NATO’s misconception of Soviet Military Strategy
At the 2024 HAAC, Walker Gargagliano gave a presentation on “NATO’s Misconception of Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict.” This has now been turned into a paper that was published by the Journal of Strategic Studies. It is behind a paywall, but many of those who have access to a college library can probably take a look at it. The article is here: A bolt from the blue: NATO’s misconception of Soviet military strategy: Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol 0, No 0 – Get Access
The abstract reads:
Throughout the Cold War, both NATO policymakers and the general public expressed a fear of a surprise Soviet attack, shaping their military stance, funding, and procurements in Europe to counter this eventuality. However, the type of war the Soviet Armed Forces planned to wage with the West was of a vastly different character than often feared. The concept of undertaking a strategic surprise attack in Europe was completely alien to Soviet theory, which rather conceptualized war as an extended affair requiring an extended mobilization process in a war which would be fought with total, rather than limited, objectives.
