Mystics & Statistics

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency II

By Perhelion [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons
By Perhelion [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons

Additional posts in this series:
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency III
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency IV

Even as James Quinliven’s assertion of the importance of force density became axiomatic during the dark days of the U.S. war in Iraq, other researchers began to take a closer look at the role force strength played in past insurgencies. What quickly became evident was that the lack of available empirical data to analyze limited the validity of the analysis. Quinliven’s conclusions had been based on just 13 cases. The persuasiveness of conclusions of similar studies were also limited by small sample sizes.[1] Larger data sets, such as those provided by the Correlates of War Project or the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project were available but did not contain the detailed strength data needed for force ratio analysis. The urgency of the Iraq conflict led to government funding to collect the specific data needed to facilitate large-N case studies based on samples that approached statistical significance.

The Dupuy Institute [2]

The Dupuy Institute (TDI) undertook one of the earliest efforts to gather a significant sample of historical insurgency data for serious analysis. Between 2004 and 2009, sponsored by the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA); Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment; and the National Intelligence Council of the Central Intelligence Agency, TDI amassed data on 109 cases of post-World War II insurgencies, interventions, and peacekeeping operations. 83 cases were used for analysis.

Led by Chris Lawrence, TDI’s analytical effort found that insurgency outcomes closely tracked the force ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents. While overwhelming numbers were not required to defeat an insurgency, force ratios above 10-to-1 nearly always guaranteed a counterinsurgent victory. Conversely, lower force ratios did not preclude success, but conflicts with two or fewer counterinsurgents per insurgent greatly favored an insurgent victory.

When force ratios were assessed together with the nature of the motivation for the insurgency, TDI found that force ratios had little impact on the outcome of insurgencies with a limited political or ideological basis. However, when facing broadly popular insurgencies, counterinsurgents lost every time they possessed a force ratio advantage of 5-1 or less, failed half the time with odds between 6-1 and 10-1, but succeeded three-quarters of the time when outnumbering the insurgents by 10-1 or more.

TDI also examined the relationship between force density and conflict outcome, but was unable to find any correlation in the data.

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) [3]

In 2004, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) of the British Ministry of Defence initiated a multi-year research program into counterterrorist/counterinsurgency campaigns as an extension of previous research on asymmetric warfare. The three-year effort, led by Andrew Hossack, involved data collection on 44 post-World War I asymmetric conflicts, of which 34 were used for analysis.

Hossack’s study concluded that there is a relationship, albeit weak, between between the odds of military campaign success and force ratios as measured in terms of a ratio of median annual force strengths. The advantages were relatively modest. Each tenfold increase in the ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents improved the chances of success by only 30%. A 10-1 manpower advantage yielded a 47% chance of success. Improving the ratio to 100-1 still only afforded a 77% chance of winning.

RAND [4]

In 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense contracted RAND’s National Defense Research Institute for a comprehensive study of insurgency and counterinsurgency. In support of the project, Martin Libicki directed the compilation of data on 89 post-World War II insurgencies to analyze why they began, grew, and were resolved. The original list of cases was based upon a dataset of 127 insurgencies created by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin[5] and modified.

With regard to force ratios, Libicki concluded that “as a general rule, the greater the government-to-insurgent force ratio, the lower the odds of an insurgent victory,” but that “the relationship is not particularly strong.”

CAA

In 2008, CAA contracted with TDI to code the data for it had collected for 102 post-World War II conflicts and design a database for it, which was designated the CAA Irregular Warfare Database. The availability of the Irregular Warfare Database spawned two CAA analytical efforts.

The first was conducted by Justine Blaho and Lisa Kaiser in 2009, who sought to build a model to predict the outcome of irregular wars. They tested 34 independent variables from 74 of the cases in the database and found 11 with significant correlations to outcome, including the peak counterinsurgent-to-insurgent ratio for each conflict. Blaho and Kaiser removed the variable for counterinsurgent-per-civilian (force density) from their analysis because it did not demonstrate a significant correlation to outcome. Among other conclusions, they determined that counterinsurgents had a greater probability of winning an irregular war if the peak year counterinsurgent-to-insurgent ratio is high.[6]

In 2009, CAA undertook another study aimed at providing historical context for U.S. force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their goal was to find the number of counterinsurgent forces required to arrest and reverse a given level of insurgent vio­lence. The analysts whittled the number of cases from the Irregular Warfare Database to be analyzed to 42 by eliminating those not deemed to be insurgencies, those lacking complete data, and third-party interventions on the side of the insurgents.

