Category Insurgency & Counterinsurgency

Comments to Mission: Indecipherable

I try to stay out of the discussion of the political issue of the day. Needless to say, discussions of Gaza and Iran tend to immediately get political. I am hesitant to express my opinions, because honestly, I really don’t want to waste my time arguing in the invariably testy exchanges that will follow. There are better things I could be doing with my time (like getting my next book complete).

Anyhow, other people I know are more than willing to wade into the debate and as they referencing my work on counterinsurgencies, so it is hard to ignore it entirely.

This is the latest article from Douglas A. Samuelson in RealClearDefense: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/07/06/mission_indecipherable_1192703.html

He does reference his previous article in September 2025 that also references my work on counterinsurgencies: Assessing Israel’s Approach in Gaza | RealClearDefense

His first point is that the U.S. and Isreal have nowhere near the ten-to-one force ratio that appears to be essential to success. Specifically, my studies focused on needing a four-to-1 to ten-to-one ratio to “win” an insurgency depending on insurgent cause. This is discussed in this blog post TDI Friday Read: How Many Troops Are Needed To Defeat An Insurgency? – The Dupuy Institute and A Force Ratio Model Applied to Afghanistan – The Dupuy Institute among other places (like my book America’s Modern Wars). This is a ratio of counterinsurgents (which usually does not include police) to insurgents (including part-time players). I have no idea nor have I examined how many insurgents Hamas and other Gaza groups are capable of fielding. If it is thousands, then Israel probably has the forces to control, contain and eventually defeat the insurgency. If it is tens of thousands, they have a problem. The Wikipedia page on the Gaza War gives Hamas and Palestinian allies a strength of 20,000 to 40,000. I have no idea if that is correct, or if that is correct now. My focus recently has been on Ukraine, not Gaza.

His second point is that U.S. and Isreal do not appear ready to commit to involvement lasting ten or more years….

Now, my studies appear to the source of the DOD quote that insurgencies last an average of ten years. That is an average and includes a number of one-sided cases that were over in four years or less. Furthermore, about a third of the cases were cases where the insurgents won, and on the average they tend to be shorter than those cases where the counterinsurgent won. What this means is that to win a counterinsurgency you must be prepared and willing to stick is out for 20 or more years. It some cases it will go longer than that (i.e. Northern Ireland, which lasted about 30 years).

If you want a single line quote, then if you want to win a counterinsurgency be prepared to go strong and go long. We did not do that in either in Vietnam or Afghanistan and lost the Vietnam War after 10 years and Afghanistan after almost 20 years.

In a later part of the article, does a direct comparison of the population the U.S. versus Iran.  Now, what matters is the force ratio of counterinsurgents versus insurgents. If the U.S. went into Iran and there was not much resistance, only a few thousand people, then we could successfully conduct a counterinsurgency with tens of thousands. On the other hand, if the factions of the Iranian people are able to raise tens of thousands, then our level of commitment wou9ld have to noticibly higher. The IRGC supposedly consists of 150,000 active personnel. As it is, I don’t think anyone is seriously contemplating any long term ground commitment in Iran.

Anyhow, back to working on my book(s) on the Russo-Ukrainian War.

E. B. Vandiver, long serving head of CAA, has passed away

E. B. Vandiver, known to everyone as “Van”, passed away this last week at the age of 87. He became the director of the Concepts Analysis Agency in 1984. I first briefed him in 1987 when I was leading the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB). He retired from full-time work in 2012, promoted up to being “Director Emeritus.” CAA had now become the Center for Army Analysis and had moved to its own building in Fort Belvoir.

A bio: Edgar Bishop Vandiver III (born September 19, 1938), American operations research analyst | World Biographical Encyclopedia

I gather there will be services in Fairfax, VA on Wednesday, March 25.

