The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 376

Bakhmut is the story except we really don’t know what is actually happening. The Russian push to the north of the city has closed around enough so that there is a gap of only around 4 kilometers between the north and south wings of the Russian advance, except there has been no significant advances for several days. There are rumors that Ukraine has been withdrawing forces from Bakhmut, or that Ukraine is going to counterattack, that the Russian advances have stalled, or that Russia is about to take Bakhmut, and that Russia is taking heavy losses or that Ukraine is taking heavy losses (see: Ukrainian soldiers in Bakhmut: ‘Our troops are not being protected’ ( Pick a rumor. The weather has warmed up, leaving the ground very muddy, which is certainly slowing and limiting operations. It is distinctly possible that Bakhmut could fall any day now… or maybe it won’t.

There have also been several strikes in Russia this last week. This includes 1) the Russian Volunteer Corps, led by the neo-fascist Denis Kapustin (aka Nikitin), a unit of Russians fighting for Ukraine, making an incursion into the bordering Bryansk district on 2 March with a couple of dozen people (45 according to Kapustin) and killing two, 2) some strikes in the Belgorod region, and 3) a failed drone strike against a gas facility on 28 February in the Moscow region, 60 miles from Moscow. Russia is also claiming today that Kapustin attempted to assassinate a Russian oligarch.

What is interesting over the last month is what has not happened. The weather at the beginning of the month finally chilled enough to freeze the ground. This created a six-week window for offensive operations. We are now more than half-way through that window and neither side has conducted a major offensive. Other things that have not happened include: 1) Bakhmut has not fallen, 2) there had not been a major missile strike since 10 February and 3) Russia had not showed up on the battlefield with an extra 200,000 or 500,000 troops. In general, this month is notable for what has not happened. Needless to say, some “analysts” were predicting all kinds of things.

I am guessing at this point, that if nothing has happened in the first four weeks of this six-week weather window, then probably nothing major is not going to happen in the last two weeks. That does not mean that Bakhmut may not fall, but I don’t really consider it militarily significant.

The rest of the front is quiet. In the last two weeks there has not been much action to the south of Bakhmut at the village of Vuhledar (pop. 14,144 in 2022). Two Russian naval infantry brigades (the 155th and the 40th) appear to have taken heavy losses in an attack a couple of weeks ago, and nothing has happened since then. There are only minor actions in and around Kreminna, Svatove, etc. There was another Ukrainian strike on two Russian bases in Melitopol, with claims of high Russian casualties.

The Russian losses at Vuhledar appear to include (based upon Orynx): 19 tanks destroyed, 4 abandoned and 1 captured; 31 AFVs destroyed, 9 abandoned, 1 captured; 9 trucks and specialized vehicles destroyed. This covers losses from 26 Jan to 27 Feb.  The much higher loss figures that other people quote appear to be based upon tanks and IFVs “damaged.” Not sure exactly what that means. This is heavy losses. Whether it is enough to gut one or two brigades is harder to determine.

Russia last big aerial bombardment attack was on 10 February using 71 missiles. Ukraine claimed 61 downed (86%). What is interesting is the long wait since then. If Russia was going to degrade the Ukrainian power system, then they probably need to strike every 7 to 10 days. They are no longer doing that. Is that because they need to preserve resources (drones and rockets) and they attacks are not having their desired effect, either to the electrical grid or to the will of the Ukrainians to continue the war? It appears that this Russian air campaign is a failure.

The U.S. and many countries in and around Europe are now providing tanks to Ukraine. This includes 31 Abrams (M1A2) from the U.S., the previously announced 40 AMX-10 light tanks from France, the previously announced 14 Challengers from the UK and 14 new Challengers from the UK, 14 Leopards (2A6) from Germany announced on Jan. 25 plus they are going to provide 14 more later, 14 or so Leopards (2A4?) from Poland, maybe 20 Leopards (2A4) from Spain, but so far only 6 have been confirmed (they are planning to train 55 Ukrainian crew members), no Leopards from Netherlands (previous rumors said 18), Portugal is sending 4 (2A6) out of their 37, 8 (2A4) from Norway out of their 36, and 4 2A4 Leopards from Canada out of their 80. Non-NATO members Finland is providing 3 Leopards and Sweden is providing 6 or 10 A6s. Also, Morocco is providing Ukraine with 173 T-74s EA, 70 are already in Ukraine. It does appear in a number of cases the announcements are lagging behind the actual shipments of tanks. Poland is providing Ukraine with another 60 upgraded T-72s. It has already sent Ukraine some 260 or more tanks. 

Twelve countries in NATO have Leopards. Germany is saying that a total of around 80 will be sent between them all. My count currently shows at least 73 Leopards from eight different countries (two not yet in NATO). It now looks like many of the older 40-45 ton German Leopard Is are being refurbished and will be sent. Germany has 88 of them it could send and Belgium has 50. Between Denmark, Netherlands and Germany, they are putting together a package of 100 1A5s, although the details of the deal keep changing.  It will be a while before most of them arrive. An initial package of 29 is being refurbished and are supposed to arrive in the summer (enough for one more brigade). There are a lot of them out there, with Greece supposedly having 520 (and 392 U.S. M-48s and 100 U.S. M-60s) and Turkey having 355 or 397 (and 750 M-48s and 785 M-60s). Opportunity to replace old stocks. Switzerland has 230 Leopard 2 tanks of which 96 are not in operation (in storage). Getting neutral Switzerland to release these unused tanks is a challenge. Germany has asked.

