Category Urban Warfare

The Defensive Value of Urban Terrain According to the QJM

According to the Trevor Dupuy’s Quantified Judgment Model (QJM), as described in the book Numbers, Predictions and War (1985 edition), the value of defending is urban terrain is between 1.82 to 2.24. This is a multiplier to the combat value of the defender.

This consists of the value of a defense posture (Table 5, page 230)…

                         Force Strength

Attack:                        1.0

Defense (hasty)          1.3

Defense (prepared)    1.5

Defense (fortified)      1.6

Withdrawal                  1.15

Delay                            1.2

 

…Multiplied by the value of terrain (Table 1, page 228):

Terrain Characteristics

Rugged-Mixed          1.5

Rolling-Mixed           1.3

Urban                        1.4

 

Now, the entire terrain table is not included here, there are 14 terrain types in the table. I just included the three that were discussed in the previous post: The Defensive Value of Urban Terrain | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). As can be seen, there is not a lot of difference between Rolling-mixed to Urban to Rugged-Mixed. Clearly there is an advantage to defending in urban terrain, but no more so than other good defensive non-urban terrain.

Keep in mind that with the QJM, it only requires superior combat value to move forward. So, if a force is doing a prepared defense (1.5) on urban terrain (1.4), which equals 2.1; then a force with more than 2.1 times more combat power will be able to advance against them. 

Now, this is a game construct, not a piece of analytical work. It really has no other validity than any other game construct. For example, in “classic” Avalon Hill (AH) games the urban terrain multiplies the defense by 2. But their Combat Result Tables (CRT) are still based upon a three-to-one rule, so attacking urban terrain with twice the force on the AH 1-to-1 combat results table was a truly risky proposition. The attack still has a 50% chance of losing. The AH CRT is here: Force Ratios and CRTs | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Whereas with the QJM, the attack is going to go forward and with roughly equal casualties.

Still, the QJM is a model that has been extensively validated three times, so there are some reasons to believe that some parts of it may be close to reality. But we have not validated the model to a large collection of urban engagements. This would be useful to do but it does take a little effort.

The Defensive Value of Urban Terrain

I probably should have blogged about this long ago, but you now, it is hard to stay on top of the blog and keep working on all various books that I keep signing contracts for.

Anyhow, we started getting hits on this blog from this article:  Urban Operations in Ukraine: Size, Ratios, and the Principles of War – Modern War Institute (usma.edu)

They specifically say:

“A military axiom is that an attacking force should outnumber defenders at the tactical level of war by a ratio of 3:1 to have a reasonable chance for success. Some analysts, including those responsible for US Army doctrine, believe a ratio as high as 6:1 is sometimes necessary to achieve success in urban operations because of the increased strength of the defense on urban terrain. Regardless of the actual requirements, force ratios are relevant for urban planners.”

This link to us is in reference to the 6:1 figure, and leads to blog post: U.S. Army Force Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Now, I do not know why they would use that link. I clearly am disputing the army doctrine figures with my charts from page 10 and 210 of War by Numbers:

European Theater of Operations (ETO) Data, 1944

 

Force Ratio                       Result                          Percent Failure   Number of cases

0.55 to 1.01-to-1.00            Attack Fails                          100%                     5

1.15 to 1.88-to-1.00            Attack usually succeeds        21%                   48

1.95 to 2.56-to-1.00            Attack usually succeeds        10%                   21

2.71-to-1.00 and higher      Attacker Advances                   0%                   42

 

Force Ratio…………Cases……Terrain…….Result

1.18 to 1.29 to 1        4             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

1.51 to 1.64               3             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

2.01 to 2.64               2             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

3.03 to 4.28               2             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

4.16 to 4.78               2             Urban         Defender penetrated

6.98 to 8.20               2             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

6.46 to 11.96 to 1      2             Urban         Defender penetrated

 

Now, my specific discussion on this is part of a three-page section on pages 209-211 called The Effect of Urban Terrain on Outcome. To quote from part of it:

The lack of any failed urban attacks is due to the favorable force ratios. The lowest force ratio of an urban attack is 1.72 to 1, and only four attacks are less than 2.00 to 1. Of the nine nonurban attacks between 1.71 and 2.00 to 1, only three failed. No attacks, urban or nonurban, executed with above 2.56 to 1 failed. There were a total of ten urban attacks made between 2.00 to 1 and 2.56 to 1 and nine nonurban attacks made in the same range. Two of the nonurban attacks in these cases failed.

