Category Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming

Data from the First Validation of the QJM

I do state in War by Numbers that there were three validations of the QJM/TNDM although the first was not published. That is not entirely correct. It was not published as a stand alone validation, but significant parts of it was published. The actual engagements were all published as part of the Combat Data Subscription Service. It was eight volumes, with the first volume published in 1975. In there it listed all the engagements used by the QJM. For example (page 6):

 

 

 

 

 

Now, the actual results of these test runs was published in his 1977 book Numbers, Predictions and War (NPW).  As Trevor Dupuy specifically notes on page 58 of his book:

Appendix B contains a consolidated summary of HERO’s QJM Engagement Data Base. The first 8l examples in this consolidated statistical comparison show the theoretical results and actual results of these 81 World War II engagements (60 in the Development Data Base, 21 in the Validating Data Base; 61 in ltaly, 19 in northwest Europe, and 1 in Russia). In all of these the P/P value reflects an average German combat effectiveness superiority factor of about 23 percent.”

This was done back in the day when Data Base was two words and could exist on paper, vice a computer.

Anyhow, in Appendix B of NPW is “HERO’s QJM Data Base (as of May 1977)”.  The specific engagement in question is given as:

No.     Year & Date          Battle Designation         Force X Designation     Posture
1.         1943, Sep   9-11     Port of Salerno                B  46 ID                               A
                                                                                                                                 Air %:
Force Y Designation       Posture            Na            Nd               S/S          W   W     P/P
G   16 PzD                            PD                     12,917       4,250         1.83          0     22   0.73
                                                                % cas/day
Surp     P/P          PR/PR      CEV       x         y             I          I           SE         SE
1.5          1.10          0.87          0.79      3.51    0.94      7.4      2.3       1.02     3.85

I left out the subscripts. But one can see Appendix B (pages 234-235) for these details.

Now, this does not still actually do a direct validation in that it compares model results to actual historical combat results, but one can see the data they used for their inputs and what the outcomes were of these engagements.

9 Books

Finally here is a picture of all nine of my published books. It includes two copies of The Battle for Kyiv, as one is the hardback and one is the paperback version. The paperback version does have some revisions and an expanded photo section.

We are looking to add two more books to that collection in the next six months. An additional book on the Russo-Ukrainian War should be out in the next 2 to 3 months, and The Battle of Tolstoye Woods should be out hopefully this spring. The editing process on all my books is slow, primarily because the large amount of charts, tables and tabular data in them that are a pain to edit and proof.

Two books

These two books are my two analytical books. Both quantitative in approach. Notice the use of the word “Understanding” in both titles.

American’s Modern Wars cover our analysis of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies based upon an analysis of 89 post-WWII cases. There has been very little quantitative analysis of insurgencies. This is the most extensive effort I am aware of. We were blessed with budget and a staff that at one point included ten people. It is amazing what you can do when you have manpower (read $$$).

War by Numbers is our analysis of conventional warfare. It was built from a series of studies we did over the years for the DOD and other contractors. Probably the most extensive qualitative analysis of aspects of conventional war that has been done in the last few decades. Again, helps to have budget.

These are my two “theoretical” books. I am halfway through a book called More War by Numbers. I have stopped work on it to concentrate on other tasks. May get back to in 2027.

The analysis for America’s Modern Wars was based upon 89 post-WWII insurgencies, interventions and peacekeeping operations. We did expand the database to well over 100 cases but never went back and re-shot the analysis due to budget cuts. It would be my desire to expand the database up to around 120 cases, update the 20 or so that were on-going (our data collection stopped in 2008). and then re-shoot and expand the analysis. This would be a good time to do this instead of again waiting until we are in another insurgency and yet again chasing our tail. Our track record on these have not been good, we lost Vietnam, we lost Afghanistan and Iraq was touch-and-go for a while. While we are not in the middle of another insurgency is a good time to study and learn about them based upon real world experience (AKA history).

Sorry to get preachy, but I really don’t like losing wars.

Leavenworth Master’s Thesis on “Forecasting Approaches in Operations Desert Sheild and Desert Storm

In 2020 Major Aaron F. Anderson, a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth Kansas, published a master’s thesis called “Forecasting Approaches in Operations Desert Sheild and Desert Storm.” It was just sent to me.  I was not aware of it even though the author quoted my book War by Numbers extensively. It is referenced 19 times in the paper, so of course, I have a bias towards it.  Anyhow a link to the 45-page paper is here: Forecasting Approaches in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Paper’s abstract: 

Books and public sources that describe the QJM and TNDM

The QJM (Quantified Judgment Model) and TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model are two combat models that Trevor Dupuy developed first in 1977 as the QJM, and then heavily revised and released in 1990 at the TNDM. We do sell a computerized version of the TNDM along with manuals and training courses but at a price out of reach for most individuals. See: TNDM & QJM – The Dupuy Institute

Now, I do regularly get enquiries about the model. The combat models are described in a half-dozen books.

