Category U.S. Military Doctrine

On (Maneuver) War

Another blog post from William “Chip” Sayers. The opinions presented are his own, and he is not shy. My one editorial comment is in brackets.

The blog post and William F. Owen article he references is here: The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud ? – The Dupuy Institute and The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

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On (Maneuver) War

Recently, Chris brought up an article entitled, “The Maneuver Warfare Fraud” by William F. Owen. That took me back to a bright summer day in 1998 when I was walking through the Gray Research Center on my way to class at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (C&SC) in Quantico, Virginia. Imagine my surprise as a Department of Defense civilian and former Air Force officer when I ran across a shrine to USAF Colonel and fighter pilot John Boyd! It had a mannequin wearing his flight suit, sporting his Fighter Weapons School patch and his squadron scarf the Navy loves to laugh at (they have no room to boast with their mock turtlenecks). I was unaware that morning of the Marines’ obsession with Maneuver Warfare, but I was about to be indoctrinated. I not only attended C&SC, but I stayed to attend the second-year course, the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and, risking questions about my judgment, I went back after a decade to finish my trifecta at Marine Corps War College (MCWAR). I have given my academic resumé to impress upon the reader that I was essentially raised in the belly of the beast, as it were.

While I was vaguely aware of the concept, its attachment to Bill Lind and the “Military Reform” movement of the 1970s and 80s put me off, so I hadn’t — until my arrival at Command & Staff — studied the concept. It would be fair to say that I was skeptical that Lind and Co. had come up with something new in the way of warfare. 

From its early days, the nascent Military Reform movement (or “Fighter Mafia” as they styled themselves, then) was mostly concerned with the disastrously wrong concepts of tactical aircraft procurement. In the wake of the Vietnam War — where sophisticated U.S. interceptors were perceived to have difficulty with basic MiGs — the Reformers believed implicitly that cheaper, simpler aircraft were better than more sophisticated and expensive aircraft. One of the Reformers went so far as to say that the Air Force could buy five 1950s-era F-5 day-fighters armed with basic weapons for the price of one F-15. He went on to project that the simple F-5 could fly twice as many sorties as the more complex aircraft, and therefore an F-5 force could be 10 times as effective as an F-15 based force — implying that buying a fleet of F-5s five times larger than the planned F-15 buy was a valid option. 

There were several things wrong with such simplistic thinking. First, by the time that the Reformers were making this argument in the late 1970s, the issues they had with the USAF’s fighter force were being solved by the F-15: the new aircraft had an effective radar that was simple to use, it had great visibility and the agility to match it, and it had weapons that proved to be far more reliable and deadly by a shift to solid-state electronics. It was as if the Reformers were stuck in the previous war, having failed to learn the lessons the USAF was rapidly integrating. 

The Reformers, overly proud of their USAF fighter community origins, seemingly failed to understand that the F-5 was a day fighter, unable to fight for air superiority in typical European weather.  As long as the Soviets intended to invade only on sunny days, we would be fine. Finally, we most certainly would not replace the intended F-15 fleet on a 5 to 1 basis. In fact, the infrastructure required to support such a large fleet of aircraft in an era of irresponsibly low defense spending strained credulity to the breaking point. It is virtually a given that their biggest fan, Senator Gary Hart [Hartpence] (no relation to B. H. Liddell Hart), and others like him would have made sure the exchange would have been 1 for 1, leaving the Soviets with an overwhelming advantage in numbers and at least parity in aircraft quality. Fortunately, clearer minds prevailed and the F-15 program went forward unchecked.

Two other programs were influenced by this group: The F-16 and the A-10. When the F-15 program got away from them, the Fighter Mafia claim to have “forced” the Air Force to hold a Light-Weight Fighter competition. The truth is that, after the Fighter Mafia successfully imposed their “Not a pound for air-to-ground!” policy on the F-15 program to ensure that it was a single-mission air superiority aircraft, the USAF was going to need somebody to haul its bombs. The winner of the LWF competition was going to be a multi-role fighter from the outset. The Fighter Mafia was overjoyed that the prototype YF-16 had a nose that was “too pointy” to house a radar. However, General Dynamics and Hughes conspired to dash their hopes when the F-16A appeared on the ramp with a slightly larger nose that housed a miniaturized, but very capable multi-mode radar.

Shattered by two losses in a row, the Fighter Mafia made sure that the A-10 program included none of the modern conveniences — no avionics, no laser-guided bombs, no hydraulics, and no hope on the modern battlefield. While the F-15 and F-16 defied the Military Reformers’ doomsaying throughout the 1990s, the A-10A proved unable to withstand a 1970s-era air defense system manned by Iraqis and its perceived success was due entirely to the AGM-65 Maverick missile. In the early 2000s, the Air Force finally admitted defeat and upgraded the entire fleet to A-10C standard by putting in all of the avionics that the Fighter Mafia so assiduously avoided in the 1970s.

With Senator Gary Hart and other acolytes on Capitol Hill joining the fight, Bill Lind — then a legislative aide for Hart — joined forces with the Fighter Mafia and transformed the crusade into the Military Reform movement. The movement now had clout, media attention and, briefly, the influence to take on not just major programs, but the institutions themselves. Make no mistake, once politicized, the movement was more about slashing the Defense budget than it was about improving the fighting capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Reformers next took on the U.S. Army’s the M-247 Sgt York DIVAD Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Gun (SPAAG) and the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) was established by Congress — largely through the influence of Sen. Hart and the Reformers — to test weapon systems under “combat” conditions including “live” fire against vehicles. In the past forty years, DOT&E has proven to be useful, but its first several projects were sketchy, at best.

