Category Casualty estimation

A Friendly Fire Discussion

I have decided to turn one of my email discussions I was having with several people into a blog post. As they got into a discussion of friendly fire (I gather based upon one addressee’s personal experience), I ended up making the following statement:

Friendly fire (FF):

1. The original figure that came out of WWII was 2% of the casualties were due to friendly fire (Beebe and Debakey?).

2. This was probably low.

3. Since WWII there has been no definitive studies on FF casualties that I am aware of.

4. It was much higher than 2% in the 1991 Gulf War.

5. In the 1990s Chuck Hawkins (Vietnam company commander) and Gene Visco (DUSA OR) did some preliminary work looking at FF casualties. They were attempting to get a contract to do an actual proper survey of the subject. That did not happen.

6. By default, the preliminary work by Hawkins and Visco (both deceased) is the only significant work on FF casualties that has been done since WWII. I may have a copy somewhere in my files. Not sure anything has been published or is on the internet. I think they presented their findings at ISMOR.

Dermot, you are welcome to discuss what the UK has done.

Dermot Rooney, the author of Slog or Swan (see: Slog or Swan – The Dupuy Institute) came back with the following response:

Here’s the Slog or Swan quote:

Meanwhile, fragile radio communications separated infantry and artillery, contributing to a high rate of fratricide. A Canadian study conducted during Veritable put the number of Allied casualties to friendly artillery at between seven and 21 percent of the total. The actions examined for the current assessment support splitting the difference at around 15 percent.11 This figure is alarmingly close to the 19 percent attributed to German small arms, and considerably greater than the six percent benchmark for friendly fire casualties in a First World War barrage. Artillery fratricide was also a major factor in five of the failed attacks in the current assessment and, considering the tendency to underreport such events, was likely a factor in as many more. The high chance of fratricide very probably undermined the essential trust between infantryman and gunner, the coordination of fire and assault, and therefore the value of suppression.12

 

[11] This is another of those tantalising glimpses mentioned earlier. The figures are the extremes presented in Brigadier E. C. Plow’s study of munition fragments removed from casualties and could only be found in Appendix L of Copp’s Cinderella Army. Copp and Buckley opt for ‘as high as 19 percent’. Copp, Cinderella Army, pp.291, 338–340; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p.272.

[12] Contrary to the mines and mud narrative, the Canadian wounds study also found 4 percent of casualties were caused by the combination of mines and grenades, way behind German artillery, German small arms, and Allied artillery. J. B. Coates and J. C. Beyer (eds), Wound Ballistics in World War II: Supplemented by experiences in the Korean War (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, 1962) has mines accounting for 0 to 10 percent of total casualties depending on the sampling method. The battle descriptions for this assessment suggest the effect of mines on advance rates was marginal and appears no greater than in other operations.

If anyone has a copy of any presentations made or write-ups done by Charles Hawkins or Gene Visco on fratricide, please forward them to me (LawrenceTDI@aol.com).

I do note that the links to Cornwallis Group, founded in 1996 by Gene Visco, is no longer connected to the ISMOR site. It does seem like we are losing knowledge. The earliest ISMOR link I can find is ISMOR 39 (with the Eugene Visco prize): ISMOR – ISMOR 39 | ORS. There were links to earlier ISMOR conferences and papers, and links in ISMOR to the Cornwallis Group, but I cannot find these. 

Books and public sources that describe the QJM and TNDM

The QJM (Quantified Judgment Model) and TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model are two combat models that Trevor Dupuy developed first in 1977 as the QJM, and then heavily revised and released in 1990 at the TNDM. We do sell a computerized version of the TNDM along with manuals and training courses but at a price out of reach for most individuals. See: TNDM & QJM – The Dupuy Institute

Now, I do regularly get enquiries about the model. The combat models are described in a half-dozen books.

1.  The first version of the combat model, the QJM, is fully described in Trevor Dupuy’s book Numbers, Predictions and War (1977). You may have to fish around for it, it is not in print. I see a used version for sale on Amazon.com for $77.59 and $89.95.
2. The theoretical discussions that come from his work is described in his book Understanding War (1987). This is the most significant book written by Trevor Dupuy and should be in every serious military analyst’s library. Amazon.com has a used copy for $15.89. We have new copies for $24.95: Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat – The Dupuy Institute and Ordering Information – The Dupuy Institute. An earlier theoretical book, Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (1980) is available on Amazon.com for $19.96.
3. The new model, the TNDM, was created in 1990. It is described in two books, Attrition (1990) and If War Comes (1991). Both are out of print. Attrition is for sale on Amazon.com for $123.10. I tried to warn you:  We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute. If War Comes is not on Amazon.com (even though it was on the Times best-sellers list).  His father’s books, written in 1938 is available for $15.55 paperback and $30.00 hardcover. Trevor Dupuy’s book is available on Ebay for $45.95.
4. Some quantitative analysis of combat and a little on the TNDM is described in my book War by Numbers (2017). That book is still in print and available in Amazon.com for $37.15 (list price 39.95). It is rated at 4.7 out of 5 on Amazon.
5. Now there were a lot of reports and studies does to develop these combat models. They include:
6. There were also a dozen “International TNDM Newsletters” prepared when we were working various support contracts for the TNDM. They are here:  TNDM Newsletter – The Dupuy Institute
7. Finally, it is discussed in our blog: Mystics & Statistics – The Dupuy Institute. Specifically if you search on our blog categories “TNDM”: TNDM – The Dupuy Institute or “Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming”: Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming – The Dupuy Institute or “casualty estimation”:  Casualty estimation – The Dupuy Institute or “Dupuy’s Theory of Combat”: Dupuy’s Theory of Combat – The Dupuy Institute
8. Finally, it was discussed in our now inactive Forum: The Dupuy Institute Forum – powered by Infopop
 
Hopefully, that should answer a lot of enquiries.
 

Shout out to Echoes of Past

I do want to make a shout out to Echoes of Past who keeps posting quotes by my book War by Numbers and from Trevor Dupuy’s books. His twitter account is here: Echoes of Past (@EchoesofpastX) / X

This includes: Echoes of Past on X: “4/5 “We can still lose this war. . . . The Germans are colder and hungrier than we are, but they fight better. —GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON, January 4, 1945, in Dupuy et al., Hitler’s Last Gamble” (Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers) @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/fcgMxVkEV0″ / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “”#Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple #aphorism.” (Christopher A. Lawrence, #War by Numbers) https://t.co/kioG46QbI2″ / X

and from our blog: Echoes of Past on X: “#Ukraine #Kursk operation does three things for them: 1. Propaganda value. 2. Ukraine 🇺🇦 captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 & have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for people Russia holds. https://t.co/SWHSFkoSLn” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. ⁦@dupuyinstitute⁩ https://t.co/Gryxkdtvho” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Depressing insight for Tank Enthusiasts from book “War by Numbers” by Christopher A. Lawrence. Tank loss rates are 5-7 times higher than personnel casualties in combined arms engagements. #WarByNumbers #ArmoredForces #MilitaryStrategy @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/d5WWTuH3bT” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@AmosFox6 @dupuyinstitute Hi Amos, it will be an excellent opportunity to hear him. I just finished one of his classics “War by Numbers”. Sharing few insights and I will be building it further. You may bookmark 🔖 it.👇” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/mXBHvEHFDr” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 5/n Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces https://t.co/jjLil3rKbM” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 4/n According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/NrINYgN5qd” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “3️⃣/n In warfare, combat effectiveness plays a crucial role in inflicting casualