Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
The RMA podcast by Amos Fox is out. I am the interviewee. I have not listened to it and am afraid to do so. Never completely happy with my interviews (or my books, or my reports, or my blog posts).
Anyhow, it is here:
https://shows.acast.com/650105b75a8d440011ecd53c/666f739ffb889700139c5124
Russia is one of those few places on the planet that implemented a flat-tax system, a darling idea of the American neo-conservative movement in the 1980s that never really did pass the smell test (forgive me for getting a little political). But, by one of the accidents of nature, several U.S. conservative economic advisors got the ear of the people managing and mismanaging the Russian economy in the 1990s and convinced them to establish a flat tax there. This was before Putin was in charge.
As the Russian economy grew through the booming oil and gas industries, Russian tax revenues from those sources boomed, to the point where over half of the government income came from the revenues from the oil and gas industry. Therefore, they were able to maintain their 13% flax tax system throughout Putin’s regime. This was odd, but it has been the case there for around three decades. It was one of the 26 countries/entities (including Transnistria and South Ossetia) on the planet able to live with a flat tax (which includes Ukraine (19.5%) and four NATO countries: Bulgaria (10%), Romania (10%), Hungary (15%) and Estonia (20%)).
This is no longer the case. In 2021 they imposed a slightly higher tax rate of 15% on those making more than 5 million rubles a year. (1 dollar = 89 rubles, $56K a year). They kept the flat tax rate at 13% for the rest. This was before there was a war in Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine did mess up the Russian government budget, as they were collecting less money from the oil industry because of sanctions and sometimes lower oil prices, while their own expenditures grew. This has finally caused the system to crack, resulting in them raising taxes. See: Russia Is Preparing New Tax Hikes. Here’s Why. – The Moscow Times
This well done article provides for the following tax rates:
The average annual income in Russia is around 900,000 rubles a year ($9,960). 50 million rubles is an annual income of around 562,000 dollars. This is still considerably lower than U.S. tax rates.
Most Russians are not affected by this tax increase. They expect around 2 million people, or about 3% of their population, will be affected by this tax increase. The majority of those higher income earners live in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the majority of the people in those two central cities do not support Putin. So, political impact has been (deliberately) minimized.
The Russian corporate tax rate is rising from 20% to 25%. The current U.S. corporate tax rate is 21%.
Anyhow, it is worth reading the entire article.
I did five posts on analyzing force ratios using the campaign database. They are here:
Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – The Dupuy Institute
Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued – The Dupuy Institute
I think this is actually kind of a big deal, and will be presenting it at HADSS in July: Updated Schedule for HADSS 2024 – The Dupuy Institute and at HAAC in October: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute
Now, as part of that presentation, I do compare it to the division-level engagements. I have posted about this before. They are here:
The World War I Cases from the Division-level Database – The Dupuy Institute
The World War II Cases from the Division-level Database – The Dupuy Institute
Post-World War II Cases from the Division-level Database – The Dupuy Institute
Force Ratios at Kharkov and Kursk, 1943 – The Dupuy Institute
Force Ratios in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956-1973) – The Dupuy Institute
And a summary of force ratios and 3-to-1 rule posts:
Summation of Human Factors and Force Ratio posts – The Dupuy Institute
Summation of Force Ratio Posts – The Dupuy Institute
JSTOR, Trevor Dupuy, Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute
And more stuff:
Force Ratios and CRTs – The Dupuy Institute
and most recently here:
The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute
And in the first few chapters of my book War by Numbers.
Anyhow, we have discussed force ratios at the division-level and have now addressed them at the army-level by using the campaign databases. We do have the ability to look at them at Battalion and Company-level, which I will probably do at some point in the future. We do have a couple of databases to address this. They are no where near as robust as our division-level data base (752 cases) but as they are the only thing out there like that, they will have to do.
Battalion and Company Level Data Bases – The Dupuy Institute
At some point this will all probably be assembled in my future book More War by Numbers, which is half-written. Probably won’t get serious about that book until 2025.
