve as chief of staff of the Army. Franks, therefore, suddenly became a lame duck in the crucial early days of the occupation. He seems to have been a cipher on the all-important decisions surrounding de-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi Army, quietly leaving these matters to others much as he had earlier acquiesced on the deployment process. He did conclude that the key to security and civil reconstruction in Iraq was to get "an international bureaucracy moving—quickly." (p. 526) But he apparently did little to arrange for that or to push for any preferred course for the occupation. In *American Soldier* Franks prefers to blame others for failing to make decisions that he shrank from advocating, such as fence-mending through the United Nations to build a

bigger coalition, committing unlimited American troops and treasure to Iraqi security, or limiting the American commitment by rejecting such policies as de-Baathification, which primarily excluded Sunnis and thus fed insurgent resistance. Avoiding such choices brought the worst outcome in all three spheres: a limited coalition, a shortage of American resources to secure Iraq, and a sizable, armed, and angry group of Sunnis who were convinced the Americans had stolen the Sunnis' birthright. Regarding the occupation, Franks only regrets mistakes he attributes entirely to others—the ill-defined, all-purpose scapegoat known as the international community, the U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the George W. Bush administration, the Clinton administration, Congress, Rumsfeld, Powell, and not least, the much maligned service chiefs. (pp. 544-45) While he managed to grasp the laurels before they withered, Franks passed up an opportunity to place the occupation on a more secure foundation.

In *Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth about the War in Afghanistan and Iraq*, retired Marine Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong confirms Franks's deeply held

animosity toward the service chiefs. As Franks's deputy, DeLong tracked events from the attacks of 9/11 to the fall of Baghdad, and he reports that Franks's difficult, alienating, and distrustful attitudes shaped an adversarial relationship with the Pentagon. (pp. 8, 27-28, 86) Conflicts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to a head over the new Iraq war plan, and Central Command, with Rumsfeld's support, shot down all objections to the plan from the service chiefs. (pp. 86, 102) In DeLong's account, Central Command's strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq were brilliant and "both campaigns were an unqualified success." (p. 136) Others were responsible for those things that went wrong, beginning with the Iraqis themselves. Saddam bore the first responsibility for post-invasion disorder because he freed criminals just before the war. Iraq's soldiers and police fostered chaos by abandoning their posts, and Iraqi civilians destroyed their country with rampant looting. Unnamed American officials made things worse when they disbanded the Iraqi Army without naming a provisional government. (pp. 117-18) Written in haste, DeLong's account contains numerous factual errors, such

General DeLong



Department of Defense




as daing the 1988 chemical attacks on the Kurds as 1995, citing the alleged concrete bunker at Dora Farms that was never found, and referring to Third Army when the author means the 3d Infantry Division.

Journalist Bob Woodward's *Plan of Attack*, published in the spring of 2004, deals in greater depth with the institutional bureaucracies behind the war. Woodward's focus is not on the efficacy of force ratios but on the individuals, relationships, politics, and diplomacy that shaped the planning. Rumsfeld's personality and reputation.

According to Woodward, Rumsfeld returned to the Pentagon in 2001 with thoughtful use-of-force guidelines that would weigh necessity, purpose, cost, political viability, and diplomatic options before committing American troops to combat. At the same time, Rumsfeld was deeply suspicious of the Pentagon and its ways, believing that civilian and military bureaucrats had stultified innovation in the Department of Defense and left it mentally stuck in the Cold War. The secretary addressed the problem with a reform agenda that he christened "transformation." These lofty efforts, however sometimes founded on Rumsfeld's personality, which former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft described as "secretive" and "difficult if not impossible to read." (p. 19) Rumsfeld led by raising doubts, a technique Secretary of State Powell found maddening, believing his defense counterpart prone to hypercritical and noncommittal questioning and mute when circumstances called for making recommendations or taking responsibility. (p.183)

Hell-bent on reforming the military, Rumsfeld combined an opaque style of leadership with an abrasive skepticism toward the uniformed brass and the Pentagon, which he found was "more broken than he had anticipated." (p. 19) Briefed on the military's war plans, he judged them an egregious example of everything that was wrong with the Department of Defense.



Secretary Rumsfeld outlines his defense plans at a Pentagon briefing, May 2001.

