The RoRo Ships

China has a collection of dozens of Roll-on, Roll-off (RoRo) commercial transports that have had their ramps reinforced to be able to use heavy equipment. This has led to a number of people counting them as Chinese amphibious assets. They have used some of them for training exercises with the Chinese marines.

The actual count of these is 40 or 63 or more (I have seen various figures). They are commercial ships and used regularly for commercial shipping. As such, at any given moment they are scattered across the world.

Now if China could gather dozens of these together, then they might be able to increase Chinese lift capacity by tens of thousands. There are some real problems with that.

1. They really can’t be used in the first wave. They usually require docks to unload at and cannot be used across the beach. As such, they really don’t increase the Chinese first wave capacity of around 20,000 troops.

Now, theoretically, they could load up with LCMs, LCUs and ZDP-05s and unload off shore at sea to contribute to a first wave. This is a difficult arrangement but could add 10-20K troops to the first wave. Still, it does not appear to be how they would be used.

2. They do require docks to unload at. This means China either have to take a port in the first couple of days of the operation or they would have to set up at sea docks. If Taiwan is properly defending, taking ports in the first week will be difficult. Furthermore, if they doing their job properly, once those ports are taken the dock areas should be difficult to use.

Now, China does have mobile docks, similar to the U.S. These are difficult to maintain in a hostile environment. They are difficult to maintain in the non-hostile environment. The U.S. recently deployed one in Gaza and had lots of problems. This was done in peacetime, in the Mediterranean (a more peaceful body of water than the South China Sea) and by the nominally most experience amphibious force on the planet.  So, China would be looking at setting up mobile docks on the first or second day of an invasion, which then would mostly likely become prime targets. The RoRo ships would need functional docks to unload.

3. They would have to be gathered from across the world and this would telegraph the blow by weeks if not months. These are commercial ships scattered across the world doing commercial transport. They would have to stop doing commerce, return to China and be readied for military operations. Hard to hide that. If Taiwan knows for weeks that China is coming, then they can start mobilizing. So, instead of facing over 100,000 deployed troops, they will face hundreds of thousands. Has China gained an advantage by doing this? 

In the end, people seem to believe that the RoRo ships gives China the lift capacity that it needs to invade Taiwan. It does not seem to do this. Furthermore, an amphibious operation would be greatly assisted by surprise, or at least limiting the warning to hours, vice days. Using RoRo’s does the opposite. They are not a first wave asset, and maybe not even a second or third wave asset. They are an asset after an attack as already been conducted, a port had been seized, it can be protected and is operational.  It is a supplemental capability to Chinese amphibious operations.  

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
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Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
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His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
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Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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