Category Dupuy’s Verities

Dupuy’s Verities vs the Russo-Ukrainian War

So, we have had almost three full years of conventional war in and around Ukraine. Back in the 1970s- 1980s Trevor Dupuy assembled a list of factors (or verities) that influence and describe conventional combat. They covered combat in three different areas. They were 1) The Timeless Verities of Combat (13 verities), 2) Combat Attrition Verities (29 verities), and 3) Combat Advance Rates (15 verities).

They are listed below in these three posts:

The Timeless Verities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor N. Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor Dupuy’s Combat Advance Rate Verities – The Dupuy Institute

They are listed in detail in my book War by Numbers, although I edited a few for brevity.

They are listed in detail in Trevor Dupuy’s 1987 book Understanding War. They are also listed in his 1980 book Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.

They have been around for a while. I think they are a significant list and of course have been coded into his combat models the QJM and TNDM, which actually have proven track record of making good predictions. I do think they have been underutilized and underappreciated by the wider defense community.

Anyhow, my questions for the community that reads our blog is:

1. Which of these verities have been re-confirmed by war in Ukraine?, and
2. Which of these verities have been called in doubt by the war in Ukraine?

Interested to see the responses.

 

 

 

P.S. Some related links:

TDI Friday Read: Principles Of War & Verities Of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Offensive Action – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Power Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

The Combat Value of Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Utility Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Initiative – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Fortification – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Advantage Of The Offensive – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Requirements For Successful Defense – The Dupuy Institute

A Comment On The Importance Of Reserves In Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Effects of Firepower in Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Inefficiency of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Combat Power =/= Firepower – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Complexities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Response to Question on Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Average Losses per Day in Division-level Engagements on the Eastern Front in 1943 – The Dupuy Institute

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

Last Six Blog Posts – The Dupuy Institute

Shout out to Echoes of Past – The Dupuy Institute

These are all the posts you get if you click on the category “Dupuy’ Verities”:  Dupuy’s Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Shout out to Echoes of Past

I do want to make a shout out to Echoes of Past who keeps posting quotes by my book War by Numbers and from Trevor Dupuy’s books. His twitter account is here: Echoes of Past (@EchoesofpastX) / X

This includes: Echoes of Past on X: “4/5 “We can still lose this war. . . . The Germans are colder and hungrier than we are, but they fight better. —GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON, January 4, 1945, in Dupuy et al., Hitler’s Last Gamble” (Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers) @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/fcgMxVkEV0″ / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “”#Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple #aphorism.” (Christopher A. Lawrence, #War by Numbers) https://t.co/kioG46QbI2″ / X

and from our blog: Echoes of Past on X: “#Ukraine #Kursk operation does three things for them: 1. Propaganda value. 2. Ukraine 🇺🇦 captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 & have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for people Russia holds. https://t.co/SWHSFkoSLn” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. ⁦@dupuyinstitute⁩ https://t.co/Gryxkdtvho” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Depressing insight for Tank Enthusiasts from book “War by Numbers” by Christopher A. Lawrence. Tank loss rates are 5-7 times higher than personnel casualties in combined arms engagements. #WarByNumbers #ArmoredForces #MilitaryStrategy @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/d5WWTuH3bT” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@AmosFox6 @dupuyinstitute Hi Amos, it will be an excellent opportunity to hear him. I just finished one of his classics “War by Numbers”. Sharing few insights and I will be building it further. You may bookmark 🔖 it.👇” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/mXBHvEHFDr” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 5/n Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces https://t.co/jjLil3rKbM” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 4/n According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/NrINYgN5qd” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “3️⃣/n In warfare, combat effectiveness plays a crucial role in inflicting casualties. The Germans in WWI and WWII, as well as the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli wars, showcased higher casualty-inflicting rates. 💥 #warfare #combat #effectiveness Pic 2 :@vtchakarova https://t.co/WQR8JwwPfU” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “2/n Historical fortifications like Maginot Line, Mannerheim Line, Siegfried Line, & Bar Lev Line were overcome not due to their failure, but because of a powerful relentless effort. It’s important to recognize context, rather than jumping to conclusions. https://t.co/nV3bxn1KSD https://t.co/ywrGBhFvNP” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “1️⃣st thought from “War by Numbers” by Christopher A Lawrence Tank loss rates are 5 to 7 times higher than personnel casualty rates. This applies to combined arms engagements in which armored forces make up a substantial proportion of fighting strength on one or both sides. https://t.co/Dshm8nopA4” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces @dupuyinstitute @WarMonitors @WarintheFuture @AmosFox6 @VertigoWarrior @warmatters https://t.co/IJHwBVdcrO” / X

