Category World War II

The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992

Released as of 20 July, 2022 is a new book from Richard W. Harrison, The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992. It is available from Amazon here: The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace, 1941–1992: Harrison, Richard W: 9781952715105: Amazon.com: Books

Richard Harrison will be presenting at the Historical Analysis Annual Conference on 29 September. See: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 9 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

 

Economist Article on Russian Casualty Estimates

Sunday evening (probably Monday UK time) The Economist published an article called “How heavy are Russian casualties in Ukraine?” It is here (but not fully available if you do not have a subscription): How heavy are Russian casualties in Ukraine? | The Economist.

The Dupuy Institute was name-checked in the article and the author gave us a shout out on twitter (@sashj). We do appreciate that. 

Still, it does look like the article was heavily influenced or even inspired by my post on 22 July in the section on casualties that started more than half-way down the 7,000+ word post: 

Casualties: William Burns, the Director of the CIA, on 20 July and Mi-6 in the UK are both now putting Russian dead in this war at 15,000. Lots of other people have published much higher figures. Still, this is in line with what I was pointing out a while back: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

On the other hand, he was not so brave as to pick up on the theme presented in the second half of my paragraph:

Glad to see a little reality is starting to creep back into the estimates. I am surprised that any professional historian and defense analyst let themselves get sucked into the higher figures. Overestimation of enemy casualties is kind of a constant in military history.

I guess these types of statements make people uncomfortable.

Here is series of somewhat related posts on the issue of overclaiming:

The 728th Fighter Regiment on 16 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Soviet versus German kill claims at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

So What Was Driving the Soviet Kill Claims? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

This issue is further discussed in my soon-to-be published book Aces at Kursk. I do look at the records of individual aces.

The Economist article then goes into a discussion on wounded-to-killed ratios. I will post more on that later when I get in the right mood to (I do have a book I am supposed to be finishing).

Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing

Below is the list of chapters in my new book coming out next month: Aces at Kursk: The Battle of Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front 1943. It is with Pen & Sword in the UK. The release date in the UK is 30 August. We have the UK Amazon link here: Buy from Amazon (UK). The release date for the U.S. is 30 October. The U.S. Amazon link is here: Buy from Amazon. Both of these links are on the right side of the blog. If you click on the image, it goes to the Pen & Sword site. You can pre-order the book direct from the publisher or Amazon or other sites. I have not yet seen a final copy. Not sure if I will have copies available at our conference: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 9 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is discounted if pre-ordered. It is cheapest if pre-ordered directly from Pen & Sword. They have a nice pre-order discount. It is not a small book, 392 pages. 

Chapter One: The Strategic Air Campaign                                             1

Chapter Two: Both Sides Prepare                                                         14

Chapter Three: The Strike at Dawn: 5 July 1943 (Monday)                 40

Chapter Four: The Fight for Air Superiority: 6-7 July 1943                 60

Chapter Five: The Air War Continues: 8-9 July 1943                           97

Chapter Six: A Less Intense Air War Continues: 10-11 July 1943    119

Chapter Seven: The Air Battle to Support the Offensive:

              North of Kursk, 5-11 July 1943                                               130

Chapter Eight: The Soviet Counteroffensives: 12 -14 July 1943      185

Chapter Nine: Winding Down: 15-24 July 1943                                  213

Chapter Ten: The Last Air Offensive                                                   227

Appendix I: German and Soviet Terminology                                    241

Appendix II: Air Campaign Statistics                                                  251

Appendix III: The Structure of the German Ground Offensive         317

Appendix IV: Commander Biographies                                              332

 

Aces at Kursk

Oh, and by the way, I have a new book coming out next month: Aces at Kursk: The Battle of Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front 1943. It is with Pen & Sword in the UK. The release date in the UK is 30 August. We have the UK Amazon link here: Buy from Amazon (UK). The release date for the U.S. is 30 October. The U.S. Amazon link is here: Buy from Amazon. Both of these links are on the right side of the blog. If you click on the image, it goes to the Pen & Sword site. You can pre-order the book direct from the publisher or Amazon or other sites. I have not yet seen a final copy. Not sure if I will have copies available at our conference: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 8 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is discounted if pre-ordered. It is cheapest if pre-ordered directly from Pen & Sword. They have a nice pre-order discount.

