The North Korean ballistic missile threat to Guam [Reuters]
Gerry Doyle has an excellent article in The New York Times exploring the issue of defending the island of Guam from a potential North Korean ballistic missile threat. In response to President Donald Trump’s comments earlier this week, North Korea issued an oddly specific threat to conduct a ballistic missile test targeting the area around Guam.
Key takeaways from the article:
The U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile (BMD) system based in South Korea would have no chance of intercepting a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) during its initial ascent (boost-phase). THAAD is not designed for boost-phase intercept.
Japan fields a sea-based U.S. Aegis BMD equipped with SM-3 missiles, which is designed to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles at the middle (mid-course) and final (terminal phase) parts of their flight. It is likely that a Hwasong-12 moving toward Guam would be out of SM-3 range as it passed over Japan, however.
Guam itself is defended by a layered BMD system including sea-based U.S. Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which are all designed to engage incoming ballistic missiles during mid-course and terminal phase. This is where an intercept would most likely occur.
Despite possessing the technical capability for intercepting a provocative North Korean missile test, Doyle points out a tricky policy problem for the U.S.
If Japan or the United States shoots down the missiles, North Korea could see it as an escalation, prompting a military response. If they do nothing, and allow the North Korean missiles to fly unharmed, it’s unclear how Pyongyang would interpret it.
On the other hand, if they try to intercept the missiles but fail, it could undermine the credibility of both countries’ assurances that their antimissile systems can work.
We do have THAADs deployed in Hawaii, Guam, South Korea and Alaska (the map does not show them in Hawaii, South Korea nor Alaska). The U.S. Army has five THAAD batteries that are part of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade.
There are only 4 GBI’s (ground based interceptors) in Vandenberg. There is some question over the ability of a THAAD to intercept an ICBM (vice an IRBM), but we will let Shawn discuss that. Not sure how many Aegis systems we have in the area, but as they are sea based, it could several and they can move. Again, not sure about their ability to intercept an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile vice the much smaller IRBM, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile). Korea is currently threatening Guam with four IRBMs. They most likely do not yet have a nuclear warhead with a working ballistic vehicle (BV) connected to an ICBM, but may be less than a year away from this capability.
The intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-14 is allegedly seen during its test in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang, July, 4 2017. [KCNA/via REUTERS]
This past July, North Korea conducted a pair of test launches of a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which it calls the Hwasong-14 (“Mars”). While North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un claimed the vehicle can strike “any region and place any time,” skeptical Western military analysts concede it likely has the range to reach much of the United States. (There is disagreement as to whether the Hawsong-14 can actually deliver a nuclear warhead to targets in the Eastern U.S., but analysts concur that it can strike Hawaii, Alaska, and the Western U.S.)
According to a recent Defense Intelligence Agency assessment, the North Koreans have developed nuclear warheads small enough to be mounted on its ballistic missiles, including the Hwasong-14. The DIA estimate also credited the North Koreans with a stockpile of up to 60 nuclear weapons, though some outside analysts believe it to be fewer.
Earlier this week, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho vowed that, “Should the U.S. pounce upon the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) with military force at last, the DPRK is ready to teach the U.S. a severe lesson with its strategic nuclear force.”
What real capability does a functional ICBM with nuclear warheads provide the North Koreans? What would happen if they did attempt a nuclear attack on the U.S.? The answer is that no one, including the North Koreans, knows with any certainty.
Hitting A Bullet With A Bullet: Ballistic Missile Defense
Shooting down an incoming ICBM has been likened to “hitting a bullet with a bullet”; however IBCMs travel at speeds eight times faster than a bullet. The only current ballistic missile defense (BMD) system the U.S. possesses capable of intercepting ICBMs is the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), a combination of Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs), long-range radars, and a distributed fire control system. There are only two existing GMD emplacements, one at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and the other at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The Ft. Greely site houses 30 GBIs, though ten more are scheduled for deployment there, and four are based at Vandenberg, for a total of 44 by the end of 2017.
GMD has demonstrated a mixed track record in tests, achieving 10 intercepts in 18 attempts (55%). U.S. Air Force General Lori Robinson, commander of the U.S. Northern Command, nevertheless told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April that “Today we have exactly what we need to defend the United States of America against North Korea.”
