Category World War II

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development and Doctrine in World War II

Just to give you a heads up, Richard Anderson, former researcher at TDI, is publishing the book American Thunder as of December 16, 2023. It will make for a great stocking stuffer for the right person. See: Amazon.com: American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II: 9780811773812: Anderson, Richard: Books. This is his fourth book (American Thunder, Cracking Hitler’s Atlantic Wall, Artillery Hell, Hitler’s Last Gamble). He has been working on this last one for over fourteen years.

The table of contents are:

Introduction 1
Acknowledgements 4
U.S. Army World War II Procurement and Nomenclature 6
Part One: Organization, Development, and Production from Armistice Day to VJ Day 13
Chapter 1 Stagnation and Rebirth: The Lean Years from the End of the Great War to 1 September 1939 14
Chapter 2 State of the Art: The View Looking in, Sereno Brett and Arthur Hadsell 62
Chapter 3 Learning to Walk: 1 September 1939 to 30 June 1940 73
Chapter 4 State of the Art: The View Looking Out, the Spanish Civil War 94
Chapter 5 The Sleeping Giant Stirs: 1 July to 31 December 1940 107
Chapter 6 The Threat Perceived 129
Chapter 7 Explosive Growth…and Growing Pains: 1 January to 7 December 1941 137
Chapter 8 First Blood in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines, 1941-1942 161
Chapter 9 Giant Steps…and Stumbles: the First Year of the War, 1942 174
Chapter 10 Hard Knocks: The Battle of Happy Valley 223
Chapter 11 Learning Curve: the Second Year of the War, 1943 244
Chapter 12 More Hard Knocks: Early Lessons Learned 291
Chapter 13 Maturity: the Third Year of the War, 1944 303
Chapter 14 Europe: the Normandy Breakout 366
Chapter 15 Endgame, the Last Year of the War, 1945 383
Chapter 16 Europe: The Winter of Discontent 426
Chapter 17 Firestorm in the Pacific 456
Part Two: Controversies 484
Chapter 18 Death Traps? Myths of U.S. Tank Development in World War II 485
Chapter 19 The Great Tank Scandal? “It is said that it takes three of our Shermans to knock out a Tiger.” 494
Chapter 20 Bigger Guns? 506
Chapter 21 Where are the Tanks? The Real Tank Scandal 524
Chapter 22 What’s in a Name? 546
Conclusion 552
Appendix I: Other Ordnance Combat Vehicles 556
Tank Recovery Vehicles 556
Mine Clearing Vehicles 558
Flame Throwing Vehicles 564
Tank Rocket Launchers 572
Engineer Assault Vehicles 574
Remanufactured Tanks 576
Appendix II: Lend-Lease 578
Appendix III: Tank ‘T’ Numbers Assigned by Ordnance, 1926-1945 590
Appendix IV: Tank Model Year, ‘Mark’, and ‘M’ Numbers Assigned by Ordnance, 1928-1945 591
Appendix V: The Cost of Ordnance 592
Appendix VI: The Cost of War: U.S. Army Armored Personnel and Tank Losses in World War II 596
Appendix VII: Firing Tests 625
Shoeburyness Test, 23 May 1944 (1st ETOUSA Test) 625
Balleroy Test, 10 July 1944 (2d ETOUSA Test) 628
1st Isigny Test, 12-30 July 1944 (3d ETOUSA Test) 629
2nd Isigny Test, 19-21 August 1944 (4th ETOUSA Test) 632
703d Tank Destroyer Battalion Test, 5-9 December 1944 636
Bibliography 638
Primary Sources 638
Armored and Infantry School Student Papers 638
Other Primary Sources 638
Secondary Sources 650
Newspaper, Magazine, and Journal Articles 660
Websites 664
Videos 666
 
And:
 
