Category Middle East

Isfaran – 2

A second post on Isfaran. The original post was just a look at the terrain: Isfaran – The Dupuy Institute. Apparently, some other people are looking at it too, see WP article: Risky commando plan to seize Iran’s uranium came at Trump’s request – The Washington Post

Now, the part of the article that got my attention was the part about “flying in excavation equipment.” Now, I do not know how deep the enriched uranium is buried and how long it takes to dig it out, but… I am guessing that this would involve holding forces in place in the middle of Iran for day or two or four.

Anyhow, waiting to see what actually occurs.

View of Isfaran and Naqsh-e Jahan Square (Pedram Forouzanfar, 23 April 2020)

Article on potential landing sites

This article came across my desk yesterday, and it does confirm or reinforce several points I have been making in last few blog posts: Will Trump Order U.S. Ground Troops to Invade Iran?

If fact, it so closely parallels what I have been saying that I wonder if they were reading my blog. This has happened before with other publications. That they list out the five landing ships and list the landing locales in the same order as I list them makes me suspicious. Could be just great minds thinking alike.

Anyhow, they did add a factoid that differed from my discussion, in that they had the airborne brigade with only two battalions (vice 3) They also left out the 10th Mountain Division, which we know has some presence in the Middle East.

My blog posts:

  1. Isfaran – The Dupuy Institute
  2. Kharg Island – The Dupuy Institute
  3. Qeshm Island and the Straits of Hormuz – The Dupuy Institute
  4. Larak and Abu Musa – The Dupuy Institute

 

Larak and Abu Musa

War teaches geography. Two islands in the Strait of Hormuz mentioned as possible landing sites are Larak and Abu Musa along with some immediate surrounding islands.

Karak is right next to Qeshm and Hormuz Island (see our previous post). It is only a few miles from each of them, and only 24 miles (39 kilometers) from Oman, on the other side of the straight. It is possible to seize and hold Larak and leave Qeshm in Iranian hands, but not sure how this does not generate some U.S. casualties. Of course, one can make the same argument for seizing Qeshm and not seizing the Iranian mainland areas a mile or so away from it. The problem is that all these islands are within mortar range of each other and mainland Iran. I gather Iran has 3,000+ mortars, a very annoying weapon that seems to have been forgotten about amid all the discussion of higher-tech rockets, missiles and drones. 

Karak island is 19 square miles (49 square kilometers). This is like a little over a quarter of D.C. (28%). It is 266 feet tall (81 meters). All these islands are rough with considerable elevation (which does not make things easier).  There are two villages on the island, the largest of 466 people. There is a nice collection of coral reefs off the island. 

 

I gather it has a military base on the island loaded with surface-to-surface missiles in addition to serving as an oil terminal. Two ships were sunk there in 1988. The Iranian Vosper-class frigate Sahand was sunk by the U.S. Navy in 200-meter-deep waters southwest of Larak Island. 45 crew were killed. The Liberian supertanker Seawise Giant was seriously damaged and set on fire by Iraqi antiship missiles while anchored off the coast of Larak Island (see Seawise Giant after the air attack for photos).

 

The other island in discussion is Abu Musa and its surrounding islands. It is even smaller and is disputed between Iran and UEA. So the U.S. could seize the islands and hand them over to UAE. It is inside the gulf just outside of the Strait of Hormuz. It is just south of the deep water shipping lanes that go to and from the strait.

 

It is 4.9 square miles (12.8 square kilometers). It is 43 miles (70 kilometers) from the Iranian mainland and 37 miles (59 kilometers) from the UAE mainland. The highest point is the 360 foot (110 meter) Mount Halva. The town of Abu Musa has a population of 1,953 and the entire island has a population of 2,131 (2012). 

Looks like elements of the 82nd Airborne Division are heading to the Gulf

Well, it looks like elements of the headquarters and the entire 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division is heading to the Gulf. See: Pentagon confirms elements from the 82nd Airborne Division to deploy to the Middle East

This adds three more maneuver battalions to the six slated to be in the area in a couple of weeks. Supposedly, the brigade can be moved there in 18 hours.  They probably won’t get there that fast but might get there before the 11th MEU (see my Kharg post on that). 

Hard to envision that you would move parts of the 82nd Airborne Division if you were not going to do something. It appears the three options are 1) Kharg, 2) Isfaran and 3) Qeshm, with Kharg the most likely option for deployment. Might be just an attempt to provide more pressure on Iran in negotiations.

