Category Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming

TMCI is officially closing this year

The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) is officially closing this year. The TMCI webpage is here: http://militaryconflict.org/. The website had not been updated since 2014.

TMCI was founded in 1979 by Dr. Donald S. Marshall and Trevor Dupuy. They were concerned by the inability of existing Defense Department combat models to produce results that were consistent or rooted in historical experience. The organization was a non-profit, interdisciplinary, informal group that avoided government affiliation in order to maintain an independent perspective and voice. It’s object was to advance public understanding or organized warfare in all its aspects. Most of the initial members were drawn from the ranks of operations analyst experienced in quantitative historical study and military operations research.

The organization conducted over 60 general meetings over its 41 years of existence, usually hosting two meetings a year. I gather in the early years, some of its meetings had over a hundred attendees, but in recent times it was a core group of around 20. There were also attempts to get funding from DOD to support it, which never occurred.

The TMCI eventually ended up being run by Roger Mickelson. During this stage, it actually wrote and published three books: 1) Anatomy of a Combat Model published in 1995, 2) A Concise Theory of Combat published in 1997, and 3) A Philosophy of War published in 2013.

The Anatomy of a Combat Model was written by Lawrence J. Low and is available from the TMCI site at http://militaryconflict.org/Anatomy%20of%20a%20Combat%20Model_1.pdf  I am not sure it will continue to be available through this website. It does not appear to be posted elsewhere.

A Concise Theory of Combat was written by Edmund L. Dubois, Wayne P. Hughes Jr., and Lawrence J. Low. Link to it is here: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/40235431-a-concise-theory-of-combat and I gather can be downloaded from here: https://www.scribd.com/doc/47751814/A-Concise-Theory-of-Combat and here: https://core.ac.uk/display/36731683 . I cannot vouch for the validity of either of these sites.

I cannot find a link to A Philosophy of War. I have my hard copy but cannot find where it can be obtained on line. It is not on Amazon.

Roger Mickelson was killed in 2016 in a car accident and while TMCI continued, it seemed to have lost focus. Some of the people involved in it, Wayne Hughes and Chuck Hawkins, also recently passed away.

TMCI never really accomplished what it hoped to do. Partly because it never got funding and nor had a staff. As such, there was little work done between meetings and everything was volunteer only. You get what you pay for with volunteer work. If the DOD feels that there is a need for independent analysis of combat and the development of a theory of combat, then they probably need to fund such an effort. So far, they have not.

A few related posts:

The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) Will Meet in October

Three Presentations

The Elements of Trevor Dupuy’s Theory of Combat

World War IV

Roger Mickelson (Col, USA): “Final Change of Command”

So, Who’s Your Favorite Admiral?

Charles Hawkins passed away

Published Obituary for Charles Hawkins

John Honig passed away

John Honig passed away

John Honig passed away on 30 January 2020 at the age of 96. He was one of the regular attendees of The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) in addition to being one of the founding members of the Military Operations Research Society (MORS)

His obituary is definitely worth a read. He was born in Austria in 1923:  https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/washingtonpost/obituary.aspx?fhid=10909&n=john-honig&pid=195250345

His has donated papers to the Holocaust Museum: https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn692234

John Honig interview: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/45464588.pdf

 

Time and the TNDM

[The article below is reprinted from December 1996 edition of The International TNDM Newsletter. It was referenced in the recent series of posts addressing the battalion-level validation of Trevor Dupuy’s Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM).]

Time and the TNDM
by Christopher A. Lawrence

Combat models are designed to operate within their design parameters, but sometimes we forget what those are. A model can only be expected to perform well in those areas for which it was designed in and those areas where it has been tested (meaning validated). Since most of the combat models used in the US Department of Defense have not been validated, this leaves open the question as to what their parameters might be. In the cue of the TNDM, if the model is not giving a reasonable result, then you must ask, is it because the model is being operated outside of its parameters? The parameters of the model are pretty well defined by the 149 engagements of the QJM Database to which it was validated.

One of the areas where there is a problem with the TNDM is that while the analyst is capable of running a battle over any time period, the model was fundamentally validated to run 1 to 3 days engagements. This means that there should be a reduced confidence in the results of any engagement of less than 24 hours or over three days. The actual number of days used for each engagement in the original QJM data base is shown below:

By comparison, the 75 battalion level engagements that we are using to validate the TNDM for battalion-level engagements occur over the following time periods:

Three of the engagements used in the battalion-level validation are from the QJM database.

