Category AI

AI and the 3-to-1 rule (AI issue #4)

My friend, affectionally known as Mr. Spock, decided to look at a little further. He asked Microsoft’s Copilot: “What evidence is there about Dupuy Institute claims concerning the relevance of a 3:1 ratio’s usefulness in military warfare?”

The short answer: The Dupuy Institute’s own research does not support the idea that the 3:1 ratio is a universally valid or predictive rule of warfare. Their empirical battle databases show that attackers often win with less than 3:1, that 3:1 is rarely achieved, and that the rule itself is conceptually ambiguous. The Institute’s founder, Trevor N. Dupuy, explicitly criticized the rule’s usefulness.

Now this does contradict the previous AI answer on the subject: Another AI issue (#3) – The Dupuy Institute

It did provide a “structured, evidence-driven breakdown”

Core Evidence From Dupuy Institute Sources

1. Dupuy’s empirical critique of the 3:1 rule

Trevor Dupuy argued that the 3:1 rule is ambiguous, poorly defined, and unsupported as a universal planning factor. He questioned what “3:1” even refers to—men, weapons, firepower, or some other measure—and emphasized that context matters more than raw numbers. dupuyinstitute.dreamhosters.com

He wrote that neither numbers nor firepower “tells us much unless we know the circumstances under which these numbers face each other and the manner in which the firepower is applied.” dupuyinstitute.dreamhosters.com

2. Historical battle database results (HERO/CAA study)

Dupuy’s Historical Evaluation Research Organization (HERO) compiled 598 battles (1600–1973). The U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency analyzed these data and found:

  • Attackers with ≥3:1 manpower succeeded 74% of the time.
  • Attackers with between 1.5:1 disadvantage and <3:1 advantage still won 58–63% of the time.
  • Only 17.7% of battles** even achieved a 3:1 manpower advantage.** dupuyinstitute.dreamhosters.com

Implication:
3:1 improves odds but is not required for success, and most real battles do not meet it.

3. Dupuy’s own clarification in Understanding War

In a 1989 correspondence responding to critics, Dupuy clarified that he did not endorse the 3:1 rule as a reliable predictor. He called it a “crude rule of thumb” used by planners, not a validated law of combat. JSTOR

He emphasized that the rule’s basis is only that “in historical instances an attacker with such an advantage has usually been successful”—a generalization, not a principle. JSTOR

4. Modern Dupuy Institute commentary (Christopher A. Lawrence)

Current TDI leadership continues to stress that:

  • The 3:1 rule is frequently misunderstood.
  • Their data shows wide variation in outcomes at all force ratios.
  • Human factors, posture, terrain, and operational conditions often outweigh raw ratios. The Dupuy Institute

Lawrence points readers to Understanding War and War by Numbers, both of which show that force ratios alone are weak predictors of outcomes.

🧭 External scholarly reinforcement

5. U.S. Army monograph: An Examination of Force Ratios

A 2019 Army thesis reviewing Dupuy and others concludes that force ratios are often invalid as planning heuristics and may create “unwanted mental constraints.” apps.dtic.mil

This aligns with Dupuy’s own empirical findings.

🎯 Synthesis: What the Evidence Shows

What is supported?

  • A 3:1 manpower advantage does correlate with higher attacker success rates.
  • It is a useful very rough heuristic for planners.

What is not supported?

  • That 3:1 is necessary for success.
  • That 3:1 is a universal predictor across eras, terrains, or force types.
  • That 3:1 is meaningful without specifying what is being measured (men, firepower, combat power).
  • That 3:1 is commonly achievable in real operations.

Dupuy Institute’s bottom line:

The 3:1 rule is not a validated law of combat, but a simplistic planning rule whose predictive value collapses under empirical scrutiny.

 

In the end its sources are two articles on this blog, a response Trevor Dupuy wrote in 1989 in response to a question about his 1987 book Understanding War, and a masters-degree-level thesis prepared at C&GS. It interestingly and somewhat significantly did not reference Trevor Dupuy’s book Understanding War which has a chapter on the subject or my book War by Numbers which has a chapter on force ratios.

Now, why isn’t it referencing these sources, which are probably where I would start if I was researching this subject? Well, they are published books and still under the 70 year copyright rule.  So you can look at a copy at your local library, but AI cannot reference or read it. It is not available as a download file on the internet, therefore they appear to not exist. This means that AI has a 70-year blind spot, in that it cannot reference or review anything written in the last 70-years unless someone re-posts elements to the internet. This is what is did with Trevor Dupuy’s book Understanding War.  In this effort (which was fine), it mostly used blog posts written by me or Shawn Woodford.

I am not sure how this works, but if I get hit by a bus, and am no longer able to pay the annual fees to maintain this blog, then I gather this knowledge will disappear from the internet and from AI’s access.  

This is now the fourth issue I have had with AI (not that I am using it much). I have blogged about them:

1. Khrushchev Quote and AI – The Dupuy Institute
2. Yahoo AI and order of battle for operations near Chernihiv in 2022 – The Dupuy Institute
3. Another AI issue (#3) – The Dupuy Institute
4. This blog post (AI Issue #4)

Another AI issue (#3)

My biggest issue with AI is not that it is going to take over the world (i.e. Terminator V?), it is that it makes mistake. AI makes simple factual errors because it lacks the ability to question and crosscheck. Now, granted a lot of people make the same type of mistakes, but if these “machines” are going to be better than us, they kind of need to quit making simple mistakes.

I have blogged about these mistakes before. here Khrushchev Quote and AI – The Dupuy Institute  and here Yahoo AI and order of battle for operations near Chernihiv in 2022 – The Dupuy Institute. It messed up a citation in the first case and it made an error in the order of battle in the second. The problem was that these mistakes were on the web (and AI does not seem to be able to do original research) and it picked up those errors. It does not appear to have the ability to weigh and discern the difference between contradictory data or look deeper into data that does not look right. It seems to have no ability to tell if the data does not look right. It does provide entertaining art though:  War by Numbers by AI – The Dupuy Institute.