From a practical point of view, it means that around four or so Ukrainian tank battalions will be armed up with Abrams/Leopard 2/Challengers. Ukraine has over 30 tank battalions. Some should probably be in place for the spring offensives. Some of the Canadian Leopard 2s have already arrived in Poland. At least 4 of the Leopards have arrived in Ukraine. Challengers will be arriving in Ukraine next month (March).

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia mapIt is dated 6 March. The last dated update on the map is Soledar on 16 January.

Map from 13 January 2023 of Bakhmut area is from @War_Mapper:

Map from 6 March 2023 of Bakhmut from @War_Mapper:

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.


We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secureRussia has rejoined the grain deal that they withdraw from on 29 October as a result of Ukrainian attacks on Russian ships near Sevastopol, and they have renewed the grain deal for another 120 days. The shipments still continue and the agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Turkey has resulted in over twenty-three million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 5 March, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea was 23,149,363 metric tonnes carried in 785 ships according to recent posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 14 days left to the agreement. The Russians did hit a Turkish ship in Odesa last month. I am guessing that is an accident, as Turkey is one of the few NATO countries that Russia has any dialogue with

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (

Russia is digging trench lines along the beaches in Crimea. Is there really a threat of amphibious invasion from Ukraine?

Weather: Kharkiv at 2 PM: It is 35 degrees (2 Celsius) and cloudy. Snow is forecasted for today and rain is forecasted for tomorrow, Wednesday and Friday through Tuesday. For the next 10 days, it is rarely freezing at nights and above freezing on all days. Sunrise is now at 6:06 and sunset is at 5:24, giving them over eleven hours of daytime to operate it. 

Kherson is 45 degrees (7 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. Rain is forecasted for Tuesday and Friday through Monday. For the next 10 days, it is freezing on only one night and above freezing during all of the days. Sunrise at 6:18 and sunset at 5:41. 

This week appears unusually warm for March in Ukraine. This is creating a massive mud problem and probably stalling out most major offensive efforts. Is this the case for the rest of March? I suspect serious offensives will not start until Spring. Spring in 1943 meant around 1 May. It was too wet and muddy before then.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (

Do not know the current strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army but am guessing that it is between 200,000 to 300,000 troops. They clearly are going to have to build it up to 400,000 or more in response to Russia’s partial mobilization. There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They were reporting their ground forces at 198,000 in July 2022. 

Do not have a good estimate of the total number of foreign volunteers now in Ukraine, although it is clearly thousands.

Russian Army Build-up:  

Ukraine is reporting that around 280,000 Russians are deployed in Ukraine. This seems a reasonable estimate. On 4 November Putin stated at 318,000 reservists and “new volunteers” have been mobilized and 49,000 are in combat zones. I assume the Russian army in Ukraine was at about 200,000 at the start of this mobilization. Ukrainian press is now reporting that Russia is going to mobilize another 500,000 starting 15 January. Now their minister is saying Russia recruited 500,000 soldiers in their call up of reservists. We shall see if these rumors are correct. Ukraine will have to respond in kind.

The U.S. and UK estimate that the Wagner Group had 50,000 people in December 2022. Have no idea if this estimate is accurate.

The Russian defense budget for 2023 is $159 billion, up from $111 billion in 2022. This appears to now be around 9% of GDP.

According to one article, which I suspect is a little biased, Russian tank production at Uralvagonzavod is currently over 900 armored vehicles a year, including 35-40 T-90s a month. In contrast, the U.S. is producing two M-1A2 a month in Lima, Ohio. The German Leopard 2 is also still in production. 

Russia is getting some support from China, possibly spare parts and more important, microchips. They are reportedly not currently providing Russia with weapons. This is a source of discussion between the U.S./EU and China.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia has added at least 41,000 troops to the front line from their new partial mobilization effort and will be adding more. Potentially up to 300,000. Most likely by the spring next year, both armies will be sporting 400,000 or more troops. It does appear that by next spring, the level of intensity and casualties from this war will be a count twice as high as it currently has been.

General Valery Zaluzhny, the head of the Ukrainian armed forces, said in an interview on 16 December that Russia is preparing 200,000 fresh troops to launch another attack on Kiev in February or March or maybe late January. This is sort of line with my assumption that the Russian Army in Ukraine will be built up to around 400,000 troops by spring. Suspect the same or more for Ukraine. On the other hand, a Ukrainian minister is now saying the Russians recruited 500,000 late last year (instead of 300,000) and so therefore will be employing superior numbers against Ukraine. Not sure this is the case. 

Economics and the Home Fronts:

On 30 December the Prime Minister of Ukraine said that Ukraine managed to harvest 60 million tons of crops. In 2021 according to the Kyiv Independent Ukraine harvested 84 million tons of cereals and legumes, as well as 22.6 million tons of oilseed. This was actually the largest harvest in the recent history of Ukraine (since 1991). This was primarily due to favorable weather conditions (they are being helped by global warming?). In 2021 Ukraine had 42 million hectares of farmland which covers 70% of the country. Large agro-corporations operated 6 million of these hectares, small and medium agro-companies operated on 11 million. In 2020 Ukraine’s agricultural sector made up 9% of their GDP. A 20-year moratorium on land transactions was officially lifted on July 1, 2021.