This it appears that force ratios are a major factor in determining outcome. It does not appear that the difference between urban and nonurban terrain significantly influenced this result, nor can a difference be seen between rugged terrain and nonrugged terrain. Also the difference between rolling and mixed, rugged and mixed, or rugged and wooded terrain does not seem to have significantly influenced the outcomes. If a difference in the effect between rolling terrain and rugged terrain cannot be demonstrated, then the difference in effect between urban and nonurban terrain is also likely to be of the same order of effect, or less. However, the difference in terrain could affect combat power, and the difference caused by this effect could be 20 to 30 percent without it showing up in this analysis. Such small differences cannot be conclusively demonstrated given the small number of cases and the considerable variation found in this data.

Table 16.4. Summation of Force Ratios Compared to Outcomes, ETO

Force Ratio                                         Result

0.55 to 1.01 to 1.00                            Attack fails

1.15 to 2.56 to 1.00                            Attack may succeed

2.71 to 1.00 and higher                     Attack Advances

 

It is in the “attack may succeed” area where we may detect some differences caused by terrain effects. In the range of 1.15 to 2.56 to 1.00 we also found the statistics in table 16.5. For the urban versus nonurban cases, we found the statistics in table 16.6.

Table 16.5 Outcomes for attacks from 1.15 to 2.56 to 1.00

Cases            Attack Fails              Attack Advances             Defender Penetrated

55                   12 (21.82%)              35 (63.64%)                       8 (14.55%)

 

Table 16.6. Outcomes Based upon Terrain

                  Cases             Attack Fails         Attack Advances     Defender Penetrated

Urban        14                      0                         14                              0

Rolling        25                     6 (24.00%)         17                              2

Rugged       30                    6 (20.00%)          18                              6

 

Little can be concluded from this data, which appear to support a null hypothesis. That is, the terrain (be it urban vs. nonurban or rolling vs. rugged) has no significantly measurable included on the outcome of the battle.

Now, this is all kind of carefully worded to make sure I do not step beyond my data. Let me try to simplify this in three simple points:

  1. Urban terrain does not favor the defender more so than other terrain (rolling or rugged). In fact, it appears less. 
  2. Needless to say, the statement in the Modern War Institute article that “…ratio of 3:1 to have a reasonable chance of success” has little meaningful value. The attacker can be seen succeeding almost 80% of the time at ratios between 1.15 to 2.56 to 1. They reference the blog post that establishes this in their article.
  3. The statement that “ratio as high as 6:1 is sometimes necessary to achieve success in urban operations because of the increased strength of the defense on urban terrain” is simply out there. We did three studies on urban warfare, using more cases than anyone else has done. While we did not establish what was the defensive value of urban terrain, it clearly was not massive. 

Old posts reactivated

It does appear that number of our older posts are being tapped. We do have over 1,300 posts on this blog now going back to December 2015. Some of these older posts are getting a lot of attention recently. This includes this perennial favorite, that seems to have been recently quoted in a couple of news articles: 

The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

This one is also getting a lot of attention: 

Wounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

This blog post was written from my draft book War by Numbers. It is more fully covered in Chapter 15 of that book. What is surprising is that no one has done any work on this subject since then. I thought I had a contract in late 2020 to further expand and expound on the subject, but apparently some of the “reviewers” of the proposed effort decided that were other things more important to examine. Therefore, my Chapter on casualties appear to be the “cutting edge” of this discussion, and as far as I know, will be the most extended discussion of the subject for some years to come. I would like to do more on this, but don’t think I will without outside funding.

The post below always regularly gets hits. I think that is because a number of people first found our blog when we did this post, and therefore, they still use this blog post to enter our blog. Still, it is relevant. 

