Category Combat Databases

The Battle of Tolstoye Woods will be released 20 October 2026

The book that I call The Battle of Tolstoye Woods will be released by Stackpole book on 20 October 2026. This is the first day of the Fifth HAAC. I doubt if I will have copies of books at the conference.

The title of the book is Turing the Tide at Kursk: The Battle of Tostoye Woods and How the Red Army Thwarted German Tanks West of Prokhorovka. Turning the Tide at Kursk probably is a better title for marketing purposes. This was the Soviet attack on 12 July 1943 that succeeded, completely putting a halt to the XLVIII Panzer Corps advance. 

The Battle of Kursk, in the south, consists of two panzer corps of equal strength advancing side-by-side to the north. The SS Panzer Corps, the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Fifth Guards Tank Army and General Pavel Rotmistrov get all the press. What was going on to the west was equally important, and in the Soviet attack succeeded (unlike Prokhorovka). This was the panzer corps with the bridging assets that was move north to cross the Psel and take Oboyan. This battle was at least as important as Prokhorovka, probably more so. General Paval Rotmistrov, who failed, is famous. General Mikhail Katukov, who succeeded, not as much

Anyhow, the link to Amazon to the book is here: Turning the Tide at Kursk: The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and How the Red Army Thwarted German Tanks West of Prokhorovka: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811778053: Amazon.com: Books

The link to the Fifth HAAC is here: The Fifth HAAC is 20 – 22 October – The Dupuy Institute

More data on Port of Salerno engagements

Now…. the engagement in the last post was from the Combat Data Subscription Service published in 1975. These were the engagements used to create the QJM (@1977) and validate the QJM. They were later assembled into something called the Land Warfare Data Base (LWDB) which was used as the basis of CBD90. It was also used as the basis for a lot of what became our DuWar series of databases, and this engagement is in the DLEDB (Division-Level Engagement Data Base). It has been reviewed and revised. The current database shows:

  1. Engagement: 23003
  2. Port of Salerno Beachhead
  3. 9/9/43
  4. Br 46th Div 
  5. Ger KG Doernemann, 16th PzD
  6. Strength: 12917
  7. Strength: 2,995
  8. Armor: 0
  9. Armor: 0
  10. Artillery: 90
  11. Artillery: 18
  12. Suprise level: Minor
  13. Casualties: 350 (2.71%)
  14. Casualties: 70 (2.34%)
  15. Created 30 October 1998 for EPW study by Richard Anderson

 

 

  1. Engagement: 23004
  2. Port of Slaerno (rev)
  3. 9/10/43 – 9/11/43
  4. Br 46th Div
  5. Ger KG Schmalz, HG Division
  6. Strength: 16,837
  7. Strength: 11,955
  8. Armor: 48
  9. Armor: 72
  10. Artillery: 119
  11. Artillery: 36
  12. Casualties: 1180 (3.50% a day)
  13. Casualties: 300 (1.25% a day)
  14. Extensively revised 30 October 1998 for EPW study by Richard Anderson. Original engagement no. 3950 deleted.

 

Anyhow, there two engagements replaced the original engagement in the QJM validation database and the CBD90. In the DLEDB there are actually 96 fields that describe an engagement. This is an abbreviated list. 

E. B. Vandiver, long serving head of CAA, has passed away

E. B. Vandiver, known to everyone as “Van”, passed away this last week at the age of 87. He became the director of the Concepts Analysis Agency in 1984. I first briefed him in 1987 when I was leading the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB). He retired from full-time work in 2012, promoted up to being “Director Emeritus.” CAA had now become the Center for Army Analysis and had moved to its own building in Fort Belvoir.

A bio: Edgar Bishop Vandiver III (born September 19, 1938), American operations research analyst | World Biographical Encyclopedia

I gather there will be services in Fairfax, VA on Wednesday, March 25.

Obituary: Edgar Bishop Vandiver III Obituary (1938-2026) | Fairfax, VA

As he was the head of the Army’s premier analytical office for almost 30 years, he had an impact on the army and its development from the 1980s, through the collapse of the Soviet Union, through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and after. The head of CAA started as a major general slot back in 1973. Vandiver filled that role for 28 years. 

Past Directors:

  • MG Hal Hallgren January 1973 – February 1976
  • MG Ennis C. Whitehead Jr. April 1976 – May 1980
  • MG Edward B. Atkenson July 1980 – February 1982
  • Mr. David C. Hardison February 1982 – September 1984
  • Mr. E. B. Vandiver III September 1984 – November 2012
  • Dr. William Forrest Crain November 2012 – May 2020

Current Director: Dr. Steven Alexander Stoddard

Wikipeida article on CAA: Center for Army Analysis – Wikipedia

In his almost 30 years at CAA, he tended to make his impact through his management and direct conversation, as opposed to issuing papers and reports. I always found this oral history project done in 2005 to be of interest:

Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Oral History Project Interview of E.B. Vandiver, III, FS on JSTOR

Anyhow, we crossed paths a lot over the decades, although we did not know each other personally. The first major project I worked on, the ACSDB, was funded by CAA and regularly briefed to Van starting in 1987. The Kursk Data Base project I worked on was funded by CAA and was the source for four of my books (my fourth book on Kursk is coming out this fall). We were asked by him to do the Enemy Prisoner of Wars (EPW) studies and the three Urban Warfare studies among other projects. We ended up do the Iraq Casualty Estimate for him in 2004. That work is summarized in my book America’s Modern Wars. Certainly, half of my book War by Numbers was as a result of CAA funding. It was a productive relationship that lasted 22 years. Certainly his willingness to take me seriously when I first started working in this industry in 1987 and his willingness to continue taking me seriously after Trevor Dupuy passed away in 1995, went a long way in being able to do the work that I desired and in keeping The Dupuy Institute alive. 

