Mystics & Statistics

So You Still Think You Want A Revolution In Military Affairs?

The Paladin M109A7 next-generation artillery system being manufactured by BAE Systems is a significant upgrade to the combat-proven M109A6 Paladin cannon artillery system. [www.army-technology.com]
Even as the U.S. Army examines ongoing “hybrid” conflicts and tries to conceptualize what wars of the near future are going to be like, it’s leaders continue to believe that a technology-driven Revolution in Military Affairs remains in the cards.

“I think we are on the cusp of a fundamental change in the character of ground warfare,” U.S. Army chief of staff Gen. Mark Milley told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., on June 23. “It will be of such significance that it will be like the rifling of a musket or the introduction of a machine gun or it will have such significance impact as the change from horse to mechanized vehicles.”

Revolutionary new technologies such as nanotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence will drive that fundamental change. But while Milley said that a revolution is coming, how exactly the character of ground warfare will shape up remains an open question. “Exactly what that’s going to look like, I don’t know,” Milley said. “I just know that we’re there. We’re on the leading edge of it. I think we’ve got a few years to figure it out—probably less than ten. But I think by 2025, you’re going to see armies—not only the American Army but armies around the world—will be fundamentally and substantively different than they are today.”

Whether technological change will radically change the nature of warfare remains to be seen. The Army is nevertheless pushing forward with changes in training and force structure to adapt to new tactics and technologies already being used by other combatants.

In related news, the Army’s Paladin Integrated Management program to upgrade 133 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers to M109A7’s to improve the weapon’s reliability, maintainability, performance, responsiveness, and lethality has run into problems. The Department of Defense Inspector General found the M109A7 failed to meet maximum rate-of-fire requirements in tests and requires additional fire extinguisher capabilities in crew compartments. Army observers have warned of recent advances in Russian artillery technology and the need for effective countering capabilities. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cancelled the Army’s proposed next-generation XM2001 Crusader self-propelled howitzer in 2002.

 

5,000

IS Weakening Inside Mosul

Key quote: “We still anticipate that somewhere between 5,000 or so fighters are inside Mosul,” Garver said. “We’re still anticipating a tough fight.”

There are also ISIL fighters outside of Mosul. Note that the article states that Mosul is the home of 2 million. This is probably not the case after two years of Islamic State rule. I have seen estimates as low as 500,000.

Islamic State Strength Estimates

We have no way of confirming the accuracy of these estimates (unlike our work during the Iraq and Afghan insurgencies), but a somewhat negative article on the Iraqi Army published in the New York Times in June does provide strength estimates for the Islamic State. The article is: New York Times Article

A few details:

  1. “The Islamic State has roughly 19,000 to 25,000 fighters, about half in Iraq and half in Syria…”
  2. “Most of the 10,000 to 12,000 in Iraq are concentrated around Mosul, in the Tal Afar area, and elsewhere in Nineveh Province.”

More on the Mosul Offensive

The article here is a nice summary of the situation. Mark Perry is an old friend of The Dupuy Institute. It does have a political slant in its introduction, but the rest of it is good analysis. We usually try to avoid politics in this blog.

Mark Perry on Mosul

A few highlights:

  1. Offensive is now tentatively schedule to begin sometime in early October.
  2. …with a final battle for Mosul coming at the end of October (and therefore the political slant to the article).
  3. The attack might be coordinated with an attack on Raqqa in Syria, the capital of the shrinking Islamic State.
  4. U.S. advisors are with Iraqi units at the battalion-level.
  5. Over 200 U.S. advisors are at al-Qayyarah air base, 40 miles south of Mosul.
  6. There is an effort to include local Sunni’s in the effort, along with a CENTCOM estimate that Anbar’s Sunnis can contribute at most 10,000 soldiers to the Mosul effort.

Saigon, 1965

The American RAND staff and Vietnamese interviewers on the front porch of the villa on Rue Pasteur. Courtesy of Hanh Easterbrook. [Revisionist History]

Although this blog focuses on quantitative historical analysis, it is probably a good idea to consider from time to time that the analysis is being done by human beings. As objective as analysts try to be about the subjects they study, they cannot avoid interpreting what they see through the lenses of their own personal biases, experiences, and perspectives. This is not a bad thing, as each analyst can bring something new to the process and find things that other perhaps cannot.

The U.S. experience in Vietnam offers a number of examples of this. Recently, journalist and writer Malcolm Gladwell presented a podcast exploring an effort by the RAND Corporation initiated in the early 1960s to interview and assess the morale of captured Viet Cong fighters and defectors. His story centers on two RAND analysts, Leon Gouré and Konrad Kellen, and one of their Vietnamese interpreters, Mai Elliott. The podcast traces the origins and history of the project, how Gouré, Kellen, and Elliott brought very different perspectives to their work, and how they developed differing interpretations of the evidence they collected. Despite the relevance of the subject and the influence the research had on decision-making at high levels, the study ended inconclusively and ambivalently for all involved. (Elliott would go on to write an account of RAND’s activities in Southeast Asia and several other books.)

Gladwell presents an interesting human story as well as some insight into the human element of social science analysis. It is a unique take on one aspect of the Vietnam War and definitely worth the time to listen to. The podcast is part of his Revisionist History series.

Islamic State Fighter Estimates for Mosul

An article just quoted an estimate for the number of Islamic State fighters in and around Mosul: Retaking Mosul

They estimate that “IS fighters in Mosul, meanwhile, vary from a few thousand to “not more than 10,000.” according to the coalition.”