First, the Reformers set their sights on the Sgt York. The M-247 was the poster-child for off-the-shelf procurement: the hull and powertrain were repurposed from obsolete M-48 Patton tanks, the 40mm Bofors guns were 1950s-era upgrades of the famed WWII weapons, and the radar was from the F-16 fighter aircraft. Surely this was a weapon the Reformers would love. Not so. The stories of its test failures were the stuff of legends, almost too outlandish to be true — the gun locked on to latrine fans, slewed towards the grandstands, drones had to be equipped with radar reflectors to allow them to be tracked, etc., etc. As it happens, I had the opportunity to interview one of the test personnel and it turns out, the stories were too good to be true. None of the stories were true as related — most had the barest kernel of truth in them. Nevertheless, SECDEF Cap Weinberger was in trouble with Congress for “never having met a weapon he didn’t like,” so after all the bad press, he offered up the Sgt York as a sacrificial lamb.

The tests on the Bradley IFV were immortalized by the James G. Burton book and subsequent TV movie, The Pentagon Wars. Burton was a USAF Lieutenant Colonel at DOT&E and conducted the tests on the Bradley. While it may have been commendable that the test director was outside the Army’s chain of command in order to insure objectivity, Lt Col Burton displayed a distinct lack of understanding of the tactics associated with IFVs when he subjected the Bradley to live fire tests by Main Battle Tank (MBT) guns and Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGMs). The Bradley was not designed to stand up to rounds larger than 30mm, so when hit by rounds over three times that size, the results were predictable. Nevertheless, Burton recommended that the Bradley be better protected by rearranging ammunition and fuel stowage and adding armor. Of course, this led to an increase in weight which slowed the vehicle’s tactical mobility and led directly to its loss of amphibious capability and several infantrymen. In the desert against incompetent and demoralized Iraqi troops, this loss of capability went unnoticed. It can be imagined, however, that the inability to cross rivers or keep up with friendly tanks might have directly led to great deal more casualties in a war in Europe. Burton could have complained that the Army’s IFV should have had the same survivability as the M-1 tank and have had a legitimate point: Who came up with the idea that 10 Americans in an IFV deserved less protection than four Americans in a tank?

Operation DESERT STORM proved the Reform movement wrong about U.S. weapons on virtually every point. However, by this time, Bill Lind had put together his theory of Maneuver Warfare and captured the mind of the Marine Corps. One of the great issues I’ve always had with the Marines’ fascination was Lind’s promotion of the German concept of Auftragstaktik. This concept calls for the pushing decisions concerning the battle down to the lowest possible level and trusting the man at the leading edge to act not just autonomously, but even in defiance of orders based on his superior understanding of the battle. This requires a phenomenal amount of trust in one’s subordinates. The problem is that it is simply inconceivable that any U.S. military officer would actually give a subordinate that kind of freedom and responsibility.  Yet, my classmates at Quantico greatly admired the German system, seemingly unaware of the irony. 

Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, one time British Green Party shadow Defence Minister, wrote a masterful PhD thesis expounding the virtues of Maneuver Warfare and Auftragstaktik, published as Not Mentioned in Despatches…  Fitz-Gibbon made an incredibly detailed study of the Battle of Goose Green in the 1982 Falklands War, showing conclusively that LtCol. “H.” Jones, the commander of the British 2Paras, was a maniacally anal-retentive micro-manager who was actually losing the battle until he was killed — leaving his subordinates the freedom to wrest victory from the jaws of defeat. I’m afraid most U.S. officers are more likely to resemble H. Jones than a Rommel or Guderian. A brutal realization, but admitting the illness is halfway to the cure.

Suffice it to say, nothing the Marines taught or said changed my mind. I remain a skeptic for the exact reasons William Owen describes in his article. Essentially, Owen argues that “Maneuver Warfare” is not only nothing new, it’s not actually in automatic opposition to the Reformers’ construct of “Attrition Warfare.”  I always felt that no one in their right mind would choose a bloody frontal attack when a flanking or envelopment maneuver was available, i.e., no one chooses to be an attritionist. When my Marine buddies boasted that the USMC was a maneuver organization as opposed to the enemy — the U.S. Army — who were cast as slaves to attrition warfare. I retorted rather pointedly that in Vietnam, the Marines pummeled the Army for wanting to fix the enemy with infantry and destroy him with artillery and air strikes, as opposed to their doctrine of fixing bayonets and breaking out the grenades. Who was the maneuver force and who was the attritionist, then? In reply, I got a thoughtful “huh.”

In agreement with Owen, I believe the “Maneuver vs. Attritional Warfare” paradigm is a construct that commits the false dichotomy fallacy. The commander in the field does not necessarily need to decide between maneuver and firepower. In fact, the best outcomes happen when he uses both. It’s Tactics 101: one fireteam lays down a base of fire to suppress the enemy and keep their heads down. while the second uses that cover to maneuver to the enemy’s flank or rear and finish the job at close range. Of course, there’s more to Maneuver Warfare than this — I spent my year in SAW contemplating 2,000 years of dirty tricks to use in combat and trying to invent new ones to add to the catalog. While I’m not sure our Army School of Advanced Military Studies counterparts couldn’t keep up with us, this fits into the general maneuverist outlook.

