Category Sea Warfare

U.S. Marine Corps Concepts of Operation with the F-35B

Four F-35B Lightning II aircraft perform a flyover above the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) during the Lightning Carrier Proof of Concept Demonstration. [US Navy photo by Andy Wolfe]

The US Marine Corps (USMC) is practicing some new concepts of operation (CONOPS), using their new F-35B aircraft. The combination of a stealthy, Short-Take-Off-Vetical-Landing (STOVL) fighter with great sensors, with the aviation-centric configuration of the America Class vessels; the “Lightening Carrier (CV-L)” concept, and the flexible basing options from their CONOPS have some great potential to rapidly extend the power of the USMC ashore. “After fifteen years of emphasizing sustained operations ashore, the Marine Corps is refocusing on its naval and expeditionary roots and full-spectrum operations across the range of military operations (ROMO).”  (2017 Marine Aviation Plan)

The 21st century Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducts maneuver warfare in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict to generate and exploit psychological, technological, temporal, and spatial advantages over the adversary. The 21st century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach that embraces information warfare as indispensable for achieving complementary effects across five domains – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. The 21st century MAGTF avoids linear, sequential, and phased approaches to operations and blends maneuver warfare and combined arms to generate the combat power needed for simultaneity of action in its full range of missions. The 21st century MAGTF operates and fights at sea, from the sea, and ashore as an integrated part of the naval force and the larger combined/joint force. (emphasis added) (ibid)

The concepts laid out in the USMC document are:

  • Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) – this is a plan to reduce predictability and operate from austere locations, “independent of specialized fixed infrastructure”
  • Distributed STOVL Operations (DSO) – similar to DSO, but with “[F]uel and ordnance resupply conducted at mobile forward arming and refueling points (M-FARPS) located closer or within the operating area.”
  • “Complementing…is the mobile distribution site (MDS) concept, a vehicle-mobile site located away from the M-FARP, intended to re-arm and re-fuel the M-FARP while maintaining an element of deception and decoy. DSO is sustainable using surface connectors, land-based MDSs and host nation support, enabling readiness and sortie generation for the MAGTF.”

We might never need to employ this way…but to not lean forward to develop this capability, to train and exercise with it, is to deny ourselves a force multiplier that highlights the agility and opportunity only the Navy-Marine Corps team can provide. (ibid)

How Do These USMC Lightening Carriers Compare?

The America Class amphibious assault ship, which at ~45,000 ton displacement is larger that the French nuclear carrier Charles De Gaulle (~42,000 tons), and approaching the size of the Russian and Chinese Kuznetsov class carriers (~55,000 tons), about the same size as the Indian modified Kiev class carrier (~45,000 tons), and bigger than the Japanese Izumo Class “helicopter destroyer” (~27,000 tons), which to a layman’s eyes is an aircraft carrier; even though these vessels operate only helicopters today, the capability to operate F-35B aircraft in the future is certainly exists. Of course the dominant carrier force is the US Navy’s Nimitz class, and newer Ford class (~100,000 tons), which  operate aircraft using Catapult-Assisted-Take-Off-But-Arrested-Recovery (CATOBAR). Interestingly, the British initially designed their Queen Elizabeth class carriers (~70,000 tons) to be CATOBAR, which gives the advantage of being able to launch heavier fighters (i.e. more weapons and fuel). A doubling of the estimated cost for CATOBAR forced a redesign back to a STOVL design back in 2012.

Are STOVL Aircraft Inherently Inferior?

This is an excellent question. The physical laws of nature have a vote here, because a STOVL aircraft must carry a smaller payload, than a CATOBAR aircraft, since it lacks the initial thrust provided by the catapult. David Axe of War is Boring has delivered a scathing account of the STOVL concept and history, (to again target the F-35). The USMC pursued STOVL technology, in spite of ” …crash-plagued experimentation throughout the early years of the jet age — every STOVL or V/STOL prototype from 1946 to 1966 crashed. “USMC interest in a working V/STOL attack aircraft outstripped the state of aeronautical technology.”

The British, meanwhile, concerned about Russian bomber and missile attacks on their airfields during the Cold War, developed the Harrier Jump Jet, which did not require a lengthy, fixed runway.

But the Harrier, so appealing in theory, has been a disaster in practice … In the 1991 Gulf War, the front-line concrete lily pads never showed up, so the jump jet had to fly from distant full-size bases or assault ships. With their very limited fuel, they were lucky to be able to put in five or 10 minutes supporting Marines on the ground — and they proved tremendously vulnerable to machine guns and shoulder-fired missiles.