We did run sample engagements of 24 hours, 12 hours, 6 hours and 3 hours. The results of the 12-hour run was literally 1/2 the casualties and 1/2 of the advance for the 24-hour run. The same straight dividing effect was true for the 3- and 6-hour runs. For increments less than 24 hours the model just divided the results by the number of hours. As Dave Bongard pointed out to me, there are various lighting choices, including daylight and night, and these could vary the results some if used. But the impact for daylight would be 1.1 additional casualties and the reduction for night is .7 or .8.

The problem is that briefer battles will result in higher casualties per hour than extended battles. Also, in any extended battle, there are intense periods and un-intense periods, with the model giving the average result of those periods. For battles of less than 24 hours, there tends to be only intense periods. Therefore, it should be expected that battles lasting 3 hours should have more than 1/6 the losses of a 24 hours battle. This will be tested during the battalion-level validation.

For battles in excess of one day, there is a table in the TNDM that reduces the overall casualties and advance rate over time to account for fatigue.

How Attrition is Calculated in the QJM vs the TNDM

French soldiers on the attack, during the First World War. [Wikipedia]

[The article below is reprinted from December 1996 edition of The International TNDM Newsletter. It was referenced in the recent series of posts addressing the battalion-level validation of Trevor Dupuy’s Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM).]

How Attrition is Calculated in the QJM vs the TNDM
by Christopher A. Lawrence

There are two different attrition calculations in the Quantified Judgement Model (QJM), one for post-1900 battles and one for pre-1900 battles. For post-1900 battles, the QJM methodology detailed in Trevor Dupuy’s Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Indianapolis; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979) was basically:

(Standard rate in percent*) x (factor based on force size) x (factor based upon mission) x (opposition factor based on force ratios) x (day/night) x (special conditions**) = percent losses.

* Different for attacker (2.8%) and defender (1.5%)
** WWI and certain forces in WWII and Korea

For the attacker the highest this percent can be in one day is 13.44% not counting the special conditions, and the highest it can be for the defender is 5.76%.

The current Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM) methodology is:

(Standard personnel loss factor*) x (number of people) x (factor based upon posture/mission) x (combat effectiveness value (CEV) of opponent. up to 1.5) x (factor for surprise) x (opposition factor based on force ratios) x (factor based on force size) x (factor based on terrain) x (factor based upon weather) x (factor based upon season) x (factor based upon rate of advance) x (factor based upon amphibious and river crossings) x (day/night) x (factor based upon daily fatigue) = Number of casualties

* Different for attacker (.04) and defender (.06)

The special conditions mentioned in Numbers, Predictions, and War are not accounted for here, although it is possible to insert them, if required.

All these tables have been revised and refined from Numbers, Predictions, and War.

In Numbers, Predictions and War, the highest multiplier for size was 2.0, and this was for forces of less than 5,000 men. From 5,000 to 10,000 is 1.5 and from 10,000 to 20,000 is 1.0. This formulation certainly fit the data to which the model was validated.

The TNDM has the following table for values below 15,000 men (which is 1.0):

The highest percent losses the attacker can suffer in a force of greater than 15,000 men in one day is “over” 100%. If one leaves out three large multipliers for special conditions—surprise, amphibious assault, and CEV—then the maximum percent losses is 18%. The multiplier for complete surprise is 2.5 (although this degraded by historical period), 2.00 for amphibious attack across a beach, and 1.5 for enemy having a noticeable superior CEVs In the case of the defender, leaving out these three factors, the maximum percent casualties is 21.6% a day.

This means at force strengths of less than 2,000 it would be possible for units to suffer 100% losses without adding in conditions like surprise.

The following TNDM tables have been modified from the originals in Numbers, Predictions, and War to include a casualty factor, among other updates (numbers in quotes refer to tables in the TNDM, the others refer to tables in Numbers, Predictions, and War):

Table 1/”2”: Terrain Factors
Table 2/“3″: Weather Factors
Table 3/“4″: Season Factors
Table 5/”6″: Posture Factors
Table 6/“9″: Shoreline Vulnerability
Table 9/”11″: Surprise

The following tables have also been modified from the original QJM as outlined in Numbers, Predictions, and War:

Table “1”: OLl’s
Table “13”: Advance Rates
Table “16”: Opposition Factor
Table “17”: Strength/Size Attrition Factors
Table “20”: Maximum Depth Factor

