Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
Casemate Publishers (U.S. – Philadelphia/Haverford), who published my book America’s Modern Wars (hardcopies are here: Books – The Dupuy Institute), is advertising my book Aces at Kursk for sale. This is the email they sent me: New Releases! (mailchi.mp)
The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.
In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).
Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian.
Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.
In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):
Summation (195 engagements):
Outcome Failed Advances Penetrated
III IV V
Number of Engagements:
54 71 33
Attacker percent casualties per day:
2.98 1.20 0.83
Defender percent casualties per day:
2.62 2.96 6.40
Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).
The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).
Post-World War II (61 engagements):
Outcome Failed Advances Penetrated
III IV V
Number of Engagements:
14 8 33
Attacker percent casualties per day:
3.20 1.60 1.36
Defender percent casualties per day:
2.80 4.83 15.10
Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:
Outcome III IV V
Cases 10 29 21
Force Ratios 1.80 2.69 2.75
Loss Ratios 1.66 1.51 0.64
Note the same loss pattern exists here.
Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.
Outcome III IV V
Italian Campaign 0.74 1.76 2.53
Ardennes 0.45 3.71 5.00
Kursk 0.58 5.18 11.43
So……
This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).
It looks like Aces at Kursk is for sale in the U.S. on Amazon.com. The link is here: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books
Yesterday they were reporting 19 in stock, this morning it was 16. So it does look like they were selling and shipping. Let me know when someone sees copies in the book stores.
According to Pen & Sword, the printers should be delivering Aces at Kursk next Friday (the 5th of July) to their warehouse, and so the stock should be booked in the week commencing 8th July, all being well.
Right now, Amazon UK is showing its release date as 30 Jan. 2024. Amazon US is showing the release date as 25 July 2024. Waiting for this to be updated but I gather the UK release date is on or shortly after 8 July 2024. U.S. release date will be later (don’t know how much later).
Hunting Falcon is also in process and will be released this summer.
Sorry for the delays, these are things not under my control.
Also see:
Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing – The Dupuy Institute
Aces at Kursk – Summation – The Dupuy Institute
This is the fourth and final continuation of our previous four posts: Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – third continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is a part of a briefing on forces ratios I will be giving at HADSS in UK: Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC near DC: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
All of this analysis of the CaDB was for a reason, it was to determine if odds (force ratios) play out difference at higher level of operations (meaning army level). Are they different at the operational level vice the tactical level of warfare. The answer appears to be no. I do not know of anyone who has actually specifically explored this issue before, so I am not sure there is an existing or countervailing opinions out there.
Of course, my real interesting in looking at this (which I did last year) was because of the war in Ukraine and the upcoming Ukranian spring/summer offensive in 2023. I did brief this at the Second HAAC (October 2023) and in Norway (November 2023). The question I had was does a minor advantage in force ratios or combat power ratios lead to a bigger advantage at the operational level of combat. The answer appears to be no, as this was reinforced by limited movement of the front line in Russo-Ukrainian War since the fall of 2022.
My final slide in the briefing was “Does this relate to the fighting in Ukraine?” I then asked two questions:
Now, as it appears that Russia will be on the offensive this spring/summer, then I may need to restructure this slide and also add another point “artillery ammunition supply.”
I am probably going to do some more blog posts on this subject, looking at other levels of combat.
This is a continuation of our previous three posts: Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is a part of a briefing on forces ratios I will be giving at HADSS in UK: Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC near DC: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
This is a continuation of Section IV of the briefing titled “What is necessary to have a good chance of generating a breakthrough?”
Having put together a table in the last post of force ratios and exchange ratios by outcome, I decided to take a moment to look at each of these cases. Each of these 94 cases is a fully mapped out campaign, many that you have heard of.
First looking at the 29 cases that were coded outcome IV (attacker advances). The average force ratios were 2.69-to-1 and the average exchange ratios were 1.51-to-1:
What I was really looking for is to see if there is any pattern in these low odds cases. Do they represent particularly odd or unusual cases? They really don’t. It does help to look at the cases though.
I then looked at those 21 cases that were coded as outcome five (defender penetrated). The average force ratios were 2.75-to-1 and the average exchange ratios were 0.64-to-1. There did not seem to be any unusual pattern, although there are a number of Arab-Israeli cases in these low odd penetrations. That is because human factors matter (morale, training, experience, leadership, motivation, etc.). In fact, they matter a lot (and are not considered in most U.S. DOD combat models).