This conclusion has been questioned by the Government Accountability Office, National Academy of Sciences, and the Union of Concerned Scientists, who have all sharply criticized GMD’s technical viability and accuracy. GMD’s advocates claim that using a “shoot-look-shoot” tactic, which would target an incoming ICBM with successive GBIs raises the odds of success. However, the Union of Concerned Scientists have calculated that if the North Koreans were to fire a volley of five ICBMs and each GBI had a 50% chance of a successful interception, there would be a 28% chance that one of the North Korean missiles would get through.
The U.S. fields three regional or theater BMDs, Aegis, Patriot, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). These were developed to engage short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, however, not ICBMs, which travel much faster and higher. They are, however, a key component in defending South Korea, Japan, and other countries in the region from North Korean ballistic missile attack.
Another potential ICBM defense would be to interdict the missiles before they are launched. Liquid-fueled missiles such as the Hwasong-14 require hours to fuel with highly volatile propellants, rendering them vulnerable to conventional air or missile attack. While the U.S. and the South Koreans are able to detect test preparations ahead of time, they have not been able to pinpoint launch sites in real time before firing. The North Koreans have developed mobile launchers and capabilities for quickly firing missiles from remote areas of the country far from existing infrastructure. (As the U.S. and its Coalition allies discovered in the 1991 Gulf War, interdicting mobile ballistic missile launchers is a difficult task even with complete air superiority.) Successfully interdicting a North Korean ICBM launch would require far better U.S./South Korean intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities than those currently available.
“If he says they can’t hit Nevada on a clear day, you better believe it”
Should a North Korean ICBM successfully evade U.S. missile defenses, what would happen next? This is also a very good question with no clear answer. Conducting a successful ICBM attack with a nuclear weapon is an extraordinarily challenging technical task, which requires a lot of sophisticated technology to function flawlessly under rigorous conditions. The U.S. has tested an ICBM/nuclear warhead under operational conditions only once, with Shot FRIGATE BIRD during Operation DOMINIC in 1962. The submarine U.S.S. Ethan Allen fired a Polaris A2 ballistic missile armed with a 600-kiloton W-47 thermonuclear warhead, which detonated successfully in the air 2,000 meters from target over Johnston Island, 120 miles away in the Pacific Ocean.
Some analysts believe that the re-entry vehicle (RV) from the 28 July Hwasong-14 test broke up before landing. It is unlikely a real warhead would have survived such a failure. RV’s house a ballistic missile’s warhead, protecting it from the stresses of flight and atmospheric reentry and provide the terminal guidance onto the target. The U.S. required years of extensive, expensive testing before it perfected an ICBM RV. While North Korea has developed effective RVs for its shorter range ballistic missiles, the lack of a durable one for the Hwasong-14 will degrade its potential effectiveness and accuracy for the time being.
If a Hwasong-14 RV did manage to survive reentry, what then? On target is a relative term, even with nuclear weapons. North Korea is believed to have developed only kiloton-range fission-type nuclear devices, not megaton-range thermonuclear warheads. Size imposes limits on the yield of fission devices. The Hwasong-14 is estimated to be capable of delivering a payload of only 500 kg or less at intercontinental ranges, which would have to include the RV and the warhead. To date, the North Koreans have tested devices yielding 10-15 kilotons. With the addition of fission-boosting using deuterium, lithium-6, or tritium, the total yield might be significantly enhanced. Some analysts credit the North Koreans with the capability for building a boosted, composite pit device yielding somewhere in the 30-kiloton range. For comparison’s sake, the Fat Man fission bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945 had a yield of approximately 21 kilotons.
There is no firm estimate of the Hwasong-14’s circular error of probability (CEP) or the radius within which 50% of missile impacts would theoretically be expected to land, a standard measure of ballistic missile accuracy. By scaling up the accuracy of the Hwasong-14’s SCUD missile antecedent to intercontinental range, one analysis estimated a CEP of 30 kilometers. A blunt-body shaped RV and hasty launches from remote sites would hamper accuracy as well. It is also plausibly arguable that North Korea might be capable of matching the 3-5 kilometer CEP of the first Soviet ICBM, the R-7.
With a CEP of 30 kilometers, it would be entirely possible for a Hwasong-14 to fly successfully, evade U.S. BMDs, detonate effectively, and still completely miss a target as large as Los Angeles.
Map of a hypothetical strike on Los Angeles with a 30-kiloton nuclear airburst, delivered by a ballistic missile with a 30 kilometer CEP. The red cross represents the designated ground zero, the blue lines indicate the CEP radius, and the red dot represents the radius of 5-psi overpressure effects from the nuclear explosion. [MISSILEMAP by Alex Wellerstein, RESTRICTED DATA: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog ]
A CEP of 3-5 kilometers would greatly increase the probability of even a near-miss hitting a densely populated section of the city, killing and injuring tens or hundreds of thousands, if not more.