Tables
Table 1: Organization of the Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) 1935. 25
Table 2: Tank Production 1921-1933 60
Table 3: Tank Production 1934-1 September 1939 61
Table 4: Tank Production 1 September 1939-30 June 1940 93
Table 5: Armored Force General Staff, June 1940. 107
Table 6: Organization of the Armored Force, July 1940. 108
Table 7: The National Guard Tank Battalions 112
Table 8: Organization of the Armored Division, 1940. 114
Table 9: Tank Production 1 July-31 December 1940 128
Table 10: Medium Tank M3/Grant I Production 146
Table 11: Medium Tank M3A1 Production 146
Table 12: Medium Tank M3A2 Production 147
Table 13: Medium Tank M3A3 Production 147
Table 14: Medium Tank M3A4 Production 148
Table 15: Medium Tank M3A5 Production 148
Table 16: Medium Tank M3-Series Production 148
Table 17: British Designations for the Medium Tank M3 Series 149
Table 18: Light Tank M3-Series Production 151
Table 19: Tank Production 1 January-31 December 1941 160
Table 20: Organization of the Armored Division, 1942. 182
Table 21:Medium Tank M4 (75mm) Production 191
Table 22: Medium Tank M4A1 (75mm) Production 192
Table 23: Medium Tank M4A3 (75mm) Production 194
Table 24: Medium Tank M4A4 (75mm) Production 195
Table 25: Medium Tank M4A5 (RAM) Production 198
Table 26: Medium Tank M4A6 (75mm) Production 198
Table 27: British Designations for the Medium Tank M4-series 199
Table 28: Light Tank M5-series Production 202
Table 29: British Designations for Light Tanks M3 and M5 203
Table 30: Tank Production 1 January-31 December 1942 222
Table 31: Production of the T10 Shop Tractor (CDL) 248
Table 32: The Armored Group Headquarters 251
Table 33: Unit Assignments to the Armored Divisions before the 1943 Reorganization 252
Table 34: Organization of the Armored Division, 1943. 253
Table 35: Reorganization of the Armored Regiments, 1943 253
Table 36: Unit Assignments to the Reorganized Armored Divisions 255
Table 37: Tank Loading Capacity of Allied Landing Craft and Ships 1945 278
Table 38: Light Tank T9E1 Production 279
Table 39: Tank Production 1 January-31 December 1943 290
Table 40: Organization of the 741st Tank Battalion for D-Day, 6 June 1944. 314
Table 41: Availability of Dozer Blades in the ETOUSA 316
Table 42: Allocation of 76mm and 105mm Armed Medium Tanks January- May 1944 328
Table 43: ‘Ultimate Design’ Medium Tank M4A3 (75mm) Wet Production 340
Table 44: ‘Ultimate Design’ Medium Tank M4-Series (76mm) Wet Production 341
Table 45: ‘Ultimate Design’ Medium Tank M4-Series (105mm) Production 342
Table 46: Status of ETOUSA Medium Tanks, 20 October – 20 December 1944 342
Table 47: Medium Tank T23 Production 344
Table 48: Light Tank M24 Production 345
Table 49: Medium Tank T25 and T25E1 Production 346
Table 50: Assault Tank M4A3E2 Production 355
Table 51: Losses of the Medium (Assault) Tank M4A3E2 358
Table 52: Heavy Tank T1-Series Production 361
Table 53: Tank Production 1 January – 31 December 1944 365
Table 54: Operational Tank Strength of VII Corps on the eve of Operation COBRA. 370
Table 55: Wartime Deployment and Inactivation of the Tank Battalions 384
Table 56: Organization of the Armored Division, 1945. 388
Table 57: Heavy Tanks T26E3 issued to 3d Armored Division 20 February 1944 396
Table 58: Status of T26E3 as of 14 April 1945 402
Table 59: Heavy Tank T26E3 allocations and on hand, April 1945 402
Table 60: Status of Heavy Tanks T26, 5 May 1945 403
Table 61: Light Tanks M24 “on hand” with 12th Army Group, 3 March – 11 April 1945 409
Table 62: Allocation of Light Tanks M24 to the 12th Army Group, 12 November 1944-213 April 1945 409
