I am being told by “advisors” to start blogging again about the war in Ukraine. “That is what everyone really cares about, not the little things that you have been posting about.”
Anyhow, my last direct blog post on the war was day 699: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). A more detailed post was done for day 589: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 589 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Since then, I have not blogged extensively about the war. In part, because the changes and shifts over time were incremental and in part because I was busy getting a book done on The Siege of Mariupol. It is now day 811 of this war (or 2.2 years or over 70 million seconds).
So, let’s look at the war at the moment:
Ukrainian Forces Deployed: At least 300,000 are deployed along the front line. Last year Zelenskyy was saying that they have over 700,000 troops mobilized. There is a difference between people mobilized and people deployed. There is a difference between regular army and reserves and militia. What is actually deployed is a wild-eyed guess. We actually don’t know, and the people that do know are not saying.
Russian Forces Deployed: Probably about 400,000 or more. Putin said 617K and was immediately contradicted by Ukraine intelligence, which said 450K. I tend to believe the latter figure, except I suspect the tendency of the intel people is to overestimate. So, “more than 400,000” become the SWAG figure I used.
So, Russia may have a 1.5-to-1 force ratio advantage (say 450K to 300K) or it may be roughly closer to 1-to-1 (say 400K to 400K). Not sure. Either way, this does not seem decisive: Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). In particular look at Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).
Now what are Russia’s advantages:
- Artillery ammunition
- Air support *
- Note that Russia still has 2,000+ aircraft and has maintained around 500 or so in the theater. This is more than enough to counteract the handful of F-16s that the Ukrainians have received.
What are Ukraine’s advantages:
- Artillery (once ammunition issue is resolved)
- Air Support with Drones?
- Observation/Intelligence ?
- Morale
- Training
- Doctrine ?
Each of these is a long discussion. I may get to them later. These points are covered in three slides of my updated briefing I am doing on Force Ratios at HADSS in UK in July Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC in October: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).
But Russia has been advancing. They have over the last few months taken Avdiivka (Battle of Avdiivka is dated 10 October 2023 to 17 February 2024). They have pushed out a little beyond that. This is not militarily significant terrain, but it is of political value, as Avdiivka is near the non-operational Donetsk International Airport, and has been in Ukrainian hands since 2014. So, it has some importance if the Russian political objective is to seize the rest of Donetsk province before the start of peace negotiations.
Now, the Russians have been advancing along the border next to Kharkiv. Kharkiv is a significant objective, being the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian-speaking city in Ukraine. So, far, they have been advancing just along the border, it is not certain that these areas were even defended. This is either preparatory advances in anticipation of a major offensive, is an intended distraction, or is just taking some local territory because they can. So far, we have not seen what I would call a major offensive. Probably conditions are not quite right to start such: When does the campaign season start? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).
Still, regardless of army size, it does appear that both sides are spending roughly equally on this war: Dueling Defense Budgets | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
All evidence points to this war being stalemated, but for the last few months, Russia has been slowly advancing.
- Is this because Russian gained an advantage due to a proper build up of its armed forces over 2023/24, unlike what it did in 2022/23? This has probably helped.
- Is this because Ukraine failed to properly mobilize over 2023/24, taking its eye off the ball, to use a sports analogy? Maybe. This is what some people claim: Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s lack of manpower to thin out the front line and seek a breakthrough, military expert says (msn.com).
- Is this because Russian had an abundance of artillery shells (thanks to North Korea) and were outshooting the Ukrainians 5-to-1 or 10-to-1 according to Ukrainians sources (which I was never able to verify). Maybe. Theoretically, over time, this Russian advantage will disappear and may turn into a Ukrainian advantage. U.S. shell production was 25,000 a month and is now being ramped up to 125K a month. Europe has similarly ramped up its shell production. Once this is up to speed, then this may turn from a Russian advantage to a Ukrainian one.
- Is this because the U.S. congress held up the $61 Billion dollar aid package for six months? It may have had an impact. This is, of course, what many of the people opposed to the delay were saying. Have no idea how true that is. It is the nature of the political discourse that the effects of not doing something get overstated. For example, the delay in getting F-16s and 300km range ATACMs. So, don’t know how vulnerable the U.S. delays in the aid package made Ukraine, especially as there were no such delays in the European aid or Ukraine’s own defense expenditures. Still, the delay was hard to justify.
So, Russia may hold a slight advantage for now. I suspect that advantage does not result in any major breakthroughs. Over time, I suspect that the Russian advantages will disappear, and things will stabilize. After that, it will be up to Ukraine to see if they can develop any advantages that allow them to move forward. Needless to say, if Ukraine can start to steadily advance, this war will go in their favor. On the other hand, if Russia can get one significant breakthrough operations this spring/summer, it could be a very different story. We will have to see as it is hard to predict.
Territory Fought Over:
It appears that the fighting will be stretched from Sumy or Kharkiv down to Zaporizhzhia. This is a long line. It does not appear that it will include Kyiv (except for missile attacks). It does not appear that it will include Odessa, which is now well behind Ukrainian defensive positions. It does appear that Ukraine has won the Battle for the western Black Sea. Not only has it deprived Russia access to that area after sinking Russia’s largest ship on the Black Sea, and damaging several others, but it is now regularly moving tankers and cargo transports from the Bosporus Strait to Odessa and back. Russia is not intercepting these. Added to that Russia has replaced the admiral in charge. This does happen when you lose the largest warship on the Black Sea (the cruiser Moskva) in addition to losing control of the western half of the Black Sea.
It also does not appear that Kherson and Kherson province is a major theater. The Dnieper or Dnipro River divides that province, with Kherson and the Ukrainian Army on the north bank and the Russian army on the south bank. And then there is large Kakhovka Reservoir to the east of that the cuts off a significant section of front (see map). It does appear the effective front starts to the east of the reservoir (near Zaporizhzhia).