The following tables have remained the same:

Table 4/“5”: Effects of Air Superiority
Table 7/“12”: Morale Factors
Table 8/“19”: Mission Accomplishment
Table “14″: Road Quality Factors
Table “15”: River or Stream Factor

The following new tables have been added:

Table “7”: Qualitative Significance of Quantity
Table “8”: Weapons Sophistication
Table “10”: Fatigue Factors
Table “18”: Velocity Factor
Table “20”: Maximum Depth Factor

The following tables has been deleted and the effect subsumed into another table:

unnumbered: Mission Factor
unnumbered: Minefield Factors

As far as I can tell, Table “20”: Maximum Depth Factor has a very limited impact on the model outcomes. Table “1”: OLIs, has no impact on model outcomes

I have developed a bad habit, if I want to understand or know something about the TNDM, to grab my copy of Numbers, Predictions, and War for reference. As shown by these attrition calculations, the TNDM has developed enough from its original form that the book is no longer a good description of it. The TNDM has added in an additional level of sophistication that was not in the QJM.

The TNDM does not have any procedure for calculating combat from before 1900. In fact, the TNDM is not intended to be used in its current form for any combat before WWII.

Summation of Human Factors and Force Ratio posts

The following five posts make up our discussion of the impact of Human Factors on Force Ratios.

Force Ratios at Kharkov and Kursk, 1943

Force Ratios in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956-1973)

Measuring Human Factors based upon Casualty Effectiveness

Measuring Human Factors based on Casualty Effectiveness in Italy 1943-1944

The Performance of Armies in Italy, 1943-44

As a result of a comment by Tom from Cornwall, we ended up adding three posts to this discussion that looked at terrain and amphibious operations and river crossings in Italy:

German attacks in Italy by Terrain (1943-44)

Amphibious and River Crossing attacks in Italy 1943-44

Amphibious and River Crossing Engagements in the Italian Campaign 1943-44

The previous posts on this discussion on force ratios are presented here. These were the posts examining the erroneous interpretation of the three-to-one rule as presented in Army FM 6-0 and other publications:

Summation of Force Ratio Posts

We are going to end this discussion for now. There is some additional data from the European Theater of Operations (ETO) and Ardennes that we have assembled, but it presents a confusing picture. This is discussed in depth in War by Numbers (pages 32-48).

I am assembling these discussions on force ratios and terrain into the opening chapters for a follow-on book to War by Numbers.

The Performance of Armies in Italy, 1943-44

 

Polish Sherman III after battle on Gothic Line, Italy, September 1944

Having looked at casualty exchanges from my book War by Numbers and in the previous post, it is clear that there are notable differences between the German and Soviet armies, and between the Israeli and Arab armies. These differences show up in the force ratio tables, in the percent of wins, and in the casualty exchange ratios. As shown above, there is also a difference between the German and the U.S. and UK armies in Italy 1943-44, but this difference is no where to the same degree. These differences show up in the casualty exchange ratios. They also will show up in the force ratio comparisons that follow.

The Italian Campaign is an untapped goldmine for research into human factors. In addition to German, American and British armies, there were Brazilian, Canadian, French, French Algerian, French Moroccan, Greek, Indian, Italian, New Zealander, Polish, and South African forces there, among others like the Jewish brigade. There was also an African-American Division and a Japanese-American battalion and regiment actively engaged in this theater. Also the German records are much better than they were in the second half of 1944. So, the primary source data these engagements are built from are better than the engagements from the ETO.

We have 137 engagements from the Italian Campaign. There are 136 from 9 September to 4 June 1944 and one from13-17 September 1944. Of those, 70 consisted of the Americans attacking, 49 consisted of armed forces of the United Kingdom in the offense, and 18 consisted of the Germans attacks, often limited and local counterattacks (eight attacks against the United States and ten attacks against the UK). So, let us compare these based upon force ratios.

American Army attacking the German Army, Italy 1943-44

(70 cases in the complete data set, 62 cases in the culled data set)

 

Force Ratio……………Percent Attacker Wins………………..Number of Cases

1.22 to 1.49……………………….42%………………………………………..26

    Culled…………………………………48…………………………………………21[1]

1.50 to 1.95………………………..43………………………………………….30

    Culled…………………………………48…………………………………………27[2]

2.02 to 2.23………………………100…………………………………………..4

2.58 to 2.96………………………..71…………………………………………..7

3.04…………………………………100…………………………………………..1

Gap in data

4.11 to 4.25………………………100……………………………………………2

 

There were seven cases of engagements coded as “limited attacks” and one case of “other”. These eight cases are excluded in the table above on those lines in italics.

