Category Eastern Europe

What is more important: Ukraine or Taiwan ?

A little geo-political discussion here: What is more important 1) to support the defense of Ukraine or 2) to support the defense of Taiwan?

 

Some stats:

                         Population                                       GDP                         Area
Ukraine         33,443,000 (2024 est.)    189.827 billion    603,628 sq.km (233,062 sq. miles)
Taiwan           23,894,394 (2022 est.)    751.930 billion      36,197 sq.km (13,976 sq. miles)

 

                           Per Capita GDP      Per Capital GDP (PPP)     Gini (2022/23)     HDI (2021/22)
Ukraine               5,759 (2025 est.)       20,756                                 25.6                 0.734
Taiwan                32,339 (2023 est.)    72,485                                  34.2                  0.926
United States    86,601 (2024 est.)    86,601                                 41.6                   0.927
                            
                             Active Personnel     Reserve Personnel           Budget
Ukraine            1,260,000                    2,700,000                            64.8 billion
Taiwan                  150,000                     1,657,000                            19.1 billion  

 

Now, probably the most significant factor is who are their neighbors. In the case of Ukraine, it borders the NATO countries of Romania, Hungary and Poland and the non-NATO countries of Russian, Belarus and Moldova (and Transnistria). One can argue that it is a gateway to NATO and the EU.   

Taiwan only borders China. It is a distance over water to the Philippines or South Korea or Japan. Much further to Australia and New Zealand. 

Therefore one can make the argument that Ukraine’s geo-political position is far more significant than that of Taiwan.

One can, of course, make the argument that they are both significantly important for U.S. national security.

 

 

No Peace in our Time ?

It does not look like that any substantive and meaningful peace agreement will be happening in the Russo-Ukrainian War in the first half of 2025. It looks like the fighting will continue during the spring and summer of 2025. Perhaps substantive discussion can restart in the fall of 2025.

The current status of peace negotiations is that they have de-facto agreed to cease bombing each other’s energy structures. There is no written agreement on this. They are still bombing everything else, with volleys of 100+ drones and missiles being launched at Ukraine every few days and dozens of civilians in cities far from the front line being killed or wounded.

There is an also a minerals exploitation agreement being discussed between the U.S. and Ukraine, that has yet to be finalized and signed. Something will probably happen with that as Ukraine needs to reach some kind of settlement with the Trump administration to guarantee minimal levels of support. 

There is also an ongoing discussion of a Black Sea Truce. Not sure that is very significant as Ukraine controls the western Black Sea and is regularly shipping grain and other products in/out of Odessa. 

U.S. support for Ukraine in FY2026 (which starts in October 2025) is still undetermined. Congress passed a continuing resolution to cover the rest of FY2025 and there is not a clear bill, let alone a clear Ukrainian aid bill set up for FY2026. The House and the Senate appear to have very different ideas of what should be funded, as of course, do the Republicans and Democrats. The House is currently split 220-213 with 2 vacant seats. The Senate is currently split 53-47, with both houses of congress controlled by the Republicans. The way the political winds are blowing at the moment, it does appear like the Republicans are going to lose control of the House in November 2026.  Not sure how all this impacts aid to Ukraine but it is possible that it will terminated in FY2026 and reinstated in CY2007.

Meanwhile, on the fighting front, the weather will be getting better come the second half of May and ground operations can start in earnest then. Not sure what will be happening, but suspect Russian will continue offensive operations in Kursk province and in the Donbas. They still do not completely control the four oblasts that they claim (and have formally annexed), with them controlling almost all of Lugansk, the majority of Donetsk, and the minority (and not the capital cities) of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts. They also control Crimea and Sevastopol. They clearly want to expand their control of these four oblasts for the sake of future negotiations. Obviously, Ukraine would also be served to retake land, but not sure what offensives they are considering for 2025.

Therefore, it appears that the war will continue unabated until the autumn rains.

30-Day Ceasefire?

