Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
Casemate Publishers (U.S. – Philadelphia/Haverford), who published my book America’s Modern Wars (hardcopies are here: Books – The Dupuy Institute), is advertising my book Aces at Kursk for sale. This is the email they sent me: New Releases! (mailchi.mp)
The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.
In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).
Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian.
Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.
In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):
Summation (195 engagements):
Outcome Failed Advances Penetrated
III IV V
Number of Engagements:
54 71 33
Attacker percent casualties per day:
2.98 1.20 0.83
Defender percent casualties per day:
2.62 2.96 6.40
Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).
The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).
Post-World War II (61 engagements):
Outcome Failed Advances Penetrated
III IV V
Number of Engagements:
14 8 33
Attacker percent casualties per day:
3.20 1.60 1.36
Defender percent casualties per day:
2.80 4.83 15.10
Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:
Outcome III IV V
Cases 10 29 21
Force Ratios 1.80 2.69 2.75
Loss Ratios 1.66 1.51 0.64
Note the same loss pattern exists here.
Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.
Outcome III IV V
Italian Campaign 0.74 1.76 2.53
Ardennes 0.45 3.71 5.00
Kursk 0.58 5.18 11.43
So……
This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).
I was quiet last week because I was on travel. Here are my last six blog posts before I went silent:
The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute
Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute
People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute
The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war – The Dupuy Institute
Definition of Limited War – The Dupuy Institute
Aces at Kursk is available in the UK – The Dupuy Institute
The Aces at Kursk book is listed on Amazon.com (U.S.) as being available as of 25 July. Do not have confirmation of that yet. It was available in the UK as of 9 July.
It appears that both sides have deployed between 300,000 to 617,000 troops in this war. Putin claimed 617,000 deployed in mid-December. To quote “The front line is over 2,000 kilometers long, there are 617,000 people in the conflict zone.” See: Putin Says Over 600K Russian Servicemen in Ukraine – The Moscow Times. Ukraine shortly afterwards stated it was 450,00. I tend to lean towards the lower figures. As Russian advances over the last six months have been fairly limited, I am guessing that Ukraniain deployment is at least 300,000. It is probably closer to 400,00. They have put out a few figures noticeably higher than this, but if this was the case (and they were deployed forward), then we probably would not be seeing many advances by the Russians. So most likely the deployed figures for both sides are between 300,000 to 450,000. Let’s just use the figure 450,000 for the sake of simplicity.
The effective front line of Ukraine is around 700 kilometers. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute. Ukraine obviously has to maintain troops in mobile positions from Chernihiv to Sumy, but there are probably forces still being stood up and trained, with their defense being supplemented by National Guard and Territorial Defense Forces, to be stood up as needed. There is also the area opposite of the Khakhovka Reservoir, which is only light held by both sides. Then there is the area from the Dnipro River down to Kherson. This is an inactive front, because of the logistics issues caused by the river. While this does have to be held by forces on both sides, they basically have done no major operations since November 2022. That will almost certainly be the case going forward. So, the active front is only around 700 kilometers (435 miles)
S0, 450,000 divided by 700 km equals 643 troops per kilometer. This would be 429 per kilometer if there were only 300,000 troops. Obviously, they are not equally distributed across those 700 kilometers, but they really can’t leave large parts of the line seriously undermanned.
So, how does this compare to the last war in Ukraine (1941-1944)?
During World War II, on the Western Front, the troops were often deployed to a density of 2,000 troops per kilometer of front line. On the Eastern Front in World War II, it was often over 1,000 troops per kilometer. Now we do have a division-level database of 752 cases. Of those, 267 are from the Eastern Front 1943-1945. Let’s take a look at some examples from that:
For example, before the start of the Battle of Kursk the density of the front was (@ 1800, 4 July 1943):
Just before the Battle of Prokhorovka we have the densities at (@1800, 11 July 1943):
Now, we do have engagements from the fighting around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943. Some sample cases (again keying of the German unit:
15 February 1943:
12 March 1943:
22 August 1943:
Now World War I was a lot more dense, especially on the western front. For example:
During the Arab-Israeli Wars we see a lower deployment density, for example, in the 16 engagements in our division-level database from the 1967 war, the densities (for offense) range from 813 to 3,567 men per kilometer (with four exceptions, Mitla Pass, Zaoura-Kala, Jerin and Kabtiya). In the 1973 war we have 32 division-level engagements. The densities (for offense) range from 444 to 4,900. There are no outliers.
In the 1991 Gulf War, we also see a lower deployment density. In the 15 engagements in our division-level database we have the densities ranging from 89 to 1,200 men per kilometer.
Keep in mind this is a single dimension measurement of a two-dimensional construct. The units also deploy in depth. So, there is not one man standing there every two meters, any more than with a WWII density of 2,000 there are people standing shoulder-to-shoulder across the front line. The minority of troops deployed are shooters.
The main point is that the density is around a fourth of the typical density on the Western Front in WWII. And again, that is in one dimension.
I will leave this blog post without a conclusion, as I am not sure what it should be. For now, this is just an observation.
According to Pen & Sword, the printers should be delivering Aces at Kursk next Friday (the 5th of July) to their warehouse, and so the stock should be booked in the week commencing 8th July, all being well.
Right now, Amazon UK is showing its release date as 30 Jan. 2024. Amazon US is showing the release date as 25 July 2024. Waiting for this to be updated but I gather the UK release date is on or shortly after 8 July 2024. U.S. release date will be later (don’t know how much later).