Indeed, Mr. Axe quotes the infamous Pierre Sprey – “The Harrier was based on a complete lie.” (emphasis added).

Was The Harrier Really That Bad?  

Some claim that the Sea Harrier [is] the forgotten hero that won the war in the Falklands.  The US Air Force air chronicles states …

Harrier jump-jets performed well beyond the performance expectations of most military experts. The remarkable record of the aircraft is attributed not only to relatively sophisticated gadgetry, such as warning receivers and electronic countermeasures to confuse Argentine antiaircraft weapons, but also to the skilled British pilots…and the older Argentine planes…. In spite of its spectacular successes against British ships, Argentina lost the air-to-air war decisively. Argentine fighter aircraft failed to shoot down a single Harrier. British Harrier losses totaled nine–four to accidents and five by surface-based air defenses–surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA).

The USMC concepts specifically called out the ability to exploit spatial advantages, which also played a key roll in the Falklands:

The 400 miles from Argentina to the islands partially explained why the score was so lopsided. To make the 800-mile round trip from the Rio Gallegos Air Base on the coast severely strained the maximum operating range of the Argentine aircraft. Consequently, Argentine pilots had all they could do to reach the conflict area undetected and deliver their ordnance, “getting in and getting out” as quickly as possible.” (Ibid)

This geo-spatial situation is reminiscent of the Battle of Britain, where the RAF operated fighter aircraft nearby the battle location, while the Luftwaffe operated at the edge of their range, a limitation which was also widely credited as an important factor in the outcome.

The US Navy’s account of the Falklands War gave similar credit to the Harrier’s effectiveness:

[T]he Royal Navy was forced to go to war with only two short vertical takeoff and landing (STOVL) ships and their STOVL aircraft, the Harrier…. [T]hese units performed very well. It has been stated that had the British not had aircraft with the capabilities of the Harrier (STOVL, high reliability, and high availability) and the two small ships to operate them, it is unlikely the United Kingdom would have committed itself to hostilities in the South Atlantic…. Perhaps its greatest feature was surprising flexibility…. One of the best features of the Harrier was versatility in operating from a variety of platforms under actual combat conditions.

It is precisely this flexibility that STOVL aircraft—both the F-35B and the Harrier before it—which is leveraged in the USMC concepts. The F-35B has the added advantage that one of its key capabilities is the delivery of timely, accurate information. This information is delivered across the battle network at the speed of light, and weighs nothing, so the STOVL limitations do not apply in the same way. It seems clear that any evaluation of the F-35B’s capabilities need to consider these advantages, rather than focusing exclusively on metrics related to the Energy-Maneuverability Theory, such as wing loading, thrust to weight ratio.

Hybrid Warfare At Sea

“Who are you calling junk?”

During his Senate confirmation hearing on January 11th, Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson stated that the Trump administration is “going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building [in the South China Sea] stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” Chinese state-run media outlets responded with vows to counter any attempts by the United States to block access to the artificial islands China is constructing in the South China Sea.

The possibility of a clash between the U.S. and China in the Western Pacific has been the subject of discussion and analysis for several years now. In the current issue of the U.S. Naval Institute’s journal, Proceedings, Admiral James Stavridis (ret.) takes a look at the potential challenges posed by maritime “hybrid warfare” capabilities. Noting that current assessments of hybrid war focus overwhelmingly on land warfare, he points out that both China and Iran have demonstrated the ability to apply asymmetrical approaches to sea warfare as well.

Stavridis outlines what a hybrid war at sea might look like.

Given its need to appear somewhat ambiguous to outside observers, maritime hybrid warfare generally will be conducted in the coastal waters of the littorals. Instead of using force directly from identifiable “gray hull” navy platforms, hybrid warfare will feature the use of both civilian vessels (tramp steamers, large fishing vessels, light coastal tankers, small fast craft, and even “low slow” skiffs with outboard engines). It also will be conducted and likely command-and-controlled from so-called white hulls assigned to the coast guards of given nations. Both the Chinese and the Iranians are using their coast guards (and revolutionary guards in the case of Iran) in this fashion in the South China Sea and Arabian Gulf, respectively.

Extrapolating from this, Stavridis argues that

The United States must start to consider its responses to hybrid warfare at sea, which may require developing new tactics and technologies, working closely with allies and partners, and building U.S. hybrid capability to counter its deployment by other nations and eventually transnational actors.