Needless to say, this is a fairly good performance by the American Army, with them winning more than 40% the attacks below two-to-one and pretty winning most of them (86%) at odds above two-to-one.

 

British Army attacking the German Army, Italy 1943-44

(49 cases in the complete data set, 39 cases in the culled data set)

 

Force Ratio………………..Percent Attacker Wins………………..Number of Cases

0.85………………………………….0%……………………………………………….1

1.17 to 1.41………………………60…………………………………………………5

1.50 to 1.69………………………33…………………………………………………3

2.01 to 2.49………………………50……………………………………………….12

    Culled………………………………..86…………………………………………………7[3]

2.77……………………………….100………………………………………………….1

3.18 to 3.49………………………30………………………………………………..10

    Culled……………………………….43…………………………………………………7[4]

3.50 to 3.73……………………..80…………………………………………………..5

4.23 to 4.99……………………..42…………………………………………………12

    Culled………………………………50…………………………………………………10[5]

 

There were five cases of limited action and five cases of limited attack. These ten cases are excluded in the table above on those lines in italics.

This again shows the difference in performance between the American Army and the British Army. This is always an uncomfortable comparison, as this author is somewhat of an anglophile with a grandfather from Liverpool; but data is data. In this case they won 44% of the time at attacks below two-to-one, which is similar to what the U.S. Army did. But then, they only won only 63% of the time at odds above two-to-one (using the culled data set). This could just be statistical anomaly as we are only looking at 30 cases, but is does support the results we are seeing from the casualty data.

What is interesting is the mix of attacks. For the American Army 77% of the attacks were at odds below two-to-one, for the British Army only 23% of the attacks were at odds below two-to-one (using the culled data sets). While these 99 cases do not include every engagement in the Italian Campaign at that time, they include many of the major and significant ones. They are probably a good representation. This does probably reflect a little reality here, in that the British tended to be more conservative on the attack then the Americans. This is also demonstrated by the British lower average loss per engagement.[7]

The reverse, which is when the Germans are attacking, does not provide a clear picture.

German Army attacking the American and British Army, Italy 1943-44 – complete data set (18 cases)

Force Ratio…………………..Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.72 to 0.84………………………….0%………………………………………………7

1.17 to 1.48………………………..50…………………………………………………6

1.89…………………………………….0…………………………………………………1

2.16 to 2.20………………………..50…………………………………………………2

Gap in data

3.12 to 3.24………………………..50…………………………………………………2

 

The Germans only win in 28% of the cases here. They win in 13% of the engagements versus the U.S. (8 cases) and 40% of the engagements the UK (10 cases). Still, at low odds attacks (1.17 to 1.48-to-1) they are winning 50% of the time. They are conducting 78% of their attacks at odds below two-to-one.

In the end, the analysis here is limited by the number of cases. It is hard to draw any definitive conclusions from only 18 cases of attacks. Clearly the analysis would benefit with a more exhaustive collection of engagements from the Italian Campaign. This would require a significant investment of time (and money).[8]

Regiment de Trois-Rivieres tanks entering the ruins of Regabuto, August 4th, 1943. Source: http://www.sfu.ca/tracesofthepast/wwii_html/it.htm

————————–

[1] There were four limited attacks that resulted in three defender wins and a draw. There was one “other” that was an attacker win.

[2] There three limited attacks that resulted in two defender wins and a draw.

[3] There were four “limited actions” that were defender wins and one “limited attack” that was a defender win.

[4] There as one “limited action” that was a defender win and two “limited attacks” that were defender wins.

[5] There were two “limited attacks” that were defender wins.

[6] The author’s grandfather was born in Liverpool and raised in Liverpool, England and Ryls, Wales. He served in the British merchant marine during World War I and afterwards was part of the British intervention at Murmansk Russia in 1918-1919. See the blog post:

Murmansk

[7] See War by Numbers, pages 25-27. The data shows that for the Americans in those 36 cases where their attack was successful they suffered an average of 353 casualties per engagement. For the 34 American attacks that were not successful they suffered an average of 351 casualties per engagement. For the UK, in the 23 cases where their attack was successful, the UK suffered an average of 213 casualties per engagement. Of the 26 cases where the UK attacks were not successful, they suffered an average of 137 casualties per engagement.