Update on the number of captured: “At a meeting in St. Petersburg on Wednesday, Putin told the heads of several international news agencies that there are 1,348 Russian troops and officers in captivity in Ukraine compared to the 6,465 Ukrainians in Russian detention.” See: Putin makes rare claim on Ukraine war casualties (msn.com)
Now, I find these figures to be entirely believable. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed as of 30 June 2022 to be holding 6,000 Ukrainians soldiers in captivity. This was partly confirmed in July 2022 when the Ukrainian missing person commissioner stated on TV that more than 7,000 people were missing, including soldiers, National Guardsmen, border guards and intelligence officers. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated on 19 September that the Russians held more prisoners than Ukraine did (see: The Battle for Kyiv, page 185). There were maybe 2,439 that surrendered at Mariupol in late May 2022. There have been other people captured in the two years since then. The prisoner exchanges have traded at least 2,800 Russians soldiers and civilians for 3,001 Ukrainians soldiers and 145 civilians. Plus there were some Ukrainians who died while captivity. Anyhow, it all seems to add up, although it could be on the high side, and the figure of 6,465 probably includes some civilians.
On the other hand, his assertion that he has lost in combat only one Russian for five Ukrainians is absurd. It is as absurd as some of the bizarrely lopsided casualties claims that Ukraine is exchanging casualties at a 3-to-1 to 5-to-1 ratio in their favor.
I will be over in York (U.K.) for the HADSS Symposium in July (see Schedule for HADSS 2024 – The Dupuy Institute) and then heading over to Liverpool. My grandfather was a sailor from Liverpool. I have blogged about him before: Murmansk – The Dupuy Institute
He did end up in Murmansk in 1919. There was a mutiny on his ship the S. S. Nigeria. Below are the ship records describing the mutiny:
Crew list is here:
The discussion of activities on the ship leading up to the mutiny:
Note that three men refused to load coal. They did not consider it their work but would perform this work if paid one shilling per ton.
Note that the deck hands refused to discharge fifty empty coal bags to S. S. Competitor. They also used “threatening language.” “We are on deck but it is damned little we intend doing.”
And then: “Sailors & firemen, combined not to allow the Competitors crew to bunker S. S. Nigeria, thereby endangering the frozen meat supply for the whole of the Northern Russian Forces at Murmansk.”
And finally:
“An armed guard from HMS Glory arrive on board and arrested mutinous crew and took them away.”
Events after the mutiny:
It notes that “On going into Sailors and firemens forcastles we found a quantity of stones which were apparently pilfered from the British and American storerooms in the Nigeria. Also a sum of Russian money (3728 Rubles)”
Nine members of the crew “has this day been convicted and sentenced to various periods of imprisonment for continuing to refuse duty. One crew was “discharged fron the ship and pay a share of the expenses of the court. Three crew were to “pay share of expenese of the court and return to ship.”
Ten crew “has been payed off Articles. Wages deposited with H.B.M. Consul.”
“This day E. J Fox was drunk and was totaly incapable of performing his duties and using insolent language to the other ship’s officers and master…and will proceed to the U.K at his own expense. Wages in full have been handed to him in presence of H.B.M Consul.”
Anyhow, for better or worse, this is one of our family “war story” (from the Russian Civil War 1917-1923).
There were 34 men listed on the ship. Of those, 11 they “declined to report” on their “general conduct.” The other 23 men were rated “V.G.,” including my grandfather. One other man was discharged for medical reason. So, I am guessing that the S.S. Nigeria lost over 1/3rd of its crew during the voyage.
The Historical Analysis for Defence and Security Symposium (HADSS) is scheduled for 8-11 July at the University of York. The provisional schedule for the conference is here:
Description of the conference is here Historical Analysis for Defence and Security Symposium | ICMS – International Centre for Mathematical Sciences and here: Weighing the Fog of War (wordpress.com).
York seems like a really cool city. I will be at the conference (and presenting).
What has been released by Ukrainian intelligence is the Russian march tables for the forces coming down from Belarus and down to Kyiv. It was only the first page, so was not complete.
The units are listed down the left and the locations they are supposed to be at are listed across the top. The times are all the numbers on the chart.
Now, a few things can be derived from this.
First, it gives us a partial order of battle. They list 19 units on this chart, and we gather there is a second page that lists the rest. Listed are the 5th Guards Tank Brigade and the 76th Air Assault Division.
