Mystics & Statistics

Mosul to be Retaken Soon?

It looks like Mosul is about to be retaken soon:

Mosul Assault in Focus….

It is about time. Don’t recall many cases where the insurgents grabbed a major city and it took the conventional forces over two years to retake it. Jaffna by the Tamil Tigers and maybe a few other cases.

A few highlights:

  1. Might happen in October
  2. “…campaign needs 20,000-30,000 troops.”
  3.  “A few thousand police and 15,000 local fighters….to hold land after the assault.”
  4. “Mosul still houses one million civilians…”
  5. “…up to 10,000 jihadists are in the city…”

Mass Fires vs. Precision Fires on the Battlefield of Tomorrow

Photograph of Russian T-90 tank following a hit by a U.S.-made TOW missile in Syria. [War Is Boring.com]
Photograph of Russian T-90 tank following a hit by a U.S.-made TOW missile in Syria. [War Is Boring.com]

For anyone paying attention, it is no surprise that the U.S. Army is intently watching Russia’s military operations in the Ukraine. What they have seen is sobering. Defense One’s Patrick Tucker recently highlighted the preliminary findings of The Russia New Generation Warfare study directed by Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, who heads the Army’s Capabilities Integration Center.

According to McMaster, “the Russians have superior artillery firepower, better combat vehicles, and have learned sophisticated use of UAVs for tactical effect. Should U.S. forces find themselves in a land war with Russia, he said, they would be in for a rude, cold awakening.”

The Army evidently envisions a future clash between U.S. and Russian or Russian-backed forces will begin with long-range missile exchanges.

“We spend a long time talking about winning long-range missile duels,” said McMaster. But long-range missiles only get you through the front door. The question then becomes what will you do when you get there.

The tactics of Russian-backed irregular forces in the Ukraine have demonstrated effective leveraging of the new technological capabilities.

“Look at the enemy countermeasures,” [McMaster] said, noting Russia’s use of nominally semi-professional forces who are capable of “dispersion, concealment, intermingling with civilian populations…the ability to disrupt our network strike capability, precision navigation and timing capabilities.”

The implication of this, McMaster contends, would be that “you’re probably going to have a close fight… Increasingly, close combat overmatch is an area we’ve neglected, because we’ve taken it for granted.”

One big reason for the perceived Russian overmatch is a due to an advantage in artillery, both in terms of range and in power.

[Phil] Karber, the president of the Potomac Foundation, went on a fact-finding mission to Ukraine last year, and returned with the conclusion that the United States had long overemphasized precision artillery on the battlefield at the expense of mass fires. Since the 1980s, he said last October, at an Association for the United States Army event, the U.S. has given up its qualitative edge, mostly by getting rid of cluster munitions.

Munitions have advanced incredibly since then. One of the most terrifying weapons that the Russians are using on the battlefield are thermobaric warheads, weapons that are composed almost entirely of fuel and burn longer and with more intensity than other types of munitions.

“In a 3-minute period…a Russian fire strike wiped out two mechanized battalions [with] a combination of top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads,” said Karber. “If you have not experienced or seen the effects of thermobaric warheads, start taking a hard look. They might soon be coming to a theater near you.”

McMaster believes that the combination of heavier, longer-ranged artillery abetted by the targeting capabilities afforded by hordes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provides the Russians with a significant battlefield advantage.

“We’re out-ranged by a lot of these systems and they employ improved conventional munitions, which we are going away from. There will be a 40- to 60-percent reduction in lethality in the systems that we have,” he said. “Remember that we already have fewer artillery systems. Now those fewer artillery systems will be less effective relative to the enemy. So we need to do something on that now.”

One potential solution is to develop more flexibility in existing U.S. Army fires capabilities.

To remedy that, McMaster is looking into a new area called “cross domain fires,” which would outfit ground units to hit a much wider array of targets. “When an Army fires unit arrives somewhere, it should be able to do surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and shore-to-ship capabilities. We are developing that now and there are some really promising capabilities,” he said.