Population over Time (US vs USSR) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

This old post is also relevant right now:

What would a reconstituted Soviet Union/Russian Empire look like? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

And then there are a number of old posts related to combat that seem to be getting hits. This includes:

U.S. Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in World War II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Measuring The Effects Of Combat In Cities, Phase I | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Active Defense, Forward Defense, and A2/AD in Eastern Europe | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

I do think our three Urban Warfare studies were overlooked by the urban warfare community, in part, because it really did not say what they wanted it to say. Below is another of our blog posts on the subject, as we have two chapters on the subject in my book War by Numbers:

Urban Combat in War by Numbers | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

I gather CAA (Center for Army Analysis) was just fine with our reports, and had issued us a follow-on contract for fourth study, that never came to fruition:

Urban Phase IV – Stalingrad | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

At this point, even though I think this is worth doing, and we have already independently collected a lot of the Russian unit records for the fighting, it is probably not ever going to be done without outside funding. I have got other solo projects that are of higher priority to me (more on them later).

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 4 (ground actions)

The focus here remains on the ground actions. There is not much new here to report. What I am interested in is what ground that Russia is going to take and what ground are they going to hold. 

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol
6. Crimean border/Kherson

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The Russian Army is in the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). Have even seen an odd video of fighting there (? Russian War Ukraine – Ukrainian Armored Vehicle Totally Ignores Direct Machine Gun Fire – YouTube).  

They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl and the large Antonov/Hostomel airport north of Kiev. They appear to be at the northern and eastern outskirts of the city, maybe four miles from the center of the city. The center of the city appears peaceful.

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky remains defiantly in Kiev. They are intending to hold and fight for the city. Very different than what we saw in Afghanistan. The previous president, Petro Poroshenko, a billionaire, is also in Kiev brandishing a Kalashnikov. There is an example of national unity. The city is open to the west and the south. Reporters moving through those areas are reporting that Ukrainian militia is organizing and training.

It does not appear that Russia is aggressively, if at all, pushing into the city. 

See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14gVDF2b1vA

Afternoon (EST) update: 

Anyone care to make as estimate the size of this force? (Sky News: Massive Russian Convoy Seen Outside Kyiv): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gDmMVzjIVw

Interesting report from ITV News: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32yVBH6n4Mo

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): There were reports of a landing there on the first day. I still have no idea of the size or location of the landing. Was this a raid or a permanent landing? Are there Russian forces there now? I have not seen any reports and the camera shots from Odessa show peace and quiet for the third day in a row.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): How serious are Russian ground operations? Are they trying to surround and isolate Kharkov? It appears the Ukraine army in this area are putting up a fight. It does appear that most of the videos of captured Russians and destroyed Russian vehicles are coming from there. For example (from today): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDxjBmxu1oo and: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0X_Pl0i6cso

Video of a car driving into a mortar bombardment: Car Barely Dodges Mortar Attack In Kharkiv – YouTube

No clear news from Kharkov from the last three days. The U.S. officials were saying yesterday that the heaviest fighting is “in and around Kharkiv.” Is the Russian army slowly encircling the city? Some maps seem to indicate that, but I have no clear evidence of such.

More Kharkov videos: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j-E_rrqO3Ug

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VY_7sUvrNmY

Afternoon (EST) update:

It appears that Kharkov remains under Ukrainian control (does the scene starting at 0:30 look like a Call of Duty game?): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZsuteJN6AM

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: Of course, Russia has recognized these “people’s republics.” They only control half of their provinces. The rest of the provinces are under control of Ukraine and defended by the Ukrainian army. I gather their desire is to expand their control and take the rest of both provinces, but these are well defended. Not sure how serious will be their attempts here. So far, we have not heard much from this area.

Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oaEyKO2xNYY

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Two days ago there were reports of an amphibious landing of several thousand troops in or near Mariupol. They are reporting heavy fighting near Mariupol, but not in it.

Afternoon (EST) update: Vidoes show Russians are occupying Berdyansk (see @causcasuswar on twitter). Other reports are that 2,000 marines are advancing on Mariupol (U.S. official). The amphibious operations and Berdyansk are to the SW of Mariupol. It is debatable if this force is sufficient to take Mariupol. 

