Category Kursk Data Bases

I do have my copies of The Battle for Tolstoye Woods

Christopher A. Lawrence
October 2, 2026

I do have my 20 copies of Turning the Tide at Kursk (The Battle of Tolstoye Woods). So, I gather it will be in stores shortly.

Eastern Europe Eastern Front Kursk Data Bases Russia World War II

The Battle of Tolstoye Woods will be released 20 October 2026

Christopher A. Lawrence
October 1, 2026

The book that I call The Battle of Tolstoye Woods will be released by Stackpole book on 20 October 2026. This is the first day of the Fifth HAAC. I doubt if I will have copies of books at the conference.

The title of the book is Turing the Tide at Kursk: The Battle of Tostoye Woods and How the Red Army Thwarted German Tanks West of Prokhorovka. Turning the Tide at Kursk probably is a better title for marketing purposes. This was the Soviet attack on 12 July 1943 that succeeded, completely putting a halt to the XLVIII Panzer Corps advance.

The Battle of Kursk, in the south, consists of two panzer corps of equal strength advancing side-by-side to the north. The SS Panzer Corps, the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Fifth Guards Tank Army and General Pavel Rotmistrov get all the press. What was going on to the west was equally important, and in the Soviet attack succeeded (unlike Prokhorovka). This was the panzer corps with the bridging assets that was move north to cross the Psel and take Oboyan. This battle was at least as important as Prokhorovka, probably more so. General Paval Rotmistrov, who failed, is famous. General Mikhail Katukov, who succeeded, not as much

Anyhow, the link to Amazon to the book is here: Turning the Tide at Kursk: The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and How the Red Army Thwarted German Tanks West of Prokhorovka: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811778053: Amazon.com: Books

The link to the Fifth HAAC is here: The Fifth HAAC is 20 – 22 October – The Dupuy Institute

Eastern Europe Eastern Front Historical Analysis Annual Conference Kursk Kursk Data Bases World War II

E. B. Vandiver, long serving head of CAA, has passed away

Christopher A. Lawrence
March 23, 2026

E. B. Vandiver, known to everyone as “Van”, passed away this last week at the age of 87. He became the director of the Concepts Analysis Agency in 1984. I first briefed him in 1987 when I was leading the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB). He retired from full-time work in 2012, promoted up to being “Director Emeritus.” CAA had now become the Center for Army Analysis and had moved to its own building in Fort Belvoir.

A bio: Edgar Bishop Vandiver III (born September 19, 1938), American operations research analyst | World Biographical Encyclopedia

I gather there will be services in Fairfax, VA on Wednesday, March 25.

Obituary: Edgar Bishop Vandiver III Obituary (1938-2026) | Fairfax, VA

As he was the head of the Army’s premier analytical office for almost 30 years, he had an impact on the army and its development from the 1980s, through the collapse of the Soviet Union, through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and after. The head of CAA started as a major general slot back in 1973. Vandiver filled that role for 28 years.

Past Directors:

MG Hal Hallgren January 1973 – February 1976
MG Ennis C. Whitehead Jr. April 1976 – May 1980
MG Edward B. Atkenson July 1980 – February 1982
Mr. David C. Hardison February 1982 – September 1984
Mr. E. B. Vandiver III September 1984 – November 2012
Dr. William Forrest Crain November 2012 – May 2020

Current Director: Dr. Steven Alexander Stoddard

Wikipeida article on CAA: Center for Army Analysis – Wikipedia

In his almost 30 years at CAA, he tended to make his impact through his management and direct conversation, as opposed to issuing papers and reports. I always found this oral history project done in 2005 to be of interest:

Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Oral History Project Interview of E.B. Vandiver, III, FS on JSTOR

Anyhow, we crossed paths a lot over the decades, although we did not know each other personally. The first major project I worked on, the ACSDB, was funded by CAA and regularly briefed to Van starting in 1987. The Kursk Data Base project I worked on was funded by CAA and was the source for four of my books (my fourth book on Kursk is coming out this fall). We were asked by him to do the Enemy Prisoner of Wars (EPW) studies and the three Urban Warfare studies among other projects. We ended up do the Iraq Casualty Estimate for him in 2004. That work is summarized in my book America’s Modern Wars. Certainly, half of my book War by Numbers was as a result of CAA funding. It was a productive relationship that lasted 22 years. Certainly his willingness to take me seriously when I first started working in this industry in 1987 and his willingness to continue taking me seriously after Trevor Dupuy passed away in 1995, went a long way in being able to do the work that I desired and in keeping The Dupuy Institute alive.

