Category Missiles

The Shot Heard Around the World

Another blog post from William “Chip” Sayers:

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Week before last, Russia launched what was probably a small number of RS-26 Rubezh Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) at the city of Dnipro in Ukraine.[1] There are a number of interesting points to this incident, as well as a number of misconceptions.  Let’s try to make sense of this strike.

First, a lot of cages have been rattled over the fact that this is the first time an IRBM has been fired in anger.  The reason why this is a cage-rattling event is that IRBMs in general are a nuclear weapons delivery system, and the launch of an IRBM could, in theory, trigger a nuclear response by an interested party on the other side.  This goes to the Cold War doctrine of “launch on warning” — in other words, to launch one’s own nuclear missiles when the enemy’s incoming missiles are detected on radar (“warning”), but before they have struck their targets. 

Under this scenario, Russia might launch a small number of IRBMs at Ukraine, and when US sensors detected this, the American President would mistakenly interpret this as a nuclear attack on the United States and launch the US nuclear arsenal at Russia.  At this point, the Russians would then launch their nuclear missiles and we all go to hell in a little rowboat.  I’m not certain as to why this might happen, particularly — as in this case — if the IRBMs are armed with something other than nuclear warheads.

Frankly, Putin was apparently fairly confident that such a limited strike would not trigger global thermonuclear war and, in this case, we crossed that threshold with no discernable harm.  Unfortunately, it was a real threshold and Putin now has the leeway to use this new class of weapon with impunity.  So, let’s unpack some facts about the weapon Putin used to fire this particular shot across the West’s bow.

The first thing to understand is that the SS-26 Rubezh — or “Oreshnik,” as Putin called it — is not an operational missile.  Development of the system began in 2008, based on a two-stage version of the RS-24 Yars ICBM, with the first test launch in 2011.[2]  The missile’s first successful test flew 5,800km, which technically qualified it to be called an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), i.e., a missile designed to strike the United States.  However, all subsequent test flights have been to much shorter range, betraying its true purpose as an IRBM designed to attack European cities and therefore making it a violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.  It is not surprising that the missile that triggered the effort that culminated in the INF treaty — the SS-20 — was, itself, a cut-down version of a 1970s-era ICBM. [3]  Interestingly, all four missiles are from the same design bureau, so everything old really is new again.

It was the SS-26, along with other blatant violations, that caused President Donald Trump to withdraw the United States from the INF treaty in 2019.[4]  Ironically, Russia suspended the SS-26 program, apparently due to the lack of adequate funding.[5]  We can’t be entirely sure that Russian Rocket Forces general who announced the suspension was telling the truth, as opposed to misleading the West with disinformation.  Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the RS-26 program was suspended, and that a small number of the test missiles have been in storage awaiting more funding to complete testing. 

It is further plausible that, in anticipation of the US and NATO allies removing restrictions on Ukrainian use of Western weapons, Putin wanted an escalatory response to chill NATO and prevent further attacks on Russian soil.  The unprecedented RS-26 shot fills that roll exactly.  It remains to be seen as to how successful that signal will turn out to be.

So, what exactly did we see last week?  Video images appear to show six distinct events with 4-6 ground impacts with each event.  Of note, the reentry vehicles (RVs) or submunitions, as they’ve been described, did not appear to be explosive.  We will discuss that in more detail, in a moment.  The RS-26 has been commonly described as having four Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles, or MIRVs.[6]  Some analysts believed Putin’s statement that this was a single missile traveling at Mach 10 with six MIRVs, each with four to six submunitions.  One went so far as to make a rough estimate that one of these submunitions, weighing 100kg, would deliver the equivalent energy of a Mk 84 2,000lb bomb through kinetic energy, alone.[7]  Is this possible?  Yes.  Is it likely, No.

As we learn more about this attack, we may find that it was, indeed, a single missile.  However, my immediate reaction was that this was six missiles with four Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs), each.  As the name somewhat obliquely implies, MRVs and not independently targetable, but rather are fired as a barrage at a single area target.  Certainly, if they were MIRVs, their independent targeting capability was wasted.  More to the point, ballistic missiles are all about throw-weight, and a MIRV Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV), or “bus” — the final maneuvering stage that drops off MIRVs on trajectories toward different targets — is a heavy and complicated piece of machinery.[8]  Having a MIRV bus on a missile that was loaded with MRVs is a huge waste of throw-weight: it would be better to download the bus and use the extra weight allowance for more, or larger MRVs.  According to CSIS, the RS-26 has a total warhead lift capability of 800kg.[9]  If CSIS’s estimate is accurate, the missile could never lift 3,600kg of MIRVs — unlikely even with the bus offloaded.  

