Category Historical Analysis Annual Conference

The Five TMCI Reports

The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) was founded in 1979 by Trevor N. Dupuy, Dr. Donald S. Marshall at University of California, Berkely, and General George S. Blanchard. These guys: Trevor N. Dupuy – Wikipedia and George S. Blanchard – Wikipedia.

The TMCI closed shop in 2020, in part due to its membership aging out: TMCI is officially closing this year – The Dupuy Institute

 

We have blogged about them before:

The Three TMCI Reports – The Dupuy Institute

Two other TMCI Reports – The Dupuy Institute

They did publish five reports. We have posted the links to four of the reports on this blog. The fifth one was just forwarded to me by someone who follows our blog. It is a 22-page paper called “The Classics of Military Thought: Appreciations and Agenda” by John E. Tashjean. It is here: Defense Analysis 1987-sep vol 3 iss 3 Tashjean John E – The classics of military thought_ Appreciations and agenda_ 1987 101080_07430178708405304 – libgenli

The TMCI is the inspiration behind the HAAC:  October’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute and HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

The Fourth HAAC is tentatively scheduled for 21-23 October 2025.

Project SKYSWEEPER

This is a new blog post from TDI associate Chip Sayers, who has able to make the Third HAAC in person this time:

Project SKYSWEEPER

Armed First-Person Point of View (FPV) drone use in war zones has become a major topic of discussion in the last number of months and news this week of multiple breaches of security at U.S. military bases in the homeland have brought home the point that we need a general strategy for use against drones anywhere, but that also works in U.S. airspace.  In a war zone, a solution could be relatively straight-forward in that use of “lethal force” on the battlefield is expected.  That doesn’t hold true for use in U.S. airspace.

While this photo is almost certainly for propaganda purposes — it beggars’ belief that such small drones could lift off while burdened so outrageously — this photo does generally illustrate the armed FPV drone concept.

This FPV quadcopter sports twin M-72 -class light anti-tank weapons fixed to fire straight down on unsuspecting armored vehicles. 

The title of this post is an homage to the scale model I built as a 9-year-old of a US Army M-51 “Skysweeper” 75mm automatic antiaircraft gun. The Skysweeper had revolver magazines giving it a rate of fire of 45 rounds per minute, and an on-mount gun-laying radar and fire-control computer that ensured its proximity-fused shells would be placed with deadly accuracy. A similar system could put paid to the drone threat in areas where firing artillery is acceptable. 

In the 1990s, Oerlikon created Advanced Hit Efficiency And Destruction (AHEAD) ammunition for its line of 35mm antiaircraft guns. AHEAD, when fired, passes through three coils on the end of the gun’s barrel.  The first two measure the muzzle velocity of the round and compares that to the measured range of the target from its fire-control computer. The third sets the shell’s fuse to burst at the optimal point to damage the target. AHEAD rounds carry a payload, depending on the shell, of between 152 and 860 tungsten projectiles that can effectively shred anything in its path.

This proof plate from an AHEAD round detonation should be terrifying to anyone on the receiving end of its wrath, especially low-flying aircraft — manned, or unmanned.

A Gepard Flakpanzer. The 35mm AAA system is self-contained with search and target tracking radars, fire-control computer and guns on a turret with a Leopard tank chassis.  Note the coils at the ends of the gun barrels for programming AHEAD rounds.

The German Gepard 35mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) has been sent to Ukraine and, according to reports, the Gepard has proven to be highly effective against Russian drones. NATO countries have managed to scrape together 52 Gepards to cover potentially 1,100 kilometers of frontage, leaving an average density of one Gepard for every 20 kilometers in a simplistic, but illustrative calculation. Ammunition has also been a problem because Switzerland — the country of origin — objected to “violating their neutral status” by selling it to combatants. It begs the question of what they thought their weapons and ammunition were going to be used for — Fourth of July celebrations?  NATO has obtained through hook and by crook a quarter-million rounds, but that’s less than 4.4 minutes of fire, across the force. 