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Two or three days ago Russian troops entered Kherson and raised the Russian flag over the administrative building in the middle of the city. By the end of Day 2, Ukraine had control of Kherson and some of the area between Crimea and Kherson. They appear to have retained control of Kherson and the bridge they have been fighting over. There were also reports yesterday of fighting in Mykolaiv (pop. 476,101), the city on the Southern Bug River just west of Kherson.

This is the second or third successful counterattack we have seen from the Ukranian army. This is tough to do when your opponent has air superiority. It does seem that Russia put out a couple of unsupported airmobile columns to places like Kherson and Antonov airport. This may work if your opponent is folding but does not seem to work as well against an opponent that is determined to fight and to counterattack.

Afternoon (EST) update: Lots of action around Melitipol (pop. 150,768). Not sure of current status:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIr0TJNKWLk

Soviet flag: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmYAEsZR_fM

Russian flag: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6WDgE8QwqfY

 

I will update this post during the day as I find more information. 

 

The Home Front: There were certainly a lot of anti-war demonstrations in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, and other Russian cities the first night of the war. Do not know now how much they are continuing, but I do see a recent video of a long line of protesters marching in Novosibirsk. According to a Russian human rights media group OVD-Info the number of detained protesters is 2,692. At least 1,370 were detained in Moscow.

Casualties: The UN is reporting at least 64 civilians dead in the war. Ukraine reported two days ago 137 Ukrainians killed (mostly service members). The Ukraine health ministry is now reporting that 198 Ukrainians, including three children, have been killed. Russian casualties are guestimated, but it clearly includes several dozen killed and at least 6 captured that I have seen from videos. It is clear that at least 300 people have died in this conflict.

According to photos, at least 15 Russians have been captured, as have 40 Ukrainians (see @caucasuswar). 

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop and @caucasuswar, none of whom are known to me.

 

P.S. Ukrainian border guards may have survived reported last stand on Snake Island

P.P.S. https://www.youtube.com/shorts/qQDNY462scM. Berdyansk is a coastal city on the Sea of Azov between Mariupol and Crimea. 

P.P.P.S. Drone footnote (afternoon update): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TdTGT1dLSKA

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 2 (ground actions)

I changed the title of my previous post to “Day 1.” Again, my focus here is on the ground actions. What I am interested in is what ground are they going to take and what ground are they going to hold. Right now, this attack looks pretty unrestrained, but who knows what are Putin actual objectives or at what point he will decide he has done enough. I gather the degree of resistance by the Ukrainian Army may influence these decisions.

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
5. Mariupol.
6. Crimean border

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The Russian Army is reported to have reached the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl (I wouldn’t want to be those troops). Vladimir Zelensky vowed last night to stay in Kiev. So, it does look like they intend to hold and fight for the city (see picture above). Very different than what we saw in Afghanistan. 

The Antonov/Hostomel airport has become a real right. Apparently, Russia did an airmobile operation to put troops within 15 miles of the capitol. This is the group of Matthew Chance ran across, and they were so nice as to let him film them. Ukraine counterattacked against what would have been an isolated “forward detachment” (the head of our Kursk research team, Col. Sverdlov, wrote the influential book “Forward Detachments in Battle”). They have retaken it according to some accounts. By the end of today, I gather it was back under Russian control.

There are lots of twitter feeds on this fight. Recommend you check @RALee85 and @TrentTelenko.

This is a decent news report from AP: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sorting-fact-disinformation-russian-attack-ukraine-83106752

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): There were reports of a landing there yesterday. I still have no idea of the size or location of the landing. I see not yet seen any clear reports on the subject for today. Was this a raid or a permanent landing?

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): How serious are Russian ground operations? Are they trying to surround and isolate Kharkov? It appears the Ukraine army in this area are putting up a fight. It does appear that most of the videos of captured Russians and destroyed Russian vehicles are coming from there.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: Of course, Russia has recognized these “people’s republics.” They only control half of their provinces. The rest of the provinces under control of Ukraine and defended by the Ukrainian army. I gather their desire is to expand their control and take the rest of both provinces, but these are well defended. Not sure how serious will be their attempts here. So far, we have not heard much from this area.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Maybe, but it is well defended. Not sure this will be a high priority. The mayor is reporting fighting in the area, but I gather none at or near Mariupol.