It is not a small book, 392 pages. This book took a while to publish. I could not find an American publisher that wanted to publish it. Oddly enough, when I contacted Pen & Sword, they mentioned that they had been publishing a lot of American authors recently. 

I did have three chapters on the air war in my big Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka book. This book was built from those three chapters, the associated air war appendix, and a lot of other material that has been assembled since I first wrote this around 2002.  I also added some chapters on air war on the north side of Kursk (this was at the request of the publisher) and I did have some Soviet air regiment records that I had collected that was not part of the original big book. I also spend more time than I would like disputing accounts and figures from other books. There have been other works published since 2002 when I first wrote the manuscript for my big Kursk book. Unfortunately, some of these added to the confusion over the history. Maybe the best thing is to ignore other works and just tell your account, but in this case, I did roll up my sleeves and debate the details of what they said. Mostly this was done in footnotes, but I did also put in a few “sidebars” in the text. Kind of hated to do that as some of these people I know virtually, and they have always been decent supportive people. But facts are facts, and I really do think the story needs to be told correctly.

I will probably be working on another Kursk related book this fall called The Battle of Tolstoye Woods. This time with an American publisher. I do have a master plan to do up to a dozen books covering all the fighting in the south of Russia and Ukraine in 1943. May yet get around to covering the entire Battle of Kursk and the three battles of Kharkov in 1943.

A couple of related posts:

Aces at Kursk – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Is this my last Kursk book? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

Density of Deployment in Ukraine

One thing that stands out on this battlefield is that there is not a lot of troops covering a lot of area. As far as I can tell, for this war in Ukraine, each side has about 200,000 or so regular troops, after all new recruits and old losses are counted for. I actually have never seen any strength figures since the war has started. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army has said that they have a front width of 2,450 kilometers (1,522 miles) of which 1,105 (687 miles) are active fighting. By active fighting, I assume that means the area from Kharkov to Severodonetsk to Kherson. The border with Belarus is 891 kilometers (554 miles), which I assume is part of the “inactive area.” The Ukrainian border with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). Anyhow, not sure exactly how this active front is calculated, but I will use the Ukrainian Army figures for now (until I get the energy to pull out a ruler and painstakingly measure it myself). 

So, 200,000 troops divided by 1,105 kilometers is 181 men per kilometer, except: I suspect that some of those people are protecting Kiev and other such places away from the active front, and some are in reserve and rear positions. So, it might be two-thirds of that figure (121 men per kilometer). This is less than a tenth of World War II standards for this area.

During the Battle of Kursk before 5 July 1943, in the south around Belgorod, the frontage from the German 332nd Infantry Division through Totenkopf (the main two-corps German attack) covered 54 kilometers. This was covered by 146,443 troops, for a density of 2,712 troops per kilometer. In contrast, the part of the Soviet Sixth Guards Army’s first echelon that was facing them consisted of only 46,412 troops or 859 troops per kilometer (see page 148 of my big Kursk book). This Sixth Guards Army defense, considering both echelons, came in at 1,301 men per kilometer covering 66 kilometers of front, while the neighboring Seventh Guards Army had 1,568 men per kilometer of front covering 55 kilometers (see page 210). 