It remains to be seen how pervasive and permanent these new Russian military capabilities are and whether they will result in changes in the existing system for modern conventional combat. The advantages the Russians derive from mass fires would appear to directly challenge the U.S.’s investment in precision guided munitions and strike capabilities going back to World War II. Precision strike, networked capabilities, and information warfare were fundamental aspects of the technology-driven Revolution in Military Affairs concept that dominated U.S. military thinking in the 1990s and early 2000s. Leveraging technology is also a foundational aspect of the Defense Department’s current Third Offset Strategy.

Can Russia Cow Europe into Submission?

My previous post addressed a famous 1980s U.S. policy and strategic debate in which quantitative analysis featured prominently. Such debates are ongoing, of course. The International Security Studies Forum just posted a roundtable discussion of a recent book by MIT political scientist Barry R. Posen, Restraint:  A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. The prolific Posen is the Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of MIT’s Security Studies Program. He played a role in the 1980s NATO/Warsaw Pact debate and his ongoing research “focuses on US military strategy, force structure and capabilities, and force posture (the global distribution of U.S. military forces.)”

His new book addresses the relationship between contemporary U.S. national strategy and net assessments of military power. In it, Posen makes an argument for a new grand strategic approach, as described in its blurb:

The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls “liberal hegemony,” one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America’s consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength… His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls “command of the commons,” focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.

In his response to the comments of the roundtable participants, Posen offered his capsule assessment of Russia’s current strategic situation in the context of his recommendation that the U.S. scale back its military commitment to European security:

Russia, under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, has made itself into a meaningful military power, and is practicing a muscular foreign policy. It seized Crimea, subverts the Donbas, and backs the Assad regime in Syria. This does not mean that it is no longer possible to implement Restraint in Europe. Russia’s power must be put in perspective. The National Intelligence Council assesses Russia’s net power as a fraction of the European Union’s today, and expects little improvement by mid-century. Its disastrous economic policies show no sign of change and the decrease in oil prices has made things even worse. Europe, taken as a whole, will remain quite capable. The question is whether Russia, by virtue of a sustained commitment to the generation of military power from a deteriorating economic base, can somehow cow Europe into submission. Would the Europeans invest so little in defending themselves in the absence of the U.S. military commitment that Russia could win what the Soviet Union could not–hegemony in Europe? [Emphasis added]

In light of recent debates over the correlation of military of forces and alleged military vulnerability of the Baltic States, a realistic assessment of overall strategic and military power seems like a good question to address. Posen’s arguments are well interrogated in the roundtable and his response is illuminating. It is all worth the time to read.

[Post edited for contextual clarity.]

Four Battalions

NATO is planning on deploying four battalions of 1,000 troops each to Eastern Europe. This is:

  1. A British led battalion in Estonia
  2. A Canadian led battalion in Latvia
  3. A German led battalion in Lithuania
  4. A U.S. led battalion in Poland.

These are all multinational battalions. So, for example, the Canadian led battalion will have 450 Canadian troops in it. The rest will be from other NATO members (which has 28 members…and does not include Ukraine). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are all NATO members. The three Baltic states were a part of the Soviet Union from 1940-1991. Estonia is “ethnically” still 25% Russian, as is Latvia. Lithuania is 5% Russian and in Poland we were refused service in a restaurant in 1996 because we spoke Russian to them.

I gather they are going to be there for a while.

 

Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule

rulesDr. Reina Pennington, a professor of history at Norwich University, recently published an analysis of the Eastern Front during World War II which made the case that the Soviet superiority in manpower over Germany was not as large as is often claimed. In support of her argument, Pennington provided a table comparing the total number of Soviet and German combat forces and force ratios at different times during the conflict. She pointed out that for much of the war, Soviet forces were either outnumbered, or achieved modest numerical superiorities that did not exceed 3 to 1 until late in 1944. “A 2:1 advantage is significant,” Pennington argued, “but falls short of the 3:1 force ratio that is generally regarded as necessary for attacking forces, and it’s a long way from the double-digit advantage that is often claimed.”

To support her assertion of the relevance of the 3-1 force ratio, Pennington linked to an article by Trevor N. Dupuy, “Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule,” published in the summer 1989 edition of International Security. The problem with citing Dupuy is that his assessment of the 3-1 rule contradicts her assertion of it.