Afternoon update: There are reports of an amphibious landing of several thousand troops in or near Mariupol.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): It appears that they are fairly serious about their operations in the area north of Crimea. It looks like they entered Kherson yesterday and raised the Russian flag over the administrative building in the middle of the city. So it does appear that Russia controls the area from the Crimea to Kherson. Such an operation complicates the defense of Mariupol.

Afternoon Update: Twitter accounts report over 100 Ukranian vehicles in convoys in this area were destroyed, but that Ukraine has re-occupied the area between Crimea and Kherson. I assume this is because Russia does not have manpower deployed to hold all the areas they have moved through.

Later Update: It looks like Kherson is back under control of Ukraine. This video is worth watching in its entirety: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSCYjnwJtfk

In general, the news is lagging, as it is in the middle of the afternoon there. Will update this post as I find more information. 

The Home Front: There were a number of decent sized protests against the war in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg that I saw videos off. According to reports, Russia arrested more than 1,700 protesters. There are videos on-line of protesters and protesters being arrested.

Casualties:

Russian Losses include:

4 soldiers captured in three separate incidences (video evidence)

1 Su-25 (attack jet) crashed (Russian claim)

1 An-26 (transport plane) crashed, crew killed (Russan claim)

1 Ka-52 (assault helicopter) destroyed (video evidence) 

1 T-80 (tank) destroyed (video evidence)

1 BMP destroyed (video evidence)

450+ casualties (UK estimate) – note probably 25% or less of casualties are killed, so maybe less than 113 killed.

 

Ukrainian Losses include:

137 soldiers killed, including 10 officers (Zelensky)

14 Soldiers surrendered (Russian claim)

25 Civilians killed (U.N. High Commisiooner)

Updates: Ukrainian Su-27 shot down over Kiev (video evidence)

 

Also, there is one video on youtube called “fight between Russian Sukhoi Su35 v Ukrainian Mig29 over Kyiv.” If true, it shows that at least some of Ukrainian air force has survived the initial attack. AhirTech has posted many other interesting videos.

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop, neither who are known to me. I have not taken the time to exhaustively search their material. I am still working on my first cup of coffee this morning. Maybe later.

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – day 1 (ground actions)

Well, I did not think that Russia would actually take a step this far, but they did. I may discuss all the implications of that later. Right now my focus is on what ground actions they are taking. Is this a limited and defined operation or are they looking for large scale occupation of Ukrainian territory? As I see it there are six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
5. Mariupol.
6. Crimean border

 

Here Is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180) There is a column driving down the road from Belarus. Don’t know the size or whether it is Russian or mixed Russian-Belarussian. Needless to say, it is a big step from crossing a border to driving all the way down to the capital city. Taking Kiev is even a bigger challenge. I assume that Ukraine has some forces covering that route. I am guessing any column will get stopped or delayed. Not sure if this is anything more than a feint. I kind of doubt that they are looking at taking Kiev (especially as I gather they only have around 30,000 troops in Belarus).

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826) : I have heard reports that there is a landing there. Have no idea of the size or location of the landing., Again, I wonder if this is anything more than a distraction. Are they really looking at occupying Odessa? Cannot rule out that this is a special operations head-hunting expedition to try to capture/kill some of the people involved in the violence in Odessa in 2013, something that Putin has talked about.  

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): This may be the real objective/prize of this war. It is the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian speaking city in Ukraine. It is part of the former Soviet rust-belt cities (which include Lugansk and Donetsk). It has had a declining population since 1989, although I gather this has now stabilized. I gather it has developed a big IT business though, and almost all of its business is with overseas customers. A Russian occupation would probably destroy a lot of that business. 

Geographically, it is a city in the middle of a large open plain. It changed hands three times in 1943. It was larger (population wise) than Stalingrad, which is why we examined the operations there for our urban warfare studies. I have never been there, but drove by it on the way to Belgorod. I do see lots of pictures of Russian forces near Belgorod and at the border between Belgorod and Kharkov. I have been to Belgorod a couple of times, which is part of the Kursk battlefield. 