Just do a spot check of several division-level engagements (yes, I do have all this data for the southern Kursk and the Kharkov battles in 1943 in our database, the Division-Level Engagement Data Base or DLEDB): 1) the linear density of the LSSAH Panzer Grenadier Division on 12 July 1943 at the tank fields of Prokhorovka was 1,922.64 men per kilometer of front. The attacking Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps came in at 3,151.27 men per kilometer of front, 2) The linear density of men for the GD Panzer Division, 332nd ID and 3rd PzD attack on 5 July 1943 was 2,204.88 men per kilometer of front. It was 612.89 for the defending Soviet 71st Guards Rifle Division. Going to the battles around Kharkov, 3) the linear density of the Soviet 40th Army at Prudyanka-Dergachi on 12 February 1943 was 203.65 while the defending German GD ID was 510.38. 4) The linear density of the LSSAH assault on Kharkov on 12 March 1943 was 753.04 while the defending Soviet 19th Rifle Division, 17th NKVD Brigade and 86th Tank Brigade was 472.65. By the 14th, this had increased to 2,436.43 for the Germans and 1,739.29 for the defending Soviets, 5) The most sparsely deployed unit I have in my database for the fighting in and around Kharkov in February to August 1943 was 280.00 men per kilometer for the attacker and 169.75 for the defender at Merafa III engagement on 13 March 1943. 6) the densest is the 106th ID Defense III on 20 August 1943 with the attacking Soviet 48th Guards Rifle Corps and 375th RD deployed at 3,457.80 men per kilometer of front while the defending 106th ID was at 1,766.00 men per kilometer of front (I do have 3,649.13 for the attacker South of Kharkov on 15 March, but the defender only has 424.38). 7) The most sparsely deployed engagement I have for the Kursk fighting is nominally Soldatskoye VIII on 18 July 1943, where the attacking Soviet elements held a front of 392.25 men per kilometer and the defending German 255th ID held the front at 319.33 men per kilometer (there are a number of other engagements where one side had less density than these) 8) the densest engagement is LSSAH Division’s clash with the 31st Tank Corps on 7 July 1943, where the Germans had a density of 8.,475.00 men per kilometer and the Soviets were at 4,328.85 men per kilometer. This is mostly driven by the LSSAH frontage being temporarily reduced to 2.6 kilometers. This is all drawn from 256 division-level battles on the Eastern Front in February-August 1943 (192 from Kursk and 64 from Kharkov), with all the data drawn from the unit records of both sides. The average for the front now in Ukraine may be 121 men per kilometer, and they are not evenly distributed.

So, what does this all mean?

Well, from a theoretical point of view, it is showing the changes in linear density over time. As firepower increases, density of troop deployments decrease. This has been occurring for hundreds of years. See  Dispersion versus Lethality | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and TDI Friday Read: Lethality, Dispersion, And Mass On Future Battlefields | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Effects Of Dispersion On Combat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).  Also see my book War by Numbers.

From a more practical point of view, that means that there are many places that are holding their lines with less than 121 men per kilometer. Does this mean that any concentrated offensive force can push through these areas “if they achieve surprise.” So, should we be seeing more fluid lines?

But, in fact, we are not seeing more fluid lines. This looks less fluid than I expected. So why? Is it because U.S. intel assistance is so good that any concentration of force is immediately fired upon? Is it because any concentration of force is immediately spotted and responded to, by either firepower or movement of reserves?

I don’t really know for sure, just looking at linear densities.

The 88th Infantry Division Stole a Cake

Speaking of war crimes, I spotted this story today: US Army ‘returns’ cake to Italian woman for 90th birthday.

The 88th Infantry Division in Italy in 1944 in one of the units we have studied in some depth. There was a report done on it in 1981. See: 88. Performance of The 88th Infantry Division in World War II: Factors Responsible for its Excellence (1981) (MRA&L) – Pages: 120 at http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub1tnda.htm

This is also discussed on pages 114-121 of Trevor Dupuys Understanding War. He ended up conducting an analysis of the CEVs (Combat Effectiveness Values) of seven U.S. units, five UK units and 12 Germans units in Italy during WWII. This was done using his Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis (QJMA). Of those 24 units, the 88th Infantry Division was rated the fifth highest, based upon 4 engagements. It had a CEV of 1.14. It was the highest rated of all the allied units.

Ordering info is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/booksfs.htm

Related posts:

Human Factors In Warfare: Combat Effectiveness | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 16 (ground actions)

The slow grind continues but no real changes on the ground. I will put any changes/updates since yesterday’s post in italics. Russia continues to occupy three cities, Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649).

They have isolated Mariupol. The city has been without power since 1 March. I gather the Russian forces in that area are not overwhelming. Not sure they have the strength to take it or will try. Instead, it appears that they are going to try to starve it out. The vice-mayor said on the morning of 3 March on CNN that they could hold out for five days. This is now a city far enough away from the other fighting grounds, that I assume there will no real attempt to relieve it. 

So, it does appear that this is the first “siege” of the campaign. Is the future of the Russian offensive? Is the next one at Kharkov? 

