The report was posted 6 March, even though it is dated 28 February. Always worth reading.
“In 2018, the United Nations recorded 22,478 security-related incidents, a 5 per cent reduction as compared with the historically high 23,744 security-related incidents recorded in 2017.”
“The Mission documented 10,993 civilian casualties (3,804 people killed and 7.189 injured between 1 January and 31 December 2018, the highest number of civilian deaths records in a single year since UNAMA began systematic documentation in 2009, and an overall increase of 5 per cent compared with 2017.”
“UNAMA attributed 63 percent of all civilian casualties to anti-government elements (37 per cent to the Taliban, 20 per cent to ISIL-KP and 6 per cent to unidentified anti-government elements, including self-proclaimed ISIL-KP), 24 per cent to pro-government forces (14 per cent to Afghan national defense and security forces, 6 per cent to international military forces, 2 per cent to pro-government militias, and 2 per cent to undermined or multiple pro-government forces), 10 per cent to unattributed crossfire during ground engagements between anti-government elements and pro-government forces and 3 per cent to other incidents, including explosive remnants of war and cross-border shelling.”
“Between 1 November and 10 January 49,001 people were newly displaced by the conflict, brining the total number of displaced in 2018 to 364,883 people.”
Security Incidences Civilian
Year Incidences Per Month Deaths
2008 8,893 741
2009 11,524 960
2010 19,403 1,617
2011 22,903 1,909
2012 18,441? 1,537? *
2013 20,093 1,674 2,959
2014 22,051 1,838 3,699
2015 22,634 1,886 3,545
2016 23,712 1,976 3,498
2017 23,744 1,979 3,438
2018 22,478 1,873 3,804
As I noted in my last post: “This war does appear to be flat-lined, with no end in sight.” I choose not to comment at the moment on the on-going peace negotiations.
Today’s edition of TDI Friday Read is a roundup of posts by TDI President Christopher Lawrence exploring the details of tank combat between German and Soviet forces at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. The prevailing historical interpretation of Kursk is of the Soviets using their material and manpower superiority to blunt and then overwhelm the German offensive. This view is often buttressed by looking at the ratio of the numbers of tanks destroyed in combat. Chris takes a deeper look at the data, the differences in the ways “destroyed” tanks were counted and reported, and the differing philosophies between the German and Soviet armies regarding damaged tank recovery and repair. This yields a much more nuanced perspective on the character of tank combat at Kursk that does not necessarily align with the prevailing historical interpretations. Historians often discount detailed observational data on combat as irrelevant or too difficult to collect and interpret. We at TDI believe that with history, the devil is always in the details.
Continental U.S. Air Defense Identifications Zones [MIT Lincoln Laboratory]
My last post detailed how the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 prompted the U.S. to undertake emergency efforts to bolster its continental air defenses, including the concept of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This post will trace the development of this network and its gradual integration with those of Japan and NATO.
The permanent network depended on each radar site to perform GCI [Ground Control & Intercept] functions or pass information to a nearby GCI center. For example, information gathered by North Truro Air Force Station on Cape Cod was transmitted via three dedicated land lines to the GCI center at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, and then on to the ADC Headquarters at Ent AFB, Colorado. The facility at Otis AFB was a regional information clearinghouse that integrated the data from North Truro and other regional radar stations, Navy picket ships, and the all-volunteer GOC [Ground Observer Corps]. The clearinghouse operation was labor intensive. The data had to be manually copied onto Plexiglas plotting boards. The ground controllers used this data to direct defensive fighters to their targets. It was a slow and cumbersome process, fraught with difficulties. Engagement information was passed on to command headquarters by telephone and teletype. At Ent AFB, the information received from the regional clearinghouses was then passed on to enlisted airmen standing on scaffolds behind the world’s largest Plexiglas board. Using grease pencils, these airmen etched the progress of enemy bombers onto the back of the Plexiglas board so that air defense commanders could evaluate and respond. This arrangement impeded rapid response to the air battle.