In contrast to the previous work using data collected by TDI, the study analysts rejected the validity of counterinsurgent to insurgent force ratios. As justification, they cited the unreliability of data on insurgent force size, insurgent and civilian casualties, and counts of insurgent attacks. Instead, they adopted the force density construct “in accordance with doctrine and previous studies.” In contrast to Quinliven’s 20/1,000 ratio, the CAA analysis concluded that “the minimum counterinsurgent force is 2.8 soldiers per 1,000 residents, with more forces required as the violence level increases.”[7]

Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) [8]

In preparation for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Department of Defense asked the Institute for Defense Analysis to update a previous study estimating ground force requirements for stability operations. For the revised study, the IDA analysts also made use of the CAA Irregular Warfare Database, selecting 41 cases “with the objective of establishing a relationship between force density and outcomes.”

Like the second CAA study, the IDA analysts deemed force ratios to be a “flawed and unreliable indicator,” stating that “we do not believe that information about the size of insurgent forces is sufficiently credible to be subjected to statistical analysis.” Acknowledging previous studies that did not find a statistically meaningful link between force density and outcome, the IDA analysts adjusted the dataset in three ways: to use force densities based on their estimates for the local population of the actual areas of operation in historical cases (as opposed to the entire country); to count indecisive outcomes as military operational successes for the counterinsurgents; and rescoring several outcomes as indecisive, rather than failure for counterinsurgents.

Using this adjusted data, the IDA analysts found a statistically significant, though not robust, relationship between force density and outcome. They concluded that a density of 20‐25 troops per thousand population was consistent with a 50‐60% chance of success. Successful outcomes decreased greatly for force densities below 15 troops per 1,000, and for operations with ratios above 40 troops per 1,000, the success rate exceeded 75%.

Jeffery A. Friedman [9]

In 2011, Jeffery Friedman, then a doctoral candidate in the Harvard Kennedy School, published a large-N academic study on insurgency force strengths, which addressed the basic question “how does manpower affect counterinsurgency?” As his starting point, Friedman adopted the dataset created by Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III of 173 post-World War I insurgencies.[10] After dropping two cases, he added his own data from 400 additional sources on foreign and indigenous counterinsurgent force strengths, the size and population of areas of operations, and insurgent force size.

Friedman subjected his data to a broader range of statistical testing than the previous studies. He concluded that there was no statistical correlation between overall numbers of counterinsurgents or counterinsurgents per area and outcome. He found that counterinsurgent to insurgent force ratios were significant only with controls on the data. However, troop density – measured as the ratio of counterinsurgents per inhabitant in the specific area of operations that the counterinsurgents sought to control – demonstrated a consistent, positive correlation with insurgent success.

Perhaps of greater significance, Friedman also found that manpower did not necessarily have a decisive impact on insurgency outcome. He could find no discernible empirical support for Quinliven’s 20/1,000 ratio. A counterinsurgent troop density of 80 troops per 1,000 inhabitants was less than twice as likely to succeed as a counterinsurgent force sized an order of magnitude lower. In a model derived from his analysis, as force size increased from 5 to 80 troops per 1,000 inhabitants in the area of operations, the probability of success rose by less than 15 percent.

Conclusion

The quality of quantitative analyses of force strengths in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies improved greatly between 2003 and 2011, but the debate remains unresolved. My next post will look at the conclusions of these studies and evaluate whether they tip the scales one way or another in favor of force ratios or troop density.