Obituary: Edgar Bishop Vandiver III Obituary (1938-2026) | Fairfax, VA

As he was the head of the Army’s premier analytical office for almost 30 years, he had an impact on the army and its development from the 1980s, through the collapse of the Soviet Union, through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and after. The head of CAA started as a major general slot back in 1973. Vandiver filled that role for 28 years. 

Past Directors:

  • MG Hal Hallgren January 1973 – February 1976
  • MG Ennis C. Whitehead Jr. April 1976 – May 1980
  • MG Edward B. Atkenson July 1980 – February 1982
  • Mr. David C. Hardison February 1982 – September 1984
  • Mr. E. B. Vandiver III September 1984 – November 2012
  • Dr. William Forrest Crain November 2012 – May 2020

Current Director: Dr. Steven Alexander Stoddard

Wikipeida article on CAA: Center for Army Analysis – Wikipedia

In his almost 30 years at CAA, he tended to make his impact through his management and direct conversation, as opposed to issuing papers and reports. I always found this oral history project done in 2005 to be of interest:

Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Oral History Project Interview of E.B. Vandiver, III, FS on JSTOR

Anyhow, we crossed paths a lot over the decades, although we did not know each other personally. The first major project I worked on, the ACSDB, was funded by CAA and regularly briefed to Van starting in 1987. The Kursk Data Base project I worked on was funded by CAA and was the source for four of my books (my fourth book on Kursk is coming out this fall). We were asked by him to do the Enemy Prisoner of Wars (EPW) studies and the three Urban Warfare studies among other projects. We ended up do the Iraq Casualty Estimate for him in 2004. That work is summarized in my book America’s Modern Wars. Certainly, half of my book War by Numbers was as a result of CAA funding. It was a productive relationship that lasted 22 years. Certainly his willingness to take me seriously when I first started working in this industry in 1987 and his willingness to continue taking me seriously after Trevor Dupuy passed away in 1995, went a long way in being able to do the work that I desired and in keeping The Dupuy Institute alive. 

My last conversation with him was in 2009 or so as the budget was in decline and there was little funding left. I did acknowledge him in several of my books. In the end, without Vandiver at CAA, I would not have had the career I had and could not have done the explorations that I did. He tended to provide budget and let us work the projects as we best felt. He always supported the value of historical research and historical analysis. He had a very significant impact on the community.

9 Books

Finally here is a picture of all nine of my published books. It includes two copies of The Battle for Kyiv, as one is the hardback and one is the paperback version. The paperback version does have some revisions and an expanded photo section.

We are looking to add two more books to that collection in the next six months. An additional book on the Russo-Ukrainian War should be out in the next 2 to 3 months, and The Battle of Tolstoye Woods should be out hopefully this spring. The editing process on all my books is slow, primarily because the large amount of charts, tables and tabular data in them that are a pain to edit and proof.

Two books

These two books are my two analytical books. Both quantitative in approach. Notice the use of the word “Understanding” in both titles.

American’s Modern Wars cover our analysis of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies based upon an analysis of 89 post-WWII cases. There has been very little quantitative analysis of insurgencies. This is the most extensive effort I am aware of. We were blessed with budget and a staff that at one point included ten people. It is amazing what you can do when you have manpower (read $$$).

War by Numbers is our analysis of conventional warfare. It was built from a series of studies we did over the years for the DOD and other contractors. Probably the most extensive qualitative analysis of aspects of conventional war that has been done in the last few decades. Again, helps to have budget.

These are my two “theoretical” books. I am halfway through a book called More War by Numbers. I have stopped work on it to concentrate on other tasks. May get back to in 2027.

The analysis for America’s Modern Wars was based upon 89 post-WWII insurgencies, interventions and peacekeeping operations. We did expand the database to well over 100 cases but never went back and re-shot the analysis due to budget cuts. It would be my desire to expand the database up to around 120 cases, update the 20 or so that were on-going (our data collection stopped in 2008). and then re-shoot and expand the analysis. This would be a good time to do this instead of again waiting until we are in another insurgency and yet again chasing our tail. Our track record on these have not been good, we lost Vietnam, we lost Afghanistan and Iraq was touch-and-go for a while. While we are not in the middle of another insurgency is a good time to study and learn about them based upon real world experience (AKA history).

