Category War by Numbers

The Current Ukrainian Offensive

Ukrainian offensives do get my attention because I believe that to negotiate a peace settlement that does not permanently surrender 20% of their country Ukraine will probably need to start retaking some of that ground. They really have not reclaimed any more of their own territory since November 2022.

But they are on the offensive again. Curiously, just before the Trump inauguration. To quote twitter account @timkmak from yesterday (bolding is mine): (1) Tim Mak on X: “Here’s what we are reading today: Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation. This follows territorial setbacks for Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months. https://t.co/CEMHisnLqv” / X

“Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. 

Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.

The follows territorial setbacks in Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months.”

Other people are reporting that Ukraine has taken Berdin and has gone 2.7 kilometers past the Russian zero line (Def Mon on X: “Ukrainian forces likely went about 2.7km past the Russian zero line. https://t.co/WDFs2bGxZU” / X and Def Mon on X: “The developments in Kursk oblast looks something like this. We do not know if Ukraine managed to consolidate positions. We think we have geolocated UA units inside Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Geos: https://t.co/RNty0eKLQL https://t.co/ouerMmm9y4” / X).

Reports that this is a significant attack (“AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack): david D. on X: “im tracking about 10 “attacks” by ukr forces around kursk and north Belgorod. keep in mind that some will be real attacks, and some will be feints to draw in russian forces. russians are saying this is AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack… things will be clear later today expect” / X

There are reports of significant Russian losses (which must always be taken with a grain of salt): Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “BURN RATE: In the last 48 hours in Kursk Oblast, the Russian army lost up a battalion of North Korean infantry and VDV paratroopers. Since AUG, Moscow has deployed 50K troops to Kursk Oblast: approximately 38K are assessed as killed, wounded, missing or surrendered.” / X

Some maps of the area:  Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “UKRAINE’S KURSK OFFENSIVE: Latest from the BBC. https://t.co/QLSOk09HmP https://t.co/8xx9goK4kl” / X and Aurora Borealis 🤫 on X: “katsaps report the loss of the village of #Berdin, #Kursk region. https://t.co/QBeVLm9C81” / X and david D. (@secretsqrl123) / X and MAKS 24 🇺🇦👀 on X: “🔼🇺🇦 AFU managed to advance 8 km in the Kursk region, according to Russian voenkors. Map from ISW 🗺️👇👀 https://t.co/ebSfskuV9p” / X.

Anyhow, more to come, but all these reports must be taken with a grain of salt.

The Kursk offensive in August of 2024 was an interesting exercise but fundamentally did not retake any of their own territory and did not take enough of Kursk province to give them a lot they could trade off. It did not fundamentally change the situation on the ground, which is what was needed to give them advantage at the negotiation table. Unconditional surrender is very rare. Most wars end in a negotiated settlement.

The strength and loss figures being reported represent some fraction of reality. I do not know what that is (is it 1/10th or is it 9/10s?). I seriously doubt that the people posting these figures know that either, although some may indicate otherwise.

I was very disappointed in the failed Ukrainian offensive in early June 2023. For the sake of negotiating a positive resolution to the conflict, they really needed to take ground. I thought the Kursk offensive was a good stunt, but only that. Still, they have turned it into an extended fight that may yet yield dividends. If this offensive in Kursk is the start of a series of offensive that extend to Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, then this could become very significant. We shall see.

A key element in warfare is surprise (I do have a chapter on that in my book War by Numbers). If I can predict what Ukraine is going to do, that is not a good sign, as so to can the Russians. Therefore, if the Ukraine General Staff is doing their job right, they should be taking both Russian and me by surprise. That they appear to be doing. 

An Old Book Review for War by Numbers

This link below is a book review of War by Numbers published in the Army University Press. It was published in 2017 (the same year the book came out): War by Numbers. It just got forwarded to me by an associate but I have been aware of this favorable review for a while.

