The Battle of Kursk (1943) was the largest battle of World War II. I have three books out on the subject (the big book, The Battle of Prokhorovka and Aces at Kursk). There are two more planned (The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Tank Fields of Prokhorovka). I also have one book out in the war in Ukraine (The Battle for Kyiv), one that we are about to submit another to the publisher (The Siege of Mariupol) and several more planned. I have also done a couple of hundred blog posts on the Russo-Ukrainian War. So, I guess as measured by page count, I am kind of an expert. Still, this doesn’t mean that I have any unique knowledge or understanding as to what is going on right now in Ukraine; but let me take a shot at it.
Now, this Second Battle of Kursk is nowhere near the size of the first one, but like the first one, it is also really not at Kursk. In fact, this seems to be a fairly small affair, involving elements of two Ukrainian brigades and so far no significant Russian forces. The area involved is the size of Fairfax County. Ukraine has taken around 1,000 square kilometers. This is not particularly significant, making up less than 0.002% of Russia. It is not a region of any particular economic value. The population of the main village in the occupied area, Sudzha, is last reported as 5,127. The whole Sudzha district (which is 996 sq. kilometers) is 26,964 (2010 census and is now probably less).

This operation is just a classic case of hitting them where they ain’t. There was a reason Russia was not defending this border area. Ukraine also does not directly defend large parts of its border areas. What I assume both sides do (and this is an assumption) is to hold a couple of regiments or brigades back in central locations, ready to move towards the border if need be. So far, it does not appear that Russia is doing even that. I suspect Ukraine is, and it may have been some of those forces around Sumy that were used to conduct this operation. So a large extended masking operation probably was not needed, the forces used were already nearby. But, neither side has a continued fortified border to the northwest of Kharkiv, so these little land grabs are possible by either of them. They are relatively meaningless militarily.
But, it could result in an expansion of the front. Right now, the front has been effectively 700 kilometers in length (see: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute). This excludes all that area to the northwest of Kharkiv, including Sumy to Chernihiv. It also excludes the Kakhovka Reservoir and the part of the Dnipro River going down from there to Kherson. So, it is possible, by expanding the front to include the entire border between Ukraine and Russia, that we could end up with a 1,200 kilometer front line. Who benefits from that?
Right now Russian has about 450,000 troops located in Ukraine (Ukrainian estimate, Putin says 617,000). I am guessing that Ukraine has 300,000 to 400,000 opposite them and engaged with them. Ukraine supposedly has more than 700,000 mobilized, but I gather many are still training and holding down inactive or rear areas (like, for example Sumy and Chernihiv). The Russian Army, according to Wikipedia (IISS estimate for 2024 is the source) consists of the “Ground Forces” of 500,000 (including 100,000 conscripts) and the airborne forces of 45,000 (2023, source TASS). Their naval infantry are 12,000. So, 557,000 ground troops. There are also air force, navy and rocket forces for a total armed forces strength of 1,320,000 (December 2023, AP). Also see: Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute. Theoretically, if Ukraine has 700,000 mobilized (as the president was claiming in 2023), then Ukraine could gain an advantage by stretching out the front line. I really don’t think that is the case.
So what is the Ukrainian objectives? Are they going to set up a Kursk Peoples Republic or hold the territory? I doubt it. I assume over the next week or two, Russia will build up its force in the area, and I suspect the most likely answer is that Ukraine will declare victory and go home, withdrawing from the area as the pressure increases.
The problem is that if you hold this Fairfax County-size piece of property inside of Russia, you not only have to commit one or two or three brigades to holding the area, but you have to also secure the left and right flanks of this area with ground troops. This is at least a brigade on each flank. So now, we are talking about 3 to 5 or more brigades committed to this effort. The Ukrainian army is only around 40 to 60 or so brigades active (I have not attempted to do a count in over a year). Are they really going to commit 10% of their ground forces to hold this little area. I doubt it.
So, I suspect Ukraine will withdraw. Still, the operation does three things for them:
- Propaganda value.
- They have captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 and have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for all the people Russia holds. This helps.
- They force the Russians to more seriously protect these border regions, which they obviously were not doing. This ties down more forces from a ground army of 557K that has 450K in Ukraine.
Anyhow, this was a clever move by Ukraine, but hardly a brilliant piece of operational art, as quite simply, no significant Russian forces were enveloped and destroyed. In the end, winning large extended conventional wars is usually done by destroying armies. This does not do that. Its impact has probably been overrated by many commentators.
Also see:
The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war – The Dupuy Institute
C.A.L: “Still, the operation does three things for them:
Propaganda value…”
-There are any number of online stories touting Ukraine’s success.
I was thinking about 4.: Force the Russians to attack them- I can’t imagine that the Russians can just let this slide (see your point, 1). But the the Russians are already attacking in lots of places, and the Ukrainian defensive positions in those places are far better prepared than this place that they took last week.
“I assume over the next week or two, Russia will build up its force in the area, and I suspect the most likely answer is that Ukraine will declare victory and go home, withdrawing from the area as the pressure increases…”
New point 4.: If the Ukrainians manage to hold on to even one square mile, it gives them a bargaining chip that hundreds of square miles of Ukrainian territory would not.
Still, such mosquito bites (bites big enough to capture some soldiers, cause reactive movements, and destroy/disrupt logistics) can annoy the Russian bear (apparently, without reducing the effectiveness of the defense of Ukraine).
Right now, the Ukrainians are touting the incursion as having put them in range to cut a Russian supply line as a major benefit of the invasion.
N.B: “Still, such mosquito bites (bites big enough to capture some soldiers, cause reactive movements, and destroy/disrupt logistics) can annoy the Russian bear (apparently, without reducing the effectiveness of the defense of Ukraine)…”
-We’ll see if territorial losses in Ukraine increase or not, I suppose.
I think the main rail route from Moscow to Belgorod is still open. It does go through Kursk.
A supply train seems like an inviting target for a drone attack (as well as tracks being inviting for saboteurs).