Notes

[1] John J. McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006; James Dobbins, Keith Crane, and Seth G. Jones, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2007; Joshua Thiel, “COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges,” Small Wars Journal, 2011; Riley M. Moore, “Counterinsurgency Force Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24:5, 2013

[2] Christopher A. Lawrence, “The Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Different Counterinsurgency Tactics and Strategies,” Presentation at the Cornwallis Group XIII: Analysis in Support of Policy, The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, Canada, 17-20 March 2008; Christopher A. Lawrence, America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2015

[3] Andrew Hossack, “Security Force & Insurgent Success Factors in Counter-Insurgency Campaigns,” Presentation at the Cornwallis Group XII: Analysis for Multi-Agency Support, The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2-5 April 2007; Andrew Hossack, “Strategic Success Factors in Counter-Insurgency Campaigns: With Discussion of the Modelling Approach,” Presentation to ORS Defence Special Interest Group, 24 February 2010

[4] Martin C. Libicki, “Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings,” Appendix A in David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008

[5] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” American Political Science Review 97, 1, Feb 2003

[6] Justine Blaho and Lisa Kaiser, “A Predictive Model for Irregular Wars Based on a Structured Historical Database.” Presentation at the 48th AORS Symposium, Working Group 5 – Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, 14-15 October 2009

[7] Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency,” Parameters, Winter, 2009-10

[8] R. Royce Kneece, Jr., David A. Adesnik, Jason A. Dechant, Michael F. Fitzsimmons, Arthur Fries, and Mark E. Tillman, “Force Sizing for Stability Operations,” Arlington, VA, Institute for Defense Analysis, 2010

[9] Jeffery A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine,” Security Studies, 20:556–591, 2011

[10] Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, no. 1, Winter 2009

Chasing the Mad Mullah

The Dupuy Institute’s work on insurgencies was all based upon post-WWII cases. This was a marketing decision, because it is hard to sell history to some people, and the older the history, the less relevant it appears to them. But, some of the comments to my previous postings caused me to look back at the early British air operations after World War I. I ran across this 1983 article in the Air University Review:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jul-aug/dean.html

The article states:

“The first indication that the British Air Force could deal effectively with a colonial disturbance was the successful operation of “Z” unit in British Somaliland in 1920. This was a campaign against Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the Mad Mullah, who had been pillaging the eastern tip of Africa since 1899; and who had been evading punitive operations by regular British army units and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudanese Army for more than 15 years. The inability of ground forces to stop the Mullah and his dervishes from overrunning the country led to a cabinet decision to use air power against the brigand and his large following.”

“A self-contained RAF expedition, code-named Unit Z, was organized and equipped for a six-month-long campaign. The unit had 12 de Havilland 9a aircraft, ten Ford trucks, two Ford ambulances, six trailers, two motorcycles, two Crosley light trucks, 36 officers and 183 men. By New Year’s Day of 1920, Z Force had built a temporary airdrome at Berbera and were assembling their aircraft, which had been delivered by ship. By 19 January all aircraft had been assembled and flight tested. The RAF’s plan was simple: bomb the Mullah’s forts and pursue his bands wherever they could be found, driving them toward the resident ground forces stationed in the area.”

“The first raid, carried out by six aircraft, almost ended the war. A bomb blast nearly killed the Mullah, but he was saved by a fortuitously placed camel. Further raids, resulting in heavy casualties, took place over the next two days and caused the dervishes to retreat. Somaliland Field Forces were positioned to block the retreat while the Royal Air Force switched to a supporting role of maintaining communications between the various ground force detachments, providing air cover, and evacuating the wounded. The aircraft proved eminently successful in dislodging the Mullah and his followers from their forts and driving them toward the ground forces which were able to neutralize the Mullah and his band of men The campaign against the Mullah lasted only three weeks and cost about 77,000 pounds, a considerable saving over the campaign proposed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He had estimated that it would take 12 months and two divisions to do the job plus an additional expenditure running into millions of pounds to build the railways, roads, and garrison bases necessary to maintain the peace.”

So was this a case where a dozen aircraft were able to end an insurgency that thousands of troops had not been able to? This air contingent (called the “Z Force”) was led by Royal Air Force (RAF) “Group Captain” Gordon (equivalent to an O-5 or Colonel). The commander of the campaign was the civilian governor general of Somaliland. The ground element included: the battalion-sized Somaliland Camel Corps (700 rifles), a composite battalion of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion and the 6th (British Somalia) Battalion of the King’s African Rifles (700 rifles), a half battalion of an Indian grenadier battalion (400 rifles), and irregular Somali tribal levee (1,500 rifles), 300 “Illaloes,” and naval landing forces from the Royal Navy. So a brigade size force (at least 3,600) with air support.