According to Ukraine’s economic ministry. the Ukrainian economy shrank by 30.4% in 2022. I have seen an estimated for Ukraine of 45% decline in the economy and IMF has estimated a 35% decline (and 8.5% for Russia). Not sure that is the case anymore with $100+ billion in aid coming in (Ukrainian GDP was $181 billion in 2021). According to Ukraine, its GDP has dropped by 30% in the first nine months of this year. 

A recent late January poll said that 87% of Ukrainians support joining the EU while 86% support joining NATO. Don’t know how accurate that poll is, but it sounds about right.

According to the IMF as of 31 January 2023, the Russian GDP shrank by at least 2.2% in 2022 and maybe as much as 3.9% (World Bank/OECD). The IMF is now saying the Russian economy will grow by 0.3% in 2023. Not sure how that happens with declining oil prices (see below).For December 2022, retail sales are down 10.5% and production was down 4.3% compared to December 2021. This sounds like a still declining economy. Meanwhile the U.S. GDP grew by 2.0% in 2022 (latest IMF figures).

Russia has lost professional workers to flight from the country. The Federal State Statistic Service (Rosstat) is reporting 419,00 left Russia in the first half of 2022. They are claiming that 321,000 have returned. These are lower figures than people have previously reported (see paragraph below). See: Rosstat: Since the beginning of the year, 419 thousand people have left russia – DW – 06.09.2022

A recent non-governmental survey states that the average age of Russians who left the county after Feb. 24 is 32 years old, while 80% of them have a higher education degree. Between January and May of 2022, the population of the Russian Federation fell by over 430,000 people, 20% of those having left the country according to Rosstat. The long-term impact on Russia of this is significant and it may affect the country for decades. This article is worthwhile: ‘We realized that there’s no way we can return’: Russia’s best and brightest are leaving the country in record numbers. 6 young Russians explain why they left ( The Central Bank of Russia is reporting that 458 billion rubles (7.46 billion dollars) has been withdrawn from personal accounts since 21 September. The estimated GDP of Russia $2.133 trillion (IMF 2022), or 1.776 trillion (World Bank 2021) or 1.483 trillion (United Nations 2020). So, this is 0.3% to 0.5% of GDP that I am guessing has just migrated out of the country in the last month.

Added to that professional migration, it is estimated by the Gaidar Institute (which is still independent) that 250 to 350,000 people have left because the partial mobilization. See: IGOR YEFREMOV: “RAPID DEPARTURE OF EVEN A FEW HUNDRED THOUSAND RUSSIANS OF WORKING AGE CAUSES A VISIBLE BLOW TO THE LABOR MARKET” (The Gaidar Institute) ( This is also lower than some previous claims (for example Forbes says 600,000 to 700,000, see above under “Russian Army Build-up”). Still, this adds up to potentially a half-million or more who have left the country because of the war. 

The latest story is that of the 10,500 Russians that have entered Argentina in the last year, over half of them have been pregnant woman that have entered in the list three months (according to the Argentinian National Director of Immigration). I guess these women are voting with their feet. I wish them the best. Meanwhile, Russian birthrate in 2020 was 1.5 children born per woman (replacement rate is @2.1…U.S. birthrate is 1.664 in 2021). We have talked about this before (long before Elon Musk started talking about it):  Demographics of Russia | Mystics & Statistics ( and Demographics of Russia – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (

A major part of this war is about who is getting hurt the worst economically and how long people can stand the pain. The IMF reports that the Euro Area grew by 3.5% in 2022 and with a 2.0% growth for the U.S. It does appear that Putin’s plan to turn Europe away from supporting Ukraine has failed. From a practical point of view, around half the aid going to Ukraine is the from the U.S., the other half is from the EU. There is some other international support (like Japan). According to the latest IMF estimates (which I do not have complete confidence in), the U.S. economy is going to grow by 1.4% for 2023, the Euro area by 0.7% and Russia by 0.3%. They have the UK economy declining by 0.6% in 2023.

Russia’s Finance Ministry is saying that budget revenue in January 2023 was 35% lower compared to January 2022. Deficit was 1.77 trillion rubles (23.9 billion). Oil and Gas revenue, the backbone of Russia’s budget and economy, was down 46% compared to January 2022. The oil and gas sector accounted for up to 40% of Russia’s budget revenues in 2019. Lower oil prices are clearly having an impact. Would be nice if we could get Saudi Arabia and OPEC to up production by 2 billion barrels. Russia is selling gold to cover the deficit.

The reduction in energy imports already led to a $5.9 billion budget shortfall for Russia in August. They previously were running in the black. The Russian government ended up having to do a 10% across the board cut because of the budget shortfalls. I gather that most energy exports to the west have now ended.

Meanwhile, as of 17 February, European gas prices have dropped to below 50 Euro per megawatt hour. This is an 85% drop from the price peak last year. It just reinforces the narrative that Putin’s attempt to undermine European support has failed.

Price of oil (Brent Crude) is at 84.70 as of 8:30 AM. This lower price does hurt Russia. Saudi Arabia and OPEC decided in October to cut production by 2 billion barrels. This cut clearly helped Russia and may have affected U.S. politics. It is a dangerous political play by Saudi Arabia considering that its leadership is not well loved in the west. Saudi Arabia is now providing $410 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine and last week made their first official visit to Ukraine. Saudi currently produces around 10.6 million barrels a day. As I pointed out in an old post below $80 a barrel used to be the point where the Russian government budget would go into the red. Needless to say, low oil prices starve the Russian war machine. The Ruble is down to 75.45 to the dollar, probably because of declining oil prices. The Ukrainian Hryvnia is steady at 36.90 to a dollar.