Hunting Falcon is also in process and will be released this summer.
Sorry for the delays, these are things not under my control.
Also see:
Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing – The Dupuy Institute
Aces at Kursk – Summation – The Dupuy Institute
Recently got a request for a better map of the tank ditch at Prokhorovka. This request was in response to this post: Tank Losses on 12/13 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Instead of a map, Eugene Matyukhin provided me the following annotated aerial photographs taken at the time:
A few blog posts related to this subject:
The Importance of the Tank Ditch | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Basis of the Tank Ditch Story of 12 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Meanwhile back at the Tank Ditch | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
I have four books in process or about to be released. They are:
The Battle for Kyiv:
– UK release date: 28 November
– U.S. release date: 18 January 2024
Aces at Kursk:
– UK release date: 30 January 2024
– U.S. release date: posted as 18 January 2024, but suspect release date will be in March 2024.
Hunting Falcon:
– UK release date: 28 February 2024
– U.S. release date: posted as 29 February 2024, but suspect released date will be in April 2024.
The Siege of Mariupol:
– UK release date: sometime in 2024
– U.S. release date: sometime in 2024
Books under consideration for 2024/2025:
– The Battle for the Donbas
– The Battle of Tolstoye Woods (from the Battle of Kursk)
– More War by Numbers
Shebekino is a town in Belgorod province 19 miles (30 km) southeast of Belgorod. It population in the 2021 census was 39,680, down from 44,552 in 1989.
It was founded in 1713 and on 1 June 2023 came under fire from Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian-allied Freedom of Russia Legion is conducting operations in this area, and Russia does not seem to be able to easily suppress them. There may be a 100 or so anti-Putin Russians operating there.
Shebekino is on the Nezhegol River just south of Maslova Pristan. During the Battle of Kursk, which started 4 July 1943, the town was at the southern end of the Seventh Guards Army area of deployment, and they were faced by the German 42nd Army Corps. The 42nd Army Corps conducted feint attacks on the first couple of days of the offensive, and no other significant actions occurred there during July or August 1943.
On the other hand, just to the Northwest, Maslova Pristan was at the center of a bloody German attack of 5 July 1943, where the 320th Infantry Division tried to cross the Donets River in the face of considerable Russian opposition. Even though this produced the bloodiest day of action in July by any German division during the offensive in south, these operations are often left entirely out of some books on the Battle of Kursk.
Anyhow, in my big book on Kursk, I do reference Shebekino some 13 times. The references are on pages 414 (twice), 415 (3 times), 417 (2 times), 494 (3), 495, 548, and 657.
I have never been to Shebekino, but I was at Maslov Pristan in the 1990s. I left one picture in my book of the railroad embankment at Maslova Pristan (page 224 and above) and the road from Maslova Pristan (page 225).
Some reports:
Attacks on Shebekino triggers criticism of Russian authorities – ISW report (yahoo.com)
Daniel Horvath, the author, has passed to me a copy of a Soviet propaganda leaflet from July 1943. He said it came from a crashed plane in Orel province.
It is the same thing on both sides of the two-sided printed leaflet. Translation: Russian Propaganda Leaflet (2)
Translation:
German soldiers!
On the morning of July 5, Hitler again threw you into a senseless offensive. In two days, this adventure in the Kursk-Belgorod-Orel region cost the German troops 314 aircraft, 1019 tanks and several tens of thousands of soldiers, and
Soldiers! With the example of your dead comrades you should be convinced:
Yesterday your comrades fell, tomorrow will be your turn for a reckoning. In the two years of war in the East, Hitler has already destroyed 6,400,000 soldiers and officers in this way.
Soldiers! Think of your families! Refuse to attack!
This leaflet is valid as a pass for German soldiers and officers who surrender to the Red Army.
,<The same in Russian>
I have been quiet about the books that I am working on and publishing because some of them have been slower to release than expected.
I have three books coming out this year. The UK hardcover release dates are:
Aces at Kursk: 30 July 2023
The Battle of Kyiv: 30 August 2023
The Hunting Falcon: 30 September 2023
The U.S. hardcover release dates according to Amazon.com are:
Aces at Kursk: 30 September 2023
The Battle of Kyiv: 30 October 2023
The Hunting Falcon: 31 October 2023
So for a brief moment in time I will be pumping out a book a month. I am currently working on two other books (they might be released in 2023) and I have one other listed on Amazon.com (UK) called “The Other Battle of Kursk” with a release date of 16 July 2024. This is the book “The Battle of Tolstoye Woods.” This has been discussed with the publisher and I may get it published in 2024.
Of course, the only way one gets a book done is to ignore everything else. If some people feel I should be responding in a timely manner to their emails or requests, there is a reason I have not been. Sorry. Three books coming out in one year is evidence that there is some validity to that.
Some relevant links related to Aces at Kursk:
Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Aces at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Is this my last Kursk book? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org): The answer is no. I will be working on (and maybe completing) The Battle of Tolstoye Woods in 2024.
145 or 10? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
So did Kozhedub shoot down 62, 64 or 66 planes? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
5th Guards Fighter Regiment, 7 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
The 728th Fighter Regiment on 16 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Soviet versus German kill claims at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
So What Was Driving the Soviet Kill Claims? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Aces at Kursk – Chapters | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
And related to The Battle for Kyiv: most of this blog from December 2021 through April 2022:
December | 2021 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
January | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
February | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
March | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
April | 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
And related to Hunting Falcon:
Award Dates for the Blue Max (1916) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)