I also note articles like this one: Trump on brink of ground invasion in Iran as Saudi strongman makes astonishing pitch in secret call. Have no idea if there is any validity to the article.

I will avoid for now pontificating, or more aptly, speculating as to what will be done and how it will work. There is a point when you should not say more than what you actually know.

A few relevant links:

Kharg Island – The Dupuy Institute

Isfaran – The Dupuy Institute

Qeshm Island and the Straits of Hormuz – The Dupuy Institute

Qeshm Island and the Straits of Hormuz

The Straits of Hormuz is dotted with islands. The largest is Qeshm. Is it expected that if the U.S. is going to conduct land operations against Iran it will either be at Kharg, Isfaran or at Qeshm and possibly Hormuz Island and other islands in the Strait.

The Straits of Hormuz is 104 miles long (167 kilometers) with a width that varies from 24 mils 929 kilometers) to 60 miles (97 kilometers). It is bordered in the north by Iran and in the south by the UAE and Oman (Musandam Peninsula).  

Qeshm is by far the largest island in the strait. While there is a considerable doubt about the value of occupying this island, it has certainly been discussed. 

 

The island itself is 576 square miles (1,500 square kilometers). In comparison, Fairfax Country VA is 406 square miles (1,050 square kilometers). The country of Bahrain is 304 square miles (787 square kilometers). It is 84 miles long (135 kilometers) and between 5.8 (9.4 kilometers) and 25 miles (40 kilometers) wide. It is within 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) of the Iranian mainland. There is no bridge connecting the island to the mainland. 

The island as of 2016 has a population of 148,993 in at least 59 villages and towns. The largest town is Qeshm (40,678).  The existence of this large population would create complications for any U.S. ground operations.

It did have an earthquake just off shore in 2005 of Magnitude 6.0 that killed 13.

In 1622 English navigator William Baffin (of Baffin Bay and Baffin Island) was mortally wounded there fighting the Portuguese. One English bible editor has posited that this was where the Garden of Edin was located. It is pretty dry now.

A few interesting links: Inside Qeshm, Iran’s underground missile fortress and geological marvel | US-Israel war on Iran | Al Jazeera and Qeshm Island.

Another island in the strait is Hormuz Island. It is much smaller, being 16 square miles (42 square kilometers) and 610 feet (186 meters) in height. It is 5 miles (8 kilometers) off the Iranian coast and within sight of Qeshm. It has a population of around 6,000. This 2025 travel video is worth watching: 10 BEST Things to do on Hormuz Island in Iran 🇮🇷

Anyhow, for a variety of reasons, I do not think the U.S. is going to do ground operations at Qeshm or Hormuz Island, but one never knows.

Kharg Island

Kharg Island is in the news a lot, so let’s talk about it. It is the primary shipping hub for Iranian oil located near the northeast end of the Gulf. It is 107 miles (172 kilometers) from Iraq. Just to state the obvious, it is no where near the straits of Hormuz (it is 410 miles, 660 kilometers, away from them).

 

The island can actually be seen on this map near Iran, opposite of Kuwait. If I had a graphics person, we would add a red dot to the map.

It is a coral outcrop some 16-17 miles (25-28 kilometers) off the coast of Iran. It is 5 miles long (8 kilometers) and 2.5 to 3 miles wide (4-5 kilometers). The highest elevation is 230 feet (70 meters). It has its own supply of fresh water and the waters around it are deep. There are a number of nearby offshore oil fields that are piped directly to the island. It is the sea port for the export of 90% of Iran’s oil products. It has the ability to store up to 30 million barrels of oil. It has a population for 8,193 as of 2016, It is the home of several archaeological sites, including a Christian monastery.

 

Now, the U.S. is assembling forces. On the way to the Gulf is the 31st MEU (based in Okinawa), which will be arriving maybe later this week. It is based round the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA-7). These are small carriers. Along with it is the USS New Orleans (LPD-18). See: UPDATED: Tripoli ARG, 31st MEU Transit Malacca Strait En Route to the Middle East – USNI News.

Being sent there from the west coast is the 11th MEU, based out of Camp Pendelton CA, along with the USS Boxer (LHD-4), USS Comstock (LSD-45) and USS Portland (LPD-27). It will take three weeks or longer to arrive.