Table 63: Light Tanks M24 with 12th Army Group Units, 28 April 1945 410
Table 64: American 17-pdr Tank Conversions 412
Table 65: Medium Tank M4-Series Production by Manufacturer 417
Table 66: Total OCO-D and OMP Medium Tank M4-series Production 417
Table 67: Heavy Tank T26-Series Production 420
Table 68: Tank Production 1 January – 31 August 1945 424
Table 69: Tank Production 1 July 1940-31 August 1945 424
Table 70: Change in Tank Strength, 5th Armored Division, 2200 24 November-8 December 1944. 436
Table 71: Status of HVAP as of 14 February 1945 516
Table 72: Special Projectiles Manufactured for the 3-inch, 76mm, and 90mm guns (1,000’s). 516
Table 73: Principal Ordnance Tank Periscope Systems. 520
Table 74: Principal Ordnance Tank and GMC Telescopes. 521
Table 75: Known Medium Tank Deliveries to the ETOUSA, June-September 1944 531
Table 76: 12th Army Group Monthly Medium Tank Status 540
Table 77: Average Daily Medium Tank Strength in 12th Army Group 541
Table 78: First U.S. Army Tank Allocations Oct 44-Apr 45 543
Table 79: Third U.S. Army Tank Allocations Oct 44-Apr 45 543
Table 80: Ninth U.S. Army Tank Allocations Oct 44-Apr 45 543
Table 81: Fifteenth U.S. Army Tank Allocations Jan-Apr 45 543
Table 82: 12th Army Group Tank Allocations Nov 44-Jan 45 544
Table 83: Total Tank Allocations to 12th Army Group Oct 44-Apr 45 544
Table 84: On Hand and Redeployment of ETOUSA Tank Stocks 31 May-31 August 1945. 545
Table 86: Tank Recovery Vehicle Production 557
Table 87: Mechanized and Main Armament Flamethrower Production 572
Table 88: Medium Tank M4-series Remanufactured Production 576
Table 89: Light Tank M5, M5A1, and M3A3 Remanufactured Production 577
Table 90: Medium Tank M3 Allocation to the British Empire as of July 1942 579
Table 91: 21st Army Group Sherman Tank Holdings, 21 January 1945 581
Table 92: Lend-Lease Tank Deliveries to Britain according to Hunnicutt. 582
Table 93: Lend-Lease Tanks Deliveries to the UK according to ASF 583
Table 94: Canadian Tank Situation in Northwest Europe, May and December 1944 585
Table 95: Lend-Lease Tanks Shipped to the USSR 586
Table 96: Lend-Lease Tanks Shipped to the French 588
Table 97: Lend-Lease Tank Shipments by Type and Recipient as Recorded by the War Department 588
Table 98: Estimated Value of Army Ordnance Procurement of Combat Vehicles ($-thousands) 594
Table 99: Armored Division Total Personnel Losses 598
Table 100: U.S. Tank Casualties by Theater and Year as Calculated by ORO 599
Table 101: 5th Echelon Maintenance Awaiting Completion at ETOUSA Depots 600
Table 102: Total Work Orders by First U.S. Army Ordnance Maintenance 600
Table 103: 12th Army Group Tank Losses by Armies 601
Table 104: 12th Army Group Medium Tank Losses 601
Table 105: Armored Division and Tank Battalion Tank Losses 602
Table 106: Mechanized Cavalry Tank and Armored car Losses ETOUSA 604
Table 107: First U.S. Army Tank Loss by Type, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945 604
Table 108: First U.S. Army Strength and Losses, June-July 1944 605
Table 109: First French Army Medium Tank Losses 606
Table 110: U.S. Army Tank Losses in North Africa and Sicily 606
Table 111: U.S. Army Tank Losses in the Pacific 607
Table 112: U.S. Marine Corps Tank Losses in the Pacific 608
Table 113: U.S. Army Tank and Armored Vehicle Losses in the European Theater of Operations 609
Table 114: First Army Operational Tanks and Losses 615
Table 115: Third Army Operational Tanks and Losses 618
Table 116: Ninth Army Operational Tanks and Losses 620
Table 117: Fifth Army Tank Losses, Italian Campaign 623
 