So my question is, is Russia going to conduct serious ground operations for the sake of surrounding and isolating Kharkov?

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: Of course, Russia has recognized these “people’s republics.” They only control half of their provinces. The rest of the provinces under control of Ukraine and defended by the Ukrainian army. I gather their desire is to expand their control and take the rest of both provinces, but these are well defended. Not sure how serious will be their attempts here.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Maybe, but it is well defended. Not sure this will be a high priority. In the next reports I saw last night, while there was lots of stuff exploding around Kiev and Kharkov, there was not much happening around Mariupol.

6. Crimea: One of the problems with Crimea is that they get their water from Ukraine. Is Russia going to try to expand their control of the area north of Crimea so as to secure water resources? Maybe. Such an operation also complicates the defense of Mariupol. I have heard that they have crossed the borders there, but I do wonder how serious of an effort they will make.

It is hard to say what Russian final objectives are, but obviously they are going to bomb all major military facilities and airfields. As cities are where many reporters are located this is what is first reported on. But the question for me, it what do they intended to occupy? Are they going to conquer all of Ukraine (I doubt it, it is a very big piece to swallow)? Are they going to just occupy all of Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts? Maybe, but this is a hard fight over terrain of limited economic value? All they going to isolate and then try to take Kharkov? This I think is a distinct possibility and I am looking for any reports of ground operations there with great interest.

While I assume the Ukrainian Army has some defensive capabilities, their biggest problem is that Russia has complete air superiority. 

 

P.S.: Captured around Kharkov: First Prisoners of War as Ukraine Captures Russian Soldiers

P.P.S.: Useful map: Map shows locations of explosions and potential attacks in Ukraine

P.P.P.S: More fighting around Kharkov. This one includes a video of a destroyed Russian tank: Russian Tank Convoy Blown Up in Videos as Ukraine Fights Back Invasion

P.P.P.P.S: Matthew Chance from CNN is at Antonov airbase 15 miles north of Kiev. It looks like Russian airborne and airmobile troops have already taken it. See: Cnn reporter: This shows just how close Russian forces are to Ukraine capital

P.P.P.P.P.S. It does appear that Russia is making a play for Kherson: 

https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/801461.html

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/24/7325476/

 

Analyzing the Effects of Urban Combat on Daily Casualty Rates

Back in 2001 we did our first report on urban warfare. It was followed by three two others. It was the report that forced RAND to completely reverse revise their position on urban war. Report is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/urbanwar.pdf

Our three urban warfare reports are the basis for two chapters in my book War by Numbers. They are Chapter 16: Urban Legends and Chapter 17: The Use of Case Studies. I did brief it in several forums inside of DOD back in the early 2000s. I did consider at one point doing a separate book on urban warfare, but the interest in the subject appeared to be waning and we switched our work to examining insurgencies. I did brief part of Chapter 16 in my presentation at NYMAS (but the podcast has not been posted yet).

Urban warfare now seems to be a major topic once again. There are a number of sites and links that reference many reports, articles and studies on the subject. What is curious is that our original reports nor is my book listed on most of these sites. Our original urban warfare report was significant enough to help answer the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) questions about modeling urban fighting in their simulations and to cause RAND to issue out a revised urban warfare report based upon our report. Yet, it is not significant enough to be listed on these various reference sites. Is it because it does not provide the answer that some people want to see?

We did put the data we used for this analysis in our appendices to these reports. This resulted in one student at the Naval Postgraduate School putting out a report called “Analyzing the Effects of Urban Combat on Daily Casualty Rates.” Basically, he reworked our analysis using the data in the appendices. So he looked at 253 battles, of which 96 occurred in urban areas. The link to that report is here: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a424898.pdf

It was work done by a graduate student named Hakan Yazilitas (First Lieutenant, Turkish Army). It was for his master of science in operations research. According to his abstract:

Hypothesis tests are used to find if the DCR [Daily Casualty Rate] is different in urban operations. A linear regression model is constructed to predict outcomes of similar engagements and to see the effect of each variable. It is conluded that the attacker’s daily casualty rate is, on average, lower in urban operations. Terrain and force ratio are the most effective drivers of the daily casualty rate.