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol
6. Crimean border/Kherson

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The reinforced Russian Army is in the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, the large Antonov/Hostomel airport north of Kiev, and Irpin, the suburbs west of Kiev. The center of the city appears peaceful and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is still able to broadcast messages from his office in Kiev. I gather the city is still open to the south.

The Battle of Brovary: That tank column that is being hit that is show in various videos (See: Video shows destruction of tanks on the outskirts of Brovary, Ukraine – YouTube) is from Brovary (pop. 109,473), a suburb to the NE of Kiev. Anyone care to count size of column vice how many were hit? Can anyone tell what weapons did these hits? Various sources are saying artillery or drones. Russian Colonel Andrei Zakharov was supposedly killed at the head of this column. There are pictures of him standing next to Putin in 2016. Two generals have also been killed: Major General Vitaly Gerasimov (age 44) near Kharkov and Major General Andrie Sukhovetskiy (age 47).

During World War II the United States lost 11 generals killed in action. Germany lost 135, and had 84 executed. See: A List of American Commanders in WWII Who Lost Their Lives (warfarehistorynetwork.com)

This video has what I believe is the Russian radio traffic. They have appeared to have clipped in some pictures of Turkish drone that are not from that event: Kyiv Region Dozens Of Armored Vehicles Was Defeated By The Ukrainian Artillery, Tanks And Drones – YouTube

This is an interesting video. Claims two tanks and one BTR destroyed (which looks about right) and 30 Russian casualties. Claims it was done with RPGs. See: Russian armoured convoy destroyed in ambush near Kyiv, Ukrainian soldiers claim – YouTube

Interesting video of a Ukranian infantry counterattack near Kiev. Four minutes long. Worth watching: Ukrainian Troops Attempt To Drive Russian Forces From Village Near Kyiv – YouTube

Chernigov (pop. 285,234) it located to the NNE of Kiev. The Russians have pushed columns past the city and down to Kiev, but the city remains under Ukrainian control. It is reported that all exits from the city have been mined. There have been some Russian tank and jet aircraft losses around this area. They are shelling the city and for all practical purposes, it is isolated.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be safe and secure for now. Continue to see news reports (CNN and France 24) of the locals building up the defenses there. They did damage (sink?) a 1300-to-1700-ton patrol vessel yesterday: Vasily Bykov

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov is being shelled but it does not look like the Russians have tried to re-enter the city.  

There was at least one video-based report a couple of days ago of a Ukrainian counterattack outside of Kharkov. I then noted this recent video, which kind of looks like a recent Ukrainian counterattack. See: Welcome to Ukraine S…. This minute long video is definitely worth watching. It shows four tanks abandoned/destroyed, two Lt. Colonels were killed, and at least a half-dozen fuel trucks taken/destroyed.  The fight occurred at Chuhuiv, 35 km SE of Kharkov. It is on the map above.

As I suspect that surrounding and besieging Kharkov will be the next major objective of the Russian Army after they take Mariupol, I do consider this significant. The question is, is it significant enough to keep Kharkov from being encircled.

Sumy (pop. 259,660) looks in danger of being isolated. The Russians have taken Konotop (pop. 84,787).

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: So far, we have not heard much from this area. We do have a casualty report dated 7 March from the Donetsk People’s Republic saying they have 47 soldiers killed and 179 wounded.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Day ten of the siege. This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Mariupol is partly encircled and the power to the city is down. It appears they are going to keep it isolated and besiege it. The vice-mayor of this city said on 3 March that they can hold out for five days. I do not expect any significant relief columns.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. 

Mikolaiv (pop. 476,101), the city on the Southern Bug River just west of Kherson, is still under Ukranian control. There has been a lot of fighting here recently, but it looks like the Ukrainian Army is holding.

Update: An older short video (March 6) from Mikolaiv area: Ukrainian soldiers find field full of abandoned Russian tanks after invaders ‘fled their post’ – YouTube

The Russians appear to have gained control of a lot of the area just to the north of Crimea. This may be the end of their expansion in this area for now until they take Mariupol. 

Russia has taken Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is making everyone nervous. It is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.

I will update this post during the day as I find more information. 

Weather: Kiev at 3 PM: 32 degrees (Fahrenheit, 0 degrees Celsius) and sunny, low tonight 16 degrees. Kharkov at 3 PM: 21 degrees (Fahrenheit), mostly cloudy. Low tonight 8 degrees (-13 Celsius).