However, AAA is of no use against drones operating in U.S. airspace.  This brings to mind “the Battle of Palmdale” when a Navy drone went rogue and overflew Los Angeles in August 1956. Air Defense Command interceptors attempted multiple times to down the drone with unguided rockets, only to have the rockets’ high-explosive warheads wreak havoc on the ground below.

As we saw in last year’s shootdown of a Chinese balloon which crossed the entire breadth of the Continental U.S. (or CONUS), once the aircraft enters U.S. airspace, we must be concerned with wreckage crashing on the good citizens of Muleshoe, TX or other sparsely populated points of the country. Gone are the days when USAF Air Defense Command envisioned using rockets with nuclear warheads in U.S. airspace to defend against Soviet bombers with much larger nuclear payloads aboard. In last year’s incident, once the decision was made to finally bring down the Chinese balloon, USAF interceptors were held back until the balloon had cleared the U.S. coast, but not so far as to cause the wreckage to land in deep water.  While the high-altitude interception went off like clockwork (believe me, it was not as easy as it looked) we obviously need a means of dealing with threats that don’t risk causing physical harm to bystanders.

In Southeast Asia, reconnaissance drones were used in large numbers to photograph denied areas of North Vietnam.  Usually, they were launched from DC-130 motherships, flew over their North Vietnamese objectives, and were recovered over the South China Sea by waiting CH-3 helicopters that snared the drones’ recovery parachutes, lest they be damaged on landing. The system proved incredibly reliable with one source claiming that in 2,700+ attempts, over 2,600 were successful — a remarkable recovery rate.

A USAF C-119J demonstrates the parachute recovery technique.

USAF CH-3 helicopter with a Ryan AQM-34R Lightning Bug reconnaissance drone in tow.

The sad end of a happy warrior (he’s seemingly smiling). The North Vietnamese took the drone threat seriously and VPAF interceptor pilots were given full victory credit for shooting down a drone.

In a similar manner, helicopters or small cargo planes could use capture nets to sweep up drones fairly cheaply. Obviously, this would require a fairly permissive air defense environment, such as that found in U.S. airspace, Israel and parts of Ukraine. It is a simple, but likely effective technique when used appropriately. The most difficult part of this scheme is having the helicopter (or cargo plane) on station when drones are in the air.  Aircraft could be put up preemptively when the likelihood of drone incursions is high and aircraft available for other missions — such as aircrew recovery — could be ready as quickly as attaching the catch apparatus to an external cargo hook. In Israel’s current situation, one could envision a lot of helicopters and other aircraft being very busy, indeed. However, by using aircraft already on hand, there would be little sunk cost other than aircrew training.

Another approach would be to jam the drone’s control signal. This, of course, would not work on drones that have an autonomous guidance system similar to the U.S. Lightning Bugs flying over North Vietnam, though that carries its own set of issues. Rather infamously, the Lightning Bug that was to provide the final reconnaissance for the raid to free prisoners from the North Vietnamese POW camp at Son Tay in 1970 went astray because the drone turned to soon and didn’t see that the camp had been flooded by monsoon rains and evacuated. In any event, jamming drones in the CONUS could potentially interfere with civilian bandwidths, causing the same kind of complaints that caused sonic booms to be banned over the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, relatively low-powered jammers that could be located in the center of a large military installation might still be useful.

High-power microwave generators can be highly directional and could interfere with a drones electronics to the point that its circuit boards are “fried,” knocking the aircraft out of the sky. While purpose-built HPM weapons may appear on the battlefield in the very near future, the primary radar of the Lockheed F-35 Lightning II is believed to be capable of performing such duties and are becoming operational at such rates that they could be tasked for this under certain circumstances.

Air defense lasers may be an ideal weapon for dealing with drones, but they have been long promised and thus far failed to achieve operational status. Whatever their issues, particle beam weapons are probably further out on the technology horizon than lasers.  In the meantime, laser “dazzlers,” designed to temporarily blind pilots, have been out there — and effective — since the Falklands War, 42 years ago. Laser dazzlers could at least keep the drones from getting good optical reconnaissance data and deter amateurs from overflying facilities that may easily ruin their drone’s optics (whether or not they really can).