The U.S. and Ukraine have agreed to a thirty-day ceasefire. Russia now has to agree.

Terms are (according to the news reports):

  • Immediate 30-day ceasefire.
  • The United States immediately lifts its pause on sharing intelligence with Ukraine and resumes security assistance to that country.
    • This appears to occur even if Russia does not agree to the plan. 
  • U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to conclude “as soon as possible a comprehensive agreement for developing Ukraine’s critical mineral resources.”

The ceasefire would halt all hostilities, “not just for missiles, drones and bombs, not just in the Black Sea, but along the entire front line.” (Zelenskyy)

The U.S. and Ukrainian delegations said the interim, month-long ceasefire “can be extended by mutual agreement of the parties.” (joint statement)

Now, have no idea if this has been properly prepped with Russia or not. They could turn it down. I would not be surprised if they insist on Ukraine withdrawing from Kursk area before they agree. 

Anyhow, it is a proposed 30-day ceasefire.

  1. It does not guarantee it will be extended.
  2. Does not address any of the issues that caused the war.
  3. Does not provide any security guarantees for Ukraine.
  4. It leaves 20% of Ukraine in Russia hands.

We shall see if it is agreed to and, if agreed to, how long it stands. We have been down this road before (2014-2022).

 

 Copy of Joint Statement:

Text of US-Ukraine statement paving way for resumption of aid, intelligence sharing

Other Sources:

Ukraine agrees to U.S.-led ceasefire plan if Russia accepts

US and Ukraine call for 30-day ceasefire following Saudi talks

Force Ratios in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Lots of discussion going on about strengths in Ukraine and Russia and therefore force ratios. I have stayed away from talking about this, because I have other things going on (primarily writing and editing books). In the end, you don’t get a book done by blogging and engaging in debates on Twitter (now called X).

But one recent twitter debate got my attention, which was a conversation between Sashank Joshi, the defense editor at the Economist, and J.D. Vance, Vice-President of the United States.  I have exchanged a few emails with Joshi over the years. I have never talked to J.D. Vance.

Anyhow, as far as I can tell, both sides have 500,000 to 600,000 troops deployed in the field. My last discussion on this subject was in the middle of last year: Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute. At the time, Putin was claiming he had 617,000 deployed, while Ukraine was stating that it was only 450,000. I have not seen any new data since December 2023.

The 2025 Military Balance records 450,000 Russian forces in Ukraine.  They provide overall figures for the Russian Army of 550,000, Naval Infantry 10,000 and Airborne 35,000. They also report 20,000 in private military companies. Around 21,000 are reported deployed from Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and in the Middle East and Africa). So a maximum total available ground strength of 594,000. 

The 2025 Military Balance gives Ukrainian Army strength as 500,000, Marine Corps at 30,000 and Airborne Assault Troops at 45,000 for a total ground strength of 575,000. This is not counting Territorial Defense Forces and National Guard.

Of those 15,000 to 30,000 Ukrainians are up and round Kursk oblast in Russian territory, and the rest are defending Ukraine, from Sumy down to Kherson. The 2025 Military Balance says it was 20,000 Ukrainians in Kursk oblast.

Conversely, Russian has a rumored 40,000 to 50,000 around Kursk oblast. There are also maybe 12,000 North Koreans around Kursk oblast and maybe 2,000 Chechins fighting for Russia elsewhere in Ukraine. The Lugansk and Donets People’s Republics together are still fielding I am guessing between 15,000 to 30,000 troops for Russia.  

Anyhow, this all points to close to parity between Russian and Ukraine, with Russian perhaps having more troops. perhaps as much as a 1.2-to-1 force ratio advantage. Inevitable some commentators quoted the discredited 3-to-1 rule, but there is still an advantage to defense. We did look at this recently for Army-level operations and produced the following blog posts:

Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – third continuation – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

Now, if you really wanted to properly analyze the scenarios, then you would need to account for weapons, especially mix and quality; and logistics, especially ammunition; and of course, Human Factors. This is possible to do but is not a small task. We won’t be taking this on soon (if ever), and I gather no one else will either. 