Sorry to get preachy, but I really don’t like losing wars.

Battle of Baquba 2007 Presentation on Wednesday, 7 PM EST via Zoom

Presentation on the Battle of Baquba 2007 by one of the participants, Dr. R. Ben Richards (Major, USA, ret.) on Wednesday, 10 September, 7 PM EST.

1.  The Counter-Insurgency Insurgency (Battle of Baquba 2007) – 10 September:

https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88289615788?pwd=xcr0NqPr88g4eUtWLSW5RwD5sd6Lem.1

 

Other upcoming presentations and meetings:

3. The Armies on September 16, 1862 – 17 September:

 
2. The Forgotten Campaign – the origin and development of American Economic Warfare in WWIII (1939-41) – 24 September
4. The Morning Battle September 17, 1862 – 1 October:
 
5. The Afternoon and Evening September 17, 1862 – `15 October:
 
The Fourth HAAC is 21-23 October and Dr. Slaughter will be conducting a tour of the battlefield on 24 October (see below).
 
6. The Aftermath September 18 to 20 1862 – 29 October:
 
7. Reassessing the Battle – 12 November: 

 

Fourth HAAC:

The Fourth HAAC, 21 – 23 October. See July’s Schedule for the Fourth Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute and Fourth Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) Tickets, Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite.

We do offer a guided tour of the Antietam battlefield at the end of the HAAC conference on Friday October 24. It will also be conducted by Dr. James Slaughter. 

 

P.S. Here are the first two presentations on Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862 done by Dr. James F. Slaughter III.

1. Understanding Antietam: Part 1: The Strategic Situation in Late Summer 1862: Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (part 1)

2.  Action Prior to Antietam: South Mountain and Harper’s Ferry: Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (part 2)

 

P.P.S. Story behind the book cover: The Book Cover for America’s Modern Wars – The Dupuy Institute

On Amazon.com

The Book Cover for America’s Modern Wars

America’s Modern Wars, Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam is a theoretical work on the nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. It was originally going to be called Understanding Insurgencies but at the publisher’s request we changed the title. I added the “Understanding” part. Needless to say, theoretical works rarely top the Times Best Seller List.

The publisher (Casemate) also chose the cover art. I asked them where it was from, and they only thing they could tell me as that it was from Iraq. But, it was nice and yellow and seemed to stand out and what else do you put on the cover of a theoretical work? It did seem to stand out in the bookstore shelves.

Well, last month, the commanding officer of the two soldiers in that picture contacted me and told me where it came from. To copy parts from his emails (with his permission, of course):

I was personally present when that photo was taken in March 2007 in Buhriz, Iraq (a suburb of provincial capital city Baqubah). The photo was taken several hours into a day-long battle with al Qaeda insurgents.