Carded-for-Record in WWII

In our report: “C-1 Combat Mortality: Why is Marine Combat Mortality Less than That of the Army (JCS) (March 1998),” volume 2, Figure 145 is the following table. It was part of the presentation done by Col. (Dr.) Ron Bellamy. 

From Table 1, page 4, Medical Statistics in WWII, Office of the Surgeon General, US Army, 1975

                                            The Adjutant              The Surgeon

Type of Casualty                General’s Report       General’s Report

Wounded in Action            592,170                       723,560

    Carded for record only           —                        123,836

    Wounded admissions             —                        599,724

Total Deaths                        216,005                      213,030

    Killed in action                189,696                      192,220

    Died of wounds                 26,309                        20,810

    Other battle deaths           18,869                        16,793

Total killed and wounded   808,175                      936,590

Ratio, Wounded/Deaths           2.74                            3.40

Percent Deaths                         0.27                            0.23

 

If I calculate the wounded-to-killed ratios based upon KIA + DOW/WIA (wounded admissions) it comes out to 2.74 (as shown above) and 2.82-to-1 (vice 3.40).

Anyhow, the carded for record discussion for Vietnam is a little more complex. Maybe later.

Return-to-Duty (RTDs)

I have never really done any work on RTDs. I have an entire chapter on Casualties (Chapter 15) in War by Numbers, but nothing really on RTDS.

Anyhow, more than one person has asked me about this, so let me outline what I/we know:

1). The rule of thumb Trevor Dupuy developed on RTDs was in his “Handbook on Ground Forces Attrition in Modern Warfare,” September 1986, page 90. It says:

“Finally, there is a general rule of thumb for estimating returns to duty from casualties. For each 100 personnel casualties (battle casualty, disease, or injury) 75 will be returned to duty at the end of 20 days at a rate of five per day between the 6th and 20th days after admission, and 25 will never be returned to duty as a result of death, evacuation to the Zone of the Interior, or discharge. This will vary widely from situation to situation, depending in large part upon the theater evacuation policy.”

It is also in his book Attrition, pages 53-54, stated the exact same way. We still have copies of Attrition for sale: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org).
 

2). A report done by several people, including Ron Bellamy, who I have worked with, provides the following table:

This chart is from this report: ADA480496.pdf (dtic.mil). I am indebted to Alex Roslin for this research.

Note that RTDs here is those that are returned within 72 hours. So, 752,396 WIA in WWII. Of those, 20% are RTD within 72 hours (and 2.8% are DOW). For Vietnam 235,398 WIA. Of those, 35% are RTD within 72 hours (and 2.1% are DOW). Note that these RTDs within 72 hours are probably all casualties “carded for record only.”

Note that the wounded-to-killed ratio for the WWII data is 4.94-to-1 or 4.22-to-1 if DOW is counted as KIA vice WIA and 3.36-to-1 if DOW is counted as KIA and RTD is not counted as WIA. The wounded-to-killed ratio for Vietnam data is 6.15-to-1 or 5.33-to-1 if DOW is counted as KIA vice WIA or 3.43-to-1 is RTD is not counted.

For the Iraq/Afghanistan data there are 16,235 WIA. Of those, 51% were RTD within 72 hours (and 2.4% are DOW).The wounded-to-killed ratio is 12.82-to-1 or 9.61-to-1 if DOW is counted at KIA vice WIA and 4.58-to-1 is RTD is not counted.

Now, I suspect some of the figures are skewed by how casualties are counted. In World War I and II, you were counted as wounded if you spent the night in a hospital. In Vietnam at one point the U.S. Army counted 96,900 wounded and maybe 104,000 carded-for-record only, meaning over 100,000 soldiers were not counted as wounded, but were allowed to receive the Purple Heart (my father got one that way). I may need to do a blog post about “carded for record” or WIANE (wounded-in-action, not evacuated).

See our report: “C-1 Combat Mortality: Why is Marine Combat Mortality Less than That of the Army (JCS) (March 1998),” page 19. This was done as a joint project with Ron Bellamy. 

3). Now, where the “rule of thumb” that Trevor Dupuy came from is not known. In an attempt to find them, I pulled up three of the old HERO reports 1) 14. Historical Analysis of Wartime Replacement Requirements (26 July 1966), 2) 48. German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II (July 1975), and 3) 86. Analytic Survey of Personnel Replacement Systems in Modern War (Apil 1981).

In the second report, page 24 they do have a table “Table 3. German Replacement Army Strength, NCOs and Men, 1 September 1944” which has a total of 2,137,973 with “convalescents” making up 178.456 of that replacement army strength (8%). On 4 December 1944 (page 45) they show for November 1944 342,000 replacements of which 40,000 are convalescents (12%). And then on page 54 there are four tables, three which show convalescents. The most interesting is “Table 20: Losses and Arrivals, German Field Army. From July 1943 to March 1944.” It shows arrivals by month to the Eastern Front as 930,000, of which 421,000 are convalescents, 478,500 are replacements and 30,500 are FTDs (recruits sent to Feild Training Divisions). For “Other Fronts,” the numbers are much smaller: 24,000 convalescents and 50,000 replacements. What is interesting, but not surprising, is that the number of convalescents increase over time. From July through October 1943 it is 34,000 to 46,000 convalescents for each month, by February and March 1944 it is 60,000 convalescents a month. 