Dupuy criticized the 3-1 rule on empirical grounds. The so-called “3-1 rule” is a military aphorism that holds that attacking forces require a 3 to 1 advantage over defending forces in order to succeed. Although this rule has become widely-known and widely-held, especially in Western militaries, its origin is unknown and unattributed. It is not exactly clear to what exactly it refers, and there is no known original statement of the rule that can be consulted for clarification.

Dupuy questioned the ambiguity of the rule, which in turn undermined its relevance.

[W]hat is the force ratio to be used with the 3:1 force ratio planning factor? Is it numbers of men, or weapons? Is it firepower? Is it some other calculation of a combat power ratio? In any event, it is clear that neither numbers nor firepower tells us much unless we know the circumstances under which these numbers face each other and the manner in which the firepower is applied.[1]

In 1984, Dupuy’s Historical Evaluation Research Organization (HERO) compiled a database of battles from 1600 to 1973 for the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA; now known as the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis). CAA’s examination of the numerical force ratios in the database showed that attackers with advantages of 3-1 or more in manpower succeeded 74% of the time. It also showed that attackers won between 58% and 63% of the time when attacking with between a 1.5-1 numerical disadvantage and less than a 3-1 advantage. Attackers also managed to obtain a manpower advantage of 3-1 or greater in just 106 of 598 cases (17.7%) examined.[2]

CAA, Battle Outcome vs. Force Ratio

Dupuy concurred that a 3-1 ratio based on a simple numerical total of troop numbers had limited use as a general rule-of-thumb guide for military planning, but asserted that it was useless for analytical purposes Simply put, while there are many historical cases where an attacking force with a 3-1 numerical advantage succeeded, there are also many cases where attackers won with less than a 3-1 advantage, and even with a numerical inferiority. On the Eastern Front during World War II, for example, the German Army regularly conducted successful attacks against numerically superior Soviet forces.

Dupuy was so certain of the validity of the data on this that he made it an aphorism of his own: In the average modem battle, the attacker’s numerical strength is about double the defender’s.

This is because the attacker has the initiative and can initiate combat at a time and place of his choosing and in the manner of his choosing. The attacker can mass his forces at critical points on the battlefield to gain the advantage in strength which he believes necessary to assure the success of the attack.

A battle usually does not take place unless each side believes it has some chance for success. Otherwise, the attacker would avoid taking the initiative. The defender, if he could not avoid battle by withdrawal, would make every possible effort to reinforce the prospective battle area sufficiently to have a chance for successful defense. One circumstance in which a battle occurs without the tacit agreement or acceptance of the defender, is when the attacker achieves surprise. Alternatively, surprise by a defender (for instance, by ambush) may result in a battle taking place before the prospective attacker is ready.

Most military men are aware of the rule of thumb that an attacker can count on success if he has a three-to-one numerical superiority, while a defender can expect success if his inferiority is not less than one-to-two. But the side achieving surprise can count on the effects of surprise multiplying its force strength by a factor ranging between 1.5 and 2.5 (or even more in some cases). Thus, an attacker expecting to achieve surprise would be willing to attack with less than a three-to-one superiority.

Another factor which can influence an attacker to seek battle with less than a three-to-one superiority is confidence in the superior quality of his troops. This accounts for many instances in which the Germans attacked in World War II with less than the desirable numerical superiority, and for the similar instances of Israeli attacks in the Arab-Israeli wars without great numerical superiority.[3]

Dr. Pennington is on fairly firm ground in rejecting the idea that numerical superiority was the sole reason the Red Army defeated the German Army in World War II, but numbers did play an extremely important role in the Soviet success. The lack of a 3-1 manpower advantage did not preclude the Soviets from battlefield success; 2-1 was sufficient. By the time the Soviets achieved a 3-1 advantage, success was well in hand and the end in sight.