I am thanked in the acknowledgments, although I don’t recall what I did to help.

A few things of note:

  1. The chart on page xvii is cool (track urban vs non-urban losses).
  2. The graph on page 7 is cool (shows daily casualty rates from attacking and defenders from 1600 to present).

Urban Legends

Aachen, October 1944 (source: ww2today.com)

Urban Legends is the title of Chapter 16 of my book War by Numbers. It is one of two chapters in the book that discusses our three urban warfare studies.

Over at the blog site War on the Rocks, there is a new article called: Urban Legend: Is Combat in Cities Really Inevitable?

The article asks:

  1. “First, in what kinds of urban operations will the U.S. military be involved?
  2. “Second, in irregular urban combat what will be the role of U.S. forces?
  3. “Finally, in thinking about deterring and fighting peer adversaries is enough attention being paid to defensive urban operations…”

It then states:

This leads to a larger point. Much of the area in Eastern Europe where U.S. forces could play a key roles in deterring Russian aggression has no large urban centers….Thus, before going all-in on optimizing for urban operations, the U.S. military should take a deep breath for a moment and think carefully about future operations within the context of the National Defense Strategy.

People might also want to look at our original urban warfare report: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/urbanwar.pdf

Our first urban warfare study is dated 11 January 2002 and has been on our website since that time (see: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipubs.htm). To quote from page 78 of this study (bolding not in original):

The primary result of urban terrain…is to reduce advance rates significantly, reduce casualties to some extent and, as a result, to extend the duration of combat….the vast majority of urban terrain encountered will be flanked by non-urban terrain. Operations in these non-urban flanks will potentially advance at a pace two to four times that of the urban operations…This will, of course, result in either the defender withdrawing from the urban terrain, which is what traditionally had occurred, or an assault and eventual mop-up operation by the attacker of the enveloped defenders….

On the other hand, it is possible that one could encounter a situation where the urban terrain could not be bypasses or securely enveloped. The most notable example of such a scenario would be in South Korea, where Seoul, anchored to the west (left flank) by the sea, extends for some 25 kilometers inland and is then flanked east (right) by a substantial mountain range. While this is an important case of US defense planning purposes, it is one of the few hot spots in the world where this situation is found. An examination of an atlas shows few other cities in the world that cannot be bypassed or enveloped.

This discussion, naturally, is repeated in my book War by Numbers, on pages 251-254 in a section called “The Impact of Urban Terrain on Operations.”

Other TDI Data Bases

What we have listed in the previous articles is what we consider the six best databases to use for validation. The Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) was used for a validation effort by CAA (Center for Army Analysis). The Kursk Data Base (KDB) was never used for a validation effort but was used, along with Ardennes, to test Lanchester equations (they failed).

The Use of the Two Campaign Data Bases

The Battle of Britain Data Base to date has not been used for anything that we are aware of. As the program we were supporting was classified, then they may have done some work with it that we are not aware of, but I do not think that is the case.

The Battle of Britain Data Base

Our three battles databases, the division-level data base, the battalion-level data base and the company-level data base, have all be used for validating our own TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model). These efforts have been written up in our newsletters (here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub4.htm) and briefly discussed in Chapter 19 of War by Numbers. These are very good databases to use for validation of a combat model or testing a casualty estimation methodology. We have also used them for a number of other studies (Capture Rate, Urban Warfare, Lighter-Weight Armor, Situational Awareness, Casualty Estimation Methodologies, etc.). They are extremely useful tools analyzing the nature of conflict and how it impacts certain aspects. They are, of course, unique to The Dupuy Institute and for obvious business reasons, we do keep them close hold.