Ukrainian Army Build-up: According to the Ukrainian defense minister, more have 140,000 Ukrainians has returned and more than 20,000 foreigners from 52 countries have appealed to fight for Ukraine. This includes about 3,000 Americans who have “expressed interest” according to Ukraine. “So far, about 100 U.S. citizens have made the cut.” Volunteers also include “up to 500” Indians and about 1,000 Canadians. I have seen reports of volunteers from places like Thailand and Japan (70 volunteers). All these figures are questionable, we shall see how many actually show up in Lviv. According to senior U.S. officials, the U.S. and other NATO members have so far sent Ukraine 17,000 AT missiles and 2,000 Stinger AA missiles.

Russian Army Build-up: Russia is claiming that they have 16,000 volunteers from the Middle East. Apparently, the pay is $400 a week. 

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000. They may be able to add more from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. They appear to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war.

The Russian Home Front: Count of detained protesters is claimed to be over 13,000 since the war began, with at least 4,640 people this last Sunday. See: OVD-info. Protests continue. At least 800 people have been detained in Belarus. 11,569 medical professionals have signed a letter protesting the war, using their names, title and affiliation. 

Exchange rate: The Ruble is at 116.15 to a dollar as of 8:27 AM EST. Not sure what the exchange rate will be if Russia ever opens its stock market. 

Price of oil (Brent crude): $109.68 as of 8:27 AM EST. The last report I saw, 52% of the Russian government revenue comes from oil (even though it makes up only 7% of their economy). There is a strong desire on the part of the west to bring this price down, as it undercuts their budget. Several years ago, if the price of oil dropped below $80, the Russian budget would go into the red.

They have stopped production Ladas (the largest Russian produced automobile) and placed thousands of workers “on leave.”

Casualties: The UN is reporting for 10 March 549 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They previously reported that 23 were in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is claiming about 2,5000 civilians killed. Ukraine is reporting on 1 March over 110 soldiers killed. Russia is claiming to have captured 572 soldiers (which is entirely believable). U.S. officials are saying that between 2,000 to 4,000 Ukrainian troops have been killed.

Russia reported on 2 March 498 troops have been killed and 1,597 wounded. This is a 3.21-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio, which seems a little low (see link below). Ukraine is reporting almost 200 Russians captured. The Donetsk People’s Republic is reporting as of 4 March that they had 77 soldiers killed and 406 wounded (5.27-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). See: The overview of the current social and humanitarian situation in the territory of the Donetsk People`s Republic as a result of hostilities in the period from 26 February to 04 March 2022 – Human rights Ombudsman in the Donetsk People’s Republic (ombudsman-dnr.ru). U.S. officials are now claiming figures of around 3,500 to 6,000 Russian soldiers killed. In the past they have claimed 3,000 captured. Have no idea of the validity of the U.S. figures but suspect the Russian casualty figures are understated (because they kind of always are).

Note: Wounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Also see Chapter 15 (Casualties) in War by Numbers.

The twitter account @oryxspioenko is reporting on 5 March 99 Russian tanks have been lost by Russia based upon visual confirmation. For 6 March this is now 116. He is also reporting at this time 10 Russian aircraft shot down in the last 26 hours based upon videos of them being shot, been shot down, or their crews captured. This includes five Su-25s, Su-30s and Su-34 jets. Granted Russian has well over a thousand modern jet aircraft, but it does show that the Ukrainians do have some capability to defend their airspace. I gather as more Stingers and other surface-to-air missiles are received and deployed; this is going to become a more dangerous environment. It may serve to contain Russian air.

Russian Equipment Losses: As of 2100 hours on 7 March, @oryxspioenko is reporting the following Russian losses based upon his analysis of pictures and videos. See: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html

             2100, 7 March       0800, 11 March

Tanks:            141                179

AFVs:               89                108

IFVs:               131                158

APCs:               52                  61

Jet aircraft:      10                  11

Helicopters:     11                  11

 

The @MFA_Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is claiming as of 10 March they have destroyed 335 tanks, 1,105 armored vehicles, 49 aircraft and 81 helicopters. They also claim 12,000 personal killed.

The rate of equipment losses does appear to have slowed down.