By the way, if someone is looking for some 3-to-1 rule in this data, good luck. Warfare is more complex than that.
One more post to come on this series of force ratios for army-level operations. Debating what I should discuss next.
This is a continuation of our previous two posts: Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is a part of a briefing on forces ratios I will be giving at HADSS in UK: Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC near DC: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Section IV of the briefing is titled “What is necessary to have a good chance of generating a breakthrough?”
We coded some (94), but not all, of the 196 Army-level operations as to outcome. The outcomes are defined as (see War by Numbers for a more detailed description):
These definitions are used to create the following table:
Now, I put seven of those numbers in bold. They are worth looking at.
For those 10 operations that were coded as “failed attack”, the average force ratio is 1.80-to-1 while the average loss exchange ratio is 1.66-to-1 (i,e. the attacker lost more than the defender).
For those 29 operations that were coded as “attack advances”, the average force ratio is 2.69-to-1 while the average loss exchange ratio is 1.51-to-1.
For those 21 operations that were coded as “defender penetrated”, the average force ratio is 2.75-to-1 while the average loss exchange ratio is 0.64-to-1 (meaning the defender lost almost twice as many people as the attacker. Note that casualties included kill, wounded, missing and captured).
One notices that the loss exchange ratio gets even more favorable in mop-up operations (defender enveloped). These are often the operation after “defender penetrated.”
A few other observations:
This last point is significant. Are operations with bodies of 60 thousand plus people the same as operations with 10-20 thousand people? At least in the patterns of force ratios required, loss exchange ratios, etc., they are very similar.
More to come (my briefings are long). The obvious next work step would be to finish coding the outcome of the other 102 operations in the CaDB. This is several man-weeks of effort. Not going to take that on now (I am trying to finish up another book).
This is the continuation of our previous post: Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
In that post was a table showing the force and losses differences between battles won by the attacker, the defenders and those that are drawn. Below is a follow-up table, showing the force ratios for all the campaigns:
These are slides 19 and 20 of my briefing. Now, I do not make conclusions on this slide in this briefing or even observations, but…. there are a few that could be made looking at this table. First, a three-to-one rule doesn’t really apply. Second, the defender never wins above four-to-one. Third, clearly there are a lot of factors included in these campaigns beyond simple manpower counts, and…. fourth…. you tell me?
The next slide of my briefing goes into the Section III of the briefing: “Influence of Human Factors on Combat.” This is all drawn from War by Numbers… so… read the book. I will skip that and my next post will pick up at Section IV of the briefing “What is necessary to have a good chance of generating a breakthrough.” Probably do that post next Tuesday.
We have not made much use of our Campaign Data Base. (See: The History of the DuWar Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). We used it as part of the Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) studies back in 2000-2001 and have not made use it in the last two decades. But, for a presentation I did last year on force ratios, I blew the dust off of it because I wanted to see if force ratios were different for army-level operations than for division-level engagements. I mean, in the ETO data we have (116 cases), in the force ratios ranging between 1.15-to-1 to 1.88-to1 the attacker won 79% of the time (so much for needing 3-to-1). See: The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). So the question became, is the pattern we see at army-level different than division-level?
The Campaign Data Base consists of 196 campaigns from 1905 to 1991. They from two days in length to 155 days in length. Only three were over 60 days in length. The problem is that the database is not complete. We assembled it, used it once and have not used it again. There are some holes. For example, we only had the starting strength ratios calculated for 163 cases, we only had the total casualty ratios calculated for 162 and only had the winner calculated for 156 cases. In most cases the missing data is available but has not been assembled. The database just needs a little tender loving care.
The average attacker strength (99 cases) was 188,909. The average defender strength (96 cases) was 95,497. This comes out to a 1.98-to-1 ratio.
The average attacker losses (176 cases) was 36,076. The average defender losses (172 case) was 47,004. This comes out to a 1-to-1.30 ratio.
The average attacker percent losses per day (163 cases) was 0.69%. The average defender percent losses per day (162 cases) was 1.85%. This comes out to a 1-to-2.68 ratio.
The starting strength ratio (163 cases) was 2.24 (2.24-to-1). The total casualty ratio was (164 cases) 1.35-to-1.