Map of a hypothetical strike on Los Angeles with a 30-kiloton nuclear airburst, delivered by a ballistic missile with a 3-5 kilometer CEP. The red cross represents the designated ground zero, the blue lines indicate the CEP radius, and the red dot represents the radius of 5-psi overpressure effects from the nuclear explosion. [MISSILEMAP by Alex Wellerstein, RESTRICTED DATA: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog ]A Catastrophe Of Unimaginable Consequences
Close observers of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs understand that the July missile tests represent a nominal, but real, capability for delivering a nuclear ballistic missile strike against the U.S. The challenges in improving this capability are formidable, but they are technical in nature and there is no reason to believe the North Koreans cannot solve them in time. A true game changer would be the ability to deliver a thermonuclear warhead yielding hundreds of kilotons or more. Some analysts see this development as inevitable.
Regardless of the scenario, the launch of any North Korean nuclear-armed ICBMs toward the United States could only be regarded as a catastrophic failure of American foreign and military policy. The consequences of even a limited nuclear strike on U.S. soil would be effectively unimaginable, far beyond the death, destruction, and inevitable reality of retaliation-in-kind against the North Korean regime.
It would also represent a failure of any rational North Korean defense policy as well, since the only value ICBMs have to North Korea is in deterring foreign attack. They are militarily useless to prevent a counterattack that would invariably destroy Kim Jong-Un’s government. Their only value lies in the political threat to use them.
It would seem then that the U.S. and North Korea share a common interest in seeing that North Korea’s ICBMs are never used. The only sensible means to that end lie in deterrence and negotiation.
Hard for me to pass on articles on the First Guards Tank Army. That was one of the two Soviet tank armies in the Voronezh Front at Kursk during the defensive operations there. Its operations are discussed in some depth in my book. I found that the First Tank Army at Kursk under Katukov was much better handled than the Fifth Guards Tank Army under Rotmistrov, although Rotmistrov is now much more famous than Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.
Russia is doing a 100,000 man exercise this late summer near the Baltic States (who are members of NATO). western Russian, Belarus and Kalingrad (near Poland, also a NATO member).
It includes of course the First Guards Tank Army.
“Its establishment represents the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union that so much offensive power has been concentrated in a single command.”
There is some concern that Russia forces moved into Belarus may not leave.
Anyhow, it is probably just some shirtless swagger and signaling and I would be hesitant to read more into it than that.
It is behind a pay wall that I do not subscribe to, so have not read it yet, although I did watch his interview on CNN. Erik Prince was the founder in Blackwater, the private security firm.
U.S. B-1 bombers overfly Korean Peninsula after North’s ICBM test, June 20th, 2017. [picture-alliance/AP Photo/Lee Jin-man]
While North Korea tests its inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM)s, the U.S. and China demonstrate their capabilities and resolve to use force, both nuclear and conventional. These shows of force seem to be ratcheting up, as the North Korean tests occur more frequently. Flights of bombers and naval exercises are also complemented by words, sometimes quite strong words, such as those by the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Scott Smith, who while speaking at the Australian National University’s security conference in late July, said,
Every member of the U.S. military has sworn an oath to defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic and to obey the officers and the president of the United States as commander and chief appointed over us.
Asked by an academic in the audience whether he would make a nuclear attack on China next week if President Trump ordered it, Swift replied: “The answer would be: yes.” These words are then reported in the press as “US admiral would ‘nuke China next week’ if Trump ordered it.” (South China Morning Post) That kind of bombast is sensational, and intended to draw in readers. The reality of nuclear deterrence is that it has to be credible, meaning that the target nation must believe that nuclear weapons would be used if a certain line is crossed. This may make uncomfortable reading today, as Cold War memories are fading, but it has been reality since 1945.
[Photo deleted at the request of AFP]
China, meanwhile, has staged two different naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, likely organized to mark the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 90th Anniversary on August 1st, 2017. It is ironic that naval exercises celebrate the Army’s anniversary, and that concurrently the PLA is shrinking relative to the Chinese Navy and Air Force. “The PLA Army will likely take the brunt of the reduction, and the PLA Navy and Air Force are expected to increase in size,”according to Dr. David Finkelstein of the Center for Naval Analysis. Both the Navy, officially the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Air Force, officially the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) are nominally part of the PLA.