The photo was taken in March 2007 in the city of Buhriz which is just south and adjacent to Baqubah along the Diyala River about 35 miles northeast of Baghdad. The two soldiers — SSG Derek Grimes and SPC Joshua Emmett– were Cav Scouts in the Stryker-equipped Bronco Troop, 1-14 CAV, which was part of the Cav Squadron of 3-2 SBCT – the Army’s first Stryker Brigade. I was the Troop commander. At the time the Troop was attached to 5-20 Infantry, a Stryker infantry battalion. We had just moved up to Baqubah from Baghdad after participating in the first official surge operations there.
It was our first day there. My troop was assigned the city of Buhriz as our AO and part of the troop had stumpled into a complex ambush in a well-prepared kill zone featuring IEDs, emplaced obstacles, pre-registered indirect fire (mortars), RPG volley fire, heavy machine guns, etc. The ambush devolved into a crawling 15-hour fire fight with my troop of 17 strykers reinforced with a platoon of Bradleys, a tank platoon, a engineer platoon for IED route clearance and ultimately five AH-64 Air Weapon teams that rotated through to empty their loads of thermabaric hellfire missiles. The al Qaeda fighters had laid real or decoy IEDs (mostly triple-stacked 152mm artillery shells with control wire detonators) approximately every 30 meters along the single available road.
After al Qaeda had been evicted from Ramadi at the end of 2006 they moved to Baqubah and declared the city the capital of their Islamic Caliphate. That part of Diyala was under 3rd Bde 1 Cavalry Division, but they lacked the manpower to secure the city and were being heavily attritted. The Mech Infantry Team that I took over Buhriz from lost 19 Abrams and Bradleys in their first 4 months there and over 10 percent of their company KIA. Buhriz, itself had never been under US control. It was a Baathist retirement community before al Qaeda had moved in and laid siege to a local Iraqi Army base which they took over an literally leveled after al Qaeda had defeated a US battalion-level armored counterattack that failed to penetrate into the town and relieve the siege. If Baqubah was the capital of al Qaeda in Iraq, Buhriz was the capital of al Qaeda in Baqubah. When we arrived, 3-1 CAV reported over 4,500 “active fighters” for al Qaeda in the city.
Within a few weeks, Bronco Troop became ground zero for what later became called the Sunni Awakening. Michael Gordon partly recounts the story of how this happened and how it spread through Iraq in his book Endgame. He actually embedded with my troop for a few days during the Summer. In early April we were able to form an alliance with the local population, evict al Qaeda and establish a secure fortified enclave. Because of the reputational importance of Buhriz and the threat that if Buhriz succeeded in defying al Qaeda, active opposition would spread, al Qaeda was compelled to launch a series of large-scale conventional attacks to attempt to retake the town. This of course played to our strengths, and we repulsed them each time with heavy losses to them and minimal losses to us. We had established our own intelligence network that had infiltrated al Qaeda and we were able to get enemy BDA within 48 hours of each engagement. A former Iraqi military intelligence officer and military academy graduate who ran the network reported a total loss to al Qaeda over six months of fighting over Buhriz at around 1,200 fighters KIA. Buhriz became the meat-grinder that destroyed al Qaedas fighting power and reputation in Iraq. Our local Iraqi allies spread the “Awakening” through their networks and as we demonstrated the success of our model and succeeded defeating al Qaeda and securing the people of Buhriz (and delivered essential services), the movement quickly spread throughout the Sunni and moderate Shia areas of Iraq. And yes, as you suspected in your book, their were former insurgents who had fought US soldiers in earlier battles among the Awakening membership and leadership.
Ben Richards (Major, USA, ret.) was seriously wounded in Iraq in a targeted attempt to kill him.  He has since gotten a PhD and will be giving two virtual presentations, the first on this coming Wednesday, at 7:00 PM EST via zoom.

1.  The Counter-Insurgency Insurgency (Battle of Baquba 2007) – 10 September:

https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88289615788?pwd=xcr0NqPr88g4eUtWLSW5RwD5sd6Lem.1

and…

2. The Forgotten Campaign – the origin and development of American Economic Warfare in WWIII (1939-41)

https://us06web.zoom.us/j/85102581565?pwd=yyrcjsdWLGLtMjjFOyFXxLuDGK6VaV.1

He will also be attending the Fourth HAAC and giving three presentations there:

3. The Fourth HAAC, 21 – 23 October. See July’s Schedule for the Fourth Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute and Fourth Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) Tickets, Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite.

I do want to thank Casemate for their choice of photographs, as it lead, a decade later, to an introduction to soldier-scholar Ben Richards.

 

 

P.S. Hard copies of the book are for sale via The Dupuy Institute:  Books – The Dupuy Institute

On Amazon.com

Presentations from HAAC – Group Discussion: Could We Have Won the War in Afghanistan, 2001 – 2021?