It is clear with proper aid and support, Ukraine can hold out forever in defense (assuming the morale and desire are there). The only Russian option to change this equation is to greatly increase recruitment. There is a reason, three years into this war, they have not done this.  Therefore, it is possible to continue this war for years until someone decides to compromise.

Now, as long as Russan morale and desire reman sufficiently high (and it is probably a bigger variable than Ukrainian morale and desire), then it does not appear that Ukraine will not be able to retake the occupied territories. The question becomes: how solid is Russian morale and desire? We did see in June 2023 a revolt against the government by the Wagner mercenary company. In World War I we saw multiple countries armies collapse at various times during the third and fourth years of the war. Army morale collapses are not improbable or maybe not even unlikely. It does mean that the strategy becomes to maintain the war until Russia either modifies its negotiating position to give up territory, or the army or the government starts to collapse. 

Three long years of war

Three long years of war, sad to say. This book covers the first six weeks of the war.

It is an attempt at a military history of the war. It is the first in a series, with The Siege of Mariupol being the second book and currently in editing. The third book in the series is The Battle for the Donbas covering operations in the spring and summer of 2022. Both of these books are co-authored by Stephan Korshak. Expect to eventually have six or eight or more books covering the operations in this war. They are, unfortunately, giving us plenty to write about.

Shaping the Russo-Ukrainian Peace Negotiations

It appears that the United States had begun shaping the Russo-Ukrainian Peace Negotiations. Not sure why they would choose to do so now, but their two main points are:

  1. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Wednesday called Ukraine’s desire to recover all of the territory it has lost to Russia since 2014 an “unrealistic objective,” 
  2. Any peace deal, Hegseth added, must come with “robust security guarantees,” international oversight of the boundary between Russian and Ukrainian forces, and no NATO membership for Ukraine

Source: Hegseth calls Ukraine’s peace goals ‘unrealistic’ in meeting with allies

 

Ukrainian Corps

MilitaryLand.net on Twitter (X) stated last week that “The Ukrainian Army is reportedly planning to establish up to 20 Army Corps, including the 3rd and Azov Corps, with each corps consisting of at least five brigades.”

Now, this would imply that there are 100 Ukrainian brigades. At the start of war in February 24, 2022 Ukraine had mobilized around 25 maneuver brigades. They also had 9 artillery brigades and 2 in reserve (see pages 66 – 76 in The Battle for Kyiv for a listing of them). The does not count National Guard, Territorial Defense or Foreign Volunteers. By the end of May they had mobilized at least 13 more maneuver brigades. So by the summer of 2022 they had at least 49 brigades (including artillery). 

If I look at Militaryland.net now I can count 103 units labelled as brigades: 3 tank brigades, 46 mechanized brigades, 3 heavy mechanized brigades, 3 assault brigades, 2 mountain assault brigades, 3 motorized brigades, 2 jaeger brigades, 1 presidential brigade, 10 artillery brigades, 1 artillery recon brigade, 1 missile brigade, 2 rocket artillery brigades, 4 territorial defense brigades, 1 unmanned strike aviation brigade, 4 army aviation brigades, 4 marine brigades, 2 marine artillery brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 3 airmobile brigades, 5 air assault brigades, 1 air assault jaeger brigade, 1 air assault artillery brigade). This does count air defense and coastal defense missile and artillery units.

There are four operational commands (east, north, south and west)

Now, the structure of battalions reporting to regiments/brigades reporting to divisions reporting to corps reporting to armies date back to the Napoleonic Wars. This is kind of been the structure of most militaries over the last 200 years. There has been a push in recent time to eliminate the division and to go straight from brigades to corps. Not exactly sure what is gained by this, but for smaller armies it makes some sense. Ukraine does not have a small army.