A Marine Expeditionary Unit is a brigade size force of 2,200 that includes command elements, a reinforced infantry battalion, a composite helicopter squadron and a logistics combat element. It can land a reinforced battalion. The U.S. has 7 MEU’s. Two are soon expected to be in the gulf region. Besides landing these MEU’s, the Marine Corps does not have any independent capability to conduct an opposed landing of a brigade-size force or larger. See: Marine Expeditionary Unit – Wikipedia

It is close enough to Iraq that forces could be inserted by helicopter directly from there or from a number of other spots in the Persian Gulf. If operations were done against Kharg, it would probably be an air assault vice an amphibious operation, even though certainly Marines would be involved. I gather there are some army assets in the region including the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and the 2nd Battalion of the 127th Infantry Regiment (Wisconsin National Guard). I assume they are both located in Iraq and Syria. (See:10th Mountain brigade to deploy to Middle East, Army says | Stars and Stripes and Army’s 10th Mountain Division gets orders to deploy to Middle East ). This provides four additional maneuver battalions. Additional army assets are being sent to the gulf, including helicopters. There are rumors that one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division might also be sent.

So potentially in three weeks are so we will have six maneuver battalions available for operations in either Kharg, Isfaran (see: Isfaran – The Dupuy Institute) or Qeshm or other islands in the Straits of Hormuz.

Isfaran

Isfaran is the third largest city in Iran. It has a population of around 2,238,000 (2025 estimate) and a metro area of almost 4 million (3,989,070 2025 estimate). It is kind of in the middle of nowhere. It is 270 miles (440 kilometers) south of Tehran and 197 miles (318 kilometers) from the Persian Gulf.

The reason it has people’s attention is that in addition to all its industry (some of it defense), it is suspected of being the primary location for Iran’s nuclear weapon development program and where it stores most of its enriched uranium (in June 2022 the IAEA reported that 90% of Iran’s most highly enriched uranium was moved to Isfaran). We have obviously destroyed a lot of their gear and equipment, but we have not eliminated their enriched uranium. They supposedly have enough enriched uranium for six nuclear weapons (IAEA in September 2008). It is believed to be buried near Isfaran. Therefore, some people are discussing a ground operation.

The uranium is 60% enriched. At around 90% enriched it becomes usable for weapon use. Therefore this is a potential threat, not an actual threat. They reportedly have around 200 kilograms (441 pounds) of it.  Uranium is heavy. so I gather this makes up only 0.37 cubic feet (10.5 cubic centimeters) of material. This is not a huge cache.

The city is some 197 miles (318 kilometers) from the Persian Gulf, 590 miles (950 kilometers) from deeper water shelf of the Gulf of Oman (the more likely place our carriers are going to operate from) and around 232 miles (373 kilometers) from the Iraqi border.

It is not conveniently located for any ground operations or sea-based insertion. Caracas was located on the Caribbean Sea and that was a high-risk operation. This is located significantly inland and away from any borders.

Persia does have the distinct history of being an unconquered independent country for 1,375 years. There is a reason for that, some of that related to geography.

View of Isfaran and Naqsh-e Jahan Square (Pedram Forouzanfar, 23 April 2020)

Modern Missiles – Russian, Chinese and American, Part 1

First of a series of blog posts from Geoffry Clark on modern missiles:

—————

Modern missiles – Russian, Chinese and American, Part 1

 

Mentioned in the previous post on the Zhuhai Air Show (see The Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024 – The Dupuy Institute), the Chinese PLA have revealed two new systems in 2024, the HQ-19 and DF-100. These systems are different types of missiles, generally known as Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) and Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM), respectively.

Image Credit: truexanewsua/Telegram

 

There was also a very notable development regarding SSMs in Ukraine recently; on November 22, 2024, the Russian Federation tested a new missile named “Oreshnik” (meaning “hazel”, referring to the shape of the luminescence of the re-entry vehicles). As reported by Voice of America:

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate reported that the Oreshnik missile was launched from Russia’s Kapustin Yar 4th Missile Test Range in the Astrakhan region. The missile traveled for approximately 15 minutes before striking the city of Dnipro. The missile was equipped with six non-nuclear warheads, each containing six submunitions, and it achieved a speed of Mach 11 during its flight.