Now, the Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan has been fighting the British, the Italians and the Ethiopians since 1899 when he declared his first “jihad” (or holy war) against the colonial powers. This was already a 20-year old contest. This was the addition of airpower to what had been a very extended and extensive campaign. It was the British who gave him the nick-name the “Mad Mullah.” He is considered to be the national hero of Somalia. He does have a facebook page.

His hey-day had been around 1900-1904 when he had thousands of “Darvish” (or Dervishes) under his command and British sent four major expeditions against his Islamic Dervish state. By 1905, he was forced into a truce, where his followers constructed a theocratic state in the Italian protectorate. In 1908, he again initiated his holy war, and 1913 Hassan was able to bloodily defeat the British 110-man Somali Camel Constabulary at Dul Madoba. But, his territory remained limited to a collection of forts in the Ogaden and his fortified capital which he had occupied since 1907. Over time, his strength had declined from 6,000 fighting men in 1913 to less than a thousand in 1919.

The British began a new campaign in January 1920 supported by air forces operating from Berbera. On 21 January and subsequent days the RAF repeatedly bombed Hassan’s camp and followers, almost killing him. Meanwhile the ground forces advanced against the various Dervish forts, with the air planes conducting aerial bombardment for some of those attacks. The ground forces took the capital Taleh on 9 February. Hassan and some of his followers retreated into the Ogaden desert. Hassan later died of the flu, on 21 December 1920, at the age of 64. This was the end of the revolt.

This was a twenty year effort that only included air power at the last year, and it included significant ground forces in an offensive role (contrary to the Air University Review article). Still the British were able to defeat this Islamic state in a 21-day campaign. It was a clear demonstration of the value of air support, but it was essentially a conventional campaign against an already weakened opponent that had a clear objective in taking his forts and his fortified capital. It is not a good example of defeating an insurgency by air.

It is clear that this was primarily a ground campaign, supported by air. For a detailed description of the military operations see pages 262-284 (it can be converted to a PDF file): http://archive.org/stream/TheMadMullahOfSomaliland/214616_The_Madmullah_Of_Somaliland_1916_1921_djvu.txt

It states on page 278 that: “It is unfortunate that no very definite conclusions can probably be drawn from the results achieved, and that consequently the most extravagant claims in regard to the efficacy of aircraft under such conditions have been preferred.” This is followed by a detailed discussion of the value of air in this campaign. It is an account worth reading, especially when compared to some accounts that seem to over-value the air contribution to this campaign.

 

Air Power Defeating an Insurgency

Well, my post on this subject did stir up some conversation. My statement was that “So, we are left to state that we cannot think of a single insurgency that was defeated by airpower, primarily defeated by airpower, or even seriously undermined by airpower. Perhaps there is a case we are missing.”

This is, of course, not to say that air power has not been very important in fighting insurgencies, it is just too simply point out that air power does not seem to be able to do the job on its own.

Did I overstate my case? Are there a couple cases when this is not true? Perhaps there is a case I am missing. Let’s look at some of the other cases that people have suggested we look at.

  1. Chasing the Mad Mullah in 1920
  2. The Iraq Revolt 1920
  3. Kosovo 1999
  4. Italian Operations against the Senussi in Libya
  5. Habbaniya campaign and the defeat of Rashid Ali in May 1941

Perhaps some people were confused by the sentence “The airplane was first extensively used as a counterinsurgent tool by the United States in Nicaragua in 1927-1933…” which probably should have been written as “The airplane was first extensively used by the United States as a counterinsurgent tool in Nicaragua in 1927-1933…” I am going to edit the original post accordingly, so there is no confusion.

Anyhow, we will examine these five cases over the next couple of days. They are all pretty interesting. If there are any other examples we should look at, please let me know.