My last conversation with him was in 2009 or so as the budget was in decline and there was little funding left. I did acknowledge him in several of my books. In the end, without Vandiver at CAA, I would not have had the career I had and could not have done the explorations that I did. He tended to provide budget and let us work the projects as we best felt. He always supported the value of historical research and historical analysis. He had a very significant impact on the community.

Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base Combat Databases Insurgency & Counterinsurgency Kursk Kursk Data Bases Research & Analysis War by Numbers

9 Books

Finally here is a picture of all nine of my published books. It includes two copies of The Battle for Kyiv, as one is the hardback and one is the paperback version. The paperback version does have some revisions and an expanded photo section.

We are looking to add two more books to that collection in the next six months. An additional book on the Russo-Ukrainian War should be out in the next 2 to 3 months, and The Battle of Tolstoye Woods should be out hopefully this spring. The editing process on all my books is slow, primarily because the large amount of charts, tables and tabular data in them that are a pain to edit and proof.

Four books on Kursk

I have three books published on the Battle of Kursk and one coming out next year (The Batte of Tolstoye Woods).

The Battle of Kusk was the largest battle of World War II. You would not get that sense from the military history section of most bookstores. Anyhow, there were four parts to the battle. The German offensive in the south from 4 to 24 July 1943, the German offensive in the north for 5 – 12 July 1943, the Soviet counteroffensive around Orel from 12 July to 23 August and the Soviet counteroffensive around Kharkov from 3 August to 23 August. My books are mostly about the German offensive in the south. I have consider doing one or two about the Battle(s) of Kharkov, but I have been distracted by the war that started in that same area in 2022.

I do have a fourth book coming out next year called The Battle of Tolstoye Woods. This one actually covers the Soviet counterattack that actually worked and stopped a German panzer corps. Everyone tends to focus on the Battle of Prokhorovka, but there were three German armored corps attacking in the south, and they all had to be stopped. This book is about the Red Army halting the 48th Panzer Corps, which was as large as the SS Panzer Corps.

Anyhow, not sure if I will get around to a fifth Kursk book. Might.

P.S. I do think my original book is the largest history book ever written: Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever? — History News Network

I have not submitted it to the Guinness World Records.

P.P.S. Here is the link to the “Other Battle of Kursk” which has been posted to Amazon.com (UK). It will be The Battle of Tolstoye Woods: The Other Battle of Kursk: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811773737: Amazon.com: Books and The Other Battle of Kursk: Amazon.co.uk: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811773737: Books

Casemate has Aces at Kursk

Casemate Publishers (U.S. – Philadelphia/Haverford), who published my book America’s Modern Wars (hardcopies are here: Books – The Dupuy Institute), is advertising my book Aces at Kursk for sale. This is the email they sent me: New Releases! (mailchi.mp)

Aces at Kursk is for sale on Amazon.com (U.S.)

It looks like Aces at Kursk is for sale in the U.S. on Amazon.com. The link is here: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books

Yesterday they were reporting 19 in stock, this morning it was 16. So it does look like they were selling and shipping. Let me know when someone sees copies in the book stores.

Aces at Kursk should be out in early July

According to Pen & Sword, the printers should be delivering Aces at Kursk next Friday (the 5th of July) to their warehouse, and so the stock should be booked in the week commencing 8th July, all being well.

Right now, Amazon UK is showing its release date as 30 Jan. 2024. Amazon US is showing the release date as 25 July 2024. Waiting for this to be updated but I gather the UK release date is on or shortly after 8 July 2024. U.S. release date will be later (don’t know how much later).

Hunting Falcon is also in process and will be released this summer.

Sorry for the delays, these are things not under my control.

Also see:

Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing – The Dupuy Institute

Aces at Kursk – Summation – The Dupuy Institute

Let’s talk about artillery shells

Christopher A. Lawrence
February 27, 2024

Now, when we first did the validation database the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, one of the fields we had to fill in for each division, and corps, and army was on the tons of ammunition used each day by four types.

This was because the combat models that were supposed to be validated using this database were used in part to determine the number of shells needed for a predicted upcoming war. Back in 1987, when we started this database, it was a war in Europe versus the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Now, my history with the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), later renamed the Center for Army Analysis (still CAA), goes back to 1973, when it was founded in Bethesda, MD. I was in my junior year in high school, my mother had just been promoted to a school principal and my father had just finished his three-year assignment in the Pentagon. My mother did not want to move again, so, my father found another assignment in the DC area. This was with the newly forming CAA in 1973. He had just happened to have finished a master degree in Systems Analysis from USC, so was nominally qualified.