U.S. inflation rate for 2022 was 8.0% but appears to be declining. Germany was 7.88%, UK was 7.90%, France was 5.22%, Italy was 8.18%. Turkey was 71.98%. Russia was 11.53% for 2022. It is up to 11.8% for Russia in January 2023, inflamed by the declining ruble.

It does appear that Putin has ridden out the political blowback from the partial mobilization. This has included 1) municipal councils in St. Petersburg and Moscow petitioning for his removal; 2) street protests in Moscow, St. Petersburg and elsewhere against the mobilization. According to OVD-Info, so far 16,437 people have been arrested or detained in Russia for anti-war activism since the start of the invasion and at least another 1,300 were detained or arrested around 21 September, 3) famed musician Alla Pugacheva speaking out against the invasion, and 4) mass migration from the country that may be as many as a half-million people. Still, it appears the government is securely in power and are going continue the war for 2023.

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed.

I also note this recent article: Ukraine’s war secret: how many of their troops have died? | News | The Sunday Times ( There is also a discussion on ammunition consumption on both sides at the end of the article.

I did do a briefing on 7 December in Norway that concluded:

Losses in 2022:

Ukrainian Army:

  • 13,500 – 16,500 killed
  • 54,000 – 66,000 wounded
  • 6,000 captured
  • 1,000 missing

Russian Army:

  • 16,028 – 19,028 killed (including LPR and DPR)
  • 64,112 – 76,112 wounded
  • 1,000 captured
  • 1,000? missing


  • 6,655 killed as of 1 December
  • Real figure is probably thousands more

The (slightly edited) full briefing is here (the figures are on slide 46): Some Observations from the War in Ukraine (2)

The Pentagon has just claimed that total Russian losses may exceed 110K. That is in line with my figures. BBC News Russia and an independent Russia media outlet called Mediazona records 10,720 Russians killed in 2022 and have added another 942 deaths for January 1-17 2023. This is a count of casualties by name that is developed by reviewing Russian announcements, obituaries, etc. As such, it certainly undercounts deaths to a degree. 

As of end of November, people were batting around Russian loss figures in the range of 100,000 to 110,000 or more. Now, they seem to be above 200,000. So, nine months to get to the first 100,000 casualties and now over the last two months another 100,000 casualties? This seems odd, especially as there are no major offensives being conducted, it is bad weather and short days. Not sure what is the factual basis for these recent higher casualty estimates. 

The Mediazona count of Russian war dead as of 3 February was 13,030. The actual figures are certainly higher, but how much higher? See:  A quarter of the dead are yesterday’s civilians: what is known about Russia’s losses in Ukraine by February – BBC News Russian service.

Note that the article also says: “This figure is based on the observations of the Center for Naval Analysis of the United States, according to which for every dead Russian soldier during the war in Ukraine, there are an average of about three and a half wounded.” Not sure of the basis for the 3.5-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio

The Russian Defense Minister is now claiming as of 21 September that they have lost 5,937 killed in this war. This is their first update since March. This figure is probably low. A BBC News effort to count Russian casualties by name from open sources has come up with a figure of 6,476 as of 15 September. There are also losses of 3,069 for the DPR and at least 600 for the LPR (and I suspect the figure is higher). So, it appears that Russia and their allied losses are at least 9,606 killed and this probably does not include Chechens or the Wagner Group. He also claimed that almost 90% of the wounded have already returned to service and Ukrainian losses were 61,207 dead and 49,368 wounded. On 21 September, the Ukrainian General Staff put Russian killed at 55,110. On 25 March the Russian Defense Ministry stated that their losses were 1,351 Russians killed and 3,825 wounded (a 2.83-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio).

The BBC Russia count of Russian dead is up to 7,822 Russians reported killed as of 21 October. This includes 41 recent draftees. My general sense is that the Russia army let itself get seriously depleted and should have started partial mobilization sooner. Sending recently mobilized troops to hold the line is not a good use of personnel.

There are rumors in mid-October that Russian has suffered 90,000 irrecoverable losses. Sources are reports from Russian news service Meduza quoting unnamed FSB source (would FSB know Army losses?). An irrecoverable loss is killed, seriously wounded or missing. So maybe 1/3 to 1/2 of those losses are killed, which does produce a figure on the high side in my opinion. I assume Ukraine does know how many Russians it has captured, but I have never seen a figure for that.

Meanwhile the Ukrainian deputy defense minister on 16 October is claiming that they exchanging losses with the Russians at a rate of 1 to 6.5. I do not trust such a claim. 

The UN is reporting as of 27 February at least 8,101 civilians confirmed dead in the war. This is a large leap of almost a thousand killed since the report of 13 February (7,199) and I assume is due to upgrading of the records, as they only reporting 123 civilians killed from 1-26 February. See: Ukraine: civilian casualty update 27 February 2023 | OHCHR vice Ukraine: civilian casualty update 13 February 2023 | OHCHR. Not sure why the reporting has suddenly gotten “squirrelly.”

Of those 3,714 of the deaths are in Ukrainian controlled territory in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 622 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. One wonders how many of the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures.