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency

DoD photo by Sgt. Kevin P. Bell, U.S. Army. (Released)
DoD photo by Sgt. Kevin P. Bell, U.S. Army. (Released)

How many troops are needed to defeat an insurgency? This deceptively innocuous question is laden with political and military peril. The answer is, of course, that it depends. Some contend that a precise ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents or to the local population will lead to victory, while others argue that force strengths are irrelevant to success or failure. In the wake of America’s decidedly ambivalent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the debate remains unresolved. However, there have been several recent analytical efforts focused on resolving the question. This will be the first in a series of posts that will review these studies and their conclusions.

It is not clear where the notion originated that force ratios mattered in counterinsurgency. It appears to have become an article of faith during the British campaign in Malaya, although Sir Robert Thompson — a British staff officer in that conflict and a counterinsurgency theorist influential during the Vietnam War — subsequently claimed that the rule-of-thumb that 20 troops were needed per 1,000 insurgents to succeed was the invention of a journalist.[1] Another Mayalan campaign veteran, Richard Clutterbuck, likewise later derided the validity of a “tie-down” ratio:

Much nonsense is heard on the subject of tie-down ratios in guerrilla warfare–that 10 to 12 government troops are needed to tie down a single guerrilla, for instance. This is a dangerous illusion, arising from a disregard of the facts.[2]

The relevance of force ratios made a comeback in the mid-1990s, albeit measured in a different way. Seeking a way of projecting force requirements necessary for sustained stability operations, RAND analyst James T. Quinliven looked at 13 historical cases and concluded that success required 20 troops were needed per 1,000 local inhabitants.[3] Defining ratios by the number of troops per population became known as force density.

The political volatility of force requirements for stability operations and counterinsurgency became vividly apparent during the lead up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Quinlivan published an update of his analysis to address Iraq and asserted that to meet a ratio of 20 troops per 1,000 inhabitants, 500,000 foreign troops were necessary to stabilize 25 million Iraqis.[4] U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told Congress that “several hundred thousand” American troops would be necessary to stabilize Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein. This drew a quick rebuttal from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who testified that Shinseki’s estimate was “wildly off the mark.” The public disagreement led to Shinseki’s premature retirement and replacement as Army Chief of Staff.

Although the initial phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM quickly defeated the Iraqi military and toppled Saddam’s regime, the chaotic stabilization effort that followed and the emergence of an insurgency appeared to bear out the validity of Qunilivan’s and Shinseki’s assessments for force requirements. Certainly one influential group thought so: the authors of the revised U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrinal manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, published in 2006. The manual rejected tie-down ratios but endorsed Quinlivan’s force density concept:

During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN. The conditions of the operational environment and the approaches insurgents use vary too widely. A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.[5]

FM 3-24 was often cited as the intellectual foundation for the subsequent success of the so-called Iraqi “Surge” in 2007 under General David Petraeus, who had overseen revision of the manual as the commander of the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth.

Interestingly enough, however, this endorsement of force density ratios was qualified in the subsequent joint doctrinal manual, JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, published just three years later in 2009. While force density was still considered a useful measure, mention of the specific 20/1,000 ratio was omitted:

No force level guarantees victory for either side, insurgent or counterinsurgent. No predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly forces to enemy forces ensures success in COIN. The OE and insurgents’ approaches vary too widely. Such calculations remain very dependent upon the assets available and the situation. A better force requirement gauge is counterinsurgent force density, which is the ratio of land security forces (including both indigenous and foreign contributions) and supporting elements (which must account for technological sophistication and applicability) to inhabitants. Force density will depend on the overall context, especially the size and density of the population, and can change over time. In some situations, the necessary force ratio may be unattainable. In these situations, the commander will have to determine if there are ways to leverage other advantages through innovative operational design and interdependent joint operations. If not, this may lead the commander to adopt limited objectives or plan for a prolonged, multiphased campaign as alternatives.[6]

When JP 3-24 and FM 3-24 were again revised in 2013 and 2014, respectively, neither contained any references to force level requirements, tie-down ratios, or troop density.[7] As quickly as the concepts had been adopted, they were abandoned. This is likely the result of more careful examinations of the relationship between force strength and counterinsurgency outcomes conducted during the 2000s. I will take a closer look at these studies in subsequent posts.