While we wait for these perfect weapons, rather more primitive arms may just fill the bill: just prior to WWII, the British developed an antiaircraft weapon the consisted of a multiple rocket launcher where the rockets trailed cables to ensnare German Stukas trying to bomb Royal Navy capital ships at sea. A similar system might be effective against drones that would be brought down by hitting or being hit by the streaming cable. Better still would be if they could successfully boost a net into the air. This approach would be particularly attractive as the threat drones are generally relatively slow and are unlikely to see such an attack unless it is launched from directly in the drone’s flight path. It would also be a relatively low threat for accompanying infantry. Such a “monkey catcher” could be mounted in pairs on an armored vehicle’s turret. On the platoon or company command net, the order “drone left,” “drone forward,” or “drone right,” the unit’s vehicles could slew their turrets to face the threat and each fire a net in that direction. An individual monkey catcher might not have a high probability of success, but multiples firing from different angles would have a much higher chance of knocking down the offending drone.

At some point, laser air defense weapons will mature and be fielded, ending the current threat. Until that time, “out-of-the-box” thinking may provide a more near-term solution to the threat we face today.

 

October’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 8 – 10 October 2024

The Third HAAC is next week. Currently there are 40 presentations (and 2 group discussions). The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center
Revised 7 October 2024

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930 Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030 Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1130 – 1230 Redux: Quantifying Warfare – Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

1230 – 1400 Lunch

1400 – 1500 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire

1500 – 1600 Validation Challenges in Wargaming: What’s Real Here? – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700 New Findings on Artillery Suppression – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1700 – 1800 Gun, Baby, Gun – Dr. Iain Overton (AOAV) – virtual

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – Rangos

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100    Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1100 – 1200 Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes – virtual

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere – Dr. Christopher Davis

1400 – 1500   The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University) – virtual

1500 – 1600  The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism – Dr. Christopher Davis

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – BJs

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Musicians of Mars – Michael McCarthy

1000 – 1100   Force Ratios – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1100 – 1200 Ground Warfare in 2050: How it Looked in 2017 – Dr. Alexander Kott

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400 The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500 Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano

1500 – 1600 Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott

1600 – 1700 Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

Evening: Happy hour – Rangos

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

Day 1: Naval Warfare Analysis

0930 – 1030 A Naval Power Index: The U.S. Navy vs three challengers – Imperial Japan, USSR and PRC China – Geoffrey Clark

1030 – 1130 U-boats in the Atlantic: The Unseen and Unheard – Dr. John Magill – virtual

1130 – 1230   Open

1230-1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500 Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip

1500 – 1600 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire

1600 – 1700   A Modest Proviso – National Guard Bureau Chief George Leach and his Role as Catalyst in Motorizing Artillery – Dr. Johannes Allert (Swansea University, Wales)

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000   Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1000 – 1100   Theory of Victory: The Ideas, Doctrine and Education of the U.S. Army from 1814-1941 – Dr. Michael Bonura (CGSC) – virtual

1100 – 1200   Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare – LtC. Nathan A. Jennings (CGSC) – virtual

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   open

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600    Making Military Decisions in Plateau Eras – Michael Benhamou (Director, OPEWI) – virtual

1600 – 1700   open

Day 2: Air Warfare Analysis

0900 – 1000   Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1000 – 1100  Dogfight: Were US pilots in Korea really better than those in Vietnam? – Chip Sayers

1100 – 1200 The WW2 USAAF Strategic Bombing Campaign: Strategy and Operational Imperatives – Dr. Sorin Adam Matei & Dr. Robert Kirchubel (Purdue University) 

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   VPAF Aces: As good as they claimed? – Chip Sayers

1400 – 1500   Data for Air Combat Modeling in Network Centric Warfare – Geoffrey Clark