It is hard to imagine an air defense challenge of the magnitude that potentially faced the U.S. and USSR by 1955. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber fleet peaked at over 2,500 in 1955-1965, with 2,000 B-47s (range of 2,013 statute miles) and 750 B-52s (range of 4,480 statute miles). The range of U.S. bombers was extended considerably by the ~800 KC-135 aerial re-fueling tanker aircraft fleet as well.
In spite of the much publicized “bomber gap,” taking Soviet production numbers (and liberally adding aircraft of shorter range or unavailable until 1962…) produces an approximate estimate for a Soviet bombing fleet:
M-4 “Bison” (range of 3480 statute miles) = 93
Tu-16 “Badger” (range of 3888 statute miles) = 1507
Tu-22 “Blinder” (range of 3000 statute miles) = 250-300
Tu-95 “Bear” (range of 9400 statute miles) = 300+
That gave the U.S. an advantage in bombers of 2,750 to ~2,200 over the Soviets. Now, imagine this air battle being conducted with manual tracking on plexiglass with grease pencils…untenable!
Air Defense and Modern Computing
However, the problem proved amenable to solutions provided by the pending computer revolution.
At the Lincoln Laboratory development continued on an automated command and control system centered around the 250-ton Whirlwind II (AN/FSQ-7) computer. Containing some 49,000 vacuum tubes, the Whirlwind II became a central component of the SAGE system. SAGE, a system of analog computer-equipped direction centers, processed information from ground radars, picket ships, early-warning aircraft, and ground observers onto a generated radarscope to create a composite picture of the emerging air battle. Gone were the Plexiglas TM boards and teletype reports. Having an instantaneous view of the air picture over North America, defense commanders would be able to quickly evaluate the threats and effectively deploy interceptors and missiles to meet the threat.
By 1954, with several more radars in the northeast providing data, the Cambridge control center (a prototype SAGE center) gained experience in directing F-86D interceptors against B-47 bombers performing mock raids. Still much development, research, and testing lay ahead. Bringing together long-range radar, communications, microwave electronics, and digital computer technologies required the largest research and development effort since the Manhattan Project. During its first ten years, the government spent $8 billion to develop and deploy SAGE. By 1958, Lincoln Laboratory had a professional staff of 720 with an annual budget of $22.5 million, to conduct SAGE-related work. The contract with IBM to build sixty production models of the Whirlwind II at $30 million each provided about half of the corporation’s revenues for the 1950s and exposed the corporation to technologies that it would use in the 1960s to dominate the computer industry. In the meantime, scientists and electronic engineers in the defense industry strove to install better radars and make these radars invulnerable to electronic countermeasures (ECM), commonly called jamming.
The SAGE development effort became one of the foundations of modern computing, giving IBM the technological capability to dominate for several decades, until it outsourced two key components: hardware to Intel and software to a young Microsoft, both of which became behemoths of the internet age. It is also estimated that this effort brought a price tag which exceeded that of the Manhattan Project. SAGE also transformed the attitude of the USAF towards technology and computerization.
Current Air Defense Networks
In the 1950s and 60s, the U.S. continental air defense network gradually began to expand geographically and integrate with NADGE and JADGE air defense networks of its NATO allies and Japan.
NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE): This was approved by NATO in December 1955, and became operational in 1962 with 18 radar stations. This eventually grew to 84 stations and provided an inter-connected network from Norway to Turkey before being superseded by the NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS) in 1972. NATINADS was further upgraded in the 1980s to include data from the E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft (AEGIS (Airborne Early-warning/Ground Environment Integrated Segment); not to be confused with the USN system with the same acronym.)
Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE): This was the automated system, in the same fashion as SAGE, which replaced the manual system in place with the JASDF since 1960. The requirement was stated in July 1961, and was actually modeled on the Naval Tactical Information System (NTDS), developed by Hughes for the US Navy. This was ordered in December 1964, and operational in March 1969. This was superseded by Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) in July 2009.
We never seem to stop discussing validation at The Dupuy Institute even though it seems like most of the military operations research community only pays lip service to it. Still, it is something we encourage, even though it has only been very rarely done. A major part of our work over the years has been creation of historical databases for use in combat model validation, combat model testing, and combat model development. Over a series of posts, let me describe what databases are available.