Additional posts in this series:
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency II
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency III
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency IV

Notes

[1] Riley M. Moore, “Counterinsurgency Force Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24:5, 2013, p. 859

[2] Christopher A.Lawrence, America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2015, p. 55

[3] James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters 25, no. 4, 1995, p. 59–69

[4] James T. Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: the Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003

[5] Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. I-13

[6] Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 October 2009, p. III-3

[7] Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC: Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 November 2013; Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2014

Is Your Washroom Breeding Bolsheviks?

 

Does bombing create insurgents? This is an issue we have never examined. We did examine whether rules of engagements influenced the outcome of insurgencies, and we have a chapter on it in my book (Chapter 9: “Rules of Engagement and Measurements of Brutality,” America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, pages 83-95). What we ended up with was a series of charts, not quite statistically significant, that showed that as rules of engagement became stricter the chance of a counterinsurgent victory (blue win) increased, rising from around 40% for “unrestricted” rules of engagements to around 75% for “strict” rules of engagement. While this was a pattern, we are not sure there is direct cause-and-effect here, although we suspect so. It also showed that the “brutal” approach also generated counterinsurgent victory around 75% of the time. A sample chart from the book is shown below:

Rules

But probably more immediately relevant to the discussion is the work we did on “General Level of Brutality” (pages 92-95). In that analysis, we compared the outcome, a counterinsurgent victory (blue win) vice an insurgent victory (red win), to civilians killed per 100,000 population. We examined this for 40 insurgencies from 1948 to the present (at the time it was 2009). What we showed was:

  1. Low civilian loss rates (less than 8.00 killed) results in 14% red wins (14 cases)
  2. Medium civilian loss rates (8.91 – 56.54) results in 38% red wins (21 cases)
  3. High civilian loss rates (115.54 – 624.16) results in 60% red wins (5 cases)

Or conversely:

  1. Low civilian loss rates (less than 8.00 killed) results in 79% blue wins (14 cases)
  2. Medium civilian loss rates (8.91 – 56.54) results in 43% blue wins (21 cases)
  3. High civilian loss rates (115.54 – 624.16) results in 20% blue wins (5 cases)

For the total of 40 cases, 33% result in red wins, 15% in “gray” outcome (ongoing or drawn), and 52% in a blue win. We put the data into a three-by-three matrix and tested it to Fisher’s exact test and obtained a two-sided p-value of 0.1135. For the non-statisticians, what this means is that there is an 89% chance that this relationship is not due to chance. When we remove the “gray” results from the table, then the two-sided p-value is 0.0576. This is even more significant. The data used is in the book if anyone wishes to go back and re-test or re-categorize it.

Our conclusions were:

“Therefore, we tentatively conclude that increased levels of brutality favor the insurgency when the number of civilians killed each year averages more than 9 per 100,000 in the population.”

We then expanded that conclusion:

“The inverse is that it is to the long-term advantage of counterinsurgent forces to limit damage to civilian populations, whether caused by their own or by insurgent actions. This means tightly controlled rules of engagement and probably requires a strictly limited use of artillery and airpower. It also means properly protecting the host population, which would probably require the deployment of significant security forces as part of a total counterinsurgent force.”

When one compares these results to the desire to add more ordnance to the effort to defeat ISIL, and the stated opinion by some that we should also target their families, then one wonders how effective such an air campaign will be. Will it really attrite and reduce an insurgency, or will the insurgency grow at the same or faster rate than they are attrited? This is clearly something that needs to be studied further (and analytically) before we make it a matter of policy. This is assuming that one is comfortable with the moral implications of such a policy.

Defeating an Insurgency by Air

In the past couple of party nomination debates of 2015, the subject of bombing ISIL has come up several times. It seems that the candidates are determined to outdo each other in tonnage dropped and destruction wrought. I am not aware of any systematic analysis of the effects of airpower on an insurgency (which in itself is a significant observation). My gut reaction is that air power is just part of the equation.