1500 – 1600   Open

1600 – 1700   Open

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual

1000 – 1100   The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1100 – 1200   Analyzing Barbarossa: By the Numbers – Dr. Robert Kirchubel & Sorin Adam Matei (Purdue)

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Debate over French Armored Warfare Doctrine 1935 to 1940 – Dr. James Slaughter

1400 – 1500    Ukrainian-German spies of the Cold War – David Nelson Black – virtual

1500 – 1600   Chernobyl compromised: The story of a Russian cyber attack – Joseph Weiss (Applied Control Solutions, LLC) – virtual

1600 – 1700   Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual 



Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). – we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).

See this link below for costs ($150), address, conference description, hotels, and call for presentations: Announcements for the Third HAAC, 8-10 October – The Dupuy Institute

Five presentations from the second day of the First HAAC (2022)

Below are the five recorded presentations from the second day of the first HAAC in 2022. These are all the presentations from the Einstein Conference Room. We do not have videos of the presentations done that day from the Pike & Gallows Conference Room. We do have hard copies of them (see link below).

What was presented that day is:

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    A Statistical Analysis of Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning?                                                                Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS)

1000 – 1100    The Combat Assessment Technique       William Sayers – virtual

1100 – 1200    Machine Learning the Lessons of History      Dr. Robert Helmbold – virtual

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    Penetration Division: Theory, History, Concept                LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD

1400 – 1500    Learning from History: The Army’s Future Study Program       LtC. Adam. L. Taliaferro

 

They are here:

  1. Statistical Analysis of Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning? by Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS) (youtube.com)
  2. Combat Assessment Technique (youtube.com)
  3. Machine Learning The Lessons of History (youtube.com)
  4. Penetration Division: Theory, History, Concept by LtC. Nathan A. Jennings, PhD (youtube.com)
  5. Learning from History: The Army’s Future Study Program by LtC. Adam L. Taliaferro (youtube.com)

 

The presentations from the first day are here: Video presentations from the first day of the First HAAC – The Dupuy Institute. They are all also on The Dupuy Institute YouTube channel.

The schedule for the 2022 conference is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 – The Dupuy Institute. Two of the presentations on the 28th were cancelled. The presentation on Urban Warfare is going to be given at the 2024 conference.

The schedule for the 2024 conference on 8-10 October is here: September’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute and here: HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

September’s Announcement for the Third HAAC, 8-10 October

The Third HAAC is occurring on 8 – 10 October in Tysons Corner. There are currently 43 presentations planned and two group discussions.

The current schedule is here (updated 17 September): September’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

The conference is also posted on Eventbrite: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) Tickets, Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite

They choose the picture, but it was kind of perfect for a Historical Analysis conference. You can pay for the conference through Eventbrite.

The cost of the conference is $150 for three days or $60 per day. It is a $60 discount if you present. There is a student discount of $20 a day for “real students.” There are now multiple ways to pay 1) though Paypal via SRichTDI@aol.com, 2) by calling (703) 289-0007 and paying by credit card, 3) our you can mail me a check (very retro), 4) or pay cash, 5) or pay through Eventbrite.

Cost is here: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Hotels are here: Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Call for presentations is here: Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA – The Dupuy Institute

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

We do have virtual presentations and we do accept virtual attendees. Conference works better if lots of people attend in person. People will connect via Zoom. We will send out Zoom links to all virtual attendees just before the conference starts.

We are slowly posting up videos from the previous conferences, we are halfway through the 2022 conference. They are here: The Dupuy Institute – YouTube

If there are any questions you can email me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com or call me at (703) 289-0007. Look forward to seeing you all there.

September’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024

The Third HAAC is coming in six weeks and we are still getting more presentations. Now up to 45 (and 2 group discussions). Setting up a third conference room on Wednesday to handle the overflow. So will have a separate conference room on Tuesday for mostly Naval Warfare Analysis and a new third separate conference room on Wednesday for mostly Air Warfare Analysis.  Have revised the schedule to end the day at 1700 except for Tuesday. 