First there are two big campaign databases. These are fairly well known. It is the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) and the Kursk Data Base (KDB). I was the program manager for both of them.
The ACSDB is a database tracking the actions of all divisions on both sides for every day of the Battle of the Bulge, from 16 December 1944 to 16 January 1945. That was 36 U.S. and British Divisions and 32 German Divisions and Brigades. It tracked the strength, equipment, losses, ammunition and oil for each of these units. The stats on the database are here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/data/ardennes.htm
The ACSDB was done from 1987 to 1990 at Trevor Dupuy’s old company, DMSI. There was around 16 or so people involved with it, including consultants like Hugh Cole and Charles MacDonald. We pulled up the units records for all the units on both sides from the U.S. Archives, UK Public Records Office, and the German achives in Freiburg. It was the largest historical database ever created (I do seem to be involved in creating some large things, like my Kursk book).
The database was programmed in Dbase III and is DOS based. The data base was delivered to CAA (Center for Army Analysis). It is publicly available through NTIS (National Technical Information Service). The pictures in this blog post are screen shots from the DBase III version. We do have our own corporate proprietary version re-programmed into Access and with some updates done by Richard Anderson (coauthor of Hitler’s Last Gamble).
Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the South China Sea [Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa)/Creative Commons/Wikipedia]
My previous posts have discussed the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) and the aircraft used to perform the Defensive Counter Air (DCA) mission. To accomplish this, the JASDF is supported by an extensive air defense system which closely mirrors U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Navy (USN) systems and has co-evolved as technology and threats have changed over time.
On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea, drawing the United States into a war that would last for three years. Believing that the North Korean attack could represent the first phase of a Soviet-inspired general war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Air Force air defense forces to a special alert status. In the process of placing forces on heightened alert, the Air Force uncovered major weaknesses in the coordination of defensive units to defend the nation’s airspace. As a result, an air defense command and control structure began to develop and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) were staked out along the nation’s frontiers. With the establishment of ADIZ, unidentified aircraft approaching North American airspace would be interrogated by radio. If the radio interrogation failed to identify the aircraft, the Air Force launched interceptor aircraft to identify the intruder visually. In addition, the Air Force received Army cooperation. The commander of the Army’s Antiaircraft Artillery Command allowed the Air Force to take operational control of the gun batteries as part of a coordinated defense in the event of attack.
In addition to North America, the U.S. unilaterally declared ADIZs to protect Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan in 1950. This action had no explicit foundation in international law.
Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. While national sovereignty cannot be delegated, the responsibility for the provision of air traffic services can be delegated.… [A] State which delegates to another State the responsibility for providing air traffic services within airspace over its territory does so without derogation of its sovereignty.
This precedent set the stage for China to unilaterally declare ADIZs its own in 2013 that overlap those of Japan in the East China Sea. China’s ADIZs have the same international legal validity as those of the U.S. and Japan, which has muted criticism of China’s actions by those countries.
Recent activity by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and nuclear and missile testing by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) is prompting incremental upgrades and improvements to the Japanese air defense radar network.
In August 2018, six Chinese H-6 bombers passed between Okinawa’s main island and Miyako Island heading north to Kii Peninsula. “The activities by Chinese aircraft in surrounding areas of our country have become more active and expanding its area of operation,” the spokesman [of the Japanese Ministry of Defense] said.… “There were no units placed on the islands on the Pacific Ocean side, such as Ogasawara islands, which conducted monitoring of the area…and the area was without an air defense capability.”
The cover of SPI’s monster wargame, The Campaign For North Africa: The Desert War 1940-43 [SPI][This post was originally published on 22 September 2017.]
Even as board gaming appears to be enjoying a resurgence in the age of ubiquitous computer gaming, it appears, sadly, that table-top wargaming continues its long, slow decline in popularity from its 1970s-80s heyday. Pockets of enthusiasm remain however, and there is new advocacy for wargaming as a method of professional military education.