For the Russians (page 90), the Germans estimated that 200,000 Russian convalescents were returned monthly to combat as replacements. The Germans estimated (page 91) that in 1942 ten Soviets armies received 764,000 replacements. Of them, new conscripts formed 56.5% of the total, 22.5% were convalescents, 10% were from labor battalions, 9.5% had been non-combat troops, and 1.5% had formerly had occupational deferments. Over 44,000, about 6%, were former convicts, released from prions and concentration camps. 

For 1 January-31 August 1943 for sixteen Soviet armies the Germans estimated that 89% of the replacements were new conscripts, 9% were convalescents, and 2% were former non-combat and survivors of units destroyed. Also of interest is that the Germans estimated that 28% had training of less than 10 days, 49.6% had training of up to one month, and 22.4% had training of over one month. I will avoid the temptation to equate this with the current war in Ukraine.

A third report indicates that in June 1943, 34,384 Soviet replacements reached units (probably the Bryansk Army Group) facing the German Ninth Army as follows: 82% were new conscripts, 7% were convalescents, 11% were former non-combat. Their training was reported as 26% less than 10 days, 49% up to one month, and 11% were former non-combat.  

Now, none of this actually answers my questions on RTD rates, but I still found it pretty damn interesting.

Finally, there is the report “Analytic Survey of Personnel Replacement Systems in Modern War.” This last report was primarily written by C. Curtiss Johnson (in case he is reading this blog). 

It provides a few snippets of useful data. For example (page 48), it states for the 6695 and 6706 Conditional Companies (U.S. Army, Italy) that between 1 July 1944 and 10 June 1945 the two companies process approximately 12,400 patients, of whom nearly 10,400 were rehabilitated sufficiently to return to unit. This is 84% returned-to-duty.

In the case of the Vietnam War, the 90th Replacement battalion from the quarter ending 31 Jan 1969 through 31 October, processed 172,585 replacements and 175,346 returnees. Not sure this tells us much.

 But this does… to quote (starting from page C-2):

Table 20, based on data compile by the Office of the Surgeon, MTOUSA, in December 1944, shows… the sample included 71,378 patients, 29,727 of whom had been injured and 41,651 of whom were battle casualties. Of the injured patients, 26,174 or 88.05% were returned to duty after hospitalization, 799 or 2,69% died, and 2,754 or 9.26% were evacuated to ZI hospitals. Of battle casualty patients (WIA), 29,860 or 71.69% were returned to duty, 1,130 or 2.71% died, and 10,661 or 25.60% were evacuate to ZI hospitals.

Experience during 1943-1944 showed that 86.69% of injury patients who were returned to duty became General Assignment personnel, and the remainder (13.31%) became Limited Assignment. The same figures for battle casualty patients were 83.89% General Assignment personnel and 16.11% Limited Assignment personnel.  

…The General Board, ETO,… finding may be expressed in tabular form as follows:

Percentage of Returns Correlated to Theater Evacuation Policy

Days after Admission     Battle Casualties (2,090)   Non-Battle Cas. (100,000)

  60                                    50.7                                        90.6

  90                                    59.5                                        93.0

120                                    64.8                                        93.4

Of the total returned to duty, 28.6% of the battle casualties and 5.3% of the non-battle casualties were estimated to be Limited Assignment personnel. While no comparison can be made between the injuries surveyed by the Office of the Surgeon, MTOUSA, and the non-battle casualties surveyed by the General Board, ETO, the data for battle casualties in the two reports can be compared. This comparison shows that the MTO return rate (71.69%) much exceeded the greatest rate reported for the ETO (64.8%) and that the percentage of returned who became Limited Duty personnel was greater for the ETO (28.6%) than for the MTO (16.11%). The probable explanation for the disparity in these rates was the size of the populations surveyed: the ETO battle casualty sample was 2,090; the MTO sample was 41,651.