The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center
Revised 26 September 2024

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930 Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030 Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130 Slouching Towards Wabash: The Withering of Historical Analysis in the American Profession of Arms – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1130 – 1230 Redux: Quantifying Warfare – Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

1230 – 1400 Lunch

1400 – 1500 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire

1500 – 1600 Validation Challenges in Wargaming: What’s Real Here? – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700 New Findings on Artillery Suppression – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1700 – 1800 Gun, Baby, Gun – Dr. Iain Overton (AOAV) – virtual

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – Rangos

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Moscow vs Kiev: Institutional Autism in the German High Command – Dr. Robert Kirchubel (LtC, US Army, ret)

1000 – 1100    Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1100 – 1200 Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes – virtual

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1400 – 1500   The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University) – virtual

1500 – 1600  The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism – Dr. Christopher Davis

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – BJs

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Musicians of Mars – Michael McCarthy

1000 – 1100 Summoning the specter of “Beweglichkeit”: A critical analysis of the U.S. Army’s new FM 3-0 Operations and observed Ukrainian battlefield trends – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1100 – 1200 Ground Warfare in 2050: How it Looked in 2017 – Dr. Alexander Kott

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400 The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500 Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano

1500 – 1600 Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott

1600 – 1700 Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

Evening: Happy hour – Rangos

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

Day 1: Naval Warfare Analysis

0930 – 1030 A Naval Power Index: The U.S. Navy vs three challengers – Imperial Japan, USSR and PRC China – Geoffrey Clark

1030 – 1130 U-boats in the Atlantic: The Unseen and Unheard – Dr. John Magill – virtual

1130 – 1230 Beaches by the Numbers – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec) – virtual

1230-1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500 Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip

1500 – 1600 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire

1600 – 1700   A Modest Proviso – National Guard Bureau Chief George Leach and his Role as Catalyst in Motorizing Artillery – Dr. Johannes Allert (Swansea University, Wales)

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000   Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1000 – 1100   Theory of Victory: The Ideas, Doctrine and Education of the U.S. Army from 1814-1941 – Dr. Michael Bonura (CGSC) – virtual

1100 – 1200   Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare – LtC. Nathan A. Jennings (CGSC) – virtual

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere – Dr. Christopher Davis

1400 – 1500   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600    Making Military Decisions in Plateau Eras – Michael Benhamou (Director, OPEWI) – virtual

1600 – 1700   Salvation only in arms: A critical historical analysis of operational maneuver during the 1814 campaign in France – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

Day 2: Air Warfare Analysis

0900 – 1000   Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1000 – 1100  Dogfight: Were US pilots in Korea really better than those in Vietnam? – Chip Sayers

1100 – 1200 The WW2 USAAF Strategic Bombing Campaign: Strategy and Operational Imperatives – Dr. Sorin Adam Matei & Dr. Robert Kirchubel (Purdue University) 

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   VPAF Aces: As good as they claimed? – Chip Sayers

1400 – 1500 Data for Air Combat Modeling in Network Centric Warfare – Geoffrey Clark

1500 – 1600   Open

1600 – 1700   Open

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual

1000 – 1100 The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1100 – 1200 Analyzing Barbarossa: By the Numbers – Dr. Robert Kirchubel & Sorin Adam Matei (Purdue)

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Debate over French Armored Warfare Doctrine 1935 to 1940 – Dr. James Slaughter

1400 – 1500 Future of Maneuver Warfare – Dr. Amos Fox (Arizona State University) – virtual

1500 – 1600 Chernobyl compromised: The story of a Russian cyber attack – Joseph Weiss (Applied Control Solutions, LLC) – virtual

1600 – 1700 Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual

 

Floating unscheduled presentation: Force Ratios – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)



Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). – we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).

See this link below for costs ($150), address, conference description, hotels, and call for presentations: Announcements for the Third HAAC, 8-10 October – The Dupuy Institute

Announcements for the Third HAAC, 8-10 October

The Third HAAC is occurring on 8 – 10 October in Tysons Corner. There are currently 38 presentations planned and two group discussions.