Particularly unlikely seems to be the idea that these were MIRVs with submunitions.  What would be the point?  This would only add complexity and unnecessary weight to the missile.  No missile has ever been tested with multiple reentry vehicles that split open to release submunitions.  A reentry vehicle designed to split open seems like a summons to disaster — a seam between parts of the aeroshell sounds like an invitation for hot plasma to enter the RV during reentry.  More to the point, what purpose could submunitions possibly serve?  Why not make each submunition an RV of its own and forego the extra complexity of packaging them into a larger MRV?

Putin claimed that there is no way to defend against the RS-26.  He referenced the missile’s Mach 10 hypersonic speed and implied that it had Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) to evade defenses.  Generally speaking, the longer-ranging the ballistic missile, the higher the speed of the RVs.  Yes, travelling on the end of an IRBM, the RVs will come downhill at Mach 10, or better.  No, what we saw in the video did not reflect MaRVs — and it is highly unlikely that all of the elements that have been claimed for the missile (MaRVs with submunitions, etc.) could be combined.

Hypersonic speeds are nothing new, nor particularly remarkable.  The Soviet’s SS-1c SCUD SRBM dating back to the late 1950s reached hypersonic speeds, but even Patriot SAMs were able to shoot them down.  Hypersonic missiles with MaRVs can be a problem for missile defenses, though maneuvering decreases accuracy and bleeds off speed, so there are limits to what they can do.  Mach 10 non-maneuvering warheads are certainly not easy targets, but most experts acknowledge that the US Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles are technically capable, the Navy’s SM-3 are capable, and the Army’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense missile are certainly capable of shooting down the RS-26.  So, Putin’s boast that there is no defense against the RS-26 rings hollow.  

In sum, the use of the RS-26 in Ukraine marks a provocative, though not revolutionary event.  Putin risked much in using an IRBM in combat for the first time, but the weapon did not visibly achieve much on the ground, and probably cannot easily be reproduced, given its likely status as a developmental program that has been suspended.  This was almost a move of desperation to signal Putin’s unpredictability and willingness to use measures that test the limits of rationality.  We shouldn’t be impressed.

 

[1] What is RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile or ICBM, range and can Russians really launch it?, Indiatvnews.com, 21Nov24, https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/what-is-rs-26-rubezh-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-or-icbm-range-and-can-russians-really-launch-it-dnipro-2024-11-21-962729.  Accessed 23Nov24.

[2] Stefan Forss, “Russia’s New Intermediate Range Missiles – Back to the 1970s,” Atlantic Council, April 6, 2017

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russia-s-new-intermediate-range-missiles-back-to-the-1970s.  Accessed 24Nov24.

[3] https://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/more_news_about_rs-26_missile.shtml.  Accessed 24Nov24.

[4] https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/25/russia-violating-1987-nuclear-missile-treaty/ Accessed 25Nov24;

[5] https://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml  Accessed 24Nov24; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia Accessed 25Nov24.

[6] RS-26 Rubezh, Wikipedia, Accessed 26Nov24.

[7]  “Now I’m Really Scared: The New Oreshnik Missile Attack on Dnipro,” Millenium7* History Tech, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iL7Hb0fcpbU.  Accessed 25Nov24.

[8] Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, Ballistic And Cruise Missile Threat 2017, 9.

[9] Missiles of the world — Russia — “RS-26 Rubezh,” Missile Threat – CSIS Missile Defense Project, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-x-31-rs-26-rubezh/   Accessed. 27Nov24.

PLA Rocket Force

The following article is from Alexandru Filip of the Canadian Center for Strategic Studies: 

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During our discussion sessions on 13 and 27 November on the topic of Taiwan, a further exchanged developed regarding the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s significant missile stocks and the effects it may have in a war.

While there is a vast amount of research and data on this topic, transposing these predictions to Taiwan would perhaps require a greater simulation which can account for the complexities of the relationship between A2/AD systems, the aerial systems in use (whether it is an aircraft or missile), and the targets on the ground.

Before a deeper dive (which will follow in further blog posts), we should propose a basis of general principles derived from previous incidents. While these can serve to create guiding assumptions of how this phase of operations may unfold, when simulated, it is indeed possible that we find differences between the Taiwanese situation and historical precedent.

These principles:

-Despite a marked superiority in both quality and quantity of air assets, gaining air superiority will not be a simple task; it will require planning, and a significant number of assets for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. As evidenced by Russia’s war in Ukraine, in which the Russian Air Force has struggled to holds air superiority over more than just certain portions of Ukraine.