1.  The first version of the combat model, the QJM, is fully described in Trevor Dupuy’s book Numbers, Predictions and War (1977). You may have to fish around for it, it is not in print. I see a used version for sale on Amazon.com for $77.59 and $89.95.
2. The theoretical discussions that come from his work is described in his book Understanding War (1987). This is the most significant book written by Trevor Dupuy and should be in every serious military analyst’s library. Amazon.com has a used copy for $15.89. We have new copies for $24.95: Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat – The Dupuy Institute and Ordering Information – The Dupuy Institute. An earlier theoretical book, Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (1980) is available on Amazon.com for $19.96.
3. The new model, the TNDM, was created in 1990. It is described in two books, Attrition (1990) and If War Comes (1991). Both are out of print. Attrition is for sale on Amazon.com for $123.10. I tried to warn you:  We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute. If War Comes is not on Amazon.com (even though it was on the Times best-sellers list).  His father’s books, written in 1938 is available for $15.55 paperback and $30.00 hardcover. Trevor Dupuy’s book is available on Ebay for $45.95.
4. Some quantitative analysis of combat and a little on the TNDM is described in my book War by Numbers (2017). That book is still in print and available in Amazon.com for $37.15 (list price 39.95). It is rated at 4.7 out of 5 on Amazon.
5. Now there were a lot of reports and studies does to develop these combat models. They include:
6. There were also a dozen “International TNDM Newsletters” prepared when we were working various support contracts for the TNDM. They are here:  TNDM Newsletter – The Dupuy Institute
7. Finally, it is discussed in our blog: Mystics & Statistics – The Dupuy Institute. Specifically if you search on our blog categories “TNDM”: TNDM – The Dupuy Institute or “Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming”: Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming – The Dupuy Institute or “casualty estimation”:  Casualty estimation – The Dupuy Institute or “Dupuy’s Theory of Combat”: Dupuy’s Theory of Combat – The Dupuy Institute
8. Finally, it was discussed in our now inactive Forum: The Dupuy Institute Forum – powered by Infopop
 
Hopefully, that should answer a lot of enquiries.
 

Modern Air Combat Data

We are going to hand the forum over to Geoffrey Clark for one day a week. Mr. Clark has posted here before and presented at the last two HAACs. He will end up doing a series of posts each Wednesday on Modern Air Combat Data. This is his introductory post:

—————————-

Air Combat Data, modern Air Warfare, Ukraine and AI

Many are following the war in Ukraine, with intense detail. I have attempted to gather meaningful statistics for a cliometrical analysis, to add some analytical rigor to the debates about the relative effectiveness of the new F-16 aircraft recently deployed by the Ukrainian Air Force. I’ve been looking at the sources available for this type of analysis, for example the Wikipedia page, or the Statista comparison page, and I have been sorely disappointed in what is currently available.  There is a wealth of information available about what was lost, including serial numbers, etc., but the process by which it was lost, or the why, is so far simply not available. This type of information is typically not shared at all for years or decades after a conflict, as it might compromise the effectiveness of the related Air Forces in a future conflict. This is why there remains ongoing analysis of the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, as new information emerges, and allows for the better correlation and cross-checking of Claims and Losses.

I’m following in the footsteps of John Stillion, referencing his famous RAND “clubbing baby seals” brief on the F-35, as well as his more accessible work at CBSA, Trends in Air-to-Air Combat (2015). I’ve been gathering the detailed claims and losses data for air combat in the jet age. Sometimes, this data is made openly available by the participating Air Forces and Air Defense Forces, but often comes from some less than official sources, like hobbyist websites, or even ejection seat manufacturer websites. Nonetheless, with proper scrutiny and comparison across sources, it can produce some important insights into the air combat process, and thereby give some predictive power for future conflict in the air.

It is also important to get the first-hand narratives by the pilots, airmen and soldiers involved in the conflict. I believe this is exceedingly important to understand the context of the combat situation and what was known at the time that decisions were made, and how this led to the outcomes. The idea that AI based on LLMs with a lot of data (from the internet? From a bunch of air combat games or simulations?) can produce a fighter pilot like capability to make decisions in the heat of battle … is fraught at best. A clean, curated, reliable, accurate dataset is needed now more than ever. I’ve recently watched a presentation by Admiral Grace Hopper from 1982, excellent foresight into data processing and information flows! In order to train future AI agents effectively, the relative value of actual combat data from real war must be prioritized much more than data from exercises, and especially above simulation data, and “internet” data, whatever that is.

Therefore, I’ll start a series of blog posts to explore this topic, as I progress through the analysis of data available on various conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries. I’ll develop some primitive AI agents for air combat and simulate air combat based upon this solid data foundation. I’ll also postulate various what-ifs and wargame scenarios, both in the air domain, and multi-domain combat scenarios.

I’m pleased this year to be able to attend in person the HAAC 2024 conference to present these ideas and get some insight and support from the other attendees. 

Thanks for reading, and for your comments!

We have sold out of Attrition

Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War is no longer for sale by The Dupuy Institute. We sent out our last two copies last week. We still hold copies of everything else listed here: Books – The Dupuy Institute

If you want Attrition, it is available on Amazon.com, but at a hefty price of $180: Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War: Dupuy, Trevor N.: 9780963869234: Amazon.com: Books. We sold our copies for $19.95.