There is some confusion and debate about the classification of this missile, whether it was an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), or an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This is just a matter of range category, which is just anachronistic jargon from the Soviet Cold War and arms control negotiations and treaties. Since that time, the U.S. has withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in October 2018, many claim since China is unbound by any arms control, and the U.S. saw a need to develop such mid-range ballistic missiles.

Then, in a video address by Russian President Vladimir Putin said:

There are “no means of countering such weapons today. Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometers per second. Air defense systems currently available in the world and missile defense systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles. It is impossible.”

This high mach number is really what sets this type of missile apart. By comparison, the Chinese DF-100 missile (also known as CJ-100, and also by NATO as CH-SSC-13 Splinter) has a similar range to the Oreshnik (also known as the RS-26 Rubezh – The War Zone has a good explanation for the lineage), but these two missiles have very different speeds; the DF-100 is supersonic at about mach 4. The speed of these missiles – subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic – is directly proportional to the difficulty of interception.

So, there is debate about whether many advanced systems such as the American THAAD and certain missiles (especially the Standard Missile 3) from the Aegis system may be able to intercept such missiles. One new contender for this category is the Chinese HQ-19 SAM, which was apparently derived from the HQ-9, which was itself derived from the S-300 SAM of Russian design and build, and also widely used in the Ukraine War by both sides.

Image credit: VLS_Appreciator via twitter: https://twitter.com/VLS_Appreciator/status/1844408468452802602

 

HQ-19 at Zhuhai airshow 2024. (Image Credit: Twitter/David Wang)

 

I’ll briefly mention a few more important recent events which shed light on the state-of-the-art of missile defense.

A USAF awards ceremony on November 12 provided a number of details about how USAF squadron of F-15Es that was forward deployed to Muwaffaq Salti air base in Jordan, in order to defend Israel.  Ward Carroll reports:

During the Iranian attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, the 494th Fighter Squadron launched 14 Strike Eagle sorties, including six aircraft scrambled at a moment’s notice, while base defenses simultaneously neutralized enemy threats overhead. Ultimately those F-15Es (along with those previously mentioned base defenses) successfully engaged and destroyed more than 80 kamikaze UAVs, out of more than 300 drone and missiles intended to strike Israel.

Apparently, this air defense effort included U.S., U.K., Israel and Jordan.  What was public knowledge was the success of the Iron Dome, but there were apparently many other assets operating together to attrit the drones and missiles in their trajectories from Iran to targets in Israel. 

And, finally, the statistics published by the Ukrainian Defense Forces about the Russian missiles used, and the rate at which they were intercepted.

Screen capture of video address by General Oleksandr Syrskyi via Odessa Journal.

 

Through the translation provided by the Odessa Journal, and through the identification of these missiles and the Harpoon V Admiralty Trilogy Annexes, I’ve attempted to describe these missiles in more detail.

Missile Name

Missile Code

NATO Code

GRAU Code

Type

Flight path

Range nmi

Speed kts

Weight kgm

Signature

Missiles

Intercepted

Rate %

Kinzhal

Kh-47M2

 

39K5

ASM

Ballistic

1080

4016

3800

Vsmall

       111

               28

25%

Kalibr

 

SS-N-27

3M14

SSM

Cruise

865

600

 

Vsmall

       894

             443

50%

X-555/101

Kh-555

AS-15

 

ASM

Cruise

1620

400

1700

Vsmall

    1,846

          1,441

78%

X-555/101

Kh-101

AS-23A

 

ASM

Cruise

2160

400

2500

Stealthy

Oniks

P-800

SS-N-26

3M55

SSM

Cruise

165

1650

 

Vsmall

       211

               12

6%

Zircon

 

SS-N-33

3M22

SSM

Cruise

187

3150

 

Stealthy

           6

                 2

33%

Iskander-K

 

 

9K720

SSM

Ballistic

500

5053

4615

Small?

       202

               76

38%

Iskander-M

KN-23

 

9K720

SSM

Ballistic

500

5053

4615

Small?

    1,300

               56

4%

X-22/32

Kh-22

Burya

 

ASM

Cruise

~200

2003

5900

Small

       362

                 2

1%

Kh-32

 

 

ASM

Cruise

485

2160

5800

Vsmall

X-35

Uran

SS-N-25

3M24

SSM

Cruise

65

580

 

Vsmall

         15

                 1

7%

Tochka-U

 

SS-21

9K79

SSM

Ballistic

~120

3500

2000

Small?