Now, the holes in the database become an issue. This are holes that can be filled given time (read: budget). We have 97 cases where the attacker is coded as the winner, and 38 cases where the defender wins. We have draws in 21 other cases. The rest (40 cases) are currently not coded.
Anyhow, this all produces the following table:
Contemplate for a moment what this data is telling you. A few observations:
I will stop here for a moment. This is from slides 12 – 18 for my force ratios briefing. There is more to come (because my briefings, like some of my books, are never short).
There is a 3-to-1 rule that some people quote from somewhere. We have discussed this before: Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The 3-to-1 Rule in Histories | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The 3-to-1 Rule in Recent History Books | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).
Trevor Dupuy’s argument was always that it took a combat power advantage to advance (attack successfully). This combat power calculations considers weapons, terrain, posture, air support, human factors, etc. Because of the current artillery shell shortages for the Ukrainian Army, logistics may also be a factor.
This combat power advantage often happens at 1.5-to-1 or 2-to-1. Usually is happens by around 2-to-1 (my conclusions – see War by Numbers). For example, here is my chart of force ratios for division-level combat in the European Theater of Operation (ETO) in 1944 from page 10 of War by Numbers:
Notice that the attacker succeeds at force ratios between 1.15-to-1 to 1.88-to-1 in 79% of the 48 cases of division-level combat. It gets better from there. The book also has force ratios from other theaters and campaigns. Some of this has been discussed here before: More Combat Results Tables from War by Numbers | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Force Ratios at Kharkov and Kursk, 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Force Ratios in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956-1973) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).
A rigidly defined 3-to-1 rule tends to create an officer corps of McLellan’s. This rule-of-thumb is doing more damage than good as constructed.
What got my attention is that some people are trying to apply some 3-to-1 rule in Ukraine, and then come to the conclusion that one or the other side cannot advance because they don’t have a 3-to-1 force ratio. Yet, people have been advancing. In fall of 2022 Ukraine re-took Kherson and surrounding areas (see: 2022 Kherson counteroffensive – Wikipedia) and achieved a breakthrough at Balakliya that took back a significant portion of Donetsk province (see: Battle of Balakliia – Wikipedia) and conducted a successful offensive around Kharkiv (see: 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive – Wikipedia). In 2023 Russia did advance on Bakhmut and took it (see: Battle of Bakhmut – Wikipedia) and in 2023/2024 Russia did advance on Avdiivka and took it (see: Battle of Avdiivka (2023–2024) – Wikipedia). I think in three for those five cases the attacker did not have anything approaching a 3-to-1 advantage. Of course, I have no reliable manpower statistics for either side in any of these five battles, so this is sort of a guess, as is most of the analysis and expert opinions on this war.
I do not know how many troops Ukraine currently has. I am guessing at least 300,000 deployed. Some people throw out figures in the 600-700,000 range. I have no idea if that are total mobilized estimates or total deployed estimates. The same with Russia, where figures of 600-700,000 are also thrown out, but not sure that is what is actually deployed in Ukraine. I am guessing some number closer to 300,000. Don’t really know, and don’t know who does for certain (see the “Force Involved’ section of this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)).
Anyhow, I gather the two sides are somewhere near parity in force size. They can certainly concentrate forces to get a local advantage. With current modern intelligence gathering capabilities, concentrating forces is often seen while it is happening and opposing side can respond promptly. So not sure where anyone can get their 3-to-1 advantage.
I did do a test recently, comparing the force ratios in a database over 700 division-level combat engagements to the force-ratios in over 100 Army-level operations. The question was whether force ratios and the success from those force ratios was different at division-level vice army-level. My tentative conclusions were that force ratios for army level campaigns had the “Same patterns as for division-level combat.”
Now, I have not written this effort up. I did brief it last year at the Second HAAC and did brief it in Norway. I will be briefing it again on Thursday, July 11 at HADSS in York (see: Historical Analysis for Defence and Security Symposiums (HADSS), 8 – 11 July in York, England | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)) and for one last time at the Third HAAC (see: Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). After that, I may write it up, either as a blog post or as a chapter in a book called More War By Numbers, which will probably be delayed until 2026 (see: Current book release schedule | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org), which I probably need to update).
Anyhow, the point is, anyone doing analysis for the situation in Ukraine based upon some 3-to-1 rule probably needs to reconsider their analysis.