In addition, the United States should be considering the role of naval forces—Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and even Merchant Marine—in helping counter hybrid attacks ashore. Many of the capabilities developed to conduct and counter hybrid warfare at sea could be employed in the littoral, coastal regions, and eventually deep inland. This might be called “hybrid warfare from the sea,” and certainly is a potential part of maritime hybrid warfare.

He makes several specific recommendations:

  • “The most important thing we can do today is to study, analyze, and fully understand how the ideas of hybrid warfare as practiced today will both translate to the maritime sphere and develop there in lethal ways.”
  • Work with Coalition Partners and “encourage cross talk, exchange best practices, and share intelligence on this emerging concern.”
  • Train and exercise against maritime hybrid warfare. “The ambiguity of these scenarios will require education and training in rules of engagement, operating our conventional systems against unconventional forces at sea, and learning to act more like a network at sea in the littoral.”
  • Leverage the U.S. Coast Guard. “Involving it in a leadership role in combating maritime hybrid warfare is crucial. Many of its systems and platforms already contain the technologies to counter maritime hybrid warfare techniques, and its ethos and fighting spirit applied in this tactical arena would be powerful.”

The article goes into much more depth on these points. It is a good starting point for considering what a another potential area of future global competition may look like.

South China Sea

The South China Sea has moved front-and-center as a major issue (along with the one China policy): prevent-china-taking-over-territory

Just a few notes:

  1. Tillerson’s statement on Jan. 11 during confirmation hearings was “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”
  2. Presidential spokesman Sean Spicer said yesterday “The U.S. is going to make sure that we protect our interests there.”
  3. And from the article: “Aides have said that Trump plans a major naval build-up in East Asia to counter China’s rise.”

Not sure what the “clear signal” is and how confrontational this will be. Right now, it is just talk. But, does this mean that the Trump administration is intending to expand the navy?

Lives Of The Russian (And Ex-Russian) Aircraft Carriers

Goofus and Gallant at Sea, or the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov (l) and the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning (r). [The Telegraph and China Stringer Network, via Reuters]

When we left the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov last autumn, it was steaming (and by steaming, we mean smoking) through the English Channel with its screen toward the Mediterranean Sea to support combined Syrian-Russian military operations against rebel forces in the city of Aleppo. After being denied permission en route to refuel in Spain and Malta, the Kuznetsov arrived on station off Syria in early November.

The Kuznetsov began military operations on 8 November, but just six days later one of it’s brand-new MiG-29KR multi-role fighters crashed. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the accident was the result of an unspecified fault in one of the Kuznetsov‘s four landing arrestor cables, but the Russian newspaper Gazeta claimed the aircraft crashed when it’s engines failed while waiting to land. IHS Jane’s has speculated that the aircraft likely ran out of fuel. The MoD called attention to airstrikes launched from the Kuznetsov against Syrian targets the next day, 15 November. MoD video showed Su-33 fighter-bombers loaded with unguided bombs but no MiG-29KR’s, leading some to conclude that the latter had been grounded due to the crash.

Satellite photographs subsequently taken on 20 November of Humaymim Air Base in Syria’s Latakia province showed eight Russian Navy Su-33 and one MiG-29KR jets alongside Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) aircraft, suggesting that the Kuznetsov‘s air wing had been temporarily transferred to land to continue flight operations.

On 5 December, the MoD announced that “while landing after completing a combat task over Syria, an Su-33 fighter jet skidded off the [Kuznetsov‘s] deck because the arresting cable gear broke.” The announcement did not specify a date for the crash, but it was believed to have occurred on 3 December, less than three weeks after the first incident.

Last week, Russia announced that it would begin withdrawing its combat forces in Syria, beginning with the Kuznetsov task force. The Russian military commander in Syria, Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov, asserted that in two months, the Kuznetsov had launched 420 air combat sorties against 1,252 “terrorist targets.” No announcement has yet been made for when the long return voyage to the Kuznetsov‘s Barents Sea home port of Severomorsk, Russia, will begin, nor whether any country along the route will allow the flotilla to refuel.