 

Also a shout out to Mountain Navy: Mountain Navy 🎲🗺⚔️ on X: “Usually think of Lawrence @dupuyinstitute as Mr. “Tanks at Kursk” so this new #militaryhistory #book looks to be an interesting adjacent read. https://t.co/v7XyyGT6tc” / X

and Robert Gilbey: Robert Gilbey on X: “‘The Battle for Kyiv’ by Christopher A. Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute This is a very insightful & indifferent analysis of the opening invasion of Ukraine, leveraging metrics from OSINT & official sources it breaks down the context, actions & effects of combat ops around Kyiv https://t.co/OMX5C6kYL6” / X

and Amos Fox: Amos Fox on X: “Part I of my conversation with Chris Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute. Part II drops tomorrow. After that the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast will take a 4 week break. https://t.co/fTCrKkoes6” / X

and Mark Galeotti: Mark Galeotti on X: “I then look at 4 books to help explain Russian adaptation: 1. Christopher Lawrence of @dupuyinstitute, The Battle for Kyiv (@Frontline_Books), useful for insights into the various forms of military capability 2/” / X

and Paul Poast: Paul Poast on X: “To identify war outcomes, Stam’s study drew on military histories, notably the encyclopedic volume by Dupuy & Dupuy (cc @dupuyinstitute). https://t.co/oGJR4ZZuNQ” / X

 

I am sure there are a few I missed this year. Only two of these people are known to me. Sorry for anyone I have missed.

 

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule

Several people in their articles have referenced a 3-to-1 rule and then reference us as the source. The latest example is in a German article on Taiwan: Storming Taiwan by force of arms? | Telepolis

Of course, we are the people who are saying the 3-to-1 rule is really not correct. They obviously do not read that far.

This is the reference they use: The Source of the U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule – The Dupuy Institute. My final sentence in that article is “Are we training the next generation of George B. McCellans?”

 

Various links related to the 3-to-1 rule:

Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 Rule in Histories – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 Rule in Recent History Books – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 243 Battles 1600-1900 – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 49 U.S. Civil War battles – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus the 752 Case Division-level Data Base 1904-1991 – The Dupuy Institute

Summation of Force Ratio Posts – The Dupuy Institute

JSTOR, Trevor Dupuy, Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The 3:1 Ratio – The Dupuy Institute

Army- and Division-level force ratio posts – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

We have been talking about this for a while. It appears that some people are not listening.

 

 

 

Average Losses per Day in Division-level Engagements on the Eastern Front in 1943

Trevor N. Dupuy, among his 56 verities of combat, states that “Average World War II division engagement casualty rates were 1-3% a day.”[1]

This was based primarily on his research on the Western Front during World War II. For example, just to draw from data from real world experience, the average losses per U.S. division in 82 selected engagements was 1.2% per day in 1943-44. The average strength of these divisions was 14,000. The average loss per German division in 82 selected engagements was 1.8% per day. The average strength of these divisions was 12,000. These engagements were all from the Italian Campaign and the European Theater of Operations (primarily France).[2]

Now for Germany versus the Soviet Union, the loss rates in 1943 were higher for both sides. We do have daily unit records and have assembled them into a series of 192 division-level engagements for the southern part of Battle of Kursk in July 1943 and 64 division-level engagements for the battles around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943. They show the following statistics:[3]