-PLAAF air superiority efforts can be blunted by Ground-Based-Air-Defense led interdiction. As we have seen in Vietnam, where many of U.S. combat losses were caused by AAA fire, and SAMs.

-Taiwan should endeavor to replicate the relative success of Serbian Air Defense Forces against NATO, in Kosovo. The mountainous terrain, and the densely forested areas provide ample opportunity for dispersing, and camouflaging air-to-ground assets so as to hamper PLAAF attempts at conducting Suppression of Enemy Air Defense missions. The outcome in Kosovo was that: “NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only three of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. At the same time, over 800 SAMs were fired by Yugoslav forces at NATO aircraft, including 477 SA-6s and 124 confirmed MANPADS, for the downing of only two aircraft and several more damaged.

-Air power and missile strikes will similarly not be capable of degrading Taiwanese ground assets or air assets to the point of ineffectiveness. Robert Pape’s “Bombing to Win” demonstrates that, in the Gulf War, despite overwhelming air superiority and an extended air campaign a combined air effort did not coerce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. While it did attrit Iraqi armour, it did not render Iraqi forces entirely ineffective, and a ground invasion was still necessary.

-Dispersal of air assets into hardened shelters, which obscure the aircraft from satellite imagery, the use of decoys, underground hangars, and a raising of the air force to prevent destruction on the ground during a missile salvo would all raise the cost for the PLA Rocket Forces. This will also have the effect of forcing the PLA to dedicate further strike capability to targets on the ground. The ROCAF will still suffer damage. Yet, just as in Ukraine losses on the ground can be prevented even against an enemy which yields a significant strike capability.

-The destruction of runways, while easily repaired under relatively peaceful conditions (as was the case in Israel after the Iranian strike), will be more difficult under constant PLA strikes. Thus, the ROCAF will likely shift to road-based runways (as they have trained to do), and aircraft armed with air-superiority loadouts (lighter) will require shorter segments of runway.

-The PLA Rocket Force is likely to focus strike assets on population centers, with the aim of attracting Taiwanese air defense assets towards the protection of civilians. Just as we have seen in Ukraine, this in itself is a costly and complex endeavor which threatens to rapidly deplete missile stocks. Yet, just as in Ukraine, it may not be enough to break Taiwanese will, especially as a majority have claimed they are prepared to defend Taiwan.

A DF-11 (source: DF-11 | Weaponsystems.net).


More to come.

Modern Missiles – Russian, Chinese and American, Part 1

First of a series of blog posts from Geoffry Clark on modern missiles:

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Modern missiles – Russian, Chinese and American, Part 1

 

Mentioned in the previous post on the Zhuhai Air Show (see The Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024 – The Dupuy Institute), the Chinese PLA have revealed two new systems in 2024, the HQ-19 and DF-100. These systems are different types of missiles, generally known as Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) and Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM), respectively.

Image Credit: truexanewsua/Telegram

 

There was also a very notable development regarding SSMs in Ukraine recently; on November 22, 2024, the Russian Federation tested a new missile named “Oreshnik” (meaning “hazel”, referring to the shape of the luminescence of the re-entry vehicles). As reported by Voice of America:

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate reported that the Oreshnik missile was launched from Russia’s Kapustin Yar 4th Missile Test Range in the Astrakhan region. The missile traveled for approximately 15 minutes before striking the city of Dnipro. The missile was equipped with six non-nuclear warheads, each containing six submunitions, and it achieved a speed of Mach 11 during its flight.

There is some confusion and debate about the classification of this missile, whether it was an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), or an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This is just a matter of range category, which is just anachronistic jargon from the Soviet Cold War and arms control negotiations and treaties. Since that time, the U.S. has withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in October 2018, many claim since China is unbound by any arms control, and the U.S. saw a need to develop such mid-range ballistic missiles.

Then, in a video address by Russian President Vladimir Putin said:

There are “no means of countering such weapons today. Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometers per second. Air defense systems currently available in the world and missile defense systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles. It is impossible.”

This high mach number is really what sets this type of missile apart. By comparison, the Chinese DF-100 missile (also known as CJ-100, and also by NATO as CH-SSC-13 Splinter) has a similar range to the Oreshnik (also known as the RS-26 Rubezh – The War Zone has a good explanation for the lineage), but these two missiles have very different speeds; the DF-100 is supersonic at about mach 4. The speed of these missiles – subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic – is directly proportional to the difficulty of interception.