The Report of the Army’s postwar Replacement Board provides qualitative and quantitative assessments of the replacement value of hospitalized casualties. In Volume V, Annex 14, p. 1, Major General Russell B. Reynolds, who was ACS, G-1, SPA, stresses the replacement value of hospital returnees and comments:

When you sustain 10 battle casualties, you’ll bury 3, evacuate 2 to the US, find 4 suitable for return to duty in branch, and have to retrain, either in a training center, or on the job, 1. In the case of non-battle casualties, for each 10 you’ll evacuate about 4/10 of a man, bury 1/10 of a man, and find 8 2/4 suitable for return to duty in branch, and face a retraining job on 3/4 of a man. 

These numbers may be expressed on a percent basis as follows: of surviving battle casualties, 28.6% will be evacuees and 71.4% will be returnees; of surviving non-battle casualties, 4.0% will be evacuees and 96% will be returnees. It is interesting to note that when these figures are compared to the same figures derived from MTO and ETO data, there is a remarkable degree of correlation. 

The World War II data presented above may be compared to data developed from the statistical records of World War I by Colonel Albert G. Love of the US Army’s Medical Corps in 1931. Love found that in any typical group of AEF disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) patients, 3.70% would die, 7.52% would have to be evacuated (total lost 11.22%), and 88.78% would be returned to duty. For AEF battle casualty patients, excluding gas wounds, 8.12% would die, 29.58% would have to be evacuated (total lost 37.70%), and 61.88% would be returned to duty. The return rates for World War I DNBI casualties are very close to those of World War II, while World War I BC return rate is smaller than the smallest World War II BC return rate (ETO, General Board: 64.8%). The small World War I BC return rate undoubtedly reflects the less advanced medical treatment available in the earlier conflict (notice, for example, the greater percentage of BC patients dying in hospital).

Expressed in terms of AEF theater evacuation policies, Love’s data reveals the following:

Percentage of Returns Correlated to Theater Evacuation Policy

                                               Percentage Returned to Duty

Days after Admission          Battle Casualties        DNBI

  30                                        24.88                            67.40

  60                                        46.17                            81.74

  90                                        55.73                            86.38

120                                        59.53                            87.95   

…The best, most recent set of data on the replacement value of hospitalized personnel is the data developed from the Korean conflict by Frank A. Reister… Reister’s Table 13, p. 14, shows the final disposition of 248,946 US Army patients from division units originating in Korea during July 1950 – July 1953. Of this number 72,961 were battle casualties (WIA) and 175,985 were non-battle casualties. The distribution of final disposition for battle casualties originating in division units was as follows: 2.2% (1,574) died of wounds, 87.9% (64,159) returned to duty, 8.5% (6,239) were separated for disability, and 1.4% (989) wee administrative separations. The distribution of final dispositions for division non-battle casualties was as follows: 0.3% (485) died, 98.6% (173,525) returned to duty, 0.9% (1,625) were separated for disability, and 0.2% (35) were administrative separations.  

The return to duty figures developed by Reister may be compared to the same figures from Love’s compilation and the various World War II sets to indicate the relative increase in percentage of returns in the two admission categories since World War I and to underscore the value of hospital returnees as a source of replacements in future wars.

Bolding is mine. I suspect the bolded sentence was the basis of the Trevor Dupuy rule of thumb on RTDs.

In the end, there are over 140 old HERO, TNDA, DMSI and Trevor Dupuy reports. None that I have looked at clearly show where his “rule of thumb” on RTDs comes from, although it appears to have come from the last report referenced. I do have more old Dupuy files than I have time to look through them. 

4) There is probably more material out there of value. If so, please post it to the comments in this blog.

5) Proselytizing note: I really did try a couple of years ago to get a probably study done on wounded-to-killed ratios and weapon lethality over time. Could never quite get the funding. Not sure why. See: Two proposals on Combat Casualties | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

If someone really wants the answers to these types of questions, then someone needs to start funding proper research.

Presentations from first HAAC – Evaluating German Aerial Photography at the Battle of Kursk, 1943

The second of seven presentations for the third day in the second conference room of last year’s conference was on “Evaluating German Aerial Photography at the Battle of Kursk, 1943″ by Eugene Matyukhin. We cannot post this excellent presentation at the moment.