Battle of Kursk:

                                                            Average Losses:            Average           Average

                                             Cases     Mean     Median             Strength          Force Ratio

Germans attacking               124         0.99        0.78                21,487               1.44

Germans defending                68         0.68        0.52               16,945                0.91

Soviets attacking                    68         3.25        1.67               18,631                1.10

Soviets defending                 124         4.31        3.82               14,930                0.69

 

Battles for Kharkov:

Germans attacking                 35         0.58        0.48                17,326                2.77

Germans defending                29         0.64        0.50                14,834                0.87

Soviets attacking                    29         2.18        1.56                 17,001               1.15

Soviets defending                   35         5.21        3.05                  6,837                0.36

 

Slightly different figures will be created using differing selection criteria, but out of the 124 cases of the Germans attacking at Kursk, in only two cases were German losses greater than 3% [4]. They were both cross-river attacks done on 5 July 1943 by the 106th and 320th Infantry Divisions. German losses at Kursk while defending never exceeded 3%. German losses in the Kharkov engagements never exceeded 2% a day.

Soviet losses exceeded 3% per day in 24 cases while attacking at Kursk and exceeded 6% in ten of those cases. Soviet losses exceeded 3% per day in 67 cases while defending at Kursk (in over half the cases) and exceeded 6% in 39 of those cases. Soviet losses exceeded 3% a day in only two cases while attacking at Kharkov and in 16 cases while defending, of which in seven of those cases Soviet losses exceeded 6% per day.

 

 

[1] See Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1987), page 179.

[2] See Dupuy, Understanding War, page 169. Note that all these WWII engagements were tagged with the note that the data was approximate, more research required. The Dupuy Institute has 282 division-level engagements from the Italian Campaign and ETO that are created from the unit records of both sides. We have not done this comparison using our further developed and more extensive data collection, but suspect the results would be similar.

[3] The data used for this calculation is presented for the Battle of Kursk in a series of 192 engagement sheets in the book by Lawrence, Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorova. This work can be cross-checked by others. The data used for the battles around Kharkov have not been published yet. It might be at some point in the future. The data is currently company proprietary of The Dupuy Institute.

[4] More precise would be to remove all the engagements coded as limited action and limited attack, leaving only those coded as failed attack, attack advances, defender penetrated, defender enveloped and other. In the 124 Kursk cases of the German attacking this would remove 15 cases of limited action, 14 cases of limited attack, and 26 cases where the outcome has not been coded yet. The force ratio is now up to 1.56-to-1 and the average German percent losses are 1.25% while the average Soviet percent losses are 5.83%. Conversely, in the 68 cases where the Soviet are attacking, there are 7 cases are limited action, 9 cases are limited attack and 33 cases where the outcome has not been coded yet. The force ratio for these remaining 19 cases is 1.27 and average Soviet percent losses are 4.05 while the average German percent losses are 0.86.

 In all cases, the mean is calculated as a weighted mean, meaning that it is based upon total strengths compared to total losses. The median is calculated, naturally, by finding the midpoint of all 124 or 68 engagements.

 

The actual paper this was drawn from is here: Average Losses per Day

Response to Question on Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities

Someone just sent an email asking about a particular single line on slide 44 of my Data for Wargames briefing I gave at HAAC: “Self-propelled artillery loss rates are about three times greater than for towed guns”. The briefing is here: Data for Wargames (Summary) – 2

I noted that this from Trevor Dupuy combat attrition verities. He specifically states on page 179 of Understanding War that:

“Self-propelled artillery loss rates are about three times greater than for towed guns. This is due to a combination of factors. larger exposed target; presence of fuel and ammunition in the self-propelled guns carriages; and vulnerability of engines to damage even when the weapon is still able to fire effectively. They are also more likely to be committed under more immediately lethal combat circumstances than are towed artillery pieces. It should be noted, however, that crew loss rates are slightly lower for self-propelled guns than for towed guns.”