Second, that order of battle does not include the third battalion of any of the air assault regiments. So they list 1/104th, 2/104th, 1/234th, 2/234th, 1/237th and 2/237th… but no 3rd battalion for any of these regiments. This is because, we believe the 3rd battalion were manned by conscripts and according to Russian law, they cannot be deployed outside of Russia. Therefore, they are not. We believe that this is the case for all air assault units. This is partly the reason why these air assault forces have not played a larger role in this campaign. An air assault division does not have an armor battalion, so if their third battalion in each regiment remains at home, then a division at best fields six maneuver battalions. A number of the divisions (98th and 106th) have only two regiments. Therefore, they field only 4 maneuver battalions. Most Ukrainian brigades field at least 4 maneuver battalions.
Third, it is clear from their planning that they intended to be on the outskirts of Kyiv the afternoon of the 24th in force in three separate locations.
Fourth, this is not what happened. They did all get to their final destinations, but almost 24 hours later. So, their carefully calculated march tables turned out to be too fast by a factor of two, meaning it took them two days to get to their objectives when they were planning on one.
Fifth, this, of course, is a classic case of Clausewitzian friction in action.
Sixth, the fact that it took them two days, when they were planning on one, gave the Ukrainians time to organize a defense.
Seventh, once their got to their destinations, they really did not do much after that, because the routes were now well defended.
One does wonder if the “Ukrainians” got hold of this march order before or after the 24th of February.
Eighth, this does raise an issue related to the captured of Hostomel airport. Some accounts have claimed that the Ukrainians had seized the entire airport in the counterattack and then held it. Yet, these forces continue on their march as if that never happened. Furthermore, some of these forces were marching right by the airport. If the Ukrainians had seized the airport, then you think some of these forces would have been diverted. It does not appear that they were. Therefore, we concluded that Ukraine did not seize and hold Hostomel Airport for any extended period of time. They clearly counter attacked there, but the extent of that attack is not really known. It was probably not as successful as some have claimed.
As I note in my book (page 104) “Between 2000 and 2200 Kyiv time [24 February 2022], it was reported that the Ukrainians had retaken the airport, but this may not have been entirely the case. It does appear that they made some progress in closing with the Russian defenders and neutralizing the airstrip. By 1400 the next day, Russia declared that it had control of the airport. The airport and the neighboring town of Hostomel (population 17,534) now appeared to be in Russian hands.”
Ninth: March route was between 186 to 223 kilometers.
Tenth: The number of vehicles was 495. Imagine that in a line. These are long columns winding their way down two-line highways. There were additional units to these.
A translation of this table is provided here. It was translated by Sasho Todorov, who originally brought this chart to my attention: Transcribed Time Table 5th Tank Bde and 76th VDV Div
Related posts:
The Russian First Tank Army Report from 24 February – 15 March 2022 – The Dupuy Institute
Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War – The Dupuy Institute
We have the following data for the Israeli Defense Forces from their website here: IDF Fallen and Wounded in War | ATC (www.idf.il).
Killed:
Killed since the beginning of the war (7 October 2023): 639
Killed: 290 dead (fighting in the Gaza Strip from 27 October 2023 to 29 May 2024 among those “whose names were permitted to be published”)
Now, 639 – 290 = 349 killed on 7 October or shortly thereafter.
Fatalities from operational accidents: 44 (this in 22 from
two-sided shooting, 5 from “shooting anomalies” and 17 from “accidents”). Data from fatalities from operational accidents is correct as of 15 May 2024.
Now, I do not know if operational accidents are included in the war dead. I am assuming they are not, so 290 + 44 = 334 or 639 + 44 = 683
Wounded:
Wounded since the beginning of the war (this means from 7 October):
3,643
“Casualties” (do they mean wounded? – I assume so) from the beginning of the maneuver (this means from 23 October):
1,831
Injuries:
Injuries for operational accidents in the Gaza Strip
714
Okay, time for some simple math:
A. Wounded-to-killed ratios:
Overall force Wounded-to-killed ratios (not counting operational accidents): 3,643/639 = 5.33-to-1
Gaza Strip operations wounded-to-killed ratios: 1,831/290 = 6.31-to-1
7 October wounded-to-killed ratios: (3,643 – 1,831)/639-290) = 5.19-to-1
B. Accidental killed versus injures
Gaza Strip operations: 714/44 = 16.20-to-1
This is not a surprising figure, but not one that I have calculated before.
From “two-side shootings” and shooting anomalies: (57 + 30)/(22+5) = 3.20-to-1
From “two-sided shootings” (57/22) = 2.59-to-1
This are not surprising figures, being from I assume mostly direct gunfire.