From 1-30 November, OHCHR recorded 688 civilian casualties (162 killed). Of those, 153 were killed and 487 injured due to explosive weapons with wide area effects and 9 were killed and 39 injured due to mines and explosive remnants of war.  

From 1-31 December, OHCHR recorded 801 civilian casualties (188 killed). Of those 164 were killed and 584 injured due to explosive weapons with wide area effects and 24 were killed and 29 injured due to mines and explosive remnants of war.

From 1-31 January, OHCHR recorded 697 civilian casualties (177 killed). Of those 167 were killed and 495 injured due to explosive weapons with wide area effects and 10 were killed and 25 injured due to mines and explosive remnants of war.

They did include this chart in one of their earlier reports:

On 5 December, the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Yevhen Yenin, said that according to National Police over 9,400 civilians have been killed in Russian shelling.

More than 28,000 people have died in this conflict: 5,937 or more (Russian Army) + 9,000 or more (Ukrainian Army) + 8,101 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 27,814. It is probably in excess of 38,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses.

On 14 November a Taiwanese fighter, “Jonathan” Tseng Sheng-Guang, is reported to have died in Ukraine. The first Japanese volunteer fighter, under the name of Dobure, also has been killed in Ukraine. It is reported that at least 16 Belarussians have died fighting for UkraineIt has been reported that two Azerbaijani volunteers have died fighting for Ukraine. The total number of Americans killed in the war is eight killed in combat and three civilians. Three have been captured of which all three have now been exchanged, as has one detained civilian. On 2 February, an American medic, Pete Reed, was killed. He was a former Marine and 33 years old.On 16 February, Andrew Peters, age 28, from Wisconsin was killed. He was former U.S. Army with experience in Afghanistan.

Ammo: The second and third to last paragraphs in The Times (UK) article referenced above says:

However, Barrons argues that Ukraine needs ammunition even more than it needs soldiers. It fires 90,000 155mm shells a month and sometimes 6,000 shells a day but combined US and European production is less than 30,000 a month. “There is a mathematical mismatch,” he says. The US is tripling its output but “Europe has been too slow”.

Russia, which has been firing 20,000 shells a day and is thought to have used up ten years’ worth of production in 12 months, has the same problem. In recent weeks they have reduced the numbers by 75 per cent.

So 6,000 shells a day vice 20,000 shells a day, have no idea if that is true or what percent of the rounds fire are “smart” versus old style. One would expect the side firing the most rounds would be causing more causalities. On the other hand, if U.S. production is less than 30,000 a month Ukraine will be forced to eventually reduce their expenditures to 1,000 or 2,000 shells a day. If Russia has to reduce their numbers by 75%, then they are firing 5,000 shells a day. Don’t know if any single number in this discussion is close to reality but suspect that both sides will have to reduce their artillery expenditure at least until May. This war could be very quiet for a couple of months.

Anyhow, Ukraine is requesting 250,000 shells a month from the EU.

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now. For 24 August Ukraine reported 200 Russian sorties over Ukraine. 

On 3 September is it stated that Ukraine did 40 sorties, which is a record. On 18 September they claimed to have launched 20 air strikes, on 22 September launched 25 and on 11 October launched 15 air strikes. This is a fairly low level of air activity.

@Oryx, which is a twitter account worth following, is reporting as of 14 September that since the start of the war 53 Russian aircraft have been destroyed as have 42 Ukrainian aircraft. This is all counted by photo confirmation. On 19 September, U.S. General James Hecker stated that Ukraine has shot down 55 Russian aircraft in the war. He stated that he was pretty sure that all of those losses were due to surface-to-air missiles, SA-10s and SA-11s. This count does not include non-battle losses and accidents (of which there are some). It appears no Russian planes have been shot down in air-to-air combat and maybe only a handful of Ukrainian planes.

The Russians are now reported to be using loitering munitions. Ukraine has been using them since the start of the war. There are also reports of drone-on-drone engagements and have been 9 such cases reported. So drone vs drone combat is now a thing. 

A Ukrainian deputy prime minister is saying on 12 February that Ukraine has already “contracted” 1,765 drones. It has spent more than 85.5 million Euros on the drones and more than 3,500 servicemen have been trained to operate them. 

Missile Defense: In his 5 July video, Denys Davydov states almost 80% of Russian missiles are being intercepted by anti-missile defenses. I have seen this claim repeated elsewhere but have no idea as to its validity. On 10 October, Ukraine intercepted only 43 out of the 84 missiles (51%) fired at it. On 11 October, they intercepted 20 out of 28 (71%). On 16 October there was another wave of missiles targeting Ukraine’s energy structure. The Mayor of Kiev (heavy weight world champion Vitali Klitschko) said that 23 of the 28 drones fired at Kiev were intercepted. Overall, 42 drones were fired at Ukraine and they claimed to have shot down 36 of them. 

The bombardment on 31 October consisted of over 50 Russian missiles/drones, of which 44 were claimed to have been shot down. Ukraine claims to have shot down 73 of the over 100 missiles fired in the bombardment of 15 November. Fragments of one Ukrainian air defense missile landed in Poland killing two. The missile that landed in Poland on 15 November was probably a Soviet-era S-300 surface-to-air missile, of which most versions have a range of less than 100 miles. Pretty hard for this to be anything other than Ukrainian. On 23 November, there was a large missile attack where Ukraine claimed 51 out of 70 missiles shot down. This attack shut down all the power in Kiev and killed four civilians there. The large attack on 5 December claimed around 60 missiles shot down out of around 70 fired, which is 86% intercepted. This is particularly good. On 16 December, they claimed to have intercepted 60 out of 74, or 81%. 