This is clearly taken from one of his earlier studies in the 1970s or 19780s. See: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications or TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications or TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. Off the top of my head, I do not recall which study it was from.

Trevor Dupuy also made the comment in private conversation that one other advantage to towed artillery is that after you deployed the piece, you then had a truck available to go get more ammunition.

Dupuy’s Verities: The Complexities of Combat

“The Battle of Leipzig, 16-19 October 1813” by A.I. Zauerweid (1783-1844) [Wikimedia]
The thirteenth and last of Trevor Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat is:

Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple aphorism.

From Understanding War (1987):

This is amply demonstrated by the preceding [verities]. All writers on military affairs (including this one) need periodically to remind themselves of this. In military analysis it is often necessary to focus on some particular aspect of combat. However, the results of such closely focused analyses must the be evaluated in the context of the brutal, multifarious, overlapping realities of war.

Trevor Dupuy was sometimes accused of attempting to reduce war to a mathematical equation. A casual reading of his writings might give that impression, but anyone who honestly engages with his ideas quickly finds this to be an erroneous conclusion. Yet, Dupuy believed the temptation to simplify and abstract combat and warfare to be common enough that he he embedded a warning against doing so into his basic theory on the subject. He firmly believed that human behavior comprises the most important aspect of combat, yet it is all too easy to miss the human experience of war figuring who lost or won and why, and counts of weapons, people, and casualties. As a military historian, he was keenly aware that the human stories behind the numbers—however imperfectly recorded and told—tell us more about the reality of war than mere numbers on their own ever will.

Dupuy’s Verities: Combat Power =/= Firepower

A U.S. 11th Marines 75mm pack howitzer and crew on Guadalcanal, September or October, 1942. The lean condition of the crewmembers indicate that they haven’t been getting enough nutrition during this period. [Wikipedia]

The ninth of Trevor Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat is:

Superior Combat Power Always Wins.

From Understanding War (1987):

Military history demonstrates that whenever an outnumbered force was successful, its combat power was greater than that of the loser. All other things being equal, God has always been on the side of the heaviest battalions and always will be.

In recent years two or three surveys of modern historical experience have led to the finding that relative strength is not a conclusive factor in battle outcome. As we have seen, a superficial analysis of historical combat could support this conclusion. There are a number of examples of battles won by the side with inferior numbers. In many battles, outnumbered attackers were successful.

These examples are not meaningful, however, until the comparison includes the circumstances of the battles and opposing forces. If one take into consideration surprise (when present), relative combat effectiveness of the opponents, terrain features, and the advantage of defensive posture, the result may be different. When all of the circumstances are quantified and applied to the numbers of troops and weapons, the side with the greater combat power on the battlefield is always seen to prevail.

The concept of combat power is foundational to Dupuy’s theory of combat. He did not originate it; the notion that battle encompasses something more than just “physics-based” aspects likely originated with British theorist J.F.C. Fuller during World War I and migrated into U.S. Army thinking via post-war doctrinal revision. Dupuy refined and sharpened the Army’s vague conceptualization of it in the first iterations of his Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) developed in the 1970s.

Dupuy initially defined his idea of combat power in formal terms, as an equation in the QJM:

P = (S x V x CEV)

When:

P = Combat Power
S = Force Strength
V = Environmental and Operational Variable Factors
CEV = Combat Effectiveness Value

Essentially, combat power is the product of:

  • force strength as measured in his models through the Theoretical/Operational Lethality Index (TLI/OLI), a firepower scoring method for comparing the lethality of weapons relative to each other;
  • the intangible environmental and operational variables that affect each circumstance of combat; and
  • the intangible human behavioral (or moral) factors that determine the fighting quality of a combat force.

Dupuy’s theory of combat power and its functional realization in his models have two virtues. First, unlike most existing combat models, it incorporates the effects of those intangible factors unique to each engagement or battle that influence combat outcomes, but are not readily measured in physical terms. As Dupuy argued, combat consists of more than duels between weapons systems. A list of those factors can be found below.