My last conversation with him was in 2009 or so as the budget was in decline and there was little funding left. I did acknowledge him in several of my books. In the end, without Vandiver at CAA, I would not have had the career I had and could not have done the explorations that I did. He tended to provide budget and let us work the projects as we best felt. He always supported the value of historical research and historical analysis. He had a very significant impact on the community.

9 Books

Finally here is a picture of all nine of my published books. It includes two copies of The Battle for Kyiv, as one is the hardback and one is the paperback version. The paperback version does have some revisions and an expanded photo section.

We are looking to add two more books to that collection in the next six months. An additional book on the Russo-Ukrainian War should be out in the next 2 to 3 months, and The Battle of Tolstoye Woods should be out hopefully this spring. The editing process on all my books is slow, primarily because the large amount of charts, tables and tabular data in them that are a pain to edit and proof.

Four books on Kursk

I have three books published on the Battle of Kursk and one coming out next year (The Batte of Tolstoye Woods).

The Battle of Kusk was the largest battle of World War II. You would not get that sense from the military history section of most bookstores. Anyhow, there were four parts to the battle. The German offensive in the south from 4 to 24 July 1943, the German offensive in the north for 5 – 12 July 1943, the Soviet counteroffensive around Orel from 12 July to 23 August and the Soviet counteroffensive around Kharkov from 3 August to 23 August. My books are mostly about the German offensive in the south. I have consider doing one or two about the Battle(s) of Kharkov, but I have been distracted by the war that started in that same area in 2022.

I do have a fourth book coming out next year called The Battle of Tolstoye Woods. This one actually covers the Soviet counterattack that actually worked and stopped a German panzer corps. Everyone tends to focus on the Battle of Prokhorovka, but there were three German armored corps attacking in the south, and they all had to be stopped. This book is about the Red Army halting the 48th Panzer Corps, which was as large as the SS Panzer Corps.

Anyhow, not sure if I will get around to a fifth Kursk book. Might.



P.S. I do think my original book is the largest history book ever written: Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever? — History News Network

I have not submitted it to the Guinness World Records.

P.P.S. Here is the link to the “Other Battle of Kursk” which has been posted to Amazon.com (UK). It will be The Battle of Tolstoye Woods: The Other Battle of Kursk: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811773737: Amazon.com: Books   and   The Other Battle of Kursk: Amazon.co.uk: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811773737: Books

Two books

These two books are my two analytical books. Both quantitative in approach. Notice the use of the word “Understanding” in both titles.

American’s Modern Wars cover our analysis of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies based upon an analysis of 89 post-WWII cases. There has been very little quantitative analysis of insurgencies. This is the most extensive effort I am aware of. We were blessed with budget and a staff that at one point included ten people. It is amazing what you can do when you have manpower (read $$$).

War by Numbers is our analysis of conventional warfare. It was built from a series of studies we did over the years for the DOD and other contractors. Probably the most extensive qualitative analysis of aspects of conventional war that has been done in the last few decades. Again, helps to have budget.

These are my two “theoretical” books. I am halfway through a book called More War by Numbers. I have stopped work on it to concentrate on other tasks. May get back to in 2027.

The analysis for America’s Modern Wars was based upon 89 post-WWII insurgencies, interventions and peacekeeping operations. We did expand the database to well over 100 cases but never went back and re-shot the analysis due to budget cuts. It would be my desire to expand the database up to around 120 cases, update the 20 or so that were on-going (our data collection stopped in 2008). and then re-shoot and expand the analysis. This would be a good time to do this instead of again waiting until we are in another insurgency and yet again chasing our tail. Our track record on these have not been good, we lost Vietnam, we lost Afghanistan and Iraq was touch-and-go for a while. While we are not in the middle of another insurgency is a good time to study and learn about them based upon real world experience (AKA history).

Sorry to get preachy, but I really don’t like losing wars.

Robert Helmbold has a second book out

Robert Helmbold, previously with RAND and a senior scientist at the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), has a new book coming out:

The Truth About Little Big Horn Finally Comes Out: Helmbold PhD, Robert L.: 9798280119437: Amazon.com: Books

It is his second book. His first one came out in 2021:

The Key to Victory: Machine Learning the Lessons of History: Helmbold PhD, Robert L.: 9798448616563: Amazon.com: Books

and

The Key to Victory: Machine Learning the Lessons of History – The Dupuy Institute

He is 93. Never too late to start publishing.

The Russians are continuing to advance in Ukraine

The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.

In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).

Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian. 

Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.

In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):  

Summation (195 engagements):

Outcome              Failed       Advances   Penetrated
                               III             IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              54                71                33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             2.98            1.20             0.83

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.62             2.96            6.40

Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).

The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).

Post-World War II (61 engagements):

Outcome              Failed      Advances    Penetrated
                               III            IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              14               8                 33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             3.20            1.60             1.36

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.80             4.83           15.10

Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:

Outcome            III      IV        V

  Cases                 10       29         21

  Force Ratios    1.80    2.69     2.75

  Loss Ratios      1.66    1.51      0.64

Note the same loss pattern exists here.

Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.

Outcome                    III        IV       V

Italian Campaign     0.74     1.76     2.53

Ardennes                   0.45     3.71     5.00

Kursk                         0.58      5.18   11.43 

So……

  1. The advance rates in Ukraine are pretty much in line with outcome III and IV engagements. 
  2. The advance rates are fairly low compared to the other cases we have.
  3. Will discuss casualties later.

This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).