In comparison, the U.S. had thirteen divisions (10 Army and 3 Marine). The U.S. Army has four active corps (I, III, V and XVIII Airborne). It has six armes (1st, Central. North, South, Europe and Africa, and 8th (Korea)). Only one is an actual field army. This Army structure had never made a lot of sense to me. The Marines also have two corps headquarters (I and II MEFs)

 

P.S. Just to clarify, the U.S. Army has had a total of 260 four-star generals in its history. In wartime, we had one during the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), three during the Civil War (1861-1865), three during WWI (1917-1918), 16 during WWII (but 11 were created in 1945, so only 5 for most of the war). We currently have 11 four-star general in the U.S. Army.

For the record, over the decades I have met 11 of them, starting with William C. Westmorland. 

The U.S. Marine Corps has had 75 four-star generals in its history. The first in March 1945 during WWII. There are currently three serving.

Basically, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps has one four-star general for each division. 

 

P.P.S. I did send this out for comment before posting it, and Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West) added: 

“The “corps” are actually divisions, even though they will be labeled “corps.” The test bed was the Voron Group, which has been operating in the Lyman area since last year. The Voron Group is a National Guard “division” comprising three brigades (including Azov). I’m unsure what “division” enablers were assigned to them, if any, since enablers are more dispersed than maneuver units. The command relationships and battlefield management functioned well enough for the General Staff to replicate it across the ground forces. However, it likely succeeded because the National Guard has a better leadership caliber than the regular army (this observation comes from sources on the ground; take it as you will). “

Situation in Ukraine, 3 February 2025

I have not blogged for a while. Been focused on books recently (and they do require some focus).

Anyhow, nothing earthshaking has been going on in Ukraine and it does not appear that we are on the verge of achieving “peace for our time,” so the war does continue. Wanted to tag for a moment where the front lines are, tapping into War Mapper’s efforts:

Oskil River:

West of Pokrovsk:

Andriivka:

“Kursk salient”

West of Terny:

East of Siversk:

Around Toretsk:

Velyka Novosilka:

Overview map for 3 February 2025:

 

We do like War Mapper. War Mapper Links:

War Mapper on X: “Ukraine updates: In Kharkiv, Russia has significantly expanded its positions on the western bank of the Oskil River. They have taken positions both north and south of the previous area of control in Dvorichna. https://t.co/a4qUzciCNL” / X

War Mapper on X: “The advance wrapping around the west of Pokrovsk has continued to develop with Russian forces taking Solone and entering Udachne. https://t.co/T29GdEWwb0” / X

War Mapper on X: “Further south, they have advanced into Andriivka after taking a series of fortifications east of the Town. https://t.co/L9DkVLNGaX” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russian forces in the south of the Kursk salient have pushed up to the southern outskirts of Sudzha. https://t.co/5Qp8ETnDbv” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russia has reached and potentially already secured positions in the first Ukrainian defensive line west of Terny after previously crossing and taking Ivanivka in January. https://t.co/rr2Wp8Obac” / X

War Mapper on X: “East of Sivers’k, Russia has entered the eastern outskirts of the settlement of Verkhnokamianske. https://t.co/TTskiMSphi” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russia continues to consolidate its positions around Toretsk after recently taking control of the city. https://t.co/DKoiw3HN1J” / X

War Mapper on X: “Last week, Velyka Novosilka was fully occupied by Russian forces. https://t.co/qoqRWnRcqk” / X

War Mapper on X: “An overview map of the situation in Ukraine as of 03 March 2025. https://t.co/h3LHd4Zxzz” / X

 

The quote from Neville Chamberlain is:

“My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time… Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.”

September 30, 1938

 

 

The Current Ukrainian Offensive – resolved?

Well, so far it doesn’t look like the current Ukrainian offense, that started on Sunday 5 January, was not all that much. They took the town of Berdin and I gather 20 or so square kilometers of territory. To put that in perspective, Washington DC is 177 sq km.