The current schedule is here (updated 15 August): August’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

and here: HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

The conference is also posted on Eventbrite: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) Tickets, Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite

They choose the picture, but it was kind of perfect for a Historical Analysis conference. You can pay for the conference through Eventbrite.

The cost of the conference is $150 for three days or $60 per day. It is a $60 discount if you present. There is a student discount of $20 a day for “real students.” There are now multiple ways to pay 1) though Paypal via SRichTDI@aol.com, 2) by calling (703) 289-0007 and paying by credit card, 3) our you can mail me a check (very retro), 4) or pay cash, 5) or pay through Eventbrite.

Cost is here: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Hotels are here: Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Call for presentations is here: Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA – The Dupuy Institute

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

We do have virtual presentations and we do accept virtual attendees. Conference works better if lots of people attend in person. People will connect via Zoom. We will send out Zoom links to all virtual attendees just before the conference starts.

We are slowly posting up videos from the previous conferences, we are halfway through the 2022 conference. They are here: The Dupuy Institute – YouTube

If there are any questions you can email me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com or call me at (703) 289-0007. Look forward to seeing you all there.

 

Video presentations from the second day of the first HAAC

We had some issues with zoom and videos on the second day of the conference, so do not have videos of half the presentations that day. The schedule for that first conference is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 – The Dupuy Institute

The slides for the thirteen presentations given on the second day are here: Presentations from HAAC – Urban Warfare – The Dupuy Institute

The video on the “Statistical Analysis of Land Battles” is here, on our YouTube site:  Statistical Analysis of Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning? by Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS) (youtube.com)

 

 

Video presentations from the first day of the First HAAC

We are back to posting up videos of the first two HAAC conferences. What we have already posted from the first conference was copies of the slides for 31 presentations and videos of the first day of presentations.

The 31 presentations: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days – The Dupuy Institute

Opening presentation and presentation on Studying Combat: Two videos posted to our YouTube site – The Dupuy Institute

Data for Wargames: Third video posted to our YouTube site – The Dupuy Institute

Fitting Lanchester Equations: Fitting Lanchester Equations – Video – The Dupuy Institute

How Important are Superior Numbers? Our first virtual presentation – How Important are Superior Numbers? – by Dr. David Kirkpatrick – The Dupuy Institute

Killing Captain Hindsight: Killing Captain Hindsight – Dr. Niall MacKay – The Dupuy Institute

Weaponising Historical Analysis: Weaponising Historical Analysis – Dr. James Storr – The Dupuy Institute

Understanding Dupuy: Understanding Dupuy – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford – The Dupuy Institute

Air Combat Analysis: Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 – Daniel Horvath – The Dupuy Institute

We are able to post up videos now from the first two conferences is thanks to volunteer labor to review and edit them. More to come.

The Russians are continuing to advance in Ukraine

The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.

In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).

Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian. 

Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.

In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):  

Summation (195 engagements):

Outcome              Failed       Advances   Penetrated
                               III             IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              54                71                33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             2.98            1.20             0.83

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.62             2.96            6.40

Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).

The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).

Post-World War II (61 engagements):

Outcome              Failed      Advances    Penetrated
                               III            IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              14               8                 33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             3.20            1.60             1.36

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.80             4.83           15.10

Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:

Outcome            III      IV        V

  Cases                 10       29         21

  Force Ratios    1.80    2.69     2.75

  Loss Ratios      1.66    1.51      0.64

Note the same loss pattern exists here.

Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.

Outcome                    III        IV       V

Italian Campaign     0.74     1.76     2.53

Ardennes                   0.45     3.71     5.00

Kursk                         0.58      5.18   11.43 

So……

  1. The advance rates in Ukraine are pretty much in line with outcome III and IV engagements. 
  2. The advance rates are fairly low compared to the other cases we have.
  3. Will discuss casualties later.

This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).