————-

We had a total of 31 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The nine presentations given on the first day are all here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The 13 presentations given on the second day (including one that was not given) are all here:  Presentations from HAAC – Urban Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The presentations given on the third day include:

First: “Applying the Scientific Method to Military History (using a virtual laboratory)” by Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies PYY LTD, Sydney, Australia): Presentations from HAAC – The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Second: “Quantitative Analysis of History of Direct Fire Weapons” by Dr. Alexander Kott of the Army Research Laboratory (ARL): Kott HAAC Hist Weapons Sep2022.

Third: “Quantitative Risk Assessment in Military Decisions” by Dr. Douglas A. Samuelson of the InfoLogix, Inc.: DS_risk_HAAC_09292

Fourth: “The Criticality of Resurrecting TDI & TNDM” by Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret): TDI Proposal 22AUG22

Fifth: “The Future of TDI and work of the conference” by Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI): Closing Presentation 

First in second conference room: “The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1918″ by Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG): Meuse Argonne Offensive Operations

Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45

We did have two conference rooms operating and were running parallel briefings for part of the afternoon. The second briefing in the Einstein Conference room of the first day was given by the author Daniel Horvath. It is “Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45” (21 slides): Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front 1944 45_DH_2022.pptx

———-

We had a total of 30 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The conference opened with a brief set of introductory remarks by me. The seven supporting slides are here: Opening Presentation

It was then followed by a briefing by Dr. Shawn Woodford on Studying Combat; The “Base of Sand” Problem: 20220927 HAAC-Studying Combat

The second presentation of the first day was given by me. It is here (45 slides): Data for Wargames (Summary) – 2. 

The third presentation of the first day was given by Dr. Tom Lucas of the Naval Post-Graduate School (49 slides):  Fitting Lanchester equations to time-phased battle data

The fourth presentation of the first day was given by Dr. David Kirkpatrick of the University College of London (25 slides):  DKirkpatrick Presentation 19 Jan 22 v2

The fifth presentation of the first day was given by Dr. Niall MacKay, University of York (161 slides): HAAC2022MacKay 

The sixth presentation of the first day was given by Jim Storr (32 slides): HA Conference DC Sep 22 V1.2

The seventh and final presentation of the first day was given by Dr. Shawn Woodford (10 slides): 20220927 HAAC-Understanding Dupuy

The first briefing in the Einstein Conference room of the first day was given by Dr. Michael Johnson (CNA) (64 slides): Main brief

The Battle of Britain versus The Battle of Kursk

I do have a blog post on the Pen & Sword Blog on Aces at Kursk. The book will be released in the UK on 30 August and in the U.S. on 31 October. The post is here: Author guest post: Christopher A Lawrence – Pen & Sword Blog (pen-and-sword.co.uk).

Also:

Aces at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992

Released as of 20 July, 2022 is a new book from Richard W. Harrison, The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace, 1941-1992. It is available from Amazon here: The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace, 1941–1992: Harrison, Richard W: 9781952715105: Amazon.com: Books

Richard Harrison will be presenting at the Historical Analysis Annual Conference on 29 September. See: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 9 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

 

Economist Article on Russian Casualty Estimates

Sunday evening (probably Monday UK time) The Economist published an article called “How heavy are Russian casualties in Ukraine?” It is here (but not fully available if you do not have a subscription): How heavy are Russian casualties in Ukraine? | The Economist.

The Dupuy Institute was name-checked in the article and the author gave us a shout out on twitter (@sashj). We do appreciate that. 

Still, it does look like the article was heavily influenced or even inspired by my post on 22 July in the section on casualties that started more than half-way down the 7,000+ word post: 

Casualties: William Burns, the Director of the CIA, on 20 July and Mi-6 in the UK are both now putting Russian dead in this war at 15,000. Lots of other people have published much higher figures. Still, this is in line with what I was pointing out a while back: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

On the other hand, he was not so brave as to pick up on the theme presented in the second half of my paragraph:

Glad to see a little reality is starting to creep back into the estimates. I am surprised that any professional historian and defense analyst let themselves get sucked into the higher figures. Overestimation of enemy casualties is kind of a constant in military history.

I guess these types of statements make people uncomfortable.

