The cold hard reality is that in the long run $$$ = combat power. This is a obvious little relationship that is often ignored. This was demonstrated in spades when Japan attacked a country in 1941 that had an economy more than ten times their size. Good luck with that one. It was also ignored by the leader of Germany, who somehow or the other believed that superior willpower go overcome the overwhelming coalition arrayed against them. He could not. In the long run, warfare is decided by the golden rule: he who has the gold – rules. So, let us take a moment and look at the defense budget of Russia vs Ukraine.
Russia defense budget in 2023, according to Wikipedia, was $86.4B. Source was the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from back in the days when Sweden was neutral. Now maybe this should be adjusted by PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) to account for lower labor costs, lower food costs, etc. The PPP multiplier for the GDP is 2.66. Meaning that their real value of the budget is somewhere between 86.4 to 229.8. Hard to say how much of military expenditures should be under PPP, especially when one is talking about all the high-tech equipment that makes up a modern army. The 2024 budget is higher, that is discussed below. Their 2023 budget only make of 4.1% of the GDP, so there is room to grow. Russia is receiving no significant outside aid to support this war (they have to pay for the material from Iran, China and North Korea).
Ukraine on the other hand is receiving lots of outside aid. At least $110B a year. This includes over $50 billion from the EU & UK, and at least $61B from the U.S. Much of this is spent in their home countries for equipment, so is not directly comparable to the PPP adjusted Russian figures. On the other hand, in 2024 Ukraine is spending $66.2 billion of its own money on the war (source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine). This is 18% of their GDP. Sort of gives you some idea of what Russia might be capable of if the political will was there (so I guess willpower does matter). One of course, has to ask, why is the political will not there? What is the dynamics where Ukraine has spent 18% of their national income on the war while Russia, which initiated this war, is only spending 4%. What is the Kremlin afraid of? Their own people?
Anyhow, $66B that Ukraine is spending also needs to be adjusted by PPP. Their multiplier is 2.73. So that $66B turns into $180.2. So 180 vs 230. 1-to-1.28 ratio of expenditures. But to that Ukraine adds a least $111B in Western money. So, 181 + 111 vs 230 or a 1.27-to-1. This is of course assuming that PPP is a fully valid measurement and none of the western aid is influenced by PPP. Neither of these are quite the case. If it was a simple nominal expense comparison it would be 66 + 111 vs 86 or a ratio of 2.06-to-1.
From a practical point of view, it appears that Ukraine with western aid is outspending Russian by at least 50%. Of course, I am comparing here Ukrainian 2024 figures to Russian 2023 figures. In the long run, that means that Ukraine will win. More than likely, it will force Russia to increase it defenses expenditures by at least 50%, up to 6% or more of GDP. This is sustainable.
Now, the linked article below shows that Russia’s 2024 defense expenditure is 40% (or 39% in another article) of their national budget, which 391.2 x .4 = 156.48. They say it is a 70% increase from 2023 (86.4 x 1.7 = 146.88). Anyhow, they are having to increase their budget significantly. See: Putin approves big military spending hikes for Russia’s budget | Reuters
So, 146.88 x 2.66 (PPP multiplier) = 391. So 181 + 111 vs 391 is a 1-to1.34 ratio based upon PPP for both Russia and Ukraine. Or… 66 + 111 vs 147 is a 1.20-to-1 ratio in favor of Ukraine based upon nominal costs. So it does appear that for 2024 the two sides expenditures appear to be roughly equal. This would imply that a rough stalemate is going to be the outcome in 2024.
Now, this is a rough back-of-the-envelope calculation banged out this morning. Something more rigorous could be developed by someone. I am not sure it would tell a different story.
Establishing a MER, a military exchange rate index, the ratio of pre-war GDP (in 2020$) was 0.19 (Jap/US) or 0.2 based on outlays (41-44). If theatre allocation is factored in, this would increase to roughly one third of US levels, similar to the relative size of the naval and aircraft industry, so definitely larger than suggested by mere market rates.
On the other hand, GDPs alone cannot explain the outcome of the war in Eastern Europe. In per capita terms, Japanese and Soviet soldiers possessed less than half of the budget of an American or German soldier.
I would argue the environment remains a significant factor in the outcome of many conflicts. The strategic relevance and vulnerability of the island status in the Pacific and the sizes of the respective labour forces in the Eurasian sector, last but not least the jungles of Vietnam as an honourable mention. German outlays in 1941 surpassed Soviet by over a factor of two when they lost the initiative, while Japan went into the defensive before the US war economy ran on “full steam”.
A larger budget will increase Ukraine’s stamina, depending on the utilization and by how much labour can be substituted with technology.
“The cold hard reality is that in the long run $$$= combat power. This is a obvious little relationship that is often ignored. This was demonstrated in spades when Japan attacked a country in 1941 that had an economy more than ten times their size.”
Chris, remember that Japanese economy (including occupied lands?) vs. American economy logic when predicting war results based upon Russian economy (including occupied lands?) vs. Ukrainian economy. Of course, the situations differ because of NATO’s economies adding to Ukraine’s economy (in the long run if political will of NATO for support of Ukraine is retained for the long run). Anyway, to continue with your logic, look at GNPs rather than military budgets when predicting long-term results of warfare.
Still, $$$ is likely to translate into combat power in the long run; such that the Battle of Fort Sumpter could be viewed as the most important battle of the American Civil War because it was the battle that started a war that the Confederate States were bound to loose (ceteris paribus) against the United States unless the wishful thinking of the Confederates (quick victory so that the expected long-run outcome wasn’t reached, addition of European GNPs to Confederate GNP, 1 chivalric Southerner being equal to 10 churlish Northerners having a short-run result prior to full mobilization of overwhelming number of Northerners, lack of sustained willpower on the part of Northerners when it came to forcing members to return to the clubhouse and when it came to fighting in order to free slaves, Jeff Davis being a Napoleon in contrast to Abe Lincoln being a backwoods rail-spiltter, etc.) came to fruition. Hmm, reminds one to consider the thinking of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.