The gist of the plans "was to move a vast portion of the American military machine, and in some cases a portion of the U.S. transportation infrastructure and logistics capability" to troubled regions, whereupon the Army expected to fight big battles. (p. 33) Appalled, he berated long-serving officers, spoke of his predecessor's job performance "with disdain," and thought the institution had caused "fine, talented people" to waste their efforts through wrong-headed thinking. (pp.33,35) Rumsfeld wanted quick-strike contingency plans that would eliminate threats before they matured. Before solutions emerged, the 9/11 terrorist attacks signaled a national crisis, and Pentagon planning and execution accelerated into reaction and crisis management. Initially daunted at the need to rout Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, planners first efforts called for a massive deployment and a slow, difficult conquest of the country. Rumsfeld was furious; military planners were proposing precisely the kind of ponderous operation he had been tearing apart for months. Discarding

planners' recommendations, Rumsfeld had Franks link together Special Forces and Central Intelligence Agency teams. These joined teams used air power, precision weapons, cash, and indigenous forces to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Triumphant there, Rumsfeld thought he had found the formula that would vindicate and sustain transformation, and Franks became Rumsfeld's point man for the new strategy. (pp.5-6, 37, 41)

Rumsfeld and Franks tossed out the existing plan for Iraq and spent a year negotiating the size and shape of an invasion force. Franks finished his new plan in November 2002 and submitted it to Rumsfeld with an accompanying schedule, asking him to begin mobilizing and deploying some 300,000 troops. Rumsfeld thought the plan called for too many troops. Worse, by virtually committing the armed forces to an invasion of Iraq—and signaling invasion to the entire world—the plan deprived the administration of the flexibility it needed to pursue diplomacy. Rejecting Franks's schedule, Rumsfeld instead

started dribbling out incremental and uncoordinated deployment orders. Lacking clear guidance, the services could not coordinate mobilizations and deployments, and confusion spread. Everything depended on Rumsfeld's day-to-day schedule and priorities. As Rumsfeld later explained to Woodward, some of the deployment decision-making "was criticized. The fact that it took the deployment process and disaggregated it to support diplomacy was never understood out there, and I didn't want to say that's what we were doing so we sat here and took the hit." (p. 234)

There were, in fact, numerous factors over which Rumsfeld had little control. These included diplomacy, oversight and access rights within the region, coalition building, and domestic political concerns, all of which complicated the decisions on deployment scheduling. President George W. Bush and his administration faced a delicate task of balancing military preparations and diplomatic pressure. These measures were mutually reinforcing, but any misstep risked undermining the effort to remove Saddam. Further, the leaders of America's partners in the war on terrorism and Iraq's neighbors had their own concerns and their own domestic constituencies to pacify, causing them to develop independent roles for their nations. These complexities forestalled the timely decision-making on which military efficiency depended. However, Rumsfeld exacerbated the problems, as his elusive style and refusal to explain to the military "what we were doing" left the Army leadership, at least, perplexed on the eve of war. Indeed, just days before the president's 17 March ultimatum, the press carried stories that Rumsfeld nearly fired Army Secretary Thomas White for failing to rebuke the Army chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, over the general's estimates that occupying Iraq would require "hundreds of thousands" of troops. By Rumsfeld's own account, the defense secretary handled criticism stoically, but he also did not seem to appreciate the confusion and consequences of

improptu deployments. As a result, the invasion of Iraq was not based on any model of transformation. Instead, it was a series of ill-coordinated acts of improvisation that led—through skill, hard labor, soldiers' sacrifices, and some luck—to the toppling of the Iraqi regime. Woodward demonstrates the many complexities of the war that loom much larger than transformation.

"Transformation" stood for a new-style military that exploited the latest technological advances to reduce the fog and friction of war; it came to imply great results, quickly achieved, with controlled risks. Baghdad's fall reinvigorated Rumsfeld's vision, but the insurgency provoked a backlash against the invasion's architects. Critics blasted the Pentagon for not sending enough troops and for failing to prepare for post-hostility operations. Jeffrey Record argues the case against the administration in *Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq*, concluding that the invasion "was not only unnecessary but also damaging to long-term U.S. political interests in the world." (pp. xiv,



Secretary Rumsfeld speaks with General Franks from his Pentagon office.