Ukrainian Equipment Losses: As of 2100 hours on 7 March, @oryxspioenko is reporting the following Ukrainian losses based upon his analysis of pictures and videos:

           2100, 7 March       0800, 11 March

Tanks:           46                          49

AFVs:            38                          42

IFVs:              33                          36

APCs:            18                          19

Jet aircraft:     6                            7

Helicopters:    0                            0

 

Have no idea how accurate this count really is (the Ukrainian losses seem low), but I figure it is probably the best count publicly available.

It is clear that at least 1,500 people have died in this conflict. It may be more like 3,000 deaths. The U.S. provided estimates are higher. I am not confident in the accuracy of claims like those made by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that more than 12,000 Russian troops were killed as of 10 March. Zelenskyy’s office is also claiming that 1,200 people have died in Mariupol over the course of the nine-day siege there.

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop and @caucasuswar, none of whom are known to me.

End of the War:  While Ukrainian and Russian delegations are talking, I don’t expect much from this in the short term. Mariupol is supposed to have fallen already. I suspect the Russians will not be interested in negotiating until they have taken it. It is part of the Donetsk province.

Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, provided four conditions for a cease fire:

  1. Ukraine ceases military action,
  2. Change its constitution to enshrine neutrality (i.e. never join NATO),
  3. Acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and
  4. Recognize the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. 

These same demands were made at the talks with Ukraine yesterday in Turkey. Needless to say, these talks went nowhere.

The attached map is from Wikipedia giving the “Military situation as of 11 March 2022.” View with caution, but it does appear to be one of the better maps out there.

Nicholas Krawciw (MG, USA), 1935-2021

MGEN Nicholas S. H. Krawciw, USA (uncovered)

I just found out this weekend that Nicholas Stephen Hordij Krawciw passed away on 29 September at Ft. Belvoir. He was 85 years old.

Nick Krawciw replaced Trevor Dupuy as the head of The Dupuy Institute in 1995 after the untimely death of Trevor Dupuy. He continued as head until 2005, when I was promoted to President and he continued as the Chairman of the Board. He continued in that role until 2015, when the Institute was transferred to me.

Nick Krawciw had a long and distinguished career in the army and a life that looked like it came out of a Hollywood movie.

He was born it Lvov, then part of Poland on 28 November 1935. His father was a Ukrainian journalist and writer. When the Soviet Union occupied that part of Poland in 1939, his father had to leave to avoid arrest (other relatives had been arrested and executed by the Soviet Union on an earlier trip to Russia). Nick Krawciw and his family followed shortly thereafter, except they were intercepted by Soviet patrols while crossing the Sian River, and Nick Krawciw, at the age of five, first came under machinegun fire.  

He then spent most of World War II in Germany. They were in Berlin when their kitchen was destroyed by an allied bomb. So his mother applied for them to be farm laborers and the entire family moved to a family farm in southern Germany.

That area of Germany was then occupied in 1945 by the U. S. Army, but not before Nick Krawciw had come under artillery bombardment from them. His family, thanks to connections in the United States, then migrated to United States in 1949. He grew up in Philadelphia.

At his initiative, he went to a military high school in New Jersey, accruing a debt to pay for it, and then went to West Point, graduating second in his class in 1959.

He then served two tours in Vietnam and ended up as the senior U.N. peacekeeping forces representative in Middle East during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. He was the commanding general of the 3rd Infantry Division from 1987-1989.

He choose to retire from the army in 1990 because of health issues. He then started working with the DOD on Ukrainian issues and became a vice-president at The Dupuy Institute in 1995. He took over running the Institute after Trevor Dupuy passed away.

Wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Krawciw

West Point Warriors (Chapter 9 is about Nick): West Point Warriors

West Point: Nicholas S. Krawciw 1959

Article from 2014: Retired Ukraine military expert speaks on homeland

I did work for and with Nick Krawciw for over twenty years. It is hard to select from a long list of superlatives those which I would use to describe him. He displayed the finest traditions and standards of a U.S. Army officer and was a caring, loving family man.  All who worked with him and knew him held him in the highest regard.

The Prokhorovka! game maps – comments?

