Category Casualty estimation

Update on the number of captured: “At a meeting in St. Petersburg on Wednesday, Putin told the heads of several international news agencies that there are 1,348 Russian troops and officers in captivity in Ukraine compared to the 6,465 Ukrainians in Russian detention.” See: Putin makes rare claim on Ukraine war casualties (msn.com)

Now, I find these figures to be entirely believable. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed as of 30 June 2022 to be holding 6,000 Ukrainians soldiers in captivity. This was partly confirmed in July 2022 when the Ukrainian missing person commissioner stated on TV that more than 7,000 people were missing, including soldiers, National Guardsmen, border guards and intelligence officers. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated on 19 September that the Russians held more prisoners than Ukraine did (see: The Battle for Kyiv, page 185). There were maybe 2,439 that surrendered at Mariupol in late May 2022. There have been other people captured in the two years since then. The prisoner exchanges have traded at least 2,800 Russians soldiers and civilians for 3,001 Ukrainians soldiers and 145 civilians. Plus there were some Ukrainians who died while captivity. Anyhow, it all seems to add up, although it could be on the high side, and the figure of 6,465 probably includes some civilians.

On the other hand, his assertion that he has lost in combat only one Russian for five Ukrainians is absurd. It is as absurd as some of the bizarrely lopsided casualties claims that Ukraine is exchanging casualties at a 3-to-1 to 5-to-1 ratio in their favor. 

Turns out the New York Times, based upon citations of unnamed U.S. officials, is providing the following estimates of losses:

1. Russia: up to 120,000 killed and 170,000 to 180,000 wounded.
2. Ukraine: close to 70,000 killed with 100,000 to 120,000 wounded.

I have lots of heartburn with these figures.

First… wounded-to-killed ratios:

The wounded-to-killed ratio for WWII was 3:1. The wounded-to-killed ratio for Soviets troops at the Battle of Kursk (1943) was around 2.5:1 (2.48-to-1). Specifically, in the Voronezh Front from 4-11 July it was 2.29-to-1 and from 12-18 July 1943 it was 2.68-to-1. For the opposing Germans it was 5.11-to-1 and 4.54-to-1 respectively. See Kursk, page 1374 (not too many people can say “see page 1374 of my book”).

Since World War II, wounded-to-killed ratios have risen to 5-to-1 or higher. It was 10-to-1 for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan (and 13-to-1 for the USMC). The Donets People’s Republic (DPR) reported a wounded-to-killed ratio for 2022 of 4-to-1 (4.16-to-1).

So, they have for the Russians a wounded-to-killed of 1.5-to-1. Really? Read my book War by Numbers, Chapter 15, and then come back with some intellectually valid estimates. These are not!

They have the wounded-to-killed ratios for the Ukrainians at between 1.42 or 1.71 to one. Same ballpark as the Russians. Yet the Soviet Union has a wounded-to-killed ratio at Kursk in 1943 of 2.5-to-1. Are you saying that medical care and evacuation in the Russian and Ukrainian armies now are considerably worse that of the Soviet Union in 1943, when they did not have penicillin? The argument is absurd.

Second… Russian killed:

The only systematic reporting of Russian killed that I am aware is the BBC/Medizona reports by name of people killed. As of 11 August, this was a total of 30,003. These figures are gathered from a mix of obituaries, newspaper reports, formal death certificates, contacts with the families, reviewing graveyards and gravestones, and I gather a number of catch-as-catch-can methods. I have not reviewed their data collections efforts in detail. From my correspondence with them, they believe they are accounting for about half of the dead. This seems like a reasonable assumption, although it is an assumption. This would mean that total Russian dead from the war is perhaps 60,000 or more killed. Not sure how we get from there to 120,000.

Third… Ukrainian killed:

The reporting we have on Ukrainian dead is worse than what we have for Russian dead. Now, I am sure the Ukrainians have a better count, but they have not provided any reporting in a very long time (since summer of last year). My sense is that Ukrainian dead is probably less than Russian dead at this point. Maybe 75% of Russian dead, although this is a guesstimate based upon no solid data. So, their estimate of 70,000 Ukrainains versus 120,000 Russian dead sort of matches. It is 58% of the Russian dead or a casualty exchange ratio of 1.71-to-1. I really don’t buy into that. Ukrainian definitely took some casualties in the Kherson operations August-October 2022, possibly more than the Russians. They are on the offensive now against prepared positions. If they have significant artillery superior it is possible they could have a 2-to-1 exchange ratio, but Russia does have some active artillery, as the 47th Mech Bde videos in June showed. So, I do question the 1.71-to-1 exchange ratio.

So, if Russian killed are 60,000, then Ukrainian killed could be 45,000 or higher. I am still guessing that the wounded-to-killed ratio is 4-to-1 or higher. So maybe for Russian 60K killed and 240K wound for 300K casualties (which actually does match the totals in the New York Times article). For Ukraine maybe 45K killed (or more) and at least 180K wounded for a total of 225K casualties or higher.

Of course, these are estimates based upon little actual data. But, while it is hard to tell what the correct estimate is, it is pretty easy to tell if there is an issue with an estimate if they cannot provide a reasonable wounded-to-killed ratio. If they can’t provide a reasonable interpretation of that fairly well documented relationship (again see War by Numbers or Dupuy’s Attrition), then it does make one wonder what can be trusted in such an estimate.