So, there is debate about whether many advanced systems such as the American THAAD and certain missiles (especially the Standard Missile 3) from the Aegis system may be able to intercept such missiles. One new contender for this category is the Chinese HQ-19 SAM, which was apparently derived from the HQ-9, which was itself derived from the S-300 SAM of Russian design and build, and also widely used in the Ukraine War by both sides.

Image credit: VLS_Appreciator via twitter: https://twitter.com/VLS_Appreciator/status/1844408468452802602

 

HQ-19 at Zhuhai airshow 2024. (Image Credit: Twitter/David Wang)

 

I’ll briefly mention a few more important recent events which shed light on the state-of-the-art of missile defense.

A USAF awards ceremony on November 12 provided a number of details about how USAF squadron of F-15Es that was forward deployed to Muwaffaq Salti air base in Jordan, in order to defend Israel.  Ward Carroll reports:

During the Iranian attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, the 494th Fighter Squadron launched 14 Strike Eagle sorties, including six aircraft scrambled at a moment’s notice, while base defenses simultaneously neutralized enemy threats overhead. Ultimately those F-15Es (along with those previously mentioned base defenses) successfully engaged and destroyed more than 80 kamikaze UAVs, out of more than 300 drone and missiles intended to strike Israel.

Apparently, this air defense effort included U.S., U.K., Israel and Jordan.  What was public knowledge was the success of the Iron Dome, but there were apparently many other assets operating together to attrit the drones and missiles in their trajectories from Iran to targets in Israel. 

And, finally, the statistics published by the Ukrainian Defense Forces about the Russian missiles used, and the rate at which they were intercepted.

Screen capture of video address by General Oleksandr Syrskyi via Odessa Journal.

 

Through the translation provided by the Odessa Journal, and through the identification of these missiles and the Harpoon V Admiralty Trilogy Annexes, I’ve attempted to describe these missiles in more detail.

Missile Name

Missile Code

NATO Code

GRAU Code

Type

Flight path

Range nmi

Speed kts

Weight kgm

Signature

Missiles

Intercepted

Rate %

Kinzhal

Kh-47M2

 

39K5

ASM

Ballistic

1080

4016

3800

Vsmall

       111

               28

25%

Kalibr

 

SS-N-27

3M14

SSM

Cruise

865

600

 

Vsmall

       894

             443

50%

X-555/101

Kh-555

AS-15

 

ASM

Cruise

1620

400

1700

Vsmall

    1,846

          1,441

78%

X-555/101

Kh-101

AS-23A

 

ASM

Cruise

2160

400

2500

Stealthy

Oniks

P-800

SS-N-26

3M55

SSM

Cruise

165

1650

 

Vsmall

       211

               12

6%

Zircon

 

SS-N-33

3M22

SSM

Cruise

187

3150

 

Stealthy

           6

                 2

33%

Iskander-K

 

 

9K720

SSM

Ballistic

500

5053

4615

Small?

       202

               76

38%

Iskander-M

KN-23

 

9K720

SSM

Ballistic

500

5053

4615

Small?

    1,300

               56

4%

X-22/32

Kh-22

Burya

 

ASM

Cruise

~200

2003

5900

Small

       362

                 2

1%

Kh-32

 

 

ASM

Cruise

485

2160

5800

Vsmall

X-35

Uran

SS-N-25

3M24

SSM

Cruise

65

580

 

Vsmall

         15

                 1

7%

Tochka-U

 

SS-21

9K79

SSM

Ballistic

~120

3500

2000

Small?

         68

                 6

9%

X-25/29/31/35/58/59/60

Kh-25

AS-10

 

ASM

Direct

5

1360

295

Vsmall

    1,547

             343

22%

Kh-29

AS-14B

 

ASM

Direct

8

792

690

Vsmall

Kh-31

AS-17

 

ASM

Cruise ?

86

1690

~700

Vsmall

Kh-35

AS-20

 

ASM

Cruise

71.5

560

520

Vsmall

Kh-58

AS-11

 

ASM

Direct

66

2065

650

Vsmall

Kh-59

AS-18

 

ASM

Cruise

~150

~550

930

Vsmall

Kh-60

AS-?

 

ASM

 

 

 

 

 

S-300/400

SA-N-6a/b

 

 

SAM

Ballistic ?

~50

3885

 

Vsmall

    3,008

               19

1%

Other

?

 

?

 

 

 

 

 

 

         57

                 –

0%

 

There are reports that Russian Armed Forces are amassing large stockpiles of these missiles for future strikes.

In Part 2 of this analysis, I plan to give a few examples of these types of intercepts and illustrate the odds using the Harpoon V game system.

Thanks for reading, and for your comments!