The fourth event of the second day in the Pike & Gallows Conference room was a group discussion on whether we could have won the war in Afghanistan. I opened the discussion with a brief 12-slide presentation, built from my original presentation that morning. It is here: Could We Have Won

We then went into a general discussion around the conference room. I have not checked to see if we got a good video of that.

Anyhow, part of the reason that I added that to the program is that first: I think it actually does need to be discussed. Second, I have thought about blogging about that in depth, although I am spread so thin right now that I have held off doing so. I have not seen anyone else seriously discussing this.

The first presentation of the day was my monstrosity, Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (which I later turned into the book America’s Modern Wars): NIC Compilation 3.1

The second presentation of the day was Lessons Learned from Haiti 1915-1934 by Dr. Christopher Davis of UNCG: History as an Enemy and Instructor

The third presentation of the day was Estimating War Deaths (in Iraq) by Dr. Michael Spagat of Royal Holloway University of London: Iraq Deaths

——

We had a total of 30 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The nine presentations given on the first day are all here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Presentations from HAAC – Estimating War Deaths (in Iraq)

The third presentation of the second day was by Dr. Michael Spagat, an American scholar that teaches at the Royal Holloway University of London. It is called “Estimating War Deaths (in Iraq):” Iraq Deaths

Dr. Spagat has been focused on examining all casualties in war, and sometimes this has led him to publicly question some of the estimates that other people have provided. It is not unusual to see estimates of combat casualties inflated by an order of magnitude, and by the same token, sometimes civilian casualties get estimated at an order of magnitude higher than what they probably are. Getting a better estimate does not diminish the tragedy nor change the story. I do feel that inflated estimates actually undermine the authenticity of the story; but more to the point, facts-are-facts and data-is-data and this stuff is actually important. Anyhow, I am a big fan of Dr. Spagat’s work as demonstrated by this series of threads I posted in 2017 that I think all readers of this blog should take a look at: TDI Friday Read: Mike Spagat’s Economics of Warfare Lectures & Commentaries | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The first presentation of the day was my monstrosity, Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (which I later turned into the book America’s Modern Wars): NIC Compilation 3.1

The second presentation of the day was Lessons Learned from Haiti 1915-1934 by Dr. Christopher Davis of UNCG: History as an Enemy and Instructor

————–

We had a total of 30 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The nine presentations given on the first day are all here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Presentations from HAAC – Lessons Learned from Haiti 1915-1934

The second presentation on the second day was by Dr. Christopher Davis of UNCG (University of North Carolina, Greensboro) called “History as an Enemy and an Instructor: Lessons Learned from Haiti 1915-1934. It is here: History as an Enemy and Instructor

Now, in all my insurgency and counter insurgency work I drew all my cases from post-World War II data. It not because I did not think that data before WWII was not relevant, I just knew it would be a harder sale. People often high-handedly dismiss history as irrelevant when it gives them an answer they do not like. The older the history, the easier it is to off-handedly dismiss it. Therefore, for the sake of not having to have that argument, I kept all my insurgency work post-WWII. Even that did not protect me, with people complaining about me referencing insurgencies in Chad they had never heard of and using too many “wars of national liberation” in my data set, which supposedly biased my results. Apparently, if you do not have the data to dispute the result of our research, you just dismiss our data; which apparently is enough to establish your opposing viewpoint. Anyhow, I felt that Haiti is in fact a perfectly representative example to learn from so when Dr. Davis offered to brief on it, I immediately agreed.

The first presentation of the day was my monstrosity, Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (which I later turned into the book America’s Modern Wars): NIC Compilation 3.1

———–

We had a total of 30 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The nine presentations given on the first day are all here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Presentations from HAAC – Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan

Attached is the first presentation for the second day of the conference. It was an old presentation that I gave at the National Intelligence Council (NIC) back in 2008. It was still relevant: NIC Compilation 3.1. Most of this is discussed in my book America’s Modern Wars.

————-

We had a total of 30 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The nine presentations given on the first day are all here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).