The airplane was first invented in 1903. They were first used in war in 1911 and starting in 1915, the airplane went through an incredible development as a weapon of war. World War I (1914-1918) established the airplane as a weapon in war and World War II (1939-1945) showed just how much death and destruction it could produce.

The airplane was first extensively used as a counterinsurgent tool by the United States in Nicaragua in 1927-1933, where it played a major role. Using de Havilland DH-4 biplanes, they provided reconnaissance against the insurgency led by Augusto Sandino and provided air support for the U.S. Marines. Augusto Sandino actually declared war against the United States in June 1927, an early case of an individual or head of a revolutionary movement declaring war on a country. Sandino served as the inspiration for the Sandinistas of the 1970s and 1980s, a Nicaraguan insurgency movement that is still a major political party in Nicaragua. At the Battle of Ocotal on 16 July 1927, the Sandinistas suffered over 150 people killed and wounded. This fight included five DH-4s armed with machineguns and four 25-pound bombs conducting dive bombing attacks in support of ground troops. As a result of this slaughter from the air and ground, the Sandinistas never did massed attacks again.

Since that time, there have certainly been well over 100 insurgencies that involved air power (we have not put together a master list). I am struggling to try to think of a single insurgency that was defeated by airpower, primarily defeated by airpower, or even seriously undermined by airpower.

Two cases do come to mind. First is Vietnam, which has the distinction of being the perhaps the bloodiest guerilla war ever. It also has the distinction of being the counterinsurgency effort that used the most airpower and dropped the most bombs. Certainly airpower played a major part in the war, with the helicopter almost becoming the symbol for the war (like in the opening scene of the movie Apocalypse Now). Clearly airpower played a big part in halting the 1972 offensive by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC). Still, we all know the final results of the Vietnam War. It is certainly not a case of an insurgency being defeated by airpower.

The second case was the initial U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, where we provided airpower to an insurgency. I would have to think long and hard to find another case of an insurgency having any significant air power. In this case, we started bombing government targets in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. This process continued for almost four weeks, resulting in the quote from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on 9 October 2001 “We’re not running out of targets, Afghanistan is!” We then switched our air support in early November to providing more direct support for the tens of thousands of allied insurgent forces in the north, with the Afghani Army collapsing quickly. On 14 November, the “Northern Alliance” marched into Kabul and by the middle of December they had effective control of the entire country. Although the Taliban dominated government had folded and the Taliban was on the run, they have since returned to carry on an insurgency in Afghanistan. Again, this is certainly not a case of an insurgency being defeated by airpower, as the airpower actually supported the insurgency. It also shows the limitation of a pure air campaign vice one in support of ground troops.

So, we are left to state that we cannot think of a single insurgency that was defeated by airpower, primarily defeated by airpower, or even seriously undermined by airpower. Perhaps there is a case we are missing. It is probably safe to say that if it has never successfully been done in over a hundred insurgencies over the last hundred years, then it is something not likely to occur now.

 

Iraq/Syria Intervention Scenarios

There are a lot of potential variables to consider in developing a casualty estimate for a potential large-scale intervention. Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham have floated various proposals to deploy 10,000 U.S. ground combat troops to both Iraq and Syria, with the most recent calling for 10,000 in Syria along with 10,000 Arab allies.

It is not clear if McCain, Graham, or Obama are assuming a U.S.-led ground offensive to be followed by the withdrawal of U.S. troops, or a ground offensive and an open-ended stability/peacekeeping mission. Nor is it clear if they assume an offensive against Daesh only or an attack on the Assad regime as well.

Potential ground offensive scenarios:

1. 10-20,000 U.S. advisors only in Iraq and Syria
2. 10,000 U.S. troops leading a ground offensive against Daesh in Iraq
3. 10,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and 10,000 U.S. troops in Syria leading a ground offensive against Daesh only
4. 10,000 U.S. troops in Syria and 10,000 Arab coalition troops leading a ground offensive against Daesh only
5. 10,000 U.S. troops in Syria and 10,000 Arab coalition troops leading a ground offensive against Daesh and the Assad regime

A long-term stability and support operation in Syria would almost certainly require more than 10,000 U.S. and 10,000 Arab coalition troops, even if it were confined to areas currently held by Daesh, and even more if extended into former Assad regime areas.