For the attack on 29 December, Ukraine does report shooting down 54 out of 69 cruise missiles and 11 Iranian drones. This comes out to 81% intercepted except other reports are saying over 120 missiles were fired. So, is the interception rate more like 54%? Anyhow, it does look like the Russians overloaded the Ukrainian missile defense this time. As this is supposedly their tenth such strike (I have not verified the count), then it is about time Russia figured this out. The question is: does Russia have the resources to keep doing this?

This was followed up with an attack on New Year’s Eve of about 20 cruise missiles and further attacks on 1 and 2 January. For the attack on New Year’ Eve it looks like they shot down 12 out of 20 cruise missiles (60%). In the attack of 1 and 2 January by 39 or 45 Iranian-made Shahed drones, Ukraine claims it shot them all down. They have power outages in Kyiv as a result of the attack on 2 January. This strongly indicates that not all the drones were shot down.

There was another missile attack on 14 January of only 38 missiles that was effective. Ukraine only shot down 25 of them (only 65%), so power infrastructure was hit, as was several apartment buildings. On 25 January they shot down 47 out of 55 or 85%, which is better than they have been doing recently. The effectiveness of this missile strike against infrastructure was limited. Russia’s last big aerial bombardment attack was on 10 February using 71 missiles. Ukraine claimed 61 downed (86%).

The U.S., Germany and Holland have agreed to provide Ukraine with Patriot air defense missile systems. Should be interesting to see how well they do. Not sure when they are arriving, but it looks like we are set up to ship them and to start training Ukrainians at Grafenwoehr in Germany.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to hold onto most of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, the majority of Kherson province (but not the capital) and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) is held by Ukraine. So, parts of four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)


Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. Russia has now annexed Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson in addition to Crimea and Sevastopol. This sort of indicates that there is no basis for a negotiated settlement. Zelenskyy did lay out a 10-point peace plan in November. It includes:

5. Restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity

6. Total withdrawal of all Russian troops from all of Ukraine.

7. Punishment for war crimes.

The UN General Assembly did recently pass a resolution supporting reparations from Russia, but this does not appear to be in Zelenskyy’s ten-point plan.

Russia’s current peace position is that Ukraine must be demilitarized and de-nazified (is that a word) and Russia keeps Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia (and I guess must hand over the last two province’s capitals), Crimea and Sevastopol. The Russian foreign minister Lavrov did say on 29 Dec: “Putting forward all sorts of ideas and ‘formulas of peace,’ Zelensky cherishes the illusion of achieving, with the help of the West, the withdrawal of our troops from the Russian territory of Donbas, Crimea, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region, the payment of reparations by Russia, and the surrender of international tribunals and the like. Of course, we will not talk to anyone on such conditions.”

Probably the most significant events over the last couple of months is that 1) Russian did not shut down the Ukrainian energy grid and demoralize the population, 2) Russia did not increase the economic pain in Europe sufficiently to undermine support for Ukraine, and 3) Russian still has only done a partial mobilization and appears not to be extensively mobilizing further. Russia appears to be fighting for a stalemate in 2023.

This looks like an extended war, and I don’t think it will be over before the end of summer 2023. It may continue for years: So How Long is this War Going to Last? | Mystics & Statistics ( and Possible Outcomes of the War? | Mystics & Statistics (

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics ( The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: I sort of hate to get into discussing this as it invariably gets divisively political, but it is a significant issue. Half of the aid to Ukraine comes from the U.S. If the U.S. wavers, then this poses real challenges for Ukraine’s defensive efforts. The latest Gallup poll (3-22 January) says that 65% of Americans support the war in Ukraine. 31% clearly do not. This is pretty much the same figures as in August 2022 (66% vs 31%). Among self-identified Democrats the split was 81% to 16%, among independents it was 59% to 38% and among Republicans it was 53% to 41%. So, according to the Gallup poll, the majority of Republicans support Ukraine. On the other hand, 47% of the Republicans polled said that the U.S. is doing too much to help UkrainePrevious polling from Washington Post shows that 52% of Republicans want to reduce aid to Ukraine or “…want their member of congress to opposed additional funding.” Meanwhile, President Joe Biden was in Kyiv last week.

There was a “Rage Against the War Machine Rally” in Washington D.C. on Sunday 19 February. Its attendance was maybe 750-1000 people including Libertarian and former Republican congressman and presidential candidate Ron Paul. It was a pretty odd and controversial collection of speakers.

The United States passed the fiscal year 2023 budget before the new congress was seated. The Democrats/Independents control the Senate 51-49 and the Republicans now control the House 222-213. The U.S. budget is in place through September 2023 and cannot be overturned or cut by the new Republican majority House, if they so desire. I am pretty certain that come October 2023, the United States will be struggling to approve a budget for fiscal year 2024. This is going to complicate things. Eleven Republican members of the House just proposed a resolution (“Ukraine Fatigue Resolution”) to cut aid to Ukraine. There is a clearly a vocal minority that is opposed to supporting Ukraine, as is presidential candidate Donald Trump (whose run has been endorsed by 5 Senators, 17 congressmen and one governor). There does appear to be some public pushback from other Republicans (i.e. Nancy Mace’s “roast” at the Washington Press Club Foundation). 