The Division Level Engagement Data Base (DLEDB)

Battalion and Company Level Data Bases

We do have a number of other database that have not been used as much. There is a list of 793 conflicts from 1898-1998 that we have yet to use for anything (the WACCO – Warfare, Armed Conflict and Contingency Operations database). There is the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) of 196 cases from 1904 to 1991, which was used for the Lighter Weight Armor study. There are three databases that are mostly made of cases from the original Land Warfare Data Base (LWDB) that did not fit into our division-level, battalion-level, and company-level data bases. They are the Large Action Data Base (LADB) of 55 cases from 1912-1973, the Small Action Data Base (SADB) of 5 cases and the Battles Data Base (BaDB) of 243 cases from 1600-1900. We have not used these three database for any studies, although the BaDB is used for analysis in War by Numbers.

Finally, there are three databases on insurgencies, interventions and peacekeeping operations that we have developed. This first was the Modern Contingency Operations Data Base (MCODB) that we developed to use for Bosnia estimate that we did for the Joint Staff in 1995. This is discussed in Appendix II of America’s Modern Wars. It then morphed into the Small Scale Contingency Operations (SSCO) database which we used for the Lighter Weight Army study. We then did the Iraq Casualty Estimate in 2004 and significant part of the SSCO database was then used to create the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets (MISS). This is all discussed in some depth in my book America’s Modern Wars.

None of these, except the Campaign Data Base and the Battles Data Base (1600-1900), are good for use in a model validation effort. The use of the Campaign Data Base should be supplementary to validation by another database, much like we used it in the Lighter Weight Armor study.

Now, there have been three other major historical validation efforts done that we were not involved in. I will discuss their supporting data on my next post on this subject.

TDI Friday Read: Measuring The Effects of Combat in Cities

Between 2001 and 2004, TDI undertook a series of studies on the effects of urban combat in cities for the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA). These studies examined a total of 304 cases of urban combat at the divisional and battalion level that occurred between 1942 and 2003, as well as 319 cases of concurrent non-urban combat for comparison.

The primary findings of Phases I-III of the study were:

  • Urban terrain had no significantly measurable influence on the outcome of battle.
  • Attacker casualties in the urban engagements were less than in the non-urban engagements and the casualty exchange ratio favored the attacker as well.
  • One of the primary effects of urban terrain is that it slowed opposed advance rates. The average advance rate in urban combat was one-half to one-third that of non-urban combat.
  • There is little evidence that combat operations in urban terrain resulted in a higher linear density of troops.
  • Armor losses in urban terrain were the same as, or lower than armor losses in non-urban terrain. In some cases it appears that armor losses were significantly lower in urban than non-urban terrain.
  • Urban terrain did not significantly influence the force ratio required to achieve success or effectively conduct combat operations.
  • Overall, it appears that urban terrain was no more stressful a combat environment during actual combat operations than was non-urban terrain.
  • Overall, the expenditure of ammunition in urban operations was not greater than that in non-urban operations. There is no evidence that the expenditure of other consumable items (rations; water; or fuel, oil, or lubricants) was significantly different in urban as opposed to non-urban combat.
  • Since it was found that advance rates in urban combat were significantly reduced, then it is obvious that these two effects (advance rates and time) were interrelated. It does appear that the primary impact of urban combat was to slow the tempo of operations.

In order to broaden and deepen understanding of the effects of urban combat, TDI proposed several follow-up studies. To date, none of these have been funded:

  1. Conduct a detailed study of the Battle of Stalingrad. Stalingrad may also represent one of the most intense examples of urban combat, so may provide some clues to the causes of the urban outliers.
  2. Conduct a detailed study of battalion/brigade-level urban combat. This would begin with an analysis of battalion-level actions from the first two phases of this study (European Theater of Operations and Eastern Front), added to the battalion-level actions completed in this third phase of the study. Additional battalion-level engagements would be added as needed.
  3. Conduct a detailed study of the outliers in an attempt to discover the causes for the atypical nature of these urban battles.
  4. Conduct a detailed study of urban warfare in an unconventional warfare setting.

Details of the Phase I-III study reports and conclusions can be found below:

Measuring The Effects Of Combat In Cities, Phase I

Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase II – part 1

Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase II – part 2

Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase III – part 1

Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase III – part 2

Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase III – part 2.1

Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase III – part 3

Urban Phase IV – Stalingrad

Urban Combat in War by Numbers