The students in my C&SC class received, along with a small mountain of other volumes, the famous “box of books” which bundled together the slim Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications. I generally agree with Owen’s critique of Marine Corps doctrinal publications. While on the surface, they appear to be well written and clear overall, Owen points out points of weak logic in their doctrine and internal contradictions.

My Command and Staff thesis took the Marine Corps to task for the disconnects in the planning process — particularly when it came to wargaming Courses Of Action (COAs) in the face of doctrine that incessantly claimed that warfare was completely unpredictable. To this I replied that if warfare is so thoroughly chaotic, “who could say if a single elephant might not rout an entire phalanx, or a determined Cub Scout Pack might not be an appropriate weapon to stop an armored division?” Nevertheless, wargaming was an important step in the planning process. Most of my classmates got to that point, simply assumed success and drove on, thus obviating the reason for wargaming COAs in the first place. Apparently, no one ever assumed failure and its consequences. I had a sense of irony that we were attending a planning school that ultimately didn’t believe in planning.

In my two years of working with Marines solving planning problems, I learned that, despite their love affair with Maneuver Warfare, they tended to solve their problems in conventional ways, including some that simply required frontal attacks. As an outsider (civilian with an Air Force background), I threw out numerous solutions that would have caused the Marines to either make unconventional use of their own resources (making the Aviation Combat Element the main effort and using the Ground Combat Element to act in a support role), or to allow outside agencies (allowing Dept. of State and CIA psychological operations to take the lead and reinforcing their actions with maneuver driven by their narratives). The part of Maneuver Warfare that they did generally respect was a whole-of-government approach and at least a toleration of out-of-the-box thinking.

Owen’s reading of Sun-Tsu is interesting.  To say that “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” is really referring to diplomacy is, to put it charitably, a bit of a stretch.  On the other hand, after over 2,000 years, I find Sun Tzu more interesting as poetry than strategy. It may have been a revelation in his day (though I’ll bet it was not), but it’s already “baked in” to our current military culture.

Owen believes that some of the inspiration for Maneuver Warfare has been either misinterpreted or greatly overblown. Marshal Ferdinand Foch of WWI Western Front infamy serves as a whipping boy for the Maneuverists, but according to Owen, wrote military theory that clearly inspired — if not plagiarized by — Maneuverist hero B. H. Liddell Hart (no relation to U.S. Senator Gary Hart). Owen’s revelation about the Foch/Liddell Hart connection confirmed my belief that the latter’s work was derivative and self-aggrandizing. Given the number of times I’ve suffered through Strategy, it was nice to uncover this little gem. Our modern notions of how much we need someone to save us by pronouncing a new strategy largely comes from Liddell Hart and others like him who looked back to WWI’s Western front, when they might better have paid attention to the Eastern and Southern fronts that were far more mobile.

I was forced to endure Liddell Hart at least twice during my Marine Corps schooling and I will never forgive them for that. Like Lind, Liddell Hart passes off weak and obvious ideas as revolutionary principles. His “man in the dark” theory (Clausewitz beat him by 100 years with “the fog of war”) is about as sophisticated as a middle-school football game, while his “expanding torrent” is just embarrassing.

Owen is skeptical of John Boyd and his OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) and this is where Owen and I part ways. I’m no fan of Boyd — he was a self-important blowhard — but he did have two excellent ideas, both relating to his background as a fighter pilot. He developed the theory of Energy Maneuverability, measuring the difference between two aircraft’s relative advantages in “dogfighting.” Contrary to claims by Maneuver Warfare advocates, Boyd didn’t invent EM — fighter pilots have always thought in those terms — rather, the engineer in him devised a way to define the differences more precisely and display them graphically in a reasonably easy to digest manner. To be perfectly honest, the EM diagrams his formulae generates are still too complex to be useful in the cockpit but rather must be studied as homework before the battle. And mostly, it comes down to a pilot planning to fight a given opponent above or below a certain airspeed.

One can imagine a time when EM diagrams are loaded into an aircraft’s fire-control computer and compared to data from its Non-Cooperative Target Recognition data to advise the pilot how to duel his opponent. In fact, this is probably the best way to have unmanned, AI-driven aircraft take on other aircraft in combat.

Undoubtedly, Boyd’s biggest contribution was his concept of the OODA loop. During his time as a fighter pilot in the Korean War, Boyd observed that he could out-maneuver enemy MiGs despite the fact that, on paper, the MiG-15 should have been superior to his F-86. He found that while the F-86 had hydraulically-boosted controls, the MiG did not. This allowed the F-86 pilot to roll more rapidly than the MiG, so while the MiG-15 should have been able to turn tighter, it could not keep up with the American fighter in rapid changes of direction. The F-86 could roll one way, and the MiG would be delayed in following due to the MiG pilot’s reaction time and not being able to roll as quickly. Then the USAF pilot would roll the opposite direction, putting the MiG pilot further behind in his reaction. After a few direction changes, the MiG would be so inappropriately positioned that he would pop out in front of the American fighter. This was described as a “scissors” maneuver. 