My father was working over at manpower in the Pentagon, under Col. John Brinkerhoff. They all reported to General Donn Starry (who I did have the pleasure of meeting). Those two transferred together over the CAA, with Col. (Dr.) John Brinkerhoff taking over a division with my father as his assistant. I therefore started hearing stories about CAA combat models in 1973 based upon my father’s hands-on experience. One of the stories he told was that the model tended to fire the longest-range weapons first as units were closing. This made the 8″ Howitzer very valuable. In fact, so valuable, that the best wargaming strategy was build an army of 8″ Howitzers and destroy the Warsaw Pact before they could ever get into engagement range. Obviously, there were a couple of flaws in that wargame.

But, the suite of models, some of which are still in use today, was used to determine the ammunition requirements for the U.S. Army. Therefore, a validation database needed to address these issues. The same fields also existed the Kursk Data Base (1993-1996), which ended up never being used to validate a combat model. It was used to create a big-ass book.

Anyhow, CAA combat models did determine our ammunition requirements until the end of the cold war (22 or 25 or 26 December 1991 when the Soviet Union fell). They were also used to determine the requirements for the 1991 Gulf War. According to the story I heard in a meeting, CAA provided the Army general staff with the requirements for the Gulf War. The general staff doubled the figures CAA gave and then we stacked every dock in the Gulf with ammunition. Luckily none of Hussian’s missiles hit those docks. At the end of the war, it turns out we shipped at least ten times the ammunition we needed. As this was old dumb munitions dating back to World War II, it was cheaper to destroy them there then ship them back, which is what we did. Don’t have a count of what was destroyed in the Gulf, but guessing it was millions of rounds.

After that, I do not know what OSD PA&E or CAA or the U.S. Army did to determine ammunition requirements. We no longer had a neatly canned scenario like the Fulda Gap. We no longer had a clear enemy. How much ammunition is needed is driven by both the combat model used (which tends to “run hot”) and more significantly, the scenarios used. If all the scenarios used a four-day combat scenario (like the Gulf War) then one will end up with very different needs then if one is planning for a 90-day or 180-day war (or three-year war in the case of Ukraine). I have no idea what scenarios were used, and it is probably classified. But, the end result, is that our production of ammunition over the decades since 1991 has dropped considerably while a lot of our reserves were destroyed in the Gulf.

This, of course, harkens back to a complaint I have made over the years, which is that we tend to focus on the missions and wars we think are most likely now, and not the entire spectrum of wars and conflicts that we can see are possible if one looks wider and deeper into history. Clearly, we were not ready for extended war in Ukraine, and this is not the first time in recent times we have not been properly prepared for certain conflicts. I do discuss this issue in America’s Modern Wars.

P.S. The West is underestimating Ukraine’s artillery needs – Defense One

Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base Combat Databases Kursk Data Bases Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming Validation

The History of the DuWar Data Bases

Christopher A. Lawrence
December 14, 2023

The original databases of battles was developed by Trevor Dupuy and HERO (Historical Evaluation and Research Organization) back in the 1980s. They were published in a six volume work in 1983 as the HERO Land Warfare Data Base. This is back in the days when a data base did not have to be computerized (paper database – how quaint) and database was two words. It is report number 95 listed here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. Descriptive link is here: Analysis of Factors that have Influenced the Outcomes of Battles and Wars (dupuyinstitute.org). Of significance, there is a detailed description of each engagement in these paper reports. It was republished in 1984, 1985 and 1986 as report numbers 100, 103 and 111 here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. The final publication named the database as CHASE.

This effort was funded by CAA and was before my time. I came to work for HERO in 1987. There was then some back and forth between CAA, where HERO and CAA got to fighting over details of the content. One analyst at CAA sent 16 engagements out for comment. I did analyze that effort, although that file is now buried on an old Word Perfect DOS-era disk. He had four outside independent historians each analyze four engagements. The end result is the comments made corrections/improvements to 25% of the engagements, the comments did really did not change anything in 25% of the engagements, and the comments actually, if implemented, would have added error the engagements in 50% of the cases. This is fairly typical of outside comments, with 1-out-of-3 or 1-out-of-4 being helpful, and half of them would degrade the product. At that point, the project came to a griding halt, with much animosity between the arguing parties.

Then both HERO and CAA decided to independently computerize their databases. HERO added about four new engagements to their database, maybe corrected a few others, and the programmed it in a flat file called Reflex. It was 603 engagements (working off memory here) and called the LWDB (Land Warfare Data Base). CAA decided to computerize its version of 598 or 599 engagements and it was called the CHASE database. This became the CBD-90 that some people are still using. Neither of these versions included the extensive battle narratives as databases at that time could not handle large text files.

The computerized Reflex version of the LWDB was later purchased by Oak Ridge National Laboratories and published in the book by Dr. Dean Harley. It is a better version than the CBD-90. I did review the CBD-90 over twenty years ago. In the original database, there were a series of factors that were coded as to what degree they influenced the battle. In the CBD-90 about one-third of those factors (or one-third of the engagements that had those factors) – they were blanked out or mis-coded. It was a simple coding error, that as far as I know has never been corrected.