It is also ironic that these naval exercises will close a portion of the maritime commons to commercial traffic, also known as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), articulated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, of the U.S. Naval War College.
The PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet and the Shandong Maritime Safety Administration announced in the past two days that the central part of the Yellow Sea would be cordoned off to all marine traffic from Thursday for military purposes. An area of about 40,000 square kilometres off the coastal city of Qingdao, where the North Sea Fleet is headquartered, was expected to be affected by the drill, which would involve live ammunition, Weihai Evening Post reported on Wednesday. [Korea Times]
A US Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II VFMA 121 refuels using a KC-130J Hercules with VMGR 152 during Aviation Delivered Ground Refueling training at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, on 11 April. The technique will increase the STOVL fighter’s ability to refuel in austere locations when other resources may not be available. [USMC]
The US Marine Corps (USMC) has deployed the F-35B to their forward operating base in Iwakuni Japan, and continues to innovate with their doctrine and Concepts Of Operation (CONOPS), as previously reported in this blog. This stealth strike fighter capability, on the relative doorstep of North Korea, and also relatively difficult to reprisal strikes from North Korea, seems to be one of the strongest deterrent forces.
In an article published by the Association of the U.S. Army last November that I missed on the first go around, U.S. Army Colonel Eric E. Aslakson and Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Brown, (ret.) make the argument that “Staff colonels are the Army’s innovation center of gravity.”
The U.S. defense community has settled upon innovation as one of the key methods for overcoming the challenges posed by new technologies and strategies adapted by potential adversaries, as articulated in the Third Offset Strategy developed by the late Obama administration. It is becoming clear however, that a desire to innovate is not the same as actual innovation. Aslakson and Brown make the point that innovation is not simply technological development and identify what they believe is a crucial institutional component of military innovation in the U.S. Army.
Innovation is differentiated from other forms of change such as improvisation and adaptation by the scale, scope and impact of that value creation. Innovation is not about a new widget or process, but the decisive value created and the competitive advantage gained when that new widget or process is applied throughout the Army or joint force…
However, none of these inventions or activities can rise to the level of innovation unless there are skilled professionals within the Army who can convert these ideas into competitive advantage across the enterprise. That is the role of a colonel serving in a major command staff leadership assignment…
These leaders do not typically create the change. But they have the necessary institutional and operational expertise and experience, contacts, resources and risk tolerance to manage processes across the entire framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities, converting invention into competitive advantage.
In his seminal book, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1980), Trevor Dupuy noted a pattern in the historical relationship between development of weapons of increasing lethality and their incorporation in warfare. He too noted that the crucial factor was not the technology itself, but the organizational approach to using it.
When a radically new weapon appears and is first adopted, it is inherently incongruous with existing weapons and doctrine. This is reflected in a number of ways; uncertainty and hesitation in coordination of the new weapon with earlier ones; inability to use it consistently, effectively, and flexibly in offensive action, which often leads to tactical stalemate; vulnerability of the weapon and of its users to hostile countermeasures; heavy losses incident to the employment of the new weapon, or in attempting to oppose it in combat. From this it is possible to establish the following criteria of assimilation:
Confident employment of the weapon in accordance with a doctrine that assures its coordination with other weapons in a manner compatible with the characteristics of each.
Consistently effective, flexible use of the weapon in offensive warfare, permitting full employment of the advantages of superior leadership and/or superior resources.
Capability of dealing effectively with anticipated and unanticipated countermeasures.
Sharp decline in casualties for those employing the weapon, often combined with a capability for inflicting disproportionately heavy losses on the enemy.
Based on his assessment of this historical pattern, Dupuy derived a set of preconditions necessary for a successful assimilation of new technology into warfare.
An imaginative, knowledgeable leadership focused on military affairs, supported by extensive knowledge of, and competence in, the nature and background of the existing military system.
Effective coordination of the nation’s economic, technological-scientific, and military resources.
There must exist industrial or developmental research institutions, basic research institutions, military staffs and their supporting institutions, together with administrative arrangements for linking these with one another and with top decision-making echelons of government.
These bodies must conduct their research, developmental, and testing activities according to mutually familiar methods so that their personnel can communicate, can be mutually supporting, and can evaluate each other’s results.
The efforts of these institutions—in related matters—must be directed toward a common goal.
Opportunity for battlefield experimentation as a basis for evaluation and analysis.