C. How about friendly fire?
Percent killed by friendly fire in Gaza Strip: 22/(290 + 22) * 100 = 7.05 %
Note, the percent of expected friendly fire casualties has never been firmly established. Traditionally the figure from WWII was 1 or 2%. Many people considered these estimates low. It was clearly higher than that in Vietnam (1965-1973), but no one has assembled any systematic data. It was much higher than that in the Gulf War (1991).
Some past references:
Wounded-To-Killed Ratios – The Dupuy Institute
Also note on page 187 of War by Numbers there is a discussion of weapons effects in the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon War. The lethality figures of bullets was 0.31 and for “small arms” was 0.28. This comes out to wounded-to-killed ratios respectively of 3.23- and 3.57-to-1.
It appears that Ukraine has retaken parts of Kharkiv province: Zelenskiy Confirms Ukrainian Forces Regain Control Over Kharkiv Border Amid Russian Offensive (msn.com). The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelelskyy, announced on Friday (24 May) that Ukraine had retaken control over the border areas. Russia is still claiming to control half of Vovchansk, which is 3 miles (5 km) inside the Ukrainian border.
Map of Vovchansk area (courtesy of @War_Mapper).
My conclusion is that this Kharkiv attack was a diversion. Not sure I believe the claims of high Russian losses.
There is still fighting around Kupiansk and in the Pokrovsk sector (in the center of front in the Donbas region, to the west of Bakhmut, Donetsk and Avdiivka). See: General Staff: Most Combat Engagements Recorded In Pokrovsk Sector (menafn.com) and Ukrainian defenders hit 16 clusters of Russian military personnel – General Staff (msn.com). There is fighting around Ocehretyne, which is less than 10 miles (16 kilometers) NW of Avdiivka (which is just NW of Donetsk).
(courtesy of @War_Mapper).
I am beginning to think I might actually be right about this: There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive – The Dupuy Institute
There is a Rusi article on the subject that I am not sure of: In Ukraine, Russia is Beginning to Compound Advantages | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)
First, where does the figure of 510,000 troops come from?
Then the is the issue of the length of the front. They are saying 1,200 kilometers. That is really not a properly representative figure. If Kharkiv province is back of list of contested areas west of Kupyansk, then we are really looking at a front from Kupyansk to Kakhovka Reservoir of maybe 400-500 kilometers (250 – 300 miles). This is the action front. Vovchansk is around 80 kilometers from Kupyansk. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – The Dupuy Institute
In the end nibbling is not the same as a major offensive.
Lot’s of people throw out the figure that the front line is 1,200 kilometers long. Not really. The length of the border of Ukraine (pre-2014) with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). This is the land border. The length of the border with Belarus (which I do not think is going to re-enter this contest) is 891 kilometers (554 miles). The entire coastline of Ukraine is 3,783 kilometers (2,351 miles). I think this last figure includes Crimea.
(courtesy of @War_Mapper, map dated 18 May 2024)
But, they really are not fighting from Chernihiv to Sumy and have not done so since April 2022. This is a large portion of that 1,200 kilometer figure. They do share a border with Russia so Ukraine obviously has to protect these areas, but there really has not been any fighting in these areas for over two years. We do not expect that will change.
Second, they really cannot do major operations along the Dnipro River from Kherson up to the Kakhovka Reservoir. There was, in the best of times only three bridges across this river, and I gather that number is three less now. This creates supply issues and with all the drones, missiles and air support, hard to see how this is corrected. No one has yet to do any major military operations across the Kakhovka Reservoir. This takes a significant chunk of miles off any active front.
Therefore, for all practical purposes the front runs from the western border of Kharkiv province over to Kupyansk, down through the Donbas and then through Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the Kakhovka Reservoir. This is about 800 kilometers, vice 1,200.
Slightly more precise measurement using Google Earth:
Distance along Kharkiv Oblast border (To Kupyansk): 225 kilometers
From Kupyansk to Bakhmut: 124 kilometers
From Bakhmut to Vuhledar: 107 kilometers
From Vuhledar to Reservoir: 144 kilometers
Total = 600 kilometers
Multiply by 1.25 (a little figure borrowed from Napoleon): 750
If it was measured more precisely the front might be a little longer.
One kilometer is 0.62 miles. Therefore an active front of roughly 800 kilometers or roughly 500 miles.