Of course, in the real world I get lots of review, some are favorable, some are very unfavorable, and some are in between. I have never published or commented on them for obvious reasons. I have since met some of the reviewers. In this case, I have never met and am not familiar with this reviewer, Frederick A. Baillergeon. What got my attention was that he was out in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That is the center of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College (C&GS). This has also traditionally been the center of anti-Dupuy anti-QJM writings, with some senior people there having had an openly hostile relationship with Trevor Dupuy. A number of students there also took exception to the claims made by Trevor Dupuy that the German divisions in Italy in from late 1943 to mid-1944 were more competent (had a higher CEV) than the American and UK divisions. This actually led to a number of books trying dispute this, not that they really succeeded (Dupuy’s claims were based upon data… their refutations were not).

I did get an email a few months ago from a lady apologizing for a negative review of War by Numbers that her brother wrote. She felt it was wrong and written out of animus. Every now and then people do something that make you realize that the vast majority of people are really decent, even if a few “scholars” are not. 

Anyhow, this was a nice review by Mr. Baillergeon. It is clear that he knew his subject and had read the book carefully.

Shout out to Echoes of Past

I do want to make a shout out to Echoes of Past who keeps posting quotes by my book War by Numbers and from Trevor Dupuy’s books. His twitter account is here: Echoes of Past (@EchoesofpastX) / X

This includes: Echoes of Past on X: “4/5 “We can still lose this war. . . . The Germans are colder and hungrier than we are, but they fight better. —GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON, January 4, 1945, in Dupuy et al., Hitler’s Last Gamble” (Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers) @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/fcgMxVkEV0″ / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “”#Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple #aphorism.” (Christopher A. Lawrence, #War by Numbers) https://t.co/kioG46QbI2″ / X

and from our blog: Echoes of Past on X: “#Ukraine #Kursk operation does three things for them: 1. Propaganda value. 2. Ukraine 🇺🇦 captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 & have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for people Russia holds. https://t.co/SWHSFkoSLn” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. ⁦@dupuyinstitute⁩ https://t.co/Gryxkdtvho” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Depressing insight for Tank Enthusiasts from book “War by Numbers” by Christopher A. Lawrence. Tank loss rates are 5-7 times higher than personnel casualties in combined arms engagements. #WarByNumbers #ArmoredForces #MilitaryStrategy @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/d5WWTuH3bT” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@AmosFox6 @dupuyinstitute Hi Amos, it will be an excellent opportunity to hear him. I just finished one of his classics “War by Numbers”. Sharing few insights and I will be building it further. You may bookmark 🔖 it.👇” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/mXBHvEHFDr” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 5/n Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces https://t.co/jjLil3rKbM” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 4/n According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/NrINYgN5qd” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “3️⃣/n In warfare, combat effectiveness plays a crucial role in inflicting casualties. The Germans in WWI and WWII, as well as the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli wars, showcased higher casualty-inflicting rates. 💥 #warfare #combat #effectiveness Pic 2 :@vtchakarova https://t.co/WQR8JwwPfU” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “2/n Historical fortifications like Maginot Line, Mannerheim Line, Siegfried Line, & Bar Lev Line were overcome not due to their failure, but because of a powerful relentless effort. It’s important to recognize context, rather than jumping to conclusions. https://t.co/nV3bxn1KSD https://t.co/ywrGBhFvNP” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “1️⃣st thought from “War by Numbers” by Christopher A Lawrence Tank loss rates are 5 to 7 times higher than personnel casualty rates. This applies to combined arms engagements in which armored forces make up a substantial proportion of fighting strength on one or both sides. https://t.co/Dshm8nopA4” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces @dupuyinstitute @WarMonitors @WarintheFuture @AmosFox6 @VertigoWarrior @warmatters https://t.co/IJHwBVdcrO” / X

 