Here is series of somewhat related posts on the issue of overclaiming:

The 728th Fighter Regiment on 16 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Soviet versus German kill claims at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

So What Was Driving the Soviet Kill Claims? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

This issue is further discussed in my soon-to-be published book Aces at Kursk. I do look at the records of individual aces.

The Economist article then goes into a discussion on wounded-to-killed ratios. I will post more on that later when I get in the right mood to (I do have a book I am supposed to be finishing).

Aces at Kursk – Chapter Listing

Below is the list of chapters in my new book coming out next month: Aces at Kursk: The Battle of Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front 1943. It is with Pen & Sword in the UK. The release date in the UK is 30 August. We have the UK Amazon link here: Buy from Amazon (UK). The release date for the U.S. is 30 October. The U.S. Amazon link is here: Buy from Amazon. Both of these links are on the right side of the blog. If you click on the image, it goes to the Pen & Sword site. You can pre-order the book direct from the publisher or Amazon or other sites. I have not yet seen a final copy. Not sure if I will have copies available at our conference: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 9 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is discounted if pre-ordered. It is cheapest if pre-ordered directly from Pen & Sword. They have a nice pre-order discount. It is not a small book, 392 pages. 

Chapter One: The Strategic Air Campaign                                             1

Chapter Two: Both Sides Prepare                                                         14

Chapter Three: The Strike at Dawn: 5 July 1943 (Monday)                 40

Chapter Four: The Fight for Air Superiority: 6-7 July 1943                 60

Chapter Five: The Air War Continues: 8-9 July 1943                           97

Chapter Six: A Less Intense Air War Continues: 10-11 July 1943    119

Chapter Seven: The Air Battle to Support the Offensive:

              North of Kursk, 5-11 July 1943                                               130

Chapter Eight: The Soviet Counteroffensives: 12 -14 July 1943      185

Chapter Nine: Winding Down: 15-24 July 1943                                  213

Chapter Ten: The Last Air Offensive                                                   227

Appendix I: German and Soviet Terminology                                    241

Appendix II: Air Campaign Statistics                                                  251

Appendix III: The Structure of the German Ground Offensive         317

Appendix IV: Commander Biographies                                              332

 

Aces at Kursk

Oh, and by the way, I have a new book coming out next month: Aces at Kursk: The Battle of Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front 1943. It is with Pen & Sword in the UK. The release date in the UK is 30 August. We have the UK Amazon link here: Buy from Amazon (UK). The release date for the U.S. is 30 October. The U.S. Amazon link is here: Buy from Amazon. Both of these links are on the right side of the blog. If you click on the image, it goes to the Pen & Sword site. You can pre-order the book direct from the publisher or Amazon or other sites. I have not yet seen a final copy. Not sure if I will have copies available at our conference: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 8 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is discounted if pre-ordered. It is cheapest if pre-ordered directly from Pen & Sword. They have a nice pre-order discount.

It is not a small book, 392 pages. This book took a while to publish. I could not find an American publisher that wanted to publish it. Oddly enough, when I contacted Pen & Sword, they mentioned that they had been publishing a lot of American authors recently. 

I did have three chapters on the air war in my big Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka book. This book was built from those three chapters, the associated air war appendix, and a lot of other material that has been assembled since I first wrote this around 2002.  I also added some chapters on air war on the north side of Kursk (this was at the request of the publisher) and I did have some Soviet air regiment records that I had collected that was not part of the original big book. I also spend more time than I would like disputing accounts and figures from other books. There have been other works published since 2002 when I first wrote the manuscript for my big Kursk book. Unfortunately, some of these added to the confusion over the history. Maybe the best thing is to ignore other works and just tell your account, but in this case, I did roll up my sleeves and debate the details of what they said. Mostly this was done in footnotes, but I did also put in a few “sidebars” in the text. Kind of hated to do that as some of these people I know virtually, and they have always been decent supportive people. But facts are facts, and I really do think the story needs to be told correctly.

I will probably be working on another Kursk related book this fall called The Battle of Tolstoye Woods. This time with an American publisher. I do have a master plan to do up to a dozen books covering all the fighting in the south of Russia and Ukraine in 1943. May yet get around to covering the entire Battle of Kursk and the three battles of Kharkov in 1943.

A couple of related posts:

Aces at Kursk – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Is this my last Kursk book? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)