         68

                 6

9%

X-25/29/31/35/58/59/60

Kh-25

AS-10

 

ASM

Direct

5

1360

295

Vsmall

    1,547

             343

22%

Kh-29

AS-14B

 

ASM

Direct

8

792

690

Vsmall

Kh-31

AS-17

 

ASM

Cruise ?

86

1690

~700

Vsmall

Kh-35

AS-20

 

ASM

Cruise

71.5

560

520

Vsmall

Kh-58

AS-11

 

ASM

Direct

66

2065

650

Vsmall

Kh-59

AS-18

 

ASM

Cruise

~150

~550

930

Vsmall

Kh-60

AS-?

 

ASM

 

 

 

 

 

S-300/400

SA-N-6a/b

 

 

SAM

Ballistic ?

~50

3885

 

Vsmall

    3,008

               19

1%

Other

?

 

?

 

 

 

 

 

 

         57

                 –

0%

 

There are reports that Russian Armed Forces are amassing large stockpiles of these missiles for future strikes.

In Part 2 of this analysis, I plan to give a few examples of these types of intercepts and illustrate the odds using the Harpoon V game system.

Thanks for reading, and for your comments!

IDF Wounded-to-Killed Ratios

We have the following data for the Israeli Defense Forces from their website here: IDF Fallen and Wounded in War | ATC (www.idf.il).

Killed:

Killed since the beginning of the war (7 October 2023): 639

Killed: 290 dead (fighting in the Gaza Strip from 27 October 2023 to 29 May 2024 among those “whose names were permitted to be published”)

Now, 639 – 290 = 349 killed on 7 October or shortly thereafter.

Fatalities from operational accidents: 44 (this in 22 from 
two-sided shooting, 5 from “shooting anomalies” and 17 from “accidents”). Data from fatalities from operational accidents is correct as of 15 May 2024.

Now, I do not know if operational accidents are included in the war dead. I am assuming they are not, so 290 + 44 = 334 or 639 + 44 = 683

 

Wounded:

Wounded since the beginning of the war (this means from 7 October):

3,643

  • 2,124 “easy”
  • 955 “medum”
  • 564 “hard”

“Casualties” (do they mean wounded? – I assume so) from the beginning of the maneuver (this means from 23 October):

 1,831

  • 874 “easy”
  • 591 “medum”
  • 366 “hard”

 

Injuries:

Injuries for operational accidents in the Gaza Strip

714

  • Accidents: 453
  • Shooting anomalies: 36
  • Two-sided shooting: 57
  • Road accidents: 49
  • Other: 119

 

Okay, time for some simple math:

 

A. Wounded-to-killed ratios:

Overall force Wounded-to-killed ratios (not counting operational accidents): 3,643/639 = 5.33-to-1

Gaza Strip operations wounded-to-killed ratios: 1,831/290 = 6.31-to-1

7 October wounded-to-killed ratios: (3,643 – 1,831)/639-290) = 5.19-to-1

 

B. Accidental killed versus injures

Gaza Strip operations: 714/44 = 16.20-to-1

This is not a surprising figure, but not one that I have calculated before.

From “two-side shootings” and shooting anomalies: (57 + 30)/(22+5) = 3.20-to-1

From “two-sided shootings” (57/22) = 2.59-to-1

This are not surprising figures, being from I assume mostly direct gunfire.

 

C. How about friendly fire?

Percent killed by friendly fire in Gaza Strip: 22/(290 + 22) * 100 =  7.05 %

Note, the percent of expected friendly fire casualties has never been firmly established. Traditionally the figure from WWII was 1 or 2%. Many people considered these estimates low. It was clearly higher than that in Vietnam (1965-1973), but no one has assembled any systematic data. It was much higher than that in the Gulf War (1991).    

 

Some past references:

Wounded-To-Killed Ratios – The Dupuy Institute

Also note on page 187 of War by Numbers there is a discussion of weapons effects in the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon War.  The lethality figures of bullets was 0.31 and for “small arms” was 0.28. This comes out to wounded-to-killed ratios respectively of 3.23- and 3.57-to-1. 