[8] Curt Johnson, the vice-president of HERO, estimated that it took an average of three man-days to create an engagement. He was involved in developing the original database that included about half of the 137 Italian Campaign engagements. My estimation parameter, including the primary source research required to conduct this is more like six days. Regardless, this would mean that just to create this 137 case database took an estimated 411 to 822 man-days, or 1.6 to 3.3 man-years of effort. Therefore, to expand this data set to a more useful number of engagements is going to take several years of effort.

Amphibious and River Crossing Engagements in the Italian Campaign 1943-44

Now, there were a few amphibious operations and major river crossing operations during the Italian Campaign. These are significant enough that we should examine them separately. Among the 141 Italian Campaign engagements there are three amphibious operations and 16 river crossing operations. These are outlined in our previous post:

Amphibious and River Crossing attacks in Italy 1943-44

This is a small number of cases, but does seem to show that the defender has an advantage when defending against amphibious assaults and river crossings. To compare them to the rest of the engagements:

 

Amphibious Operations Comparison – Italian Campaign 1943-44:

………………………………………………………………..Average..Average

……………………………………………………Percent…Percent…Attacker..Defender

………………………………….……..Cases….Wins…….Advance..Losses…Losses

U.S./UK Attacking – Amphibious…..3……….100………..100………..417……….105

UK Attacking – other RM…………….10………..40………….67…………382………152

U.S. Attacking – other RM…………..20………..65………….80…………341………430

 

………………………………………….……………Force….Exchange

………………………………….……..Cases…….Ratio…..Ratio

U.S./UK Attacking – Amphibious…..3……………3.45…….3.98-to-1

UK Attacking – other RM…………….10…………..1.94…….2.51-to-1

U.S. Attacking – other RM…………..20…………..1.69…….0.79-to-1

 

River Crossings Comparison – Italian Campaign 1943-44:

………………………………………………………………..Average..Average

……………………………………………………Percent…Percent…Attacker..Defender

………………………………….……..Cases….Wins…….Advance..Losses…Losses

UK Attacking – River Crossing……8………….63………….67………..169………154

UK Attacking – other FM…………….6………….50………….67………..306………284

U.S. Attacking – River Crossing…..6…………67………….67…………388……..112

U.S. Attacking – Other RM………..17…………59………….76…………374……..477

German Attacking – River Crossing..2……….50………..100…………955………507

German Attacking – Other FM………5………..40………….40…………756………805

 

………………………………………….……………Force….Exchange

………………………………….……..Cases…….Ratio…..Ratio

UK Attacking – River Crossing……8……………2.20…….1.10-to-1

UK Attacking – other FM…………….6……………1.71…….1.08-to-1

U.S. Attacking – River Crossing…..6…………..1.47…….3.47-to-1

U.S. Attacking – Other RM………..17…………..1.72…….0.78-to-1

German Attacking – River Crossing..2…………1.96…….1.88-to-1

German Attacking – Other FM………5…………1.39……..0.94-to-1

 

Now this is a very small number of cases for comparison, and just for balance I tried to match it across similar terrain types.[1] Still, even with this very limited data, there appears to be a clear pattern. In every case the exchange ratio more favors the defender. In the case of amphibious operations, this either 2.51-to-1 or 0.79-to-1 compared to 3.98-to-1 for amphibious operations. For river crossings this is 1.08-to-1 compared to 1.10-to-1 for UK river crossings, 0.78-to-1 compared to 3.47-to-1 for U.S. river crossings (or 0.78-to-1 compared to 0.82-to-1 if the two Rapido River engagements are left out), and 0.94-to-1 compared to 1.88-to-1 for German river crossings. Obviously a whole lot more cases would need to be examined to establish anything with certainty, but there are not a lot of amphibious operations over river crossings coded in the ETO or Kursk/Kharkov sections of the database. It would require a significant research effort to assemble such data.

Of course, what this really all points to is that the data needs to be more tightly prescribed and a whole lot more cases need to be assembled.