142) He directs his unrelenting criticism against both Bush administrations. The first "erred egregiously" in 1991 when it announced a unilateral cease-fire; since Saddam had not been forced to ask for terms, he was able to avoid admitting defeat. (p. 7) Record describes the development in the 1990s of a neoconservative agenda dedicated to "an ambitious, forward-leaning foreign policy reliant on force to rid the world of tyranny and promote the spread of democracy." (p. 18) President George W. Bush entered office as a moderate realist, but the attacks of 11 September 2001 converted him to the neoconservative viewpoint (pp. 26-27) and by early March 2003 "he linked the case for war with Iraq to the 9/11 attacks." (p. 53) Although U.S. security interests were at stake in the region and regional change was needed, the costs and risks of the invasion of Iraq rendered the operation a dubious enterprise at best. (pp. 64-77) The coalition's military campaign was not remarkable; its success "was never in doubt," and Iraq's military was "doomed to defeat."

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8. Jeffrey Record, "Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War," *Panorama* 32 (Summer 2002): 4-23.  
 9. *Ibid.*, p. 5.  
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 14.  
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 7.  
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 20.  
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 18.  
 14. United States Department of Defense, "News Transcript: Secretary Rumsfeld Town Hall Meeting in Qatar," 28 April 2003, posted at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030428-sodaf0113.html>; Statement of Secretary Rumsfeld, 9 Jul 2003, p. 1.

the "Troops," *Washington Post*, 29 April 2003, p. A11.  
 4. Statement of Secretary of Defense Donald R. Rumsfeld, 9 Jul 2003, pp. 1-2, posted at <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statement/2003/JulyRumsfeld.pdf>.  
 5. Peter J. Boyer, "The New War Machine: A Reporter at Large," *New Yorker* 79 (30 June 2003): 55; Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (July/August 2003): 41-42.  
 6. Jeffrey Record, *Hollow Victory: A Century View of the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C., 1993).  
 7. Jeffrey Record, "Exit Strategy: Delusions," *Panorama* 31 (Winter 2001/2002): 21.  
 8. Rumsfeld Assaults War Critics and Praises

1. Thomas E. Ricks, "Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed," *Washington Post*, 1 Aug. 2002, p. A1; Bernard E. Trainor, "An Attack Strategy to Win," *Washington Post*, 18 Sep. 2002, p. A29.  
 2. Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York, 2004), pp. 394-95, quote, p. 395.  
 3. Richard T. Cooper and Paul Richter, "Former Commanders Question U.S. Strategy," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 March 2003, p. A10; Vernon Lohb, "Rumsfeld Faulted for Troop Dilution," *Washington Post*, 30 Mar. 2003, p. A19; Vernon Lohb, "Rumsfeld Assaults War Critics and Praises

of the invasion were sufficiently awkward to undercut exaggerated claims that Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a transformational campaign. However, placing two mechanized divisions in the enemy capital in twenty days time was no mean feat, and the tools of transformation, including advances in communications and information technology, air power developments, and joint interoperability made that possible. The interpretive problem appears to have originated in Rumsfeld's overselling early success in Iraq as transformational.<sup>14</sup> Murray and Scoble's cursory effort and Franks's and DeLong's self-congratulatory versions of the war take up Rumsfeld's theme. In their uncritical heralding of transformation as efficient and decisive, these works offer the least insight into the campaign. Record's criticism derives so much from frustration with the insurgency that it is more partisan than analytical, a problem made worse by his inconsistency. Cordesman's rationale for transformation as well as the policy dilemmas that defied military solution. The Emperor, transformation, was not naked, but his fine clothes were not appropriate for every occasion, and they left unanswered the problem of what to do after the parade.

without significant risk.<sup>10</sup> On Iraq, the failure to remove Saddam in 1991 "laid the groundwork for a potentially terrifying day of reckoning with the dangerous dictator."<sup>11</sup> At the very time that military planners and policy-makers were debating how many troops would be needed in Iraq, Record undercut land-power advocates by denying there was any need for the United States "to assume complete political and economic responsibility for failed states in the wake of American military intervention."<sup>12</sup> His conclusion again trumpeted transformation: "Air power plus small supporting ground forces plus local surrogates" could coerce or overthrow regimes. He takes the opposite view in *Dark Victory*, however, blasting the Pentagon for its obsession with "the technologies of aerial precision strike." (p. 154) Record's 2002 caveat that considerable ground forces would be required to conquer, occupy, or administer territory did little to discourage transformationalists, who tended to minimize the difficulties those responsibilities involved.<sup>13</sup>