Anyhow, it appeared the Ukrainian attack went on for two days (Sunday and Monday), at then stopped. Meanwhile other actions continued around Pokrovsk where Russia took some more territory in the slowest moving offensive since 1917 (this is probably not entirely correct… but you get the point). 

What did get my attention was the claim that “Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.” We will see if that is true. We will see if Ukraine has anything more in hand.

The Current Ukrainian Offensive

Ukrainian offensives do get my attention because I believe that to negotiate a peace settlement that does not permanently surrender 20% of their country Ukraine will probably need to start retaking some of that ground. They really have not reclaimed any more of their own territory since November 2022.

But they are on the offensive again. Curiously, just before the Trump inauguration. To quote twitter account @timkmak from yesterday (bolding is mine): (1) Tim Mak on X: “Here’s what we are reading today: Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation. This follows territorial setbacks for Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months. https://t.co/CEMHisnLqv” / X

“Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. 

Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.

The follows territorial setbacks in Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months.”

Other people are reporting that Ukraine has taken Berdin and has gone 2.7 kilometers past the Russian zero line (Def Mon on X: “Ukrainian forces likely went about 2.7km past the Russian zero line. https://t.co/WDFs2bGxZU” / X and Def Mon on X: “The developments in Kursk oblast looks something like this. We do not know if Ukraine managed to consolidate positions. We think we have geolocated UA units inside Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Geos: https://t.co/RNty0eKLQL https://t.co/ouerMmm9y4” / X).

Reports that this is a significant attack (“AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack): david D. on X: “im tracking about 10 “attacks” by ukr forces around kursk and north Belgorod. keep in mind that some will be real attacks, and some will be feints to draw in russian forces. russians are saying this is AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack… things will be clear later today expect” / X

There are reports of significant Russian losses (which must always be taken with a grain of salt): Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “BURN RATE: In the last 48 hours in Kursk Oblast, the Russian army lost up a battalion of North Korean infantry and VDV paratroopers. Since AUG, Moscow has deployed 50K troops to Kursk Oblast: approximately 38K are assessed as killed, wounded, missing or surrendered.” / X. 

Some maps of the area:  Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “UKRAINE’S KURSK OFFENSIVE: Latest from the BBC. https://t.co/QLSOk09HmP https://t.co/8xx9goK4kl” / X and Aurora Borealis 🤫 on X: “katsaps report the loss of the village of #Berdin, #Kursk region. https://t.co/QBeVLm9C81” / X and david D. (@secretsqrl123) / X and MAKS 24 🇺🇦👀 on X: “🔼🇺🇦 AFU managed to advance 8 km in the Kursk region, according to Russian voenkors. Map from ISW 🗺️👇👀 https://t.co/ebSfskuV9p” / X.

Anyhow, more to come, but all these reports must be taken with a grain of salt.

The Kursk offensive in August of 2024 was an interesting exercise but fundamentally did not retake any of their own territory and did not take enough of Kursk province to give them a lot they could trade off. It did not fundamentally change the situation on the ground, which is what was needed to give them advantage at the negotiation table. Unconditional surrender is very rare. Most wars end in a negotiated settlement.

The strength and loss figures being reported represent some fraction of reality. I do not know what that is (is it 1/10th or is it 9/10s?). I seriously doubt that the people posting these figures know that either, although some may indicate otherwise.

I was very disappointed in the failed Ukrainian offensive in early June 2023. For the sake of negotiating a positive resolution to the conflict, they really needed to take ground. I thought the Kursk offensive was a good stunt, but only that. Still, they have turned it into an extended fight that may yet yield dividends. If this offensive in Kursk is the start of a series of offensive that extend to Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, then this could become very significant. We shall see.

A key element in warfare is surprise (I do have a chapter on that in my book War by Numbers). If I can predict what Ukraine is going to do, that is not a good sign, as so to can the Russians. Therefore, if the Ukraine General Staff is doing their job right, they should be taking both Russian and me by surprise. That they appear to be doing.