NOTES

[1] Trevor N. Dupuy. Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles. Indianapolis; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979, p. 13

[2] Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” International Security, Spring 1988, p. 156; Robert Helmbold and Aqeel A. Khan. “Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE): Progress Report for the Period August 1984-June 1985,” Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, August 1986

[3] Trevor N. Dupuy. Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War. Falls Church (VA): Nova Publications, 1995, pp. 98-99

Learning From Defeat in World War I

Men dressed as First World War soldiers mingle with regular commuters aboard an underground tube train in London, to mark 100-years since the start of the Battle of the Somme, early Friday July 1, 2016. London commuters were met by the eerie sight of people dressed as World War I soldiers as they made their way to work Friday, with the soldiers singing wartime songs or remaining silent, revealed later Friday as a Somme tribute, the work of Turner Prize-winning artist Jeremy Deller, National Theatre Director Rufus Norris and thousands of volunteers. (Sarah Perry / PA via AP) The Associated Press
Men dressed as First World War soldiers mingle with regular commuters aboard an underground tube train in London, to mark 100-years since the start of the Battle of the Somme, early Friday July 1, 2016. London commuters were met by the eerie sight of people dressed as World War I soldiers as they made their way to work Friday, with the soldiers singing wartime songs or remaining silent, revealed later Friday as a Somme tribute, the work of Turner Prize-winning artist Jeremy Deller, National Theatre Director Rufus Norris and thousands of volunteers. (Sarah Perry / PA via AP) The Associated Press

Last week marked the 100th anniversary of the first day of the Battle of the Somme during the First World War. The battle, intended to relieve pressure on the French Army defending against a massive German offensive aimed at Verdun, is remembered for its enormous casualty list and strategic futility. Contemporary historians are re-thinking the impact of the Somme battle and of the British Army as a learning organization. Dr. Aimée Fox-Godden of the University of Birmingham has published an interesting examination of how the lessons of the Somme were viewed and applied in other theaters during the war. Her post is the second in a series by the First World War Research Group of the Defense Studies Department, King’s College London.

Another entry in the lessons of World War I department comes in the pages of the current edition of Military Review. Major Robert Chamberlain (USA) examines the role theories of warfare influence the planning, conduct and outcome of battles, looking specifically at the case of the German Army during the Battle of Verdun (pp. 78-87). He then looks at the lessons of Verdun regarding the relationship between a theory of warfare, political objectives, and outcomes and applies them to the current state of U.S. military thinking.

Brexit and NATO’s Tanks

A British army Challenger II main battle tank from the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards fires at a target during a training exercise in Basra, Iraq. (Sgt. Gustavo Olgiati, U.S. Army)
A British army Challenger II main battle tank from the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards fires at a target during a training exercise in Basra, Iraq. (Sgt. Gustavo Olgiati, U.S. Army)

In case anyone was worrying, it does not appear as if Brexit will have a negative impact on the future of NATO tank technology. Some foresee Britain’s pending (?) departure from the European Union has having a positive effect on the military strength of the alliance. The appearance of Russia’s new T-14 Armata tank has caused some concern among rivet counters, but it seems the NATO countries have some pretty decent armored vehicles these days and some downright capable crews (Achtung Panzer!).

(H/T to COL Patrick Donohoe)

Forbes on Russia’s Oil Reserves

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Below is a Forbes article on Russia’s Oil Reserves

Russia’s Oil Production Won’t Falter

Not sure I am sold on their argument:

  1. Russia’s proven oil reserves have gone from 50 billion barrels in 2000, to 60 billion in 2008 to 80 billion now.
  2. Since 2000 they have pumped 56 billion barrels of oil (that is a staggering figure)!
  3. They are pumping around 11 million barrels a day (4 billion a year)
  4. Internal consumption is 3.5 million barrels a day (1.3 billion a year)

A little back of the envelope calculation says they have 20 years of oil left (based upon proven reserves). Of course, the point of the article is that proven reserves have expanded…but…the point not made is that they cannot expand forever. It is still a finite resource. Dinosaurs are not dying fast enough to replace current usage.

Russia is struggling to cover its bills with oil at $50 a barrel. One wonders how it would do in 20 years if they ran out of oil.

Russia Today tends to be as much of a propaganda organ as it is a news service. The original Russia Today article states: “Russia will run out of oil by 2044, according to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, with production beginning to decline in 2020.”

https://www.rt.com/business/335967-russia-oil-reserves-depletion-2044/

Anyhow, this is not my area of expertise, so would certainly appreciate some feedback as to the long-term problems Russia is facing here. At this point, I am finding myself having more faith in the Russia Today article than the Forbes article (which is really kind of sad).