Also a shout out to Mountain Navy: Mountain Navy 🎲🗺⚔️ on X: “Usually think of Lawrence @dupuyinstitute as Mr. “Tanks at Kursk” so this new #militaryhistory #book looks to be an interesting adjacent read. https://t.co/v7XyyGT6tc” / X

and Robert Gilbey: Robert Gilbey on X: “‘The Battle for Kyiv’ by Christopher A. Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute This is a very insightful & indifferent analysis of the opening invasion of Ukraine, leveraging metrics from OSINT & official sources it breaks down the context, actions & effects of combat ops around Kyiv https://t.co/OMX5C6kYL6” / X

and Amos Fox: Amos Fox on X: “Part I of my conversation with Chris Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute. Part II drops tomorrow. After that the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast will take a 4 week break. https://t.co/fTCrKkoes6” / X

and Mark Galeotti: Mark Galeotti on X: “I then look at 4 books to help explain Russian adaptation: 1. Christopher Lawrence of @dupuyinstitute, The Battle for Kyiv (@Frontline_Books), useful for insights into the various forms of military capability 2/” / X

and Paul Poast: Paul Poast on X: “To identify war outcomes, Stam’s study drew on military histories, notably the encyclopedic volume by Dupuy & Dupuy (cc @dupuyinstitute). https://t.co/oGJR4ZZuNQ” / X

 

I am sure there are a few I missed this year. Only two of these people are known to me. Sorry for anyone I have missed.

 

The Russians are continuing to advance in Ukraine

The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.

In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).

Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian. 

Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.

In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):  

Summation (195 engagements):

Outcome              Failed       Advances   Penetrated
                               III             IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              54                71                33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             2.98            1.20             0.83

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.62             2.96            6.40

Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).

The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).

Post-World War II (61 engagements):

Outcome              Failed      Advances    Penetrated
                               III            IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              14               8                 33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             3.20            1.60             1.36

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.80             4.83           15.10

Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:

Outcome            III      IV        V

  Cases                 10       29         21

  Force Ratios    1.80    2.69     2.75

  Loss Ratios      1.66    1.51      0.64

Note the same loss pattern exists here.

Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.

Outcome                    III        IV       V

Italian Campaign     0.74     1.76     2.53

Ardennes                   0.45     3.71     5.00

Kursk                         0.58      5.18   11.43 

So……

  1. The advance rates in Ukraine are pretty much in line with outcome III and IV engagements. 
  2. The advance rates are fairly low compared to the other cases we have.
  3. Will discuss casualties later.

This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).

Density of Deployment in Ukraine

It appears that both sides have deployed between 300,000 to 617,000 troops in this war. Putin claimed 617,000 deployed in mid-December. To quote “The front line is over 2,000 kilometers long, there are 617,000 people in the conflict zone.” See: Putin Says Over 600K Russian Servicemen in Ukraine – The Moscow Times. Ukraine shortly afterwards stated it was 450,00. I tend to lean towards the lower figures. As Russian advances over the last six months have been fairly limited, I am guessing that Ukraniain deployment is at least 300,000. It is probably closer to 400,00. They have put out a few figures noticeably higher than this, but if this was the case (and they were deployed forward), then we probably would not be seeing many advances by the Russians. So most likely the deployed figures for both sides are between 300,000 to 450,000. Let’s just use the figure 450,000 for the sake of simplicity.

The effective front line of Ukraine is around 700 kilometers. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute. Ukraine obviously has to maintain troops in mobile positions from Chernihiv to Sumy, but there are probably forces still being stood up and trained, with their defense being supplemented by National Guard and Territorial Defense Forces, to be stood up as needed.  There is also the area opposite of the Khakhovka Reservoir, which is only light held by both sides. Then there is the area from the Dnipro River down to Kherson. This is an inactive front, because of the logistics issues caused by the river. While this does have to be held by forces on both sides, they basically have done no major operations since November 2022.  That will almost certainly be the case going forward. So, the active front is only around 700 kilometers (435 miles) 

S0, 450,000 divided by 700 km equals 643 troops per kilometer. This would be 429 per kilometer if there were only 300,000 troops. Obviously, they are not equally distributed across those 700 kilometers, but they really can’t leave large parts of the line seriously undermanned.

