The Attack on Mariupol – part 3 of the First Phase of the War discussion

This is the third in a series of extended posts examining the First Phase of this war. The first post is here: The Assault on Kiev – part 1 of the discussion on the First Phase of the War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Second post is here: The Assault on Kherson – part 2 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Attack on Mariupol: This is sort one of the two Russian successes in the entire first two months of the war. Taking Kherson and Kherson province is the other one.

Now, while Mariupol was a primary objective of the war, everyone knew this was coming. It was well defended and was known to be a tough nut to crack. These lines and units had been in place since 2014. As Russia’s original operations also focused on Kiev (and Chernigov and Sumy) and Kharkov and Kherson (and Melitopol), they also did advance on Mariupol from the east.

The advance and operations to the east of Mariupol was probably done by a mix of Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) forces and Russian forces.

Mariupol and the areas around it was defended by at least 3,500 Ukrainian defenders, and suspect it was more than that. The two units in the area were the neo-fascist militia Azov Regiment and the Ukranian 36th Marine (or Naval Infantry) Brigade. Other units that have been listed inside Mariupol are the 12th Operations Brigade and the State Border Guards Service. Other units also listed as involved include the 10th Assault Brigade, 56th Motorized Brigade, (whose HQ is in Mariupol) and Territorial Defense Forces. But, those first two units are the ones that are still holding out in Mariupol as I am writing this. The Azov Regiment, although a volunteer militia that evolved from a football (soccer) club, is an experienced and highly motivated combat unit that has been involved in fighting since 2014. They are the neo-fascist unit tied to the Ukrainian army. As far as I know, they are the only proclaimed neo-fascist unit.

The Advance on Mariupol: Mariupol itself had not come under any form of direct ground attack in the first couple of days of the war. It was, of course, shelled on the first day of the war, being within artillery range of the front lines. On the 25th of February, forces advancing from DPR territory fought near the village of Pavlopil (pop. 624 in 2001). The Russian and DPR forces continued advancing forward over the next couple of days, reaching the outskirts of Mariupol on the night of 27 February. The following day the city was surrounded by these forces and electricity gas and internet connections was cut that evening. It does appear that the local Russian and DPR forces has effectively isolated Mariupol, making any amphibious operations near Berdyansk and operations from Melitopol somewhat redundant. 

The Surrounding of Mariupol: On March 1 the head of the DPR announced that they had surrounded the nearby town of Volnovakha (pop. 21,441), 35 miles North of Mariupol. It has a large Ukrainian Greek population. It had been heavily shelled.

Mariupol was effectively surrounded and isolated on 2 March. This appears to have been done by the forces that came out of the DPR. They also began shelling Mariupol on the 1st and 2nd of March, with the shelling on 2 March being particularly heavy. The city was without power, gas or water and the vice-mayor of the city said on 3 March that they can hold out for five days.

The Advance to Melitopol: Meanwhile, Russian forces arrived outside of Melitopol (pop. 150,768) on the morning of 25 February and the city’s leadership surrender the city later that day. Then the narrative gets a little confused, with Ukrainian claiming to have counterattacked, and the city and surrounding area still being contested over the next couple of days. On the 28th, the Ukrainians actually reclaimed the city hall. Again, it appears that the Russian forces were limited in manpower. On 1 March, after a four-day fight, Russia clearly had control of the city. This fight probably resulted in less than 100 killed on both sides. It is clear this area was not heavily defended and the attacking forces were also somewhat limited. The forces coming out of Crimea had taken Kherson, Melitopol and much of the area between those two cities. The distance between Melitopol and Mariupol was only 107 miles (172 kilometers), so Mariupol was being deeply enveloped in addition to the fighting near the city of Mariupol itself.

So, depending on available forces and what Ukrainian resistance was, it was a distance that could be covered by advancing Russian ground forces in two or more days. But then they conducted an amphibious operation to the west of Berdyansk to further envelop Mariupol on the evening of 25 February.

The Amphibious Landing at Berdyansk: This operation appears to have been rather unnecessary. They were outside of Melitopol on 25 February taking in on 1 March and they were outside Mariupol on the evening of 27 February. So not sure what the objective of this amphibious operation was unless it was just another way of introducing more forces into the area. Melitopol is only 68 miles (102 kilometers) from Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), and as far as I know, there was not a lot of Ukrainian forces in between. It seems like it would have been easier to just advance from Melitopol.

They probably just wanted to add some more forces to the operations and the available forces were naval infantry. Still, they could have brought them over to Crimea and marched on Berdyansk from the west from there, but that may have taken longer (perhaps). Or, they could landed them in Crimea before the war started and had them come out of Crimea with the rest of the forces on the 24th of February.

Anyhow, they conducted an un-opposed amphibious landing some 70 kilometers (43 miles) to the west of Mariupol on the evening of 25 February. This was also to the west of Berdyansk. It was reported by U.S. defense officials to be a force of thousands of naval infantry (marines). We never got a good estimate of the size of the operations, but it was reported to have used four landing ships. The Russians had up to 10 LSTs in the Black Sea, which could each can carry 25 APCs or 10 tanks. So the sense is that there was more amphibious capability available than what was used here. We doubt the landing was more than brigade-sized. 

Just as a note, the last opposed U.S. amphibious operation I believe was the USMC landing at Tang Island in 1975.  

These forces quickly consolidated, advance and took Berdyansk on 27 February and later connected up with whatever forces were advancing from Melitopol. Berdyansk was not well defended, with local authorities claiming that one person was killed and another wounded. At least eight Ukrainian small warships and patrol boats were seized.

The real action in Berdyansk did not happen until 24 March, where the Russian landing ship Saratov (3,400 tons) was sunk in port and one or two other landing ships were damaged by a Ukrainian missile attack. The commander of the Caesar Kunikov (2,812 tons) was reported killed on 18 April, but it probably occurred during this attack.

The Advance on Mariupol: Now, having control of Berdyansk, which was only 45 miles (72 kilometers) away from Mariupol, they now moved to complete the investment of Mariupol (which still may have been open to the west). Mariupol ending up losing power on 1 March and was certainly surrounded and cut off from the rest of Ukraine that same day (which is when I start dating the siege). At this point, no Ukrainian army forces were within 60 miles of Mariupol, and it was clearly isolated and was not going to ever be relieved. 

This was now an Alamo-like scenario, an impossible defense while surrounded for the purpose of delaying the enemy. There was no hope for the besieged. 

I will stop here for now. Next post is on the advance to take the northwest part of Ukraine (Chernigov, Sumy, Konotop). I will do a follow-up post to this one on the siege of Mariupol at some point in the near future. 

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
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Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
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His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
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Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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