Big Bombs

A lot of big bombs have been dropped over the last 70+ years. In World War II, the British dropped 42 of these 22,000 pound bombs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Slam_%28bomb%29

It evolved from the 12,000 pound Tallboy, of which 854 were made: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tallboy_(bomb)

We used some of these, designated at the T-10 in the Korean War (1950-1953). We even had a 13,000 pound guided bomb version of it that was used in Korea: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASM-A-1_Tarzon

Now re-designated as the M-121, this 10,000 pound version of the bomb was used pretty extensively in Vietnam, usually air dropped by helicopters to create landing zones, often in a “hot” area: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-121_(bomb)

The BLU-82, or daisy cutter, was a 15,000 pound bomb also used in Vietnam. 225 were built: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-121_(bomb)

This was replaced by the “Mother of all Bombs,” manufactured in 2003 and weighing in at 21,600 pounds. This is what was used in Afghanistan yesterday: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GBU-43/B_Massive_Ordnance_Air_Blast

The Russians have their own version, only 15,650 pounds: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Father_of_All_Bombs

Anyhow, these weapons have been around for a while, but I think this is the first use of one in combat since Vietnam (please correct me if I am wrong).

 

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
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Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
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His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
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Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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3 Comments

  1. You cannot expect to win wars by solely relying on strategic assets.
    During WW2, 2,770,540 bomb tonnage was dropped over Europe, 1,415,746 t or (51,1%) over Germany, which had an impact of 9-10% (and 15% on abseentism) on the Reich’s war economy. Precision and costs aside, usually civillians are going to suffer.
    Vietnam was bombed for years, yet the insurgents kept coming, it was rather inefficient. Either fight or do not go at all.
    This event can be merely described as a spectacle and Trump’s demonstration of power (flexing muscles has a malus on international affairs, depicting Trump’s diplomatic incompetence).

    • This is not a strategic weapon. It was used as a tactical weapon specifically targeted as a tunnel complex in an unpopulated area. We used a number of 10,000 pound bombs in South Vietnam (dozens or more?), they were mostly used to clear a landing area before conducting an air assault.

      • It is about the sum, the strategy is to win wars through air dominance, to minimize valuable voters lives. Maybe I should make it more clear: It is like comparing CAS with the USSB (or Drones who are used to deal with certain individuals, although they still hold some value). The most important aspect is not to increase the amount of high explosives, but rather win the brains and hearts of the Afghan people, so they will expel any despotic (insurgent) force in the future. The international and diplomatic consequences do not justify its utilization. It is fodder for the media. The price of a few insurgents vs the loss of influence and increased mistrust.

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