P.S. If you take the estimate of 120K Russian killed and assume 4-to-1 wounded, then you end up with 600,000 casualties which is hard to explain in an army that has only deployed 300,000+ to Ukraine. It does appear that people keep dicking with the wounded-to-killed figures so they can report more killed without producing outrageously high total casualty figures. 

Russian deaths, according the BBC/Mediazona accounts, were 6,902 from 24 February through 21 September 2022. Russia itself reported on 21 September that there were 5,937 killed. Now, we suspect the Russian reports understate their losses and by the nature of the data collected, the Mediazona reports also certainly understate Russian losses. That their figures are close to each other is an interesting coincidence. It does make one wonder if the Mediazona weekly totals can be used to measure the intensity of combat and degree of losses over time.

Let us toy with that idea for a moment. On 9 November, General Milley stated that Russian casualties were  “…well over 100,000…”. Now “well over 100,000” could be 199,999, but I have assumed it meant in the low end of “well over 100,000.” He also noted at the time that “Same thing probably on the Ukrainian side.” See: 100,000 Russian troops killed or injured in Ukraine, US says – ABC News (go.com).  Currently, as of 17 March, the Ukrainian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council is arguing that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded.

Now, as of late March, the U.S. DOD is apparently claiming that Russian losses are around 220,000 casualties. Does this mean that they think Russians losses have doubled since 9 November?

Let is compare that to the Mediazona death data. Up to 21 September, Russian deaths are reported at 6,902. Going up to 9 November pushes the count of deaths up to 8,826. Reported Russian deaths by Mediazona for the period from 10 November through 8 March is 4,174. Therefore, the Mediazona count of deaths over time is more than twice as much up through the more than 8 1/2-month period up to 9 November than for the four-month period from 10 November to 8 March. Yet the U.S. estimate of Russian casualties appears to double their losses over this four-month period.

So….

1. Either the U.S. DOD back on 9 November meant that “well over 100,000” meant around 150,000 or more (and so to were Ukrainian losses), or….

2. The U.S. DOD actually believes that the intensity of combat and Russia losses has more than doubled during the last four months, or…

3. They have kind of garbled this up. In light of some of their last estimates, this cannot be ruled out.

By the way, U.S. DOD estimates are talking total casualties (which is killed, wounded and possibly missing). They don’t state this, but only about 20% -25% of those are killed (assuming a 4-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio or a WWII-like 3-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio).

P.S. The following blog posts are related to this discussion:

BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Casualty Estimates for the Russo-Ukrainian War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wounded-to-killed ratios in Ukraine in 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

BBC Russia, working with Mediazona, have since early in this conflict kept a count by name of the number people reported killed from multiple sources in Russia. Don’t know how accurate the list is, but I gather everyone they list did die in Ukraine. It may not have been a combat loss. They are also probably some who died in Ukraine who are not listed. Whether the number not listed is a significant additional amount is not known. Nor is it known if there are more people have died who are not listed then those who are listed. Not sure how I would estimate that. 

Still, it is the only listing of Russian dead over time other than the weekly DPR reports (which I may blog about later). 

Anyhow, there is a chart in this link of the people killed over time: Russia’s losses in the war with Ukraine. Summary of “Mediazona”

I have not figured out how to capture it and publish it directly to this blog, but the chart I am looking at is halfway down the page called “Losses of the Russian army in the weeks of the war.” It does give casualties for each week, but only counts a total of 13,019 deaths (out of 18,024 deaths as of 24 March). This is because in a large number of cases, the exact date of death is not known.

The first week of the war is 514 deaths. The second week is 574, the third week is 437. It then drops noticeably in the fourth week to 248, then up to 333, then down to 183. This brings us into early April (up to 6 April), when Russian had withdrawn from most of northern and northeastern Ukraine. It is a total of 2,289 deaths in the first six weeks of the war. Actual losses were probably higher.

On 2 March, Russia published a casualty report saying their losses were 498 troops killed and 1,587 wounded since 24 February. As can been seen from the Mediazona report, there were at least 514 deaths in the first week of the war. 

On 25 March Russia reported 1,351 killed and 3,825 wounded. BBC/Mediazona reported less at the time, with 557 confirmed deaths as of 21 March. From the current Mediazona chart, it appears the killed are 514 + 574 + 437 + 248 = 1,773.

The only other Russian report of losses was on 21 September, when they reported 5,937 killed. At that time BBC/Mediazona were reporting 6,476 killed as of 15 September from their counting efforts. Counting from this chart shows up through 21 September: 1,773 + 333 + 183 + 143 + 197 + 287 + 226 + 275 + 184 + 313 + 244 + 178 + 157 + 175 + 206 + 200 + 193 + 167 + 114 + 85 + 128 + 166 + 118 + 179 + 284 + 197 + 197 = 6,902.

Not sure what conclusions I should draw from this.

As can be seen by this chart, Russian losses were fairly high in September and October, running between 197 and 314 a week, and were again fairly high in December 2022 through early February 2023, running from 227 to 220 a week. They have since declined. 

Also see: Casualty Estimates for the Russo-Ukrainian War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)