Boyd correctly deduced that, even without the advantage in hydraulically-boosted controls, the pilot who takes decisive action quickly can force his opponent into a reactive mode where his actions become increasingly inappropriate to the actual situation. The true genius was that Boyd recognized that this could be applied to other forms of warfare, and that the U.S. Marine Corps has applied it to its land warfare doctrine. The concept of momentum has always existed in military science — Clausewitz called it “surprise attack,” but in context, it clearly carried the idea of momentum. His famous dictum that “defense is the stronger form of warfare” was due in no small part to the defender’s diligent use of counterattacks.[1] His concept of the culmination of an attack is pinned to two things: inadequate logistics and counterattacks.[2] Put these two discussions together and you get the concept of momentum and its variability.

Boyd believed that when a side built up sufficient momentum, the opponent would become so deeply reactive that it could do nothing to stave off defeat. The Marines believe this and depend on seizure of the initiative and rapid maneuver to win victories over opponents that aren’t mentally prepared to keep up. This is a good construct, particularly well suited to American visions of “hyperwar,” as waged in the 1990s. Now that the forever wars are over, the U.S. military is trying to remember how to do peer, or near-peer force-on-force combat. They would do well to concentrate on this legacy and recreate what we once had. This will not be an easy lift, however, as only a small percentage of active-duty military members were serving prior to the great switchover to a single-minded focus on counterinsurgency.

 

[1] Clausewitz, On War, Howard, Paret & Brodie, Book Six, Chapters 2 & 3, 360, 363 and 365-366.

[2] Ibid, Book Seven, Chapters 4 & 5, 527-528.

“Our enemies generally shoot first 80 percent of the time”

Someone just asked me about a quote in the following article:
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/army-wants-smaller-brigades-stronger-divisions-lots-of-robots/

The quote is:

“Historical data on direct-fire engagements “shows that our enemies generally shoot first 80 percent of the time,” Sando said. “We don’t like those odds, [so] we want to avoid the close fight if we can. If we can’t avoid it, we want to enter it under conditions that are favorable to us.”

The question was: did this statistic come from us or do we know where it came from? Well, it definitely did not come from our work or Trevor Dupuy’s work. I have never heard of such a claim before.

Does anyone know where this came from? Is there some study or piece of quantitative historical analysis that this claim is based upon. I have my doubts about the accuracy of this claim.

If the data was drawn from unconventional (recent) warfare scenarios, then by nature of those conflicts, the insurgents initiate engagements more often than the counterinsurgents do. Not sure it would be as high as 4-to-1.

If it was drawn from conventional war scenarios, then by their nature it should be 50/50, unless you are always the attacker. Even then I am not it would be as high as 4-to-1.

 

Force Ratios at Kharkov and Kursk, 1943

T-34 Tanks near the Derzhprom building during brief Soviet re-occupation of Kharkov, February 1943. Source: https://thecharnelhouse.org/

Now, some of the data provided in the previous posts were muddied by the fact that there were serious differences in the performances of the opposing armies. This is true for the German Army versus the Soviet Army in 1943, the Israeli Army versus the Arab armies in 1956-1973, and for the U.S. Army, USMC and allied armies versus the Iraqi Army in 1991. To a much lesser extent, it is also true for the German Army versus the U.S and UK armies up through the middle of 1944. This is discussed in some depth in my book War by Numbers.

As such, this seems like also a good time to again briefly address this issue. We need to break down the force ratio tables by which nationality is attacking. First let us look at the Eastern Front World War II data:

World War II, Kharkov and Kursk 1943 (180 cases)

German Army attacking the Soviet Army – culled data set (100 cases)

Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins……………..Number of Cases

0.49………………………………..0%…………………………………………….1

0.58 to 0.95………………………90……………………………………………..10

1.01 to 1.49……………………..100……………………………………………..30

1.52 to 1.96………………………95……………………………………………..19

2.09 to 2.42…………………….100……………………………………………….6

2.57 to 2.87…………………….100……………………………………………….7

3.00 to 3.45…………………….100……………………………………………….8

3.60 to 3.79…………………….100……………………………………………….2

4.31 to 5.85………………………92……………………………………………..13

6.48 to 6.63…………………….100……………………………………………….2

8.60 to 11.41…………………..100……………………………………………….2

 

In these hundred battles, when the Germans are on the offensive, they win 96% of the time. That is a pretty impressive result. The full data set with another 28 cases that include “limited action” and “limited attack” are listed below.