 

 

———

[1] In the case of U.S./UK Attacking – Amphibious, one engagement was done by the U.S. and the other two by the UK. In the case of UK Attacking – River Crossing there were 7 cases in flat mixed terrain and 1 case of rolling mixed terrain. In the case of U.S. Attacking – River Crossing there were 3 cases of rolling mixed terrain, one case of Rugged Mixed, and two cases codes as FB/M, meaning the terrain varied from flat bare to flat mixed. In the case of German Attacking – River Crossing, both engagements were in flat mixed terrain but one was against the U.S. and the other was against the UK. In the case of German Attacking – Other FM two engagements were against the U.S. and three were against the UK.

 

Measuring Human Factors based on Casualty Effectiveness in Italy 1943-1944

Then there is our analysis from the 137 engagements from the Italian Campaign. This was new analysis using the entire current version of the database.

………………………………………………………..Average………Average

Italian Campaign Data……………………………Force Ratio….Loss Ratio

All U.S. Attacks (70 cases)………………………..1.80-to-1………2.41-to-1

U.S. Low-odds Attacks (13 cases)……………….1.35-to-1………3.95-to-1

….1.20- to 1.50-to-1

All UK Attacks (49 cases)…………………………3.00-to-1……….3.17-to-1

UK Low-odds Attacks (7 cases)………………….1.29-to-1……….2.20-to-1

….0.85- to 1.50-to-1

All German Attacks (18 cases)………………….1.44-to-1……….1.14-to-1

German Low-odds Attacks (13 cases)…………1.02-to-1……….0.92-to-1

….0.72- to 1.48-to-1

 

In this case, when the U.S. was the attacker, they lost more than two men for every one the defending Germans lost. The UK lost about three men in the attack for every German loss. When the Germans attacked they lost about one for one. This was true even though the average force ratio of the U.S. and UK were higher than the German attacks.

The low odds attack data just reinforces this impression. When the Americans attack, they loose four men for every defending German lost. The UK low odds attacks are little better in that they loose two men for every defending German lost. When the Germans attacked at low odds, they lost fewer than one for one (from War by Numbers, pages 42-43).

………………………………………………………..Total…………….Total

Italian Campaign Data…………………………..Force Ratio…..Loss Ratio

All U.S. Attacks (70 cases)………………………1.65-to-1………..1.06-to-1

U.S. Low-odds Attacks (13 cases)……………..1.36-to-1………..1.43-to-1

…..1.20- to 1.50-to-1

All UK Attacks (49 cases)…………………………2.58-to-1………1.63-to-1

UK Low-odds Attacks (7 cases)………………….1.24-to-1………1.92-to-1

….0.85- to 1.50-to-1

All German Attacks (18 cases)…………………..1.27-to-1………0.84-to-1

German Low-odds Attacks (13 cases)………….1.03-to-1………0.63-to-1

….0.72- to 1.48-to-1

 

The Italian data, based upon weighted averages, show a different picture. Most significant is the casualty effectiveness of the U.S. attacks. The shift in the loss ratio from 2.41-to-1 down to 1.06-to-1 is caused a number of smaller engagements having very lopsided exchange ratios. For example the casualty ratios for one of the Rapido River operations were 48.12 to 1. These engagements clearly skewed the statistics. In fact, there is only one other engagement which has a casualty exchange ratio greater than 10.

Using these weighted statistics, if it harder to discern any difference in casualty effectiveness between the U.S. and the Germans. The U.S. had a 1.06-to-1 loss ratio when they attacked (average force ratio of 1.65-to-1), while the Germans had a 0.84-to-1 loss ratio with lower average odds (1.27-to-1). This supports the contention that combat effectiveness favored the Germans by 20 to 30 percent. These figures show the British slightly worse than the U.S., with a casualty effectiveness ratio some 50% worse than the U.S. (from War by Numbers, pages 44-45).

Measuring Human Factors based upon Casualty Effectiveness

This issue was addressed in multiple chapters of my book War by Numbers, so we will just present a few tables related to casualty effectiveness drawn from that book. They are simple comparisons of the average force ratios for attacks compared to the average loss ratios for these attacks. First, table compares the Soviet Union versus the German Army.