Meanwhile, in early January 2017, the Chinese Defense Ministry announced that it’s only (current) aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (the Kuznetsov‘s sister ship, née Riga, then Varyag) and five escorts would conduct a “‘cross-sea area’ training exercise, involved J-15 fighter jets, as well as several ship-borne helicopters” in the South China Sea. The Chinese then proceeded to rattle cages in the region by unexpectedly sailing the Liaoning carrier group through the volatile Taiwan Straits yesterday, prompting Taiwan to scramble F-16 fighters and to divert a frigate in response. Just two days earlier, Japan and South Korea had launched fighter jets in response to an incursion by Chinese aircraft into the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. This follows the seizure of a U.S. Navy underwater drone by a Chinese warship off the coast of the Philippines last month.

While the actual military capabilities of the Kuznetsov and Liaoning may be modest in comparison with U.S. aircraft carriers, the political and military reactions they have elicited indicate the value of sea-going air power. The diplomatic utility of power projection should not be underestimated. Imagine the results if the Russians or Chinese possessed aircraft carriers comparable to the U.S.S. Nimitz, which conducted its own politically-charged transit of the Taiwan Strait in 1996.

GAO: “We’re 26 ships into the contract and we still don’t know if the [Littoral Combat Ship] can do its job.”

In a previous post, I questioned the wisdom of a defense procurement strategy of buying expensive, technologically advanced weapons systems while they are still being developed and before they have been proven combat effective. One of the examples I cited was the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.

(The LCS should not be confused with the Navy’s new guided-missile destroyer U.S.S. Zumwalt, which recently suffered an embarrassing propulsion system failure at sea, necessitating a tow back to port for repairs).

The incoming Trump administration is going to have a decision to make with regard to the LCS. Congress approved procurement of 40 total LCSs in the recent National Defense Authorization Act of 2017. The Navy has already built, purchased, or ordered 28. It intends eventually to build up to a fleet of 52 small surface combatant ships, either LCSs or a modified version it has classified as a frigate. As part of its 2018 budget request, the Navy wants $14 billion for the final 12 authorized vessels and their associated weapons systems to fund a “block” purchase.

However, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 1 December, the General Accounting Office, a Defense Department representative, and various senators criticized the LCS program for “for cost overruns, engineering failures, and more.” They called for reduced, rather than increased, spending on it.

On the campaign trail, President-elect Donald Trump promised to expand the Navy to 350 ships as part of his proposals to “upgrade America’s military.” The Congressional Research Service has predicted the Navy would increase its total request to 56 small surface combatants.

The outcome remains to be seen, but a potential spanner in the works to Trump’s plans may be the recent revelation in the Washington Post of a Defense Department internal report that alleged that it was wasting up to $125 billion annually on poor business administration. Congress is expected to pass a continuing resolution this month to allow for negotiation of a new budget in early 2017.

Russian Fleet Strength

The Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the Battle Cruiser Peter the Great are the only two ships of that size in the Russian fleet (keying off the previous post). One source places their active strength at:

1 Carrier (58,660 tons displacement) – commissioned 1990

1 Battle Cruiser (28,000 tons) – commissioned 1998

3 Cruisers (12,500 tons) – commissioned 1982-1989

14 destroyers (7,570 – 7,940 tons) – commissioned 1982-1999

1 Kashin class destroyer (4,390 tons) — commissioned 1969

6 Frigates (3,575 – 4,400 tons) – commissioned 1980-2016

5 Large corvettes (2,2000 tons) — commissioned 2008-2014

Lots of landing ships, smaller corvettes (less than 1,000 tons), auxiliary ships, intelligence ships, patrol boats, minesweepers, landing craft, and of course, submarines: 7 Cruise missile submarines (19,400 tons), 18 attack submarines (7,250 – 13,800 tons), 2 special-purpose submarines and 13 “boomers” (ballistic missile submarines).

The Admiral Kuznetsov Adventure

The super-stealthy Admiral Kuznetzov passes stealthily through the English Channel near Kent Credit: Jim Bennett for The Telegraph
The super-stealthy Admiral Kuznetsov passes stealthily through the English Channel near Kent (Jim Bennett for The Telegraph)

A Russian naval flotilla of seven ships, including the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and battle cruiser Peter the Great, steamed through the English Channel today under the watchful eyes of the British Royal Navy. The squadron is on a voyage from Severomorsk, the home of the Russian Northern Fleet, to the coast of Syria to help provide air support for the regime of Bashar Assad against the forces of Syrian rebels and Daesh fighters.

The deployment is viewed as more of a politically symbolic show of force than a meaningful military contribution. The Kuznetsov carries just 15 Su-33 and MiG-29 fighter/bombers and is capable of only limited flight operations. This will provide meager augmentation for Russian aircraft already operating from Syrian airbases.