German Army attacking the Soviet Army – complete data set (128 cases)

Force Ratio………………….Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.49…………………………………….0%…………………………………………….1

0.58 to 0.95…………………………..47…………………………………………….19

1.01 to 1.49…………………………..88…………………………………………….34

1.52 to 1.96…………………………..77…………………………………………….26

2.09 to 2.42…………………………..86………………………………………………7

2.57 to 2.98…………………………100………………………………………………9

3.00 to 3.45…………………………100………………………………………………8

3.60 to 3.79…………………………100………………………………………………3

4.31 to 5.85…………………………..71…………………………………………….17

6.48 to 6.63…………………………100………………………………………………2

8.60 to 11.41……………………….100………………………………………………2

 

Out of these 128 battles, when the Germans attack they win 79% of the time. This is still impressive by any standard. Because of the additional cases being “limited action” and “limited attack” there are a lot of drawn engagements in this data set. The “culled” data set has three defender victories and one draw (and 96 attacker wins). This one has five defender victories and 22 drawn engagements. Now, let us look at how the Soviets do in response. These are the opposing forces on the same battlefield, similar terrain, similar weather, and often on the same day

Soviet Army attacking the German Army – culled data set (41 cases)

Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.40 to 0.43……………………..67%………………………………………………..3

0.51 to 0.99……………………..18…………………………………………………11

1.02 to 1.46……………………..25…………………………………………………16

1.53 to 1.96……………………..50…………………………………………………..4

2.08 to 2.31……………………..50…………………………………………………..4

2.79 to 2.89……………………..33…………………………………………………..3

 

This is a very different result than what we see for the Germans. Out of the 41 attacks, the Soviets win 13 times or 32%. If I compare the German results of their attacks at odds below three-to-one, I have the Soviets succeeding 32% of the time while the Germans are succeeding 96% of the time (70 out of 73 attacks). Hard to argue that there is not a performance difference as the two armies in 1943 were roughly equivalent in armament and the mix of armaments. Each of the engagements from Kursk are presented in considerable detail in my books on the battle.[1]

The same data, but including “limited action” and “limited attack” is shown below:

Soviet Army attacking the German Army – complete data set (52 cases)

Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins………………….Number of Cases

0.40 to 0.49……………………..50%…………………………………………………4

0.51 to 0.99……………………..14………………………………………………….14

1.01 to 1.46……………………..19………………………………………………….21

1.53 to 1.96……………………..40……………………………………………………5

2.08 to 2.31……………………..50……………………………………………………4

2.66 to 2.89……………………..25……………………………………………………4

 

With this data set, out of 52 engagements the attacker still only won 13 times, or 25%.

 

 

[1] See Lawrence. Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (2015) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (2019). The first book lays out all 192 engagements from the offensive in the south while the second book provided the detailed data for 76 of the engagements. Each engagement has a separate engagement sheet that lays out the forces involved, their strength and their losses. There is a detail narrative of their operations in the text of the books. If anyone has any questions over the accuracy or interpretation of this data, it is presented in these books, developed primarily from the unit records of both sides (primary sources).

Summation of Force Ratio Posts

I think the following posts make the cases that the three-to-one rule as presented in Army FM 6-0 and other publications is incorrect (50% chance of the defender winning at 3-to-1). If there is any historical evidence that supports this claim, then I would ask that TRADOC, which is responsible for these manuals, to produce such evidence. I strongly suspect there is no such evidence. I would hope that we will see corrective action from TRADOC.

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 243 Battles 1600-1900

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 49 U.S. Civil War battles

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus the 752 Case Division-level Data Base 1904-1991

The World War I Cases from the Division-level Database

The World War II Cases from the Division-level Database

Post-World War II Cases from the Division-level Database

The Source of the U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule

My next few blog posts are going to address the impact of “Human Factors” on these force ratios.

The Source of the U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule

Oddly enough, 1991 was when this rule was first published, that we are aware of. It was published in the CGSC (Command and General Staff College) Student Text 100-9: Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decision Making dated July 1991. There may have been work or materials prepared before then that we are not aware of.

The actual statement in that publication is that “Historical experience has shown that a defender has approximately a 50-50 probability of successfully defeating an attacking force approximately three times his equivalent strength.” The publication then goes on to recommend that for planning purposes that they “Therefore, as our start part, we will attempt to defend on each avenue of approach with, roughly, a 1-to-3 force rations expressed as a US unit defending against the next higher level enemy unit. For example, a US battalion would defend against an enemy regiment. There are only tools for the plan. Table 3-2 shows the preferred minimum planning ratios used to initially array forces.” The key here is the words “initially” and “to start with.” When deploying out a force, seeing up a blocking force that may be initially outnumbered three-to-one in an planned deployment does not mean that it will be outmatched in combat power by three-to-one as the battle develops. It is possible to reinforce the unit, provide it with artillery or air support, or withdraw to a more favorable position. So, the guidance that forces should be arrayed one level lower than the expected opposition is not bad guidance, even though one of the arguments made in that 1991 document supporting this is clearly wrong. The problem is that this rule is now repeated in other army documents without fully clarifying that this is just a planning factor for initial dispositions. It is also serving as the basis for charts in manuals and informal casualty estimation and modeling procedures. The army now commonly publishes the following table (from the proposed ATP 5-0.2, 31 July 2019):

Historical minimum planning ratios

Friendly Mission                     Friendly: Enemy

Hasty defend                          1:2.5

Deliberate defend                   1:3

Hasty attack                            2.5:1

Deliberate attack                     3:1

Delay                                       1:6

Counterattack                         1:1

Penetration (lead element)      18:1

 

This table, as shown by the data leave the impression that you need to have three-to-one odds to attack and that one-to-three odds is sufficient for defense. This would be the wrong impression to give. To claim that it is “historical” gives it more authority than it deserves, as the historical data in fact does not support this table. They are “minimum planning” factors, and that needs to properly stressed.