There is little chance we will publish it again. The rights are held by the Dupuy family, not us. We sold 54 copies over the course of 9 years. This hardly justifies a new print run.

You were warned: We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute. We did sell those 16 copies in 9 months.

Last Six Blog Posts

I was quiet last week because I was on travel. Here are my last six blog posts before I went silent:

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute

Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war – The Dupuy Institute

Definition of Limited War – The Dupuy Institute

Aces at Kursk is available in the UK – The Dupuy Institute

The Aces at Kursk book is listed on Amazon.com (U.S.) as being available as of 25 July. Do not have confirmation of that yet. It was available in the UK as of 9 July.

 

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule

Several people in their articles have referenced a 3-to-1 rule and then reference us as the source. The latest example is in a German article on Taiwan: Storming Taiwan by force of arms? | Telepolis

Of course, we are the people who are saying the 3-to-1 rule is really not correct. They obviously do not read that far.

This is the reference they use: The Source of the U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule – The Dupuy Institute. My final sentence in that article is “Are we training the next generation of George B. McCellans?”

 

Various links related to the 3-to-1 rule:

Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 Rule in Histories – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 Rule in Recent History Books – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 243 Battles 1600-1900 – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 49 U.S. Civil War battles – The Dupuy Institute

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus the 752 Case Division-level Data Base 1904-1991 – The Dupuy Institute

Summation of Force Ratio Posts – The Dupuy Institute

JSTOR, Trevor Dupuy, Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The 3:1 Ratio – The Dupuy Institute

Army- and Division-level force ratio posts – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

We have been talking about this for a while. It appears that some people are not listening.

 

 

 

The 40% Rule

Hadn’t done a blog post in the while. Been focused on getting a book done. Sorry.

There is a rule of thumb often quoted out there and often put in war games that a unit becomes ineffective or reaches a breakpoint at 40% casualties. The basis for this rule is a very limited body of studies and analysis.

First, I have never seen a study on when a unit become ineffective. Even though it is now an accepted discussion point, I have not seen such a study establishing this relationship and do not think that such a study exists. I am not saying that there is not a relationship between casualties and unit effectiveness, what I am saying that I have never seen a study establishing that 1) this relationship exists, and 2) what are its measurements, and 3) what is the degree of degradation.

What has been done is studies on breakpoints, and over time, a rule of thumb that at 40% a unit “breaks” appears to be widely accepted. It appears that this rule has then been transferred to measuring unit effectiveness.

The starting point for “breakpoints” study is Dorothy Clark’s study of 43 battalions from World War II done in 1954. That study showed that the average casualties for these battalions was around 40%, although the ranged from around 1% to near 100%. Her conclusion was that “The statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data.” She also stated “Because of wide variations in data, average loss percentages alone have limited meaning.”. We have discussed this before, see: C-WAM 4 (Breakpoints) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and April | 2018 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Breakpoints in U.S. Army Doctrine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Response 3 (Breakpoints) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

The next point is the U.S. Army’s Maneuver Control manuals (FM 105-5) which in 1964 set the attacker’s breakpoint at around 20 percent casualties and the defender’s breakpoint at around 40 percent at the battalion-level. Charts in the 1964 Maneuver Control field manual showed a curve with the probability of unit break based on percentage of combat casualties. Once a defending unit reached around 40 percent casualties, the chance of breaking approached 100 percent. Once an attacking unit reached around 20 percent casualties, the chance of its halting (type I break) approached 100 percent, and the chance of its breaking (type II break) reached 40 percent. These data were for battalion-level combat. 

We have never found any studies establishing the data for these Maneuver Control manuals and we do not think they exist. Something may have been assembled when they were writing these manuals, but we have not been able to find any such files. Most likely, the tables were extension of the Dorothy Clark study, even though she said that it should not apply.

Anyhow, that is kind of it. Other stuff had been published on breakpoints, Helmbold in 1972, McQuie in 1987 (see: Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates As a Measure of Defeat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)) and Dupuy in the late 1980s, but I have not seen anything of significance since, as it appears that most significant studies and analysis work stopped around 1989. 

Now, Dr. Richard Harrison, who spends a lot of time translating old Soviet documents, has just sent me this: 

“Supposing that for the entire month not a single unit will receive reinforcements, then we will have a weakening of 30%, with 70% of the troops present. This is a significant weakening, but it does not yet deprive the unit of its combat strength; the latter’s fall begins approximately with losses of 40%.”

His source is: 

N.N. Movchin, Posledovatel’nye Operatsii po Opytu Marny i Visly (Consecutive Operations on the Experience of the Marne and Vistula) (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1928), page 99.

So, the U.S. came up with the 40% rule in 1954 which it disowned and then adopted in 1964 regardless. And here we have a 1928 Russian writing which is directly applying a 40% rule to unit effectiveness. I have no idea what the analytical basis is for that statement, but it does get my attention.