Luke Winkie has written an ode to that bygone era through a look at the legacy of The Campaign For North Africa: The Desert War 1940-43, a so-called “monster” wargame created by designer Richard Berg and published by Simulations Publications, Inc. (SPI) in 1979. It is a representation of the entire North African theater of war at the company/battalion level, played on five maps which extend over 10 feet and include 70 charts and tables. The rule book encompasses three volumes. There are over 1,600 cardboard counter playing pieces. As befits the real conflict, the game places a major emphasis on managing logistics and supply, which can either enable or inhibit combat options. The rule book recommends that each side consist of five players, an overall commander, a battlefield commander, an air power commander, one dedicated to managing rear area activities, and one devoted to overseeing logistics.
The game map. [BoardGameGeek]
Given that a bingo clash review states that to complete a full game requires an estimated 1,500 hours, actually playing The Campaign For North Africa is something that would appeal to only committed, die-hard wargame enthusiasts (known as grognards, i.e. Napoleonic era slang for “grumblers” or veteran soldiers.) As the game blurb suggests, the infamous monster wargames were an effort to appeal to a desire for a “super detailed, intensive simulation specially designed for maximum realism,” or as realistic as war on a tabletop can be, anyway. Berg admitted that he intentionally designed the game to be “wretched excess.”
Although The Campaign For North Africa was never popular, it did acquire a distinct notoriety not entirely confined to those of us nostalgic for board wargaming’s illustriously nerdy past. It retains a dedicated fanbase. Winkie’s article describes the recent efforts of Jake, a 16-year Minnesotan who, unable to afford to buy a second-end edition of the game priced at $400, printed out the maps and rule book for himself. He and a dedicated group of friends intend to complete a game before Jake heads off to college in two years. Berg himself harbors few romantic sentiments about wargaming or his past work, having sold his own last copy of the game several years ago because a “whole bunch of dollars seemed to be [a] more worthwhile thing to have.” The greatness of SPI’s game offerings has been tempered by the realization that the company died for its business sins.
However, some folks of a certain age relate more to Jake’s youthful enthusiasm and the attraction to a love of structure and complexity embodied in The Campaign For North Africa‘s depth of detail. These elements led many of us on to a scholarly study of war and warfare. Some of us may have discovered the work of Trevor Dupuy in an advertisement for Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles in the pages of SPI’s legendary Strategy & Tactics magazine, way back in the day.
The December 2018 issue of Phalanx, a periodical journal published by The Military Operations Research Society (MORS), contains an article by Jonathan K. Alt, Christopher Morey, and Larry Larimer, entitled “Perspectives on Combat Modeling.” (the article is paywalled, but limited public access is available via JSTOR).
Their article was written partly as a critical rebuttal to a TDI blog post originally published in April 2017, which discussed an issue of which the combat modeling and simulation community has long been aware but slow to address, known as the “Base of Sand” problem.
In short, because so little is empirically known about the real-world structures of combat processes and the interactions of these processes, modelers have been forced to rely on the judgement of subject matter experts (SMEs) to fill in the blanks. No one really knows if the blend of empirical data and SME judgement accurately represents combat because the modeling community has been reluctant to test its models against data on real world experience, a process known as validation.
TDI President Chris Lawrence subsequently published a series of blog posts responding to the specific comments and criticisms leveled by Alt, Morey, and Larimer.
How are combat models and simulations tested to see if they portray real-world combat accurately? Are they actually tested?
How can we know if combat simulations adhere to strict standards established by the DoD regarding validation? Perhaps the validation reports can be released for peer review.
Some claim that models of complex combat behavior cannot really be tested against real-world operational experience, but this has already been done. Several times.
If only the “physics-based aspects” of combat models are empirically tested, do those models reliably represent real-world combat with humans or only the interactions of weapons systems?
Is real-world historical operational combat experience useful only for demonstrating the capabilities of combat models, or is it something the models should be able to reliably replicate?
If a Subject Matter Expert (SME) can be substituted for a proper combat model validation effort, then could not a SME simply be substituted for the model? Should not all models be considered expert judgement quantified?
Persuading the military operations research community of the importance of research on real-world combat experience in modeling has been an uphill battle with a long history.
Today’s edition of TDI Friday Read is a roundup of posts by TDI President Christopher Lawrence exploring the details of tank combat between German and Soviet forces 
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