President Obama’s Casualty Estimates

Well, looks like President Obama is giving out casualty estimates for a potential intervention.

That used to be our job.

His estimate was for “sending significant ground forces back to the Middle East”

The results were:

1. “…could conceivably result in the deaths of 100 American soldiers every month.”
2. “…could take up to $10 billion a month…”
3. “….and leave as many as 500 troops wounded every month in addition to those killed…”

“Mr. Obama explained that his refusal to redeploy large numbers of troops to the region was rooted in the grim assumption that the casualties and costs would rival the worst of the Iraq war. “

Clearly this was a worst case situation based upon some study or analysis done. Do not know who did the study and I not think the study is in the public domain.

This is clearly just applying the Iraq War model to the current situation. In the case of Iraq, we had over 100,000 troops deployed and were directly and often by ourselves engaged with a major insurgency. This was generating 100 deaths on some months. This is 1200 a year. We lost people at that rate for four years in Iraq (2004 = 849, 2005 = 846, 2006 – 823, 2007 – 904).

On the other hand, it appear that most people talking intervention in Syria and Iraq appear to be discussing training missions with some ground support. I do not think anyone is seriously talking about putting a 100,000 troops back in. I think most people are talking about 10,000 to 20,000 troops primarily as trainers for the Syrian insurgents, the Kurds and the Iraq government. This is in effect what we currently have in Afghanistan. Our post surge losses there are more like 100 a year (2013 = 127, 2014 = 55, 2015 = 16).

Needless to say, loss rates are tied to the force size. A force fully engaged of 20,000 is not going to suffer the same number of losses as a force fully engaged of 100,000. And, we are looking at missions that are primarily training and support, which should suffer losses less than forces that are fully engaged.

Of course, The Dupuy Institute did a casualty estimate for a peacekeeping force of 20,000 for Bosnia, and we have done a casualty estimate for major counterinsurgency force of 100,000+ for Iraq. An estimate for a training and support mission of 20,000 people would be much lower than our estimate for Iraq.

Welcome to Mystics & Statistics

Welcome all to the Mystics & Statistics blog. It is a blog intended to specifically look at quantitative historical analysis. While we have a strong interest in history, our interest it not just to record facts and figures, or to study history for history’s sake, but our interest is two-fold: 1) to be able quantify and analyze history so we can establish what we actually know and understand beyond dates and events, and 2) to be able to use that analysis to address present problems. In effect, we want to be able to use history, as opposed to just study it.

In many respects, this has always been the work that The Dupuy Institute and its predecessor organizations have been doing since 1962. But, because of the nature of our customers and the work we have done, it has always been narrowly defined to primarily addressing military and defense issues. While this will probably remain the focus of the blog due to backgrounds of the principal posters, we hope to actually expand this to some extent to be able the address other issues outside of defense. What we are interested in is quantitative historical analysis of any type. We do not think there is another blog that addresses this.

I will not attempt to define what quantitative historical analysis is. This is similar to econometrics, which relies heavily on historical trends to analyze economics. In fact, economics is the most quantified of the social sciences, and it has certainly helped make the discipline the most rigorous and useful of the social sciences. There is a discipline out there called “cliometrics” which is defined by Wikipedia as “systematic application of economic theory, econometric techniques, and other formal or mathematical methods to the study of history (especially, social and economic history). It is a quantitative (as opposed to qualitative or ethnographic) approach to economic history.” Our work is also related to operations research. In fact, the British operational research community recognizes a sub-discipline called “historical analysis.” There is a brief Wikipedia article on “quantitative history,” but they really do not describe what we do, and we have been doing it for decades. So what we are looking at historical work that is similar to economics, econometrics, cliometrics, operations research, historical analysis, quantitative history and quantitative social science.

Hopefully, with this blog we will be able to demonstrate some of the work we have been doing, some of the analysis we would like to pursue, and with the help of the guest bloggers, expand this examination past the parochial interest of the principal posters and perhaps lead this blog into areas of more general applicability and usefulness.

Sincerely,

Chris Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence
Executive Director and President
The Dupuy Institute