Second, the analytical research in real-world combat data done by him and his colleagues allowed him to begin establishing the specific nature combat processes and their interaction that are only abstracted in other combat theories and models. Those factors and processes for which he had developed a quantification hypothesis are denoted by an asterisk below.

Dupuy’s Verities: The Inefficiency of Combat

The “Mud March” of the Union Army of the Potomac, January 1863.

The twelfth of Trevor Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat is:

Combat activities are always slower, less productive, and less efficient than anticipated.

From Understanding War (1987):

This is the phenomenon that Clausewitz called “friction in war.” Friction is largely due to the disruptive, suppressive, and dispersal effects of firepower upon an aggregation of people. This pace of actual combat operations will be much slower than the progress of field tests and training exercises, even highly realistic ones. Tests and exercises are not truly realistic portrayals of combat, because they lack the element of fear in a lethal environment, present only in real combat. Allowances must be made in planning and execution for the effects of friction, including mistakes, breakdowns, and confusion.

While Clausewitz asserted that the effects of friction on the battlefield could not be measured because they were largely due to chance, Dupuy believed that its influence could, in fact, be gauged and quantified. He identified at least two distinct combat phenomena he thought reflected measurable effects of friction: the differences in casualty rates between large and small sized forces, and diminishing returns from adding extra combat power beyond a certain point in battle. He also believed much more research would be necessary to fully understand and account for this.

Dupuy was skeptical of the accuracy of combat models that failed to account for this interaction between operational and human factors on the battlefield. He was particularly doubtful about approaches that started by calculating the outcomes of combat between individual small-sized units or weapons platforms based on the Lanchester equations or “physics-based” estimates, then used these as inputs for brigade and division-level-battles, the results of which in turn were used as the basis for determining the consequences of theater-level campaigns. He thought that such models, known as “bottom up,” hierarchical, or aggregated concepts (and the prevailing approach to campaign combat modeling in the U.S.), would be incapable of accurately capturing and simulating the effects of friction.

Dupuy’s Verities: The Effects of Firepower in Combat

A German artillery barrage falling on Allied trenches, probably during the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915, during the First World War. [Wikimedia]

The eleventh of Trevor Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat is:

Firepower kills, disrupts, suppresses, and causes dispersion.

From Understanding War (1987):

It is doubtful if any of the people who are today writing on the effect of technology on warfare would consciously disagree with this statement. Yet, many of them tend to ignore the impact of firepower on dispersion, and as a consequence they have come to believe that the more lethal the firepower, the more deaths, disruption, and suppression it will cause. In fact, as weapons have become more lethal intrinsically, their casualty-causing capability has either declined or remained about the same because of greater dispersion of targets. Personnel and tank loss rates of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, for example, were quite similar to those of intensive battles of World War II and the casualty rates in both of these wars were less than in World War I. (p. 7)

Research and analysis of real-world historical combat data by Dupuy and TDI has identified at least four distinct combat effects of firepower: infliction of casualties (lethality), disruption, suppression, and dispersion. All of them were found to be heavily influenced—if not determined—by moral (human) factors.

Again, I have written extensively on this blog about Dupuy’s theory about the historical relationship between weapon lethality, dispersion on the battlefield, and historical decline in average daily combat casualty rates. TDI President Chris Lawrence has done further work on the subject as well.

TDI Friday Read: Lethality, Dispersion, And Mass On Future Battlefields

Human Factors In Warfare: Dispersion

Human Factors In Warfare: Suppression

There appears to be a fundamental difference in interpretation of the combat effects of firepower between Dupuy’s emphasis on the primacy of human factors and Defense Department models that account only for the “physics-based” casualty-inflicting capabilities of weapons systems. While U.S. Army combat doctrine accounts for the interaction of firepower and human behavior on the battlefield, it has no clear method for assessing or even fully identifying the effects of such factors on combat outcomes.