So, how does this compare to the last war in Ukraine (1941-1944)? 

During World War II, on the Western Front, the troops were often deployed to a density of 2,000 troops per kilometer of front line. On the Eastern Front in World War II, it was often over 1,000 troops per kilometer. Now we do have a division-level database of 752 cases. Of those, 267 are from the Eastern Front 1943-1945.  Let’s take a look at some examples from that:

For example, before the start of the Battle of Kursk the density of the front was (@ 1800, 4 July 1943):

  • 57th ID: 684 vs 683
  • 255th ID: 467 vs 495
  • 48th PzC (-): 2,458 vs 651
  • 11th PzD+: 1,976 vs 1,038
  • LSSAH GzGrD: 3,763 vs 1,261
  • DR SS PzGrD: 5,207 vs 899
  • T SS PzGrD: 2,416 vs 940
  • 6th PzD+: 2,282 vs 1,168
  • 19th PzD+: 6,086 vs 3,104
  • 7th PzD+: 2,766 vs 558
  • 106th ID: 2,419 vs 511
  • 320th ID: 2,572 vs 540

Just before the Battle of Prokhorovka we have the densities at (@1800, 11 July 1943):

  •  57th ID: 395 vs 483
  • 255th ID: 482 vs 399
  • 332nd ID+: 504 vs 463
  • 48th PZC (-): 1,694 vs 1,353
  • 11th PzD+: 1,669 vs 3,373
  • 167th ID: 725 vs 917
  • T SS PzGrD: 1,371 vs 782
  • LSSAH PzGrD: 2,904 vs 1,692
  • DR SS PrGrD: 1,851 vs 1,291
  • 168th ID: 1,430 vs 282
  • 19th PzD: 1,084 vs 195
  • 6th PzD: 2,077 vs 1,348
  • 7th PzD: 3,701 vs 1,743
  • 198th ID: 1,779 vs 669
  • 106th ID: 1,690 vs 1,658
  • 320th ID: 1,302 vs 1,032

Now, we do have engagements from the fighting around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943. Some sample cases (again keying of the German unit:

15 February 1943:

  • GD ID: 888 vs 1,143
  • DR SS: 800 vs 1,794

12 March 1943:

  • LSSAH D: 753 vs 473
  • DR SS D: 2,205 vs 450
  • T SS D: 306 vs 2
  • 11th PzD: 914 vs 498

22 August 1943:

  • 106th ID: 1,341 vs 875
  • 320th ID: 1,007 vs 1,210


Now World War I was a lot more dense, especially on the western front. For example:

  • Br 8th Division, 1 July 1916: 8,071 vs 2000 (Battle of the Somme)
  • Dr. Fourth Army (-), 14 July 1916: 10,000 vs 3,333 (Somme)
  • U.S. 4th Bde (+), 6 June 1918: 2,145 vs 1,463 (Belleau Wood)
  • U.S. 3rd Bde, 1 July 1918: 7,118 vs 5,754
  • U.S. 2nd Bde (+), 12 September 1918: 11,007 vs 1,742.
  • U.S. 2nd Div (+), 3 October 1918: 4,063 vs 2,031
  • U.S. 36th Div, 8 October 1918: 4,500 vs 2,500

During the Arab-Israeli Wars we see a lower deployment density, for example, in the 16 engagements in our division-level database from the 1967 war, the densities (for offense) range from 813 to 3,567 men per kilometer (with four exceptions, Mitla Pass, Zaoura-Kala, Jerin and Kabtiya). In the 1973 war we have 32 division-level engagements.  The densities (for offense) range from 444 to 4,900. There are no outliers.