I have done four posts on the game maps for the upcoming Advanced Squad Leader (ASL) module Prokhorovka!. I have not been involved in the developing the game, but found the effort worthwhile and interesting. What I was hoping to get back from those posts were comments on the game maps themselves, what was done right and well, and more importantly, what was not done right or needed to be corrected. So far, I have not gotten any comments on the game maps. I have provided some of my own to the designers, and in the case of the Storozhevoye map, it was re-worked before I posted it. 

So anyhow, for the sake of our game designers, could we get some comments please.

Previous posts:

Andreyevka Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Stalinskii Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Oktyabrskii Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Storozhevoye Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

Andreyevka Map for the game Prokhorovka!

As I have mentioned before, I am preparing a little write-up for the Italian wargame company Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com). They are designing a set of scenarios for use in the game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). They have been providing me with some of their advance material, although I am not involved in the design of the game. This is the fourth game map they have provided me.

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. This game map covers the area around Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. I do use different transliteration conventions than them (and many other people). For example, they spell Andreevka with an ee in the middle. An American, seeing the ee will invariably pronounce it like geek as opposed to ge-yek with two syllables. The two e’s are separately pronounced in Russian. Some transliteration conventions use an apostrophe instead of a y. I don’t think most Americans know what to do with a word spelled ge’ek or Andre’evka. The apostrophe is part of the Library of Congress transliteration system (which I think sucks). Some people use that system but take out the apostrophes, which gets us back to geek or Andreevka. I think it should be Andreyevka, which is closer to the Russian pronunciation.

Andreyevka and Vasilyevka is where the XVIII Tank Corps attacks into and through, getting as far as 200 meters east of the Bogoroditskoye church. Bogoroditskoye is often not marked on maps, but it is south of the Psel just west of Vasliyevka. Bogoroditskoye was defended by German armor (tanks or assault guns or Marders) and the Soviets claim at one point that they repulsed German counterattacks by 50 tanks from the Bogoroditskoye area (see page 318 of my Prokhorovka book or page 931 of my Kursk book). We have never clearly identified who that German armor unit was. I believe the Bogoroditskoye church is the church marked on Map M37-26C just west of the ravine west of Vasileyevka and is between Kozlovka and Vasilyeka. The Totenkopf SS two bridges were just west of Bogodoritskoye.

At 1600 (Moscow time) the XVIII Tank Corps’ II Battalion, 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade is claimed to be deployed from the Psel River to the center of Bogoroditskoye.

The eastern edge of the Andreyevka (assuming the gully marks the eastern edge) is some five kilometers almost due west of height 252.2. See 1:50000 scale Map M37-26C (there are copies of this map in both of my Kursk books). The village of Mikhailovka is just to the northeast of Andreyevka, along the Psel River (see story below). The XVIII Tank Corps moved through it during their attack.

Below is an aerial photograph of Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. The picture should be rotated 90 degree clockwise.:

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

Andreevka

Now, I have looked their work, but I am hardly the right person to conduct photo analysis. Still, it looked pretty good to me. If anyone has any comments, criticisms, recommendations, corrections, edits, and so forth for this map, please let me know. I will forward the comments to them.

Thanks

 

 

 

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

P.S. In an email dated 12 April 2021, sent after this initial post, the game map designer informed me that “In the scenario, every hex North of the road A12-CCC10, on level 1 (the lower level), is Mud, so the vehicles and manhandled Guns may bog, the infantry goes slower and HE rounds effect is a bit “cushioned” (look at D8.23 and E3.6 in ASL Rulebook).”

P. P.S. My Mikhailovka story: In 1996, while leading a tour of mostly former German and American officers of the battlefield, we arrived at Mikhailovka while they were doing their presidential elections (back when Yelstin was running for re-election). Our American officers, led by a retired general, decided that this was a unique opportunity to see this new Russian democracy in action. So they decided to go into the town hall and watch the election unfolding. Needless to say, the local election officials were a little overwhelmed with the sudden arrival of rather large contingent of foreigners at their site. They initially said that we would have to leave, and then after conferring for a bit, they decided we could come in and observe the election in pairs. So we did. A rather informal observation of the 1996 Russian elections as conducted in the village of Mikhailovka by former German and American officers.

This trip is also discussed in a chapter in the book Becton: Autobiography of a Solider and Public Servant.