The bigger problem is that you fight as your train. So, if the officer corps is trained that you need at least a three-to-one force ratio to have a 50% chance of winning, then what kind of war planning and offensive action is now being envisioned? In World War II, the most common attack in our database are those at odds 1.00- to 1.49-to-one and they win 63% of the time. In the post-World War II engagements, the most common attack is done at 0.54- to 0.97-to-1 and the attacker wins 75% of the time (20 cases). So to what reality are we training our officers? Are we training the next generation of George B. McCellans?

Post-World War II Cases from the Division-level Database

We have 66 engagements in our database from after World War II. There are 51 cases from the Arab-Israeli Wars and 15 cases from the 1991 Gulf War.

Arab-Israeli Wars 1956-1973 (51 cases)

Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins………………..Number of Cases

0.54 to 0.97-to-1……………….76%…………………………………………….17

1.00 to 1.47-to-1……………….82……………………………………………….11

1.51 to 1.99-to-1……………….50…………………………………………………4

2.04 to 2.25-to-1……………….50…………………………………………………4

2.90-to-1……………………….100…………………………………………………1

3.03 to 3.59-to-1…………………0…………………………………………………2

3.50 to 3.96-to-1……………….25…………………………………………………4

4.11 to 5.87-to-1……………….40…………………………………………………5

6.06-to-1……………………….100…………………………………………………1

8.02 to 12.18-to-1…………….100…………………………………………………2

 

Now, this data is highly variable, with the largest number of attacks being conducted at less than one-to-one odds and the attacker winning 76% of the time. This is because of a significant difference in the combat capability of Israeli forces compared to the Egyptians, Syrians and other Arab armies that they are engaged with. This difference is well documented and discussed in more depth in my book War by Numbers. Of the 17 attacks at less than one-to-one odds, 16 were conducted by the Israelis and only one attack was conducted by the Arab armies. The Iraqi attack at those low odds was resoundingly defeated (Tel el Hara, 11 October 1973).

There is a similar performance disparity between the German and the Soviet armies in 1943. This also affects the force ratio data from World War II. We will separate these cases out by who the attacker is just to clarify the results. In the case of the Gulf War, the difference in morale, motivation and performance of the two armies were extremely disparate. This is a fairly extreme case, although not the only such case in history.

Gulf War (1991):

Force Ratio…………………..Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.20 to 0.21…………………………0…………………………………………………..2

0.64 to 0.93………………………..67…………………………………………………..3

1.10 to 1.16………………………100…………………………………………………..2

None between 1.16 and 2.47

2.47……………………………….100………………………………………………….1

2.60 to 2.86………………………100………………………………………………….5

3.00 to 3.26………………………..50………………………………………………….2

 

One is hesitant to draw any conclusions from this data. The one attack that failed at three-to-one was the Iraqi Army attack at Khafji 29 January – 1 February 1991. In fact, all four failed attacks in the data set occurred when the Iraqis were attacking.

Anyhow, these databases can certainly be expanded and further analysis can be done, but good luck finding the three-to-one rule in this data that results in the defender winning 50% of the time. It is clear that from 1600 to 1991 that the attacker won more often than not at two-to-one odds or even lower, depending on the period and the forces involved. There is really no historical evidence supporting the Army version of this rule that I know of. I have been in this industry for over three decades and have not seen such evidence. I am not aware of any databases the size, depth or range of ones used here. If this historical data does not establish the rule, then where is the historical data that does?

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus the 752 Case Division-level Data Base 1904-1991

Our most developed database through is our division-level database of 752 cases covering combat from 1904 to 1991. As this addresses modern combat, it is a useful database for such a test. Of those 752 cases, we have the forces ratios and outcome for 672 of them. All the engagements previously discussed from ETO in 1944 and Kharkov and Kursk in 1943 are drawn from this database. As such, there is some overlap between these 672 cases and the 116 cases from ETO and 73 cases from the Eastern Front previously used. The data shows a very clear pattern related to force ratios.

Division-level Engagements 1904-1991 (672 cases)

Force Ratio…………………..Percent Attacker Wins………………Number of Cases

0.20 to 0.20-to-1………………..0%………………………………………………….2

0.25 to 04.9-to-1………………22…………………………………………………….9

0.50 to 0.99-to-1………………42…………………………………………………..77

1.00 to 1.49-to-1………………55…………………………………………………150

1.50 to 1.99-to-1………………59…………………………………………………123

2.00 to 2.49-to-1………………71…………………………………………………..56

2.50 to 2.99-to-1………………83…………………………………………………..53

3.00 to 3.49-to-1………………69…………………………………………………..48

3.50 to 3.98-to-1………………77…………………………………………………..30

4.06 to 5.87-to-1………………65…………………………………………………..66

6.06 to 7.90-to-1………………88…………………………………………………..17

8.20 to 17.87-to-1……………100…………………………………………………..22

 

This table drives home in spades the problem with the U.S. Army current interpretation of the three-to-one rule (50% chance of defender success). To start with, the attacker starts winning over half the time at 1.00 to 1.49-to-1 odds. By the time they get to 2.50 to 2.99-to-1 odds they are winning 83% of the time. It is quite clear from this data that the U.S. Army rule is wrong.