Losses in the Hamas-Israel War – Day 111

I have not blogged much about the Hamas-Israeli War since the first couple of days of the war (for example, see: Hamas-Israeli War – Day 3 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). On Monday, 22 January, 24 Israeli soldiers were killed in one day. Twenty-one were killed in a single blast that collapsed two buildings. Previously, on October 31, 16 Israeli soldiers were killed, 11 in a single incident when an armored personnel carrier was hit. 

Total losses for the Israeli armed forces during the offensive into Gaza is 219 (as of 22 January). See: 24 soldiers killed on deadliest day for Israeli forces in Gaza combat | CNN. Wikipedia is reporting a total of 627 service members killed, 556 soldiers, 61 police and 10 “Shin Bet” personnel. Many of those were among the 1,200 killed on 7 October. See: Authorities name 556 soldiers, 60 police officers killed in Gaza war | The Times of Israel.

Just for comparison, Israeli losses in the 1956 War were 172 killed, their losses in the 1967 war were 776-983 killed, their losses in the 1973 War were 2,521 to 2,800 killed, their losses in the 1982-85 intervention in Lebanon were 654 killed, their losses were 559 killed (256 in combat) in the 1985-2000 Southern Lebanese Conflict (vs Hezbollah) and they lost 121 killed in the 2006 Lebanon War (also vs Hezbollah). The Gaza War (2008-2009) lasted 23 days and resulted in 10 Israeli soldiers killed (and 3 civilians). The 2014 Gaza War lasted 50 days and resulted in 67 Israeli soldiers killed (and 6 civilians).

Hamas’ actual losses are harder to gauge. Israel is claiming that they have killed about 9,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza along with more than 1,000 killed during the attacks on 7 October. The U.S. is recently saying they have been attritted by 20-30%. Just to complicate such calculations, it is uncertain what Hamas’ strength originally was. U.S. intelligence estimates Hamas strength at between 25,000 to 30,000 before the war, plus thousands of police and other forces. Israel estimates Hamas at 30,000 or more.

Israel is estimating that as many at 16,000 Hamas have been wounded. The U.S. estimates between 10,500 to 11,700 wounded. This produces some unusually low wounded-to-killed ratios. Israel as reported three days ago to have 190 killed and around 1,200 wounded in their offensive operations, producing a 6.32-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio. See: Hamas Toll Thus Far Falls Short of Israel’s War Aims, U.S. Says (msn.com).

The Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry has said that the total number of Palestinians killed since October 7 is 25,295 (as of 22 January). It is hard to know how accurate these figures are, but MSNBC has made the argument that in the past the Gaza Health Ministry has provided accurate estimates: Casualties in the Hamas-Israeli War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Regardless, it does seem that a significant percent of the losses are civilians and that civilian killed number in the thousands. With over 40% of the population being under 14 or younger, then over half of those civilians were not of voting age when Hamas was first elected to lead Gaza in 2006 (and it was their last election: see 2006 Palestinian legislative election – Wikipedia). This is just noted in case someone wants to make an argument that these civilians deserve what they are getting. There has also been hundreds of thousands of civilians forced to relocate, and there are not a lot of good places to relocated to in Gaza.

Israel lost over 1,200 killed on 7 October. This included around 799 civilians and a large number of military, reservists, police, etc. Total Israeli civilians killed since the start of this war is 809 (according to Wikipedia). Over 250 civilians have been taken hostage (253 according to Wikipedia), of which 110 have been rescued or released and 38 are confirmed to now be dead (at least three killed by Israel). This leaves over 100 who may be still in captivity. Some of them have probably died (according to Wikipedia there are 107 living captives and 29 dead bodies while CNN reports 104 living and 28 dead bodies).

The U.S., in operations against the Houthis in Yemen, have lost two special forces soldiers. Houthi losses are fairly limited (10 according to Wikipedia).

There is no good solution here. I was of the opinion that the most rational result would have been for Israel to invade Gaza for two weeks, negotiate a hostage release, declare victory and pull out. For lots of reasons, this did not happen. So, the war continues past day 111, with the 800 Israeli civilians killed on 7 October being overshadowed by the thousands of civilian deaths in Gaza. Hamas is slowly winning the propaganda war.

Note the opinion of U.S. 18-24 years olds or “under 35” in various recent polls: Quinnipiac poll shows Israel-Palestine divide across generations, parties – POLITICO and Vast majority of voters back Israel over Hamas: Poll (msn.com).