The “Ukraine Fatigue Resolution” is worth a read. It is here: Text – H.Res.113 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): Ukraine Fatigue Resolution | | Library of Congress.

Belarus: I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Belarus has stated on 16 October that a little less than 9,000 Russian troops will be stationed in Belarus to protect it borders. 

Kaliningrad: On 14 February, in the Russian isolated city next to NATO members Poland and Lithuania, an IL-20M and 2 Su-27s were intercepted by two Dutch F-35s and escort away from the NATO area. Eight Dutch F-35s are stationed in Poland. Kaliningrad is the former Prussian capital of Koenigsberg. It was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945 and its annexation was confirmed in 1990.

EU: Ukraine has been made a candidate member of the European Union as of 23 June. It still means that it will be years before Ukraine becomes part of the EU, but this is a big first step. The Ukraine government applied for EU membership less than week after Russia first invaded them. Moldova was also granted candidate membership. Georgia has not (and it is not on good terms with Russia).

This was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

NATO: Finland and Sweden signed the accession protocol to join NATO on 5 July, along with all 30 members of NATO. They officially applied to join NATO on May 18. There was an objection from Turkey, but Sweden and Finland have resolved their issues just before the summit in Madrid in early July. As of 1 October, 28 NATO members have ratified the accession protocol. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states and Norway abuts Russia above the arctic circle. Also, Denmark has joined the common EU defense cooperation, something which it has stayed out of for three decades. The United States voted on 4 August to the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO by 95-1. The remaining two states that need to vote for this are Hungary and Turkey.  Hungary is not going to get around to it until early 2023. It appears that Sweden has made all the “reforms” that it is going to make. Specifically, it has rejected the request to extradite four people. The U.S. in the past has made similar refusals. It is now up to Turkey to decide if this is enough. The U.S. is apparently negotiating selling F-16s to Turkey. This may be the quid-pro-quo that makes this happen. In October 2021 Turkey requested to purchase 40 F-16s. Congress has resisted approving the sale, but it appears it will go through if Turkey approves Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Turkish elections are scheduled for 14 May, so this issue may not get resolved until after that. Right now, U.S. Turkish relations have been a little contentious. Turkey was also just hit with a massive earthquake on 6 February near Syria. Around 53,000 dead in Turkey and Syria, around 46,000 of them in Turkey.

Meanwhile, on 30 September, the president of Ukraine formally applied to join NATO. 

Also, the United States will be establishing a permanent troop presence in Poland, maintain a rotational brigade in Romania, and enhance its rotational deployment in the Baltic States, among other expansions. As of December, the United States has a total of 100,000 troops across all of Europe (including Germany and Italy). Canada is leading a NATO battlegroup of Latvia of around 2,000 soldiers, including troops from Canada, Albania, Czech Republic, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Germany is to lead a combat brigade in Lithuania of 3,000 – 5,000 soldiers. The command unit of around 100 soldiers arrived on 4 September. A NATO battalion of about 1,500-1,600 has been stationed there since 2017 and is under command of a German officer. There are also NATO battle groups in Estonia and Poland. Germany is also now talking about an armored division for protection of NATO’s eastern border.

Poland has completed on 30 June a steel wall on its border with Belarus to curb the flow of asylum seekers from Belarus. The wall is 115 miles long (186 km), 18 feet tall (5.5 meters) and cost $407 million to build (353M Euros). Poland is also building a fence along its border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which has irked Russia. Work began in late February. The Polish border with Belarus is 258 miles long (416 km). Poland also announced around 15 July that it will be increasing its defense budget to be 5% of the GDP and building up its army to 300,000 troops. Poland is currently spending 2.4% of its GDP on defense. It is going to increase it next year to 3%. The U.S. currently spends 3.5% of our GDP on defense.

Lithuania has also completed a barrier between itself and Belarus. It is mostly a 4 meter (13 foot) tall steel wire fence topped by concertina barbed wire. It covers approximately 550 kilometers (342 miles) and costs 152M euros. See twitter @LinasKojala post for 29 August for a picture of the fence.

Finland is now also talking about starting to build a barbed-wire fence along its long border with Russian starting early next year. They are looking at it covering 124 miles of the 832-mile border. Estimated cost is $393 million with a completion date of 2026.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Artillery fire was exchanged on 5 October between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as a result of their continuing conflict that Russia is supposed to be policing. There are also now credible reports and videos of Azerbaijanis executing Armenian prisoners. Significant fighting has erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia on 13 September. There has been a cease-fire as of 15 September. Armenia has said that at least 49 of its soldiers have been killed since fighting erupted early Tuesday. They are now saying 105. Azerbaijan has said it has lost 50 troops. Russia is serving as the peacekeeper force with about 2,000 troops. I gather most of the fighting is artillery shelling. There have been large protests the last few days in the capital of Yerevan, Armenia against the prime minister. Meanwhile, U.S. Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, is in Yerevan as of 18 September. This visit was then followed by protests in Yerevan against the Russian dominated military alliance CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which Armenia, Russia, Belarus and three other post-Soviet states are members of.