The Kuznetsov's projected course from Russia to Syria. {BBC)

This will mark the carrier’s first combat mission, although it has been deployed to the Mediterranean Sea four times previously, in 1995, 2007, 2012, and 2014. The U.S. Sixth Fleet monitored the Kuznetsov‘s 2012 voyage closely, out of concerns that the aged and problematic vessel might suffer mechanical troubles sufficient to cause it to sink, requiring a complex rescue operation. Such concerns were validated when the Kuznetsov‘s boilers “blew out” off the coast of France on it’s return voyage, and the ship had to be taken under tow by an accompanying Russian ocean-going tug.

The present squadron also includes a tug, a practice that appears to have become standard Russian Navy procedure in recent years.

Chinese Carriers II

The Type 001A Class carrier:

China’s First Homebuilt Aircraft Carrier

  1. Won’t be operational until 2020 “at the earliest”
  2. Had a ski ramp in the bow (like the Liaoning)
  3. Displacement is 60,000 to 70,000 tons
  4. Estimate to carry around 48 aircraft
    1. 36 J-15 multirole fighters
    2. 12 Z-9 or Z-18 helicopters

Not sure I believe the article in the previous post about China having four more of these ready-for-action by 2025.

The video in the article of the Liaoning landing and launching J-15s is worth watching.

Chinese Carriers

Chinese Carriers

There seems to be some buzz out there about Chinese aircraft carriers:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asiatoday/china-likely-to-become-ai_b_11164324.html

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/21/will-china-become-an-aircraft-carrier-superpower/

We usually don’t talk about seapower on this blog but doing a simple count of carriers in the world is useful:

  • Total Carriers (100,000+ tons): 10 (all U.S.)
  • Total Carriers (42,000 – 59,100 tons): 5 (China, Russia, India, U.S., France)
  • Total Carriers (40,000 – 41,649 tons): 8 (all U.S.)
  • Total Carriers (26,000 – 32,800 tons): 7 (Brazil, India, 2 Australian, Italy, Japan, Spain)
  • Total Carriers (11,486 – 21,500 tons): 10 (UK, 3 French, Egypt, 2 Japanese, South Korean, Italy, Thailand)

Summarizing the count (and there is a big difference between a 100,000+ Nimitz class carrier the Thailand’s 11,486 ton Charki Naruebet):

  • U.S. 19 carriers
  • U.S. Allies: 14 carriers
  • Neutrals: 5 carriers (India, Brazil, Egypt, Thailand)
  • Potentially hostile: 2 carriers (China, Russia)
  • Total: 40 carriers

China and Russian both have one carrier of over 55,000 tons. These Kuznetsov class carriers can carry around 36 – 41 aircraft. Each of our ten Nimitz class carriers carry around 80-90 aircraft. Our amphibious assault ships can carry 36 or more aircraft. In all reality, these carriers are their equivalent.

To be commissioned in the future:

  1. 2016    U.S.                 100,000 tons (CVN-78)
  2. 2016    Egypt                 21,300 tons
  3. 2017    Japan                27,000 tons
  4. 2017    UK                     70,600 tons !!!
  5. 2018    India                  40,000 tons
  6. 2018    U.S.                   45,000 tons
  7. 2019    Russian             14,000 tons
  8. 2019    South Korea      18,800 tons
  9. 2020    UK                     70,600 tons   !!!
  10. 2020    China                 65,000 tons   !!!
  11. 2020    U.S.                 100,000 tons (CVN-79)
  12. 2021    Turkey               26,000 tons
  13. 2022    Italy                 TBD
  14. 2025    India                  65,000 tons
  15. 2025    Russia             100,000 tons !!!
  16. 2025    U.S.                 100,000 tons (CVN-80)
  17. 2028    South Korea      30,000 tons
  18. 2029    Brazil               TBD
  19. 2036    South Korea      30,000 tons
  20. TBD    India                   4 carriers at 30,000 tons
  21. TBD    Singapore        TBD
  22. TBD    U.S.                   7 carriers at 100,000 tons  (CVN 81-87)
  23. TBD    U.S.                   9 carriers at 45,693 tons (LHA 8-16)

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_carriers_in_service

Now, the first article states that the Chinese plan to have six carriers deployed by 2025. There are only two shown in these listings, the active Liaoning (CV-16) and the newly build CV-001A to be commissioned in 2020. So maybe four more 65,000-ton carriers by 2025?

Needless to say, we are probably not looking at a “carrier gap” anytime in the near or mid-term future.