Now an old friend of mind has found another error. In this case he was using AI to help with a wargame design. It provided the following note:

  • Even overwhelming invasions (e.g., the Great Heathen Army) suffered setbacks.

Your probability curve (14% at 1:1, 28% at 2:1, 42% at 3:1, etc.) mirrors the historical pattern that 3:1 is the threshold of likely success, a principle echoed in modern military theory (e.g., Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions, and War).

It actually referenced Numbers, Predictions, and War. Not sure if the AI could actually read it as it is not supposed to be available on the web (copyright is still active). But NPW does not actually address the 3-to-1 rule. Doesn’t even mention it (I do have a .pdf version I can search). Now, Trevor Dupuy does have a chapter on it in Understanding War, but it doesn’t really say that. We have blogged about this before:

  1. The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule – The Dupuy Institute
  2. The Source of the U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule – The Dupuy Institute
  3. The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus the 752 Case Division-level Data Base 1904-1991 – The Dupuy Institute
  4. The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 49 U.S. Civil War battles – The Dupuy Institute
  5. The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 243 Battles 1600-1900 – The Dupuy Institute
  6. People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute which references another eight links to the blog on the subject, including:
  7. Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

Anyhow, we have talked about it a lot. It never seems to go away even though I think the military analytical community would be better served to never reference it again. I also have a chapter on force ratios in my book War by Numbers.

So, AI pulls up a rule that does not have much validity and then proceeds to give an incorrect reference to a book that never discusses it. Not encouraging.

Yahoo AI and order of battle for operations near Chernihiv in 2022

Well, having some more problems with AI. I was trying to confirm for once and for all whether any elements of the Russian 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade was near Chernihiv in first six weeks of the Russo-Ukrainian War? My suspicion is that it was not although some Wikipedia-type orders of battle put it there.

I did ask Yahoo AI and it said:

———

The 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade was indeed active near Chernihiv in 2022 during the early stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Operational Context

  • The brigade is part of the Russian Airborne Forces and was involved in operations aimed at capturing key Ukrainian cities.
  • Chernihiv, located in northern Ukraine, was a significant target due to its strategic location.

Military Engagement

  • Reports indicate that the brigade participated in assaults and faced resistance from Ukrainian forces.
  • The fighting around Chernihiv was intense, with Ukrainian defenders successfully repelling several attacks.

Current Status

  • As of late 2022, the situation in the region evolved, with ongoing military engagements and shifting front lines.

This information is based on various military analyses and reports from the conflict.


Unfortunately, it did not give the actual sources they used. I gather anything incorrectly entered into Wikipedia results in AI responses that could be in error. I went to their Yahoo Chat and they gave three sources: 1) Siege of Chernihiv | Military Wiki | Fandom, 2) 6 months of war: How Russia got derailed in Ukraine and 3) Russian Authorities Detain, Threaten Soldiers Refusing to Fight in Ukraine – The Moscow Times.

I am still not convinced that AI is operating above the level of a bright high school student.

 

Khrushchev Quote and AI

Nikita Khrushchev is one of more interesting people of the cold war era. I found a quote of his that I wanted to use in one of my books on the current Russo-Ukranian war. The quote is “The more bombers, the less room for doves of peace.”

Great quote, it is all over the internet, but none of the references actually said when and where it was said. I am jaded enough that I never use a quote that I cannot find the source for. I could not find a source of this one.

So, not being a complete dinosaur, I decided to use Yahoo.com little AI function (chat.yahoo.com). It ended up stating:

Nikita Khrushchev famously stated, “The more bombers, the less room for doves of peace,” during a speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959. This quote reflects his critique of the arms race and the paradox of military escalation during the Cold War, emphasizing that an increase in military power diminishes the space for peaceful resolutions and diplomacy 1.

If you have more questions about Khrushchev or related topics, feel free to ask! 😊

Sources:

 

Problem solved. AI gave me date and location. But, I checked the footnote and it did not say that. So then I checked speech that he gave there: On Peaceful Co-Existence: A Collection : Хрущев, Никита Сергеевич, 1894-1971 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

On page 100 is the complete transcript of the speech he gave at the UN on September 18, 1959. It has one reference to bombers, no references to doves. It clearly was not stated in this speech.

Now, it does appear that the Yahoo AI just made up an answer. A convincing invention, and one that could have caught me out if I did not diligently crosschecked.

So, I went and searched the newspapers.com file. The Tampa Tribune in 1995 gave me the attribution “Nikita Khrushchev, speech on Moscow radio, March 14, 1958.  Aug 06, 1995, page 8 – The Tampa Tribune at Newspapers.com.

Oddly enough that was the only two papers in the newspapers.com database that repeated this quote. The Tucson Citizen in 2002 also used the quote, attributing it to “Nikita S. Khruschev, Soviet premier, 1958”.  Dec 28, 2002, page 19 – Tucson Citizen at Newspapers.com. So at least they agree on the year, even if they spell his name differently. 

Should I stop looking? I would like to find the original source or an earlier source for this quote. Not sure where to look next.

 

P.S. Just to note, Khrushchev was

1938-1947: First Secretary, Kiev City Committee

1938-1947: First Secretary, Kiev Regional Committee

1944-1947: Chairman, Ukrainian Council of Ministers

And in 1954 he was the person who transferred Sevastopol and Crimea to Ukraine. 

He, as always, has a very checkered history. This is well illustrated by his grave, done at his family’s request by a sculptor he had suppressed: Ernst Neizvestny – Wikipedia.