The Record canon damns problems and extolls successes but collectively offers no insight for mitigating the former or enhancing the latter. *Dark Victory's* analysis derives more from frustration over Iraq and the rhetoric of transformation than from any substantive insight regarding strategic policy or military operations, and this frustration is what produces his myopia. In light of Record's abrupt reversals, planners and policy-makers would be well advised to be skeptical about his latest critique.

Controversies surrounding the importance of transformation and troop strength will continue, if only for purposes of budgetary wrangling. As Record recognizes, the debate was always "an extension of the prewar argument within the Pentagon over the future size and structure of U.S. armed forces." (p. 104) For historians and military analysts studying the war in Iraq, the debate oversimplifies difficult issues and can obscure our understanding of the origin, course, and outcome of the invasion. Woodward's and Atkinson's books are particularly valuable because they demonstrate that the planning, preparation, and execution

## NEWS NOTES

### Call for Papers: July 2006 Conference of Army Historians

The Center of Military History is soliciting papers for the 2006 biennial Conference of Army Historians, which will be held on 25-27 July 2006 in the Washington, D.C., area. The theme of the conference will be "Terrorists, Partisans, and Guerrillas: The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775-2005." Papers may address any aspect of the U.S. Army's role in irregular warfare. Conference organizers will especially welcome papers that focus on structuring the Army to fight irregular conflicts, the development of doctrine and training necessary to engage in these types of operations, and the American experience in Vietnam. Presenters should be prepared to speak for twenty minutes. An individual interested in presenting a paper should send a proposed topic, a one-page prospectus on the paper, and some information about his or her background to Dr. Stephen Carney, either by email to [2006CAH@history.army.mil](mailto:2006CAH@history.army.mil) or by mail to U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FPF (Dr. Carney), 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058. Further information may be obtained by calling Dr. Carney at 202-685-2728.

### Army Medical History Office Issues Book on Medical Response to 2001 Pentagon Attack

The Office of Medical History, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, has published a 164-page, illustrated compilation of excerpts of interviews relating to the medical response to the attack made on the Pentagon by a hijacked commercial airliner on 11 September 2001. Edited by Sanders Marble and Ellen Mihliser, the book is entitled *Soldiers to the Rescue: The Medical Response to the Pentagon Attack*. It includes accounts of forty-two individuals, primarily uninformed medical personnel, who provided assistance at the Pentagon, along with interview-based summaries of the responses to the attack of nearby Army medical facilities and top Army medical commands. The text of the book and thirteen of its illustrations are posted at <http://history.army.mil/menware/soldiers/> frontpage.htm. Requests for copies of the printed book, which includes two additional illustrations, may be sent by email to [John.Greenwood@sg.amedd.army.mil](mailto:John.Greenwood@sg.amedd.army.mil) or by mail to the Office of Medical History, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, ATTN: DAG-MH (Room 401B), 5111 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, Virginia 22041-3258. Supplies of the printed edition are limited.

### Army Museums Open New Exhibits

The U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Museum at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, opened an exhibit in February 2005 on the 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion, a World War II airborne unit with African American enlisted personnel. The 1st Armored Division Museum in Baumholder, Germany, opened in April 2005 a new exhibit on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, as did the 1st Infantry Division in Würzburg, Germany, in July 2005. The U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia, opened in November 2005 an exhibit on the evolution of Army footwear. "From Shoe Leather to Gore-Tex™," the exhibit traces Army combat boots from the Civil War to the Iraq War.

### The Author

Maj. W. Shane Story has been assigned to the Histories Division of the Center of Military History since November 2003. He was an instructor in the History Department at the U.S. Military Academy in 1996-98 and holds a doctorate in history from Rice University. He served in 2002 as the historian of the U.S. element of the multinational Kosovo Force and in April through November 2003 as a member of the Military History Group of the Combined Forces Land Component Command in Kuwait.