In the 1991 Gulf War, we also see a lower deployment density. In the 15 engagements in our division-level database we have the densities ranging from 89 to 1,200 men per kilometer.

Keep in mind this is a single dimension measurement of a two-dimensional construct. The units also deploy in depth. So, there is not one man standing there every two meters, any more than with a WWII density of 2,000 there are people standing shoulder-to-shoulder across the front line. The minority of troops deployed are shooters.

The main point is that the density is around a fourth of the typical density on the Western Front in WWII. And again, that is in one dimension.

I will leave this blog post without a conclusion, as I am not sure what it should be. For now, this is just an observation.

Army- and Division-level force ratio posts

I did five posts on analyzing force ratios using the campaign database. They are here:

Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – third continuation – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation – The Dupuy Institute

 

I think this is actually kind of a big deal, and will be presenting it at HADSS in July: Updated Schedule for HADSS 2024 – The Dupuy Institute and at HAAC in October:  Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

 

Now, as part of that presentation, I do compare it to the division-level engagements. I have posted about this before. They are here:

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus the 752 Case Division-level Data Base 1904-1991 – The Dupuy Institute

The World War I Cases from the Division-level Database – The Dupuy Institute

The World War II Cases from the Division-level Database – The Dupuy Institute

Post-World War II Cases from the Division-level Database – The Dupuy Institute

Force Ratios at Kharkov and Kursk, 1943 – The Dupuy Institute

Force Ratios in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956-1973) – The Dupuy Institute

 

And a summary of force ratios and 3-to-1 rule posts:

Summation of Human Factors and Force Ratio posts – The Dupuy Institute

Summation of Force Ratio Posts – The Dupuy Institute

JSTOR, Trevor Dupuy, Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

 

And more stuff:

Force Ratios and CRTs – The Dupuy Institute

 

and most recently here: 

The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

 

And in the first few chapters of my book War by Numbers.

 

Anyhow, we have discussed force ratios at the division-level and have now addressed them at the army-level by using the campaign databases. We do have the ability to look at them at Battalion and Company-level, which I will probably do at some point in the future. We do have a couple of databases to address this. They are no where near as robust as our division-level data base (752 cases) but as they are the only thing out there like that, they will have to do.

Battalion and Company Level Data Bases – The Dupuy Institute

At some point this will all probably be assembled in my future book More War by Numbers, which is half-written. Probably won’t get serious about that book until 2025. 

IDF Wounded-to-Killed Ratios

We have the following data for the Israeli Defense Forces from their website here: IDF Fallen and Wounded in War | ATC (www.idf.il).

Killed:

Killed since the beginning of the war (7 October 2023): 639

Killed: 290 dead (fighting in the Gaza Strip from 27 October 2023 to 29 May 2024 among those “whose names were permitted to be published”)

Now, 639 – 290 = 349 killed on 7 October or shortly thereafter.

Fatalities from operational accidents: 44 (this in 22 from 
two-sided shooting, 5 from “shooting anomalies” and 17 from “accidents”). Data from fatalities from operational accidents is correct as of 15 May 2024.

Now, I do not know if operational accidents are included in the war dead. I am assuming they are not, so 290 + 44 = 334 or 639 + 44 = 683

 

Wounded:

Wounded since the beginning of the war (this means from 7 October):

3,643

  • 2,124 “easy”
  • 955 “medum”
  • 564 “hard”

“Casualties” (do they mean wounded? – I assume so) from the beginning of the maneuver (this means from 23 October):

 1,831

  • 874 “easy”
  • 591 “medum”
  • 366 “hard”

 

Injuries:

Injuries for operational accidents in the Gaza Strip

714

  • Accidents: 453
  • Shooting anomalies: 36
  • Two-sided shooting: 57
  • Road accidents: 49
  • Other: 119

 

Okay, time for some simple math:

 

A. Wounded-to-killed ratios:

Overall force Wounded-to-killed ratios (not counting operational accidents): 3,643/639 = 5.33-to-1

Gaza Strip operations wounded-to-killed ratios: 1,831/290 = 6.31-to-1

7 October wounded-to-killed ratios: (3,643 – 1,831)/639-290) = 5.19-to-1

 

B. Accidental killed versus injures

Gaza Strip operations: 714/44 = 16.20-to-1

This is not a surprising figure, but not one that I have calculated before.