They also note that the current population of Mosul is estimated at between 500,000 and one million. Also: “Al-Hashimi, the analyst, estimated retaking Mosul would require 80,000 men, of whom 15,000 are expected to come from the government-sanctioned Shiite militias.’

Also note: “An official…said there was not yet a detailed plan for retaking Mosul. “for now, the plan is simply that Mosul is next.'”

Anyhow, estimating the size of an insurgency or irregular force is somewhat of a challenge. Part of the challenge is that a significant percent (the majority?) of the force and the support personnel for the force is not “full-time”….so to say. They are people that are activated irregularly and as needed. I ended up with an entire chapter in my book America’s Modern Wars on estimating insurgent force size. In the end, I concluded that you are probably best estimating the force size based upon their levels of activity (incidents occurred and people killed) compared to other insurgencies. This did produce estimates higher than the official U.S. DOD estimates for Iraq and Afghanistan. In retrospect, it appear our estimates were closer to reality.

Of course, all these “part-time” and “casual” insurgents disappear back into the population when you occupy an area and are available to be called upon again.

Population around Mosul

Mosul is a big prize. The Islamic State is fundamentally different without this city. A few population stats pulled from this article: Up to One Million Could Flee Mosul

1. “An estimated 3 million people live under Islamic State rule in Iraq” (plus they control significant territory and population in Syria).

2. Mosul has 1.2-1.4 million

3. Another 825,000 live in the Nineveh plain and provinces of Kirkuk and Salhuddin

4. 250,000 are in Anbar province

The Nineveh plains are to the north and east of Mosul. Kirkuk and Salhuddin provinces are to the south and southeast of Mosul. So if there is a successful campaign to take Mosul (and we have kind of been waiting for one since June 2014), then we are looking at one or two million people possibly stripped from the Islamic State.

 

Neanderthals

Nominally this blog is about “quantitative historical analysis”….not just as related to defense, not just as related to The Dupuy Institute’s work. We have not posted much here outside of our immediate areas of expertise (and one could certainly argue that this subject is not history).

This article caught my attention: Neanderthals in Germany Went Extinct Right After Population Peak

A few highlights:

  1. Neanderthals lived from 200,000 to 40,000 years ago.
  2. Over 50% of identified Neanderthal settlements in Germany date back to between 60,000 to 43,000 years ago.
  3. During the time period between 100,000 and 70,000 years ago, there were only four identified Neanderthal settlement sites in Germany
  4. In the period between 70,000 and 43,000 years ago there were ninety-four
  5. Less than 1,000 years later, there was a rapid decrease and Neanderthals disappeared
  6. Neanderthals eventually went extinct in Europe between 41,000 and 39,000 year ago, coinciding with a period of extreme cold.

Neanderthals have 99.5% of the same DNA as modern humans (Chimpanzees maybe as little as 94%: see Human-chimp Gene Gap). Some Neanderthal DNA appears to be part of modern Eurasians.

ISIL Oil Revenues

I gather it has kind of been a grind to get to this point, but this article notes that: ISIS Suffers Near Collapse in Oil Revenue

A few interesting quotes:

  1. “The Islamic State, pushed off more than half the Iraqi territory it seized in 2014…”
  2. “….with partial access to just two of the five Iraqi oil fields it once controlled.”
  3. “In May the US estimated that its revenue had been roughly halved to $250 million a year from the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria”
  4. “The loss of oil revenues has forced the militants to cut salaries by a third….”
  5. “They have also imposed more taxes on farmers, truckers, and traders and increased fines for minor violations of religious bans….”
  6. “At least 100 drivers were killed trying to smuggle crude into Syria. Drivers are refusing to go…..”
  7. “I saw my brother get killed by an airstrike while sitting inside his truck. Other trucks were blown up like in a video game.”

 

Trevor Dupuy’s Combat Advance Rate Verities

t-34_76_4One of the basic processes of combat is movement. According to Trevor Dupuy, one of the most important outcomes of ground combat is advance against opposition. He spent a good amount of time examining historical advance rates, seeking to determine if technological change had led to increases in advance rates over time. On the face of it, he determined that daily rates had increased by about one-half, from about 17 kilometers per day during the Napoleonic Era, to about 26 kilometers a day by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. However, when calculated by the duration of a campaign, average daily advance rates did not appear to have changed much at all over 200 years, despite the advent of mechanization.

His research on the topic yielded another list of verities. He did not believe they accounted for every factor or influence on advance rates, but he did think they accounted for most of them. He was also reasonably confident that no weapons or means of conveyance then foreseen would alter the basic relationships in his list.[1]

  1. Advance against opposition requires local combat power preponderance.
  2. There is no direct relationship between advance rates and force strength ratios.
  3. Under comparable conditions, small forces advance faster than larger forces.
  4. Advance rates vary inversely with the strength of the defender’s fortifications.
  5. Advance rates are greater for a force that achieves surprise.
  6. Advance rates decline daily in sustained operations.
  7. Superior relative combat effectiveness increases an attacker’s advance rate.
  8. An “all-out” effort increases advance rates at a cost in higher casualties.
  9. Advance rates are reduced by difficult terrain.
  10. Advance rates are reduced by rivers and canals.
  11. Advance rates vary positively with the quality and density of roads.
  12. Advance rates are reduced by bad weather.
  13. Advance rates are lower at night than in daytime.
  14. Advance rates are reduced by inadequate supply.
  15. Advance rates reflect interactions with friendly and enemy missions.

NOTES

[1] Trevor N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House, 1987), pp. 158–163.