The following article is from Alexandru Filip of the Canadian Center for Strategic Studies:
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During our discussion sessions on 13 and 27 November on the topic of Taiwan, a further exchanged developed regarding the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s significant missile stocks and the effects it may have in a war.
While there is a vast amount of research and data on this topic, transposing these predictions to Taiwan would perhaps require a greater simulation which can account for the complexities of the relationship between A2/AD systems, the aerial systems in use (whether it is an aircraft or missile), and the targets on the ground.
Before a deeper dive (which will follow in further blog posts), we should propose a basis of general principles derived from previous incidents. While these can serve to create guiding assumptions of how this phase of operations may unfold, when simulated, it is indeed possible that we find differences between the Taiwanese situation and historical precedent.
These principles:
-Despite a marked superiority in both quality and quantity of air assets, gaining air superiority will not be a simple task; it will require planning, and a significant number of assets for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. As evidenced by Russia’s war in Ukraine, in which the Russian Air Force has struggled to holds air superiority over more than just certain portions of Ukraine.
-PLAAF air superiority efforts can be blunted by Ground-Based-Air-Defense led interdiction. As we have seen in Vietnam, where many of U.S. combat losses were caused by AAA fire, and SAMs.
-Taiwan should endeavor to replicate the relative success of Serbian Air Defense Forces against NATO, in Kosovo. The mountainous terrain, and the densely forested areas provide ample opportunity for dispersing, and camouflaging air-to-ground assets so as to hamper PLAAF attempts at conducting Suppression of Enemy Air Defense missions. The outcome in Kosovo was that: “NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only three of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. At the same time, over 800 SAMs were fired by Yugoslav forces at NATO aircraft, including 477 SA-6s and 124 confirmed MANPADS, for the downing of only two aircraft and several more damaged.”
-Air power and missile strikes will similarly not be capable of degrading Taiwanese ground assets or air assets to the point of ineffectiveness. Robert Pape’s “Bombing to Win” demonstrates that, in the Gulf War, despite overwhelming air superiority and an extended air campaign a combined air effort did not coerce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. While it did attrit Iraqi armour, it did not render Iraqi forces entirely ineffective, and a ground invasion was still necessary.
-Dispersal of air assets into hardened shelters, which obscure the aircraft from satellite imagery, the use of decoys, underground hangars, and a raising of the air force to prevent destruction on the ground during a missile salvo would all raise the cost for the PLA Rocket Forces. This will also have the effect of forcing the PLA to dedicate further strike capability to targets on the ground. The ROCAF will still suffer damage. Yet, just as in Ukraine losses on the ground can be prevented even against an enemy which yields a significant strike capability.
-The destruction of runways, while easily repaired under relatively peaceful conditions (as was the case in Israel after the Iranian strike), will be more difficult under constant PLA strikes. Thus, the ROCAF will likely shift to road-based runways (as they have trained to do), and aircraft armed with air-superiority loadouts (lighter) will require shorter segments of runway.
-The PLA Rocket Force is likely to focus strike assets on population centers, with the aim of attracting Taiwanese air defense assets towards the protection of civilians. Just as we have seen in Ukraine, this in itself is a costly and complex endeavor which threatens to rapidly deplete missile stocks. Yet, just as in Ukraine, it may not be enough to break Taiwanese will, especially as a majority have claimed they are prepared to defend Taiwan.
A DF-11 (source: DF-11 | Weaponsystems.net).
More to come.