From “two-side shootings” and shooting anomalies: (57 + 30)/(22+5) = 3.20-to-1

From “two-sided shootings” (57/22) = 2.59-to-1

This are not surprising figures, being from I assume mostly direct gunfire.

 

C. How about friendly fire?

Percent killed by friendly fire in Gaza Strip: 22/(290 + 22) * 100 =  7.05 %

Note, the percent of expected friendly fire casualties has never been firmly established. Traditionally the figure from WWII was 1 or 2%. Many people considered these estimates low. It was clearly higher than that in Vietnam (1965-1973), but no one has assembled any systematic data. It was much higher than that in the Gulf War (1991).    

 

Some past references:

Wounded-To-Killed Ratios – The Dupuy Institute

Also note on page 187 of War by Numbers there is a discussion of weapons effects in the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon War.  The lethality figures of bullets was 0.31 and for “small arms” was 0.28. This comes out to wounded-to-killed ratios respectively of 3.23- and 3.57-to-1. 

French Estimate of Russian Killed in Ukraine

Seems like everyone in and out of NATO has their own estimate of Russian losses. The current French estimate, according to their foreign minister, is 150,000 Russian soldiers killed and a total of 500,000 casualties. See: France’s Shocking Estimation: 150,000 Russian Soldiers Dead in Ukraine War (msn.com)

First reality check: Wounded-to-killed ratios. 500,000 – 150,000 = 350,000 wounded. Wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.33-to-1. The Soviet Army mostly on the attack in the southern salient of the Battle of Kursk from 12-18 July 1943 had a wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.68-to-1 (see Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka, page 1374, this is also in Chapter 15 of War by Numbers).

Are they saying the Russian medical care is worse now than in 1943, before they had penicillin, or in many cases no painkillers other than Vodka? They also had in 1943 a shortage of trained doctors, the rear hospitals were not brought forward that spring to be near the front, and they had a poor medical evacuation system.

Anyhow, another estimate to ignore. What data are these estimates actually based upon?

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation

This is the fourth and final continuation of our previous four posts: Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – third continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).  It is a part of a briefing on forces ratios I will be giving at HADSS in UK: Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC near DC: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

All of this analysis of the CaDB was for a reason, it was to determine if odds (force ratios) play out difference at higher level of operations (meaning army level). Are they different at the operational level vice the tactical level of warfare. The answer appears to be no. I do not know of anyone who has actually specifically explored this issue before, so I am not sure there is an existing or countervailing opinions out there.

Of course, my real interesting in looking at this (which I did last year) was because of the war in Ukraine and the upcoming Ukranian spring/summer offensive in 2023. I did brief this at the Second HAAC (October 2023) and in Norway (November 2023). The question I had was does a minor advantage in force ratios or combat power ratios lead to a bigger advantage at the operational level of combat. The answer appears to be no, as this was reinforced by limited movement of the front line in Russo-Ukrainian War since the fall of 2022. 

My final slide in the briefing was “Does this relate to the fighting in Ukraine?” I then asked two questions:

  1. What are the odds?
    1. What is the strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army?
    2. What is the strength of the Russian Army deployed in Ukraine?
  2. What other advantages does the Ukrainian attacker have?
    1. Artillery
    2. Air Support? (Drones?)
    3. Observations/Intelligence
    4. Morale
    5. Training

Now, as it appears that Russia will be on the offensive this spring/summer, then I may need to restructure this slide and also add another point “artillery ammunition supply.”

 

I am probably going to do some more blog posts on this subject, looking at other levels of combat.