Previous recent fights have resulted in at least 2 Armenians killed and more than a dozen wounded and 1 Azeri killed and 3 wounded. Azerbaijan took the border position. Russia is the Armenian-leaning peacekeepers in this area. One wonders if many of the outlying areas of the Soviet empire are going to turn into disorder over the next few months. The Azerbaijan embassy in London was also seized a few months ago by Muslim fundamentalists. Azerbaijan is a secular state. The Muslim fundamentalists may be supported by Iran. On 14 November, there was another round of shelling reported by Armenia at the border. On 26 November, there was another clash along the border, but no losses and then more firing on 27 November, with two Armenians reported wounded. There was another shelling by Azerbaijan reported on 23 December by Armenia. No casualties reported. It appears that Azerbaijan is trying to cut off the Lachin corridor, which connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.

Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan has called for parliamentary elections on March 19. We shall see how that goes. Khazakstan was having blackouts, not caused by bombing. The last time they had political demonstrations (January 2022), estimates were that 217 to over 230 people were killed and they called in over 3,000 Russian paratroopers to help them. There were also major protests in 2011 (14 killed), 2016, 2018, several times in 2019, and 2020. So kind of waiting for next big eruption. Meanwhile, Khazastan has set up two “Yurts of Invincibility” in Bucha and Kyiv. These yurts provide food, medical care and shelter to Ukrainians.

European Support: The government of Hungary is the one NATO nation that is not clearly behind Ukraine. Hungary is dealing with economic problems and the EU is withholding recovery funding due to a “rule-of-law dispute.” Prime Minister Viktor Orban on 11 October called for a ceasefire in the war and accused the U.S. of fueling the war. He did state that he was on the side of Ukraine. He also has not yet approved Sweden and Finland’s membership into NATO but he has finally acquiesced to the latest EU aid effort to Ukraine. 

The country that produced the largest peace demonstrations, some 70,000 protesters in Prague on 3 September 2022, has just elected a retired three-star general as its president. He has made it clear that he supports Ukraine. Recent elections in Estonia have reinforced the support for governments that favor supporting Ukraine. It does appear that Putin’s policy of trying to undermine support this winter in Europe for the war in Ukraine is failing. It does appear that European support is solid and broad, with Czechia elections, Germans providing Leopards, Hungary signing off on EU aid packages to Ukraine, Bulgarian parliament overruling their president and providing aid, etc. The political situation is getting simpler, the war is going to continue until at least next fall. It may get resolved on the battlefield this summer. It could continue into 2024.

In 2022 there have been some protests against the pro-western government of Moldova (pop. 2.6 million). The President of Moldova is now claiming that Russia was planning to stage a coup d’état through opposition protests. Zelenskyy made the same claims a week ago. Last June Moldova was granted EU candidate status. Moldovan intelligence intercepted some attempts between October and December of last year. Russia still has 1,500 peacekeeping troops in Transnistria and of course, there is still the breakaway Russian statelet of Transnistria (pop. @360,938) carved out of Moldovan territory. A Russian presence in Moldova is a threat to Odesa.

There was an anti-war protest in Berlin on Saturday, 25 February. It was attended by around 10,000, mostly from the left wing of the political spectrum. Germany has a long history of a pacifistic vocal left-wing since the 1980s (remember the late Petra Kelly and the Green Party). If this is the best that this political wing can produce now, that is very limited. It does appear that most of Europe is solidly behind Ukraine (as is Japan, South Korea, Australia and even New Zealand). Putin has done a good job of politically uniting the west.

Iran: It appears that the large protests in Iran are fizzling out. There are some serious demonstrations going on in Iran since 16 September, supported by labor strikes. It is said that at least nine protesters died in the first five days and Iran is now stating as of 24 September that 41 protesters have been killed. The count is certainly higher than that. An Oslo-based organization called Iran Human Rights is claiming as of 29 November that at least 448 people killed. They previously reported that also 40 security forces were killed. An Iranian general did acknowledge on 27 November that over 300 were dead. There are also an armed group (separatists?) that conducted an attack on 30 September in southeastern Iran (city of Zahedan) that killed 19 people. One wonders if the Iranian government has weathered the storm. Iran has arrested over 20,000 protesters.

Meanwhile, the night of Jan. 28 someone attacked manufacturing facilities in Iran. It was done with at least three drones and a strike was clearly made in Isfahan, a city of 2-4 million right in the middle of Iran. There were four reported large explosions. The mostly likely story is that it was done by Israel operating from Azerbaijan. 

Miscellaneous: Also, corrupt Navy-contractor “Fat Leonard” Francis, 57, was detained last Tuesday by Interpol in Venezuela trying to flee to Russia. He had escaped house arrest in San Diego, fled to Mexico then Cuba and was intercepted at the Venezuelan airport. He was not using an alias and should be extradited back to the U.S. He is currently still in Venezuela.

There were two pipelines that were bombed in international waters. Apparently 165 feet of the pipe is destroyed. Sweden is currently investigating but has not found any clear evidence linking Russia to the bombing. That said, it is hard to imagine who else would do this. I am kind of ignoring the latest claims from Seymour Hersh. He has been dead wrong before.

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

Articles: 1516


  1. “Pick a rumor”
    That’s true, but if the maps are accurate, doesn’t seem like a confortable position for the ukranian forces.
    Hope they know what they are doing.

  2. I would like to think Bahkmut is some important linchpin of some plan. Maybe the UKR are about to drop the hammer while the RU focus is on Bahkmut. Probably hopium.

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