Now, this data is skewed a little bit by the inclusion of engagements with “limited action” or only “limited attack.” They include engagements where the attacker has a significant force ratio but conducted only an initial probing attack of battalion size. Sometimes those attacks did not succeed. So the success rate of some the higher odds engagements would actually be higher if these were eliminated. So, we ended up culling 102 of these engagements from the above table to produce the following table.  There is not a big difference in the results between this tighter table of 570 cases and the previous table of 672 cases. The primary difference is that the attacker tends to be more successful in all categories. All the culled engagements were from World War II.

Division-level Engagements, 1904-1991 (570 cases) – culled data set

 

Force Ratio………………….Percent Attacker Wins……………….Number of Cases

0.20 to 0.20-to-1………………..0%…………………………………………………2

0.25 to 04.9-to-1………………25……………………………………………………8

0.50 to 0.99-to-1………………52…………………………………………………..62

1.00 to 1.49-to-1………………62…………………………………………………133

1.50 to 1.99-to-1………………66…………………………………………………108

2.00 to 2.49-to-1………………80………………………………………………….49

2.50 to 2.99-to-1………………83………………………………………………….48

3.00 to 3.49-to-1………………70………………………………………………….40

3.50 to 3.98-to-1………………76………………………………………………….29

4.06 to 5.87-to-1………………73………………………………………………….55

6.06 to 7.90-to-1………………88………………………………………………….17

8.20 to 17.87-to-1……………100………………………………………………….17

56.20-109.98-to-1……………100…………………………………………………..2

 

Needless to say, this tighter data set is even further biased against the published U.S. Army three-to-one rule.

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 49 U.S. Civil War battles

From 1st Alabama Cavalry, USV website (www.1stalabamacavalryusv.com). Alexander Lawrence was from Fayette County, Alabama and fought for the Union with the 1st Alabama Cavalry

As the three-to-one rule of thumb appears to have evolved out of the American Civil War (although not as published in FM 6-0), then we should probably look at just our Civil War battles in our database.

Among those 243 cases are 49 cases from the American Civil War. As the three-to-one rule may have evolved from that experience, let us looking at just those cases:

 Force Ratio……………………Percent Attacker Wins……………….Number of Cases

0.44 to 0.48-to-1…………………0%………………………………………………3

0.53 to 0.97-to-1………………..18……………………………………………….11

1.00 to 1.47-to-1………………..36……………………………………………….14

1.53 to 1.96-to-1………………..25……………………………………………….12

2.10 to 2.31-to-1………………..50…………………………………………………6

3.00-to-1……………………….100…………………………………………………1

5.00-to-1……………………….100…………………………………………………1

15.05-to-1……………………..100…………………………………………………1

 

The American Civil War is a very good test case for such an examination. Both officer corps were primarily trained at West Point (the U.S. military academy); both armies fought in the same style and doctrine; they used most of the same weapons, including the same muskets and same artillery; they were similar in culture; and they were similar in training, doctrine, background and capability. While some historical mythology has tried to make the southern Americans better fighters, it is hard to accept the argument that a farmer from North Carolina is a different, more motivated or a more capable fighter than a farmer from Pennsylvania. Most of the United States was rural. There wre also units raised to fight for the north from all of the southern states. This is about an equal comparison between two opponents that one is going to find.

The end results from these two tests are that the three-to-one rule as recorded in FM 6-0 clearly does not apply. In the case of the Civil War data at 2.10 to 2.31-to-1 odds the attacker is winning half the time. Where does one get the notion that at 3.00-to-1 odds the defender will win half the time? What historical data established that?

So the U.S. Army version of the three-to-one (meaning defender wins half the time) does not show up in the almost 400 years of history that we are examining here and does not show up in the American Civil War.

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule versus 243 Battles 1600-1900

Now, at the time I wrote War by Numbers, I was not aware of this sentence planted in FM 6-0 and so therefore did not feel a need to respond to the “3-to-1 rule.” It is a rule of thumb, not completely without value, that had been discussed before. I thought this issue was properly understood in the U.S. analytical and defense community, therefore I did not feel a need to address it further. It turns out that I do. So, let me take a moment to tap into our databases and properly address this using all the resources at my disposal.

First of all, The Dupuy Institute has a database of 243 engagements from 1600-1900 called the Battles Data Base (BaDB). These are almost all field battles, where the two sides deployed their forces of tens of thousands of people and resolve their dispute that day. Of the 243 battles, only 40 of them last longer than a day. The largest engagement has the attacker fielding 365,000 men (Leipzig, 1813) and the smallest engagement had the defender fielding but 350 men (Majuba Hill, 1881).