……………………………………………………….Average…………..Average

……………………………………………………….Force Ratio………Loss Ratio

All Soviet Attacks (18 cases)……………………..1.42-to-1…………..5.63-to-1

Soviet Low-odds Attacks (12 cases)…………….1.00-to-1…………..4.83-to-1

…..0.51- to 1.34-to-1

All German Attacks (31 cases)…………………..1.66-to-1………….0.30-to-1

German Low-odds Attacks (21 cases)…………..0.93-to-1………….0.41-to-1

….0.63- to 1.42-to-1

 

This shows a very significant casualty effectiveness advantage on the part of the Germans. When the Soviets attacked, they lost an average of 5.63 men for every German lost. When the Germans attacked, the lost .30 men for every man the Soviets lost, or inflicted 3.33 casualties for every 1 they lost. The difference between the effectiveness of the Germans when attacking versus defending is probably explained by the advantages of defense, terrain, etc. When the “odds are even,” which is roughly approximated by the low odds attacks, the Soviets attacked at an average odds of 1-to-1, yet lost almost five men for every one the Germans lost. The Germans attacks at less than 1-to-1, and caused almost 2.5 losses per one of their own (from War by Numbers, page 42)

Now these calculations were based on taking an average of the force ratios and the loss ratios (killed, wounded and missing). One can also sum up the total force ratios for all these attacks and compare them to the total losses for all these attacks. In the table below, the force ratio is the sum of the strength of all the cases, compared to the sum of the strength of the opposing forces, while the losses are the total losses for each side, compared to the losses on the opposing side.

………………………………………………………Total……………Total

Kursk Campaign Data…………………………..Force Ratio……Loss Ratio

All Soviet Attacks (18 cases)……………………..1.43-to-1………6.04-to-1

Soviet Low-odds Attacks (12 cases)…………….1.02-to-1………3.92-to-1

….0.51- to 1.34-to-1

All German Attacks (31 cases)………………….1.34-to-1……….0.30-to-1

German Low-odds Attacks (21 cases)…………0.99-to-1……….0.27-to-1

…..0.63- to 1.42-to-1

 

Notice that using the “weighted averages” did not change the numbers much. These figures still support the contention that there is a casualty effectiveness difference between the Germans and the Soviet of around 4 to 1 (from War by Numbers, page 44).

The 51 division-level engagements from the Arab-Israeli fighting show the following relationship:

………………………………………………………..Average………..Average

………………………………………………………..Force Ratio……Loss Ratio

All Israeli Attacks (33 cases)………………………1.29-to-1……….0.46-to-1

Israeli Low-odds Attacks (26 cases)……………..0.92-to-1……….0.43-to-1

….0.54- to 1.47-to-1

All Arab Attacks (18 cases)………………………..4.09-to-1………3.65-to-1

Arab Low-odds Attacks (2 cases)…………………0.96-to-1………4.91-to-1

….0.87- to 1.09-to-1

……………………………………………………….Total…………….Total

……………………………………………………….Force Ratio……Loss Ratio

All Israeli Attacks (33 cases)……………………..1.04-to-1……….0.31-to-1

Israeli Low-odds Attacks (26 cases)……………..0.89-to-1………0.28-to-1

….0.54 to 1.47 to 1

All Arab Attacks (18 cases)……………………….3.02-to-1………2.81-to-1

Arab Low-odds Attacks (2 cases)………………..0.95-to-1………3.87-to-1

….0.87 to 1.47 to 1

 

Now, there are probably performance differences between the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi and Palestinian forces, but for the sake of simplicity, all the Arab armies were lumped together. All the Arab attacks, with the exception of Mitla Pass in 1967, are from the 1973 war.

This fighting has the advantage that technologically there was not much difference between the opposing forces. The units were well armed and both sides had considerable armor. The Israeli’s had air superiority although in 1973, the Egyptians had very good air defense. It would appear that the major difference between the two armies was combat effectiveness.

One cannot help but note that the relative combat performance of the Israeli and the Arabs in 1956-1973 was similar in disparity to that between the Germans and the Soviets in 1943. This is not to say that the Germans and the Israelis performed at similar levels, as the only thing we are measuring is the relative combat performance between the two opposing forces. The German army in 1943 could have been superior to the Israeli Army of 1956-1973 and this would have meant that the Soviet Army in 1943 was also superior to the Arab armies in 1956-1973. We do not know if this is the case.

Trevor Dupuy’s analysis, using his model structure, but much of the same data, came to the conclusion that:

“The average Israeli combat effectiveness value (CEV) with respect to the Egyptians in 1967 was found to be 1.75; in other words, a combat effectiveness superiority of almost two-to-one. Following an identical procedure for the 1973 war, the average Israeli CEV with respect to the Egyptians for that war was 1.98…”[1]

As Trevor Dupuy’s combat effectiveness value is a force multiplier in his model of the combat power, then it is not directly comparable to exchange ratios, although it is related. In general, a force multiplier of two in his models will produce a casualty exchange rate of greater than two.[2] For all practical purposes, we are showing the same effect and the same results at roughly the same values.

