Lots of discussion going on about strengths in Ukraine and Russia and therefore force ratios. I have stayed away from talking about this, because I have other things going on (primarily writing and editing books). In the end, you don’t get a book done by blogging and engaging in debates on Twitter (now called X).
But one recent twitter debate got my attention, which was a conversation between Sashank Joshi, the defense editor at the Economist, and J.D. Vance, Vice-President of the United States. I have exchanged a few emails with Joshi over the years. I have never talked to J.D. Vance.
Anyhow, as far as I can tell, both sides have 500,000 to 600,000 troops deployed in the field. My last discussion on this subject was in the middle of last year: Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute. At the time, Putin was claiming he had 617,000 deployed, while Ukraine was stating that it was only 450,000. I have not seen any new data since December 2023.
The 2025 Military Balance records 450,000 Russian forces in Ukraine. They provide overall figures for the Russian Army of 550,000, Naval Infantry 10,000 and Airborne 35,000. They also report 20,000 in private military companies. Around 21,000 are reported deployed from Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and in the Middle East and Africa). So a maximum total available ground strength of 594,000.
The 2025 Military Balance gives Ukrainian Army strength as 500,000, Marine Corps at 30,000 and Airborne Assault Troops at 45,000 for a total ground strength of 575,000. This is not counting Territorial Defense Forces and National Guard.
Of those 15,000 to 30,000 Ukrainians are up and round Kursk oblast in Russian territory, and the rest are defending Ukraine, from Sumy down to Kherson. The 2025 Military Balance says it was 20,000 Ukrainians in Kursk oblast.
Conversely, Russian has a rumored 40,000 to 50,000 around Kursk oblast. There are also maybe 12,000 North Koreans around Kursk oblast and maybe 2,000 Chechins fighting for Russia elsewhere in Ukraine. The Lugansk and Donets People’s Republics together are still fielding I am guessing between 15,000 to 30,000 troops for Russia.
Anyhow, this all points to close to parity between Russian and Ukraine, with Russian perhaps having more troops. perhaps as much as a 1.2-to-1 force ratio advantage. Inevitable some commentators quoted the discredited 3-to-1 rule, but there is still an advantage to defense. We did look at this recently for Army-level operations and produced the following blog posts:
Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – The Dupuy Institute
Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued – The Dupuy Institute
The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute
Now, if you really wanted to properly analyze the scenarios, then you would need to account for weapons, especially mix and quality; and logistics, especially ammunition; and of course, Human Factors. This is possible to do but is not a small task. We won’t be taking this on soon (if ever), and I gather no one else will either.
It is clear with proper aid and support, Ukraine can hold out forever in defense (assuming the morale and desire are there). The only Russian option to change this equation is to greatly increase recruitment. There is a reason, three years into this war, they have not done this. Therefore, it is possible to continue this war for years until someone decides to compromise.
Now, as long as Russan morale and desire reman sufficiently high (and it is probably a bigger variable than Ukrainian morale and desire), then it does not appear that Ukraine will not be able to retake the occupied territories. The question becomes: how solid is Russian morale and desire? We did see in June 2023 a revolt against the government by the Wagner mercenary company. In World War I we saw multiple countries armies collapse at various times during the third and fourth years of the war. Army morale collapses are not improbable or maybe not even unlikely. It does mean that the strategy becomes to maintain the war until Russia either modifies its negotiating position to give up territory, or the army or the government starts to collapse.