As this rule of thumb evolved out of the U.S. Civil War, then an examination of historical field battles from 1600-1900 is particularly relevant. Looking at the force ratio for these battles shows:

Force Ratio…………………..Percent Attacker Wins………………..Number of Cases

0.26 to 04.9-to-1………………54%……………………………………………13

0.50 to 0.98-to-1………………54………………………………………………81

1.00 to 1.47-to-1………………56………………………………………………71

1.50 to 1.96-to-1………………63………………………………………………38

2.00 to 2.44-to-1………………50………………………………………………16

2.58 to 2.94-to-1………………57………………………………………………..7

3.00 to 3.43-to-1…………….100………………………………………………..5

3.75 to 3.76-to-1………………..0………………………………………………..2

4.00 to 4.93-to-1………………75………………………………………………..4

7.78 to 16.82-to-1……………..67………………………………………………..6

 

The pattern here is not particularly clear, as low odds attack, where the attacker is outnumbered, succeed over half the time, as do attacks at higher odds. Some of this is due to the selection of battles, some of this is due to the lack of regular trained armies, and some of this is due to the attacker choosing to attack because they have advantages in morale, training, experience, position, etc. that outweigh the numbers. But, the argument that is made in FM 6-0 that based upon historical data at three-to-one odds the defender wins 50% of the time is clearly not shown. For example, in this data set there are 12 cases between the odds of 2.50 to 3.50-to-1. Of those 12 cases, the attacker wins in 9 of them (75%). The three cases where the defender wins are: 1) Battle of Buena Vista in 1847 where Santa Anna’s Mexican Army attacked Zachary Taylor’s American Army at 2.94-to-1, 2) Battle of Inkeman in 1854 where the Russian Army attacked the French and British armies in Crimea at 2.63-to-1, and 3) Battle of Belfort in 1871 where the French Army attack the German Army at 2.75-to-1. One could certainly argue that in these three cases, the defenders held advantages in training, experience and overall combat effectiveness.

Next post will address the 49 American Civil War battles in our database.

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule

Various Three-to-one rules of thumbs have existed in the U.S. Army and in writings possibly as early as the American Civil War (1861-1865). These are fine as “rules of thumb” as long as one does not take them seriously and understands what they really mean. But, unfortunately, we have now seen something that is a loose rule of thumb turned into a codified and quantified rule. This is annoyingly overstating its importance and as given in U.S. Army manuals, is patently false.

The U.S. Army has apparently codified the “three-to-one rule” in its documentation and has given it a value. In the 2014 edition of FM 6-0, paragraph 9-103, it states that “For example, historically, defenders have over a 50 percent probability of defeating an attacking force approximately three times their equivalent strength.” This statement, on the surface, simply is incorrect. For example, the following table from my book War by Numbers is drawn from a series of 116 division-level engagements in France in 1944 against the Germans (see War by Numbers, page 10) They show the following relationship between force ratio and outcome:

European Theater of Operations (ETO) Data, 1944

 

Force Ratio………………..Result…………………Percent Failure…Number of cases

0.55 to 1.01-to-1.00………Attack Fails…………………..100%……………….5

1.15 to 1.88-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……21%………………..48

1.95 to 2.56-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……10%………………..21

2.71-to-1.00 and higher…Attacker Advances…………….0%……………….. 42

 

Now these engagements are from fighting between the U.S., UK and Germany in France and Germany in 1944. These are engagements between forces of roughly equal competence. As can be seen, based upon 42 division-level engagements, in all cases of attacks at three-to-one (more specifically 2.71-to-1 and greater), the attacker advanced. Meaning in all cases of attacks at three-to-one, the attacker won. This directly contradicts the statement in FM 6-0, and contradicts it based upon historical data.

This is supplemented by the following two tables on the next page of War by Numbers. The first table shows the German performance when attacking Soviet units in 1943.

Germans attacking Soviets (Battles of Kharkov and Kursk), 1943

 

Force Ratio………………..Result………………….Percent Failure…Number of cases

0.63 to 1.06-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……..20%……………………..5

1.18 to 1.87-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……….6%……………………17

1.91-to-1.00 and higher…Attacker Advances……………….0%……………………21

 

The next table shows the Soviet performance when attacking German units in 1943:

Soviets attacking Germans (Battles of Kharkov and Kursk), 1943

 

Force Ratio………………Result…………………..Percent Failure…Number of cases

0.40 to 1.05-to-1…………Attack usually fails…………70%……………………10

1.20 to 1.65-to-1.00…….Attack often fails…………….50%……………………11

1.91 to 2.89-to-1.00…….Attack sometimes fails…….44%……………………..9

 

These charts are from the fighting around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943 and the fighting during the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. It is 73 engagements between the German and Soviet armies.

Now, there is a clear performance difference between the German and the Soviet armies at this time. This is discussed in considerable depth in War by Numbers and will not be addressed here. But, what it amounts to is that the German Army has an advantage in the casualty exchange and that advantage also shows up in the outcomes of the battles, as show above. If they attacked at two-to-one odds are greater, they would win. The Soviets attacking at the same odds would win only 56 percent of the time. Clearly, at the division-level, in a unit to unit comparison, the Germans were two or three times better than their Soviet opponents.

Still, even in the worse case, which is the Soviets attacking the Germans, we do not get to the claim made in FM 6-0, which is the defender won 50% of the time when attacked at three-to-one. In fact, the Soviets managed to win 50% of the time when attacking at 1.20 to 1.65-to-1. Something is clearly wrong with the statement in FM 6-0.

Now, at the time I wrote War by Numbers, I was not aware of this sentence planted in FM 6-0 and so therefore did not feel a need to respond to the “three-to-one rule.” It is a rule of thumb, not completely without value, that had been discussed before (see Dupuy, Understanding War, pages 31-37). I thought this issue was properly understood in the U.S. analytical and defense community, therefore I did not feel a need to address it further. It turns out that I do. So, I will take a moment to tap into our databases and properly address this using all the resources at my disposal. This will be in subsequent blog posts.