In the meantime, around 1995 I decided we needed to reorganize and reprogram the database. We had a new database created by Jay Karamales in Access. It included text files. We loaded the old Reflex engagements in the database and then Susan Rich and I proofed the entire database back to the paper copies. Susan Rich then entered in all the narratives into the database. So this was now a complete and proofed version of the 1986 paper database.

I then broke the database up. One of the problems with the original database is that it has engagements from 1600 next to engagements from 1973 next to a series of day-long division-level engagements from WWII next to some six-month long army-level engagements from the Great War next to battalion-level actions. While there are definitely some historical trends across all these, in some cases, depending on what you are analyzing, it is comparing apples to oranges. So, I took at mostly one-day battles from 1600-1900 and put them in a separate database (243 engagements – the BaDB. I took all the large army-level engagements (like Battle of Verdun, Battle of the Somme) and put them into a Large Action Data Base – LADB. Basically, moved them out of the way. They were later used in part to help create the CaDB (Campaign Data Base). I put the smaller battalion-sized engagements into a separate battalion-level data base (BLODB). They left us with a core of around 300 engagements in a division-level database, mostly of 1-day engagements. All this work was done outside and independent of any contracted effort and therefore became a Dupuy Institute proprietary product. As with any proprietary product, you have to protect it.

We then expanded all these databases. In the case of the division-level database (the DLEDB), we ended up doing a series of studies for CAA on Enemy Prisoner of War capture rates in 1998-2001. We coded the division-level engagements by outcome and then using that to analyze capture rates based upon the outcomes of the battle. This effort included getting counts of the number captured and the number of deserters in each engagement. This is reports E-1 to E-8 here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. The data used (but not the complete listing of the engagement) was included in appendices to these reports. CAA and the U.S. Army is still using these new rates.

We also added engagements to it from our urban warfare studies (CAA), reports U-1 to U-3. We used the database to analyze the urban versus non-urban combat. It was during that study we added engagements from the Channel Ports, Aachen and the three battles of Kharkov (1943). This study is discussed in two chapters in my book War by Numbers. We also took the time and put in 192 engagements from the Battle of Kursk (1943) based upon our work on the Kursk Data Base. All these Kursk engagements are listed (abbreviated) in my big Kusk: The Battle of Prokhorovka book. We also did a study on situational awareness for OSD Net Assessment (Andy Marshall’s old office). This is report SA-1 and also two chapters in my book War by Numbers. We ended up coding 295 division-level engagements based upon their knowledge of the enemy (by reviewing their intel reports of the divisions involved). We then reviewed what was the measurable combat advantage of improved situation awareness based upon real-world combat data. So, as in the EPW study, we took our original database and added additional filled-in fields so as to be able to do properly analyze the issue. This last expansion of the database was completed in 2004.

At that point, the division-level database had 752 cases in it. We had done some additional work on the old Italian Campaign engagements to clean them up and revise them. In particular Richard Anderson collected UK records from PRO and we cross-checked and revised all the UK engagements in the database and expanded the number of Italian Campaign engagements from about 70 to around 140. We then stopped work on the database in 2004.

During that time, we also expanded the battalion-level database of 127 actions. We also had created a Campaign Data Base as part of our work, to examine operations above division-level and that last more than a few days. This was recently used for my presentation on Force Ratios that I gave at the second HAAC and in Norway in early November. See: The Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 – 19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). In 2010 we created a small draft company-level database under contract with Boeing of 100 cases. A listing of most of these databases is here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. It does not include the company-level database, the Battle of Britain database nor the Dupuy Insurgency Spread Sheets (DISS) as we have not updated that page.

Obviously, people are going to ask: how can they get access to these databases. The answer is that you cannot until someone is willing to purchase them at a price that I willing to release them for. With the internet any single sale of the database will result in the release of the entire database to the world. So, any price would have to address the fact that these powerful and unique databases, which are proprietary to The Dupuy Institute, would be shared with the world. This includes potential business competitors. We still rely on contracts for our funding and these databases are part of our “product.” So, cost of giving away an exclusive competitive advantage? We would be willing to sell them to an organization if the price is right and they could then be publicly released. So far no one has made a significant concrete offer to us.

So other links:

Some Background on TDI Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Dupuy Institute Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics

Cost of Creating a Data Base | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Division Level Engagement Data Base (DLEDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Battalion and Company Level Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Other TDI Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Using the DLEDB:

Average Losses per Day in Division-level Engagements on the Eastern Front in 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Density of Deployment in Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus the 752 Case Division-level Data Base 1904-1991 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Comparing Force Ratios to Casualty Exchange Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)