Still these are forces that are at least competent or motivated enough to engage each other in a back-and-forth conventional engagement. There are many examples of truly one-sided results, like the 1991 Gulf War, and this seems to be typical of lots of operations of the post-World War II world (from War by Numbers, pages 50-51).

[1] Colonel T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (HERO Books, Fairfax, VA., 1984), page 598.

[2] See the discussion in Chapter 16, “A New Square Law” in Col. T. N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1987), pages 221-235.

Force Ratios in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956-1973)

An Egyptian Su-100 in Suez City, 1973

We see a similar disparity in results between the Israeli Army and the various Arab armies they engaged. The Arab armies include Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi. To simplify we have just lumped the engagements involving these four armies together, although we are certain that there differences between these various armies. The data includes two engagements from 1956, 16 from 1967, one from 1968 and 32 from 1973 for a total of 51 division-level engagements. None of the engagements were coded as “limited action” or “limited attack.”

This database of only 51 engagements has 33 Israeli attacks and 18 attacks by Arab armies. It produces similar lop-sided results:

Israeli Army attacking the Arab armies (33 cases)

Force Ratio………………….Percent Attacker Wins ………………..Number of Cases

0.54 to 0.97………………………81%……………………………………………..16

1.00 to 1.47………………………90………………………………………………..10

1.51 to 1.99…………………….100………………………………………………….2

2.04 to 2.17…………………….100………………………………………………….2

2.90……………………………….100………………………………………………….1

Gap in data

3.50 to 3.96………………………..0………………………………………………….1

4.11 to 5.87………………………..0………………………………………………….1

 

As can be seen, the Israeli’s are wining 81% of the time that they attack at odds of less the one-to-one. Out of the 33 engagements where they are the attackers, they lose four and draw two. They are winning 82% of the time. Most of their attacks (79% of them) are at low odds, between 0.54- to 1.47-to-one. They win these attacks 80% to 90% of the time. They have two defeats at high odds, but in both cases, they advanced during the battle. At Jebel Libni in June 1967 they attacked at 3.60-to-one odds and advanced five kilometers. The engagement is coded as a draw because the Egyptian forces were able to successfully withdraw, as they were intending, while the Israeli forces had to rest and regroup. Both sides claimed victory. At Abu Ageila in October 1956, thee Israelis attacked at 4.57 odds and advanced 15 kilometers. This three-day engagement was coded as a defeat because the Israeli mission was to advance to Port Suez to support the Anglo-French operations there, and they were effective delayed by the Egyptians. The outcome of the engagement was coded as “attack advances” even though is a defender victory based upon the mission accomplishment scoring. The data in these tables could change slightly depending on how one chooses to code or interpret the outcome of the engagements.

When the Arab armies attacked, the results were very different.

Arab armies attacking the Israeli Army (18 cases)

Force Ratio…………………….Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.87……………………………………..0%………………………………………………..1

1.05……………………………………..0…………………………………………………..1

1.75 to 1.80…………………………..0…………………………………………………..2

2.22 to 2.25…………………………..0…………………………………………………..2

Gap in data

3.03 to 3.49…………………………..0…………………………………………………..2

3.50 to 3.96…………………………33…………………………………………………..3

4.11 to 5.87…………………………50…………………………………………………..4

6.06………………………………….100…………………………………………………..1

8.12 to 12.18……………………..100…………………………………………………..2

 

One notes that the Arab armies lose all engagements below 3.94-to-1. This is some ten of the 18 engagements. Overall, they win only one-third of the time (six engagements out of 18). All victories are at roughly four-to-one odds or higher and even then they win 71% of time. This cannot more sharply demonstrate the performance differences between some armies. This was also examined in my previous book, primarily looking at casualty exchange ratios.

Finally, there is a 1991 Gulf War, where the differences in the performance between the two armies were far greater than either the German army versus the Soviet Union in 1943, or the Israeli Army versus the various Arab armies. We have 11 engagements from the odds of 0.64- to 3.26-to-one. The U.S., UK and French win them all. We have four Iraq attacks from odds of 0.21- to 3.00-to-1. All the Iraqi attacks fail. The Gulf War is a very unusual case.

An Israeli M4A3 Sherman near Suez, 1973