Does the U.S. defense establishment’s organizational and institutional approach to innovation meet these preconditions? Good question.
I do note on Amazon that they are selling a copy of Trevor Dupuy’s Understanding War for $599: $600 book
This is not even the original edition, but the NOVA Publications reprint. I still have around 438 of these in stock at The Dupuy Institute for $24.95: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/booksfs.htm
That is $600 for a new book. They have two used ones for sale for $810.08 and $810.10. One wonders how they determined the two cents difference in price.
Anyhow, I do consider Understanding War to be the best of Trevor Dupuy’s 90+ books that he authored or co-authored. My book War by Numbers was heavily influenced by it.
Invariably, especially with a new book coming out (War by Numbers), I expected to get requests for copies of our data bases. In fact, I already have.
Back around 1987 or so, a very wise man (Curt Johnson, VP of HERO) estimated that for the LWDB (Land Warfare Data Base) that it took 3 man-days to create an engagement. The LWDB was the basis for creating many of our later data bases, including the DLEDB (Division Level Engagement Data Base). My experience over time is that this estimate is low, especially if your are working with primary sources (unit records) for both sides. I think it may average more like 6 man-days an engagement if based upon unit records (this includes the time to conduct research).
But going with Curt’s estimate, let’s take the DLEDB of 752 cases and re-create it. This would take 3 man-days times 752 engagements = 2,256 man-days. This is 9 man-years of effort. Now 9 man-years times a loaded professional rate. A loaded man-year is the cost of a person’s labor times indirect costs (vacation, SS and Medicare contributions, health insurance, illness, office space, etc.), general and administrative costs (corporate expenses not included in the indirect costs, including senior management and marketing), and any fee or profit. Loaded rate is invariably at least 60% of the direct costs and usually closer to 100% of direct costs (and I worked at one company where it was 200% of direct costs). So a loaded man-year may be as low at $120,000 a year but for people like RAND or CNA, it is certainly much higher. Nine man-years times $120,000 = $1,080,000.
Would it really cost more than a million dollars to re-created the DLEDB? If one started from scratch, certainly. Probably (much) more, because of all the research into the Ardennes and Kursk that we did as part of those database projects. The data bases were created incrementally over the course of more than 30 years as part of various on-going contracts and efforts. We also had a core group of very experienced personnel who were doing this.
Needless to say, if any part of the data base is given away, loaned out, or otherwise not protected, we loose control of the “proprietary” aspect of these data bases. This includes the programming and formatting. Right now, they are unique to The Dupuy Institute, and for obvious business reasons, need to remain so unless proper compensation is arranged.
Sorry.
P.S. The image used is from the old Dbase IV version of the Kursk Data Base. We have re-programmed it in Access.
Yes, I still use data base as two words, much to the annoyance of Jay Karamales.
Anyhow, War by Numbers does rely extensively on a group of combat data bases that were developed over several decades. The earliest versions were developed in the 1970s and they were assembled into a large data base of around 600 cases in the 1980s. They were then computerized (they were originally a paper data base), re-organized, re-programed in Access, and greatly expanded. The data bases we currently have include:
Conventional Combat Data Bases:
LADB = Large Action Data Bases of 55 cases
DLEDB = Division Level Engagement Data Base of 752 cases
BLODB = Battalion Level Operations Data Base of 127 cases
CLEDB = Company Level Engagement Data Base of 98 cases
SADB = Small Action Data Base of 5 cases
BaDB = Battles Data Base of 243 cases from 1600-1900
We also have:
CaDB = Campaign Data Base of 196 cases. While the other data bases address battles, or engagements of no more than a few days in length, this one summarizes campaigns, often extending for months.
Finally we have three databases tracking campaigns from day-to-day. They are all programmed in Access:
ACSDB = Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (meaning Battle of the Bulge)
KDB = Kursk Data Base
Battle of Britain Data Base
These were primarily intended for model validation efforts.
We also have three insurgency/peaceeping/intervention/OOTW (Operations Other than War) data bases. They are:
WACCO = Warfare and Armed Conflict Data Base of 793 cases
SSCO = Small Scale Operations Data Base of 203 cases
DISS = Dupuy Insurgency Spread Sheets of 109 cases.
The DISS data base was the one that America’s Modern Wars is based upon. The other two were earlier efforts.
These are all company proprietary, although some have been released publicly in earlier forms or different forms (including the CHASE data base of 599 cases, the ACSDB in Dbase III and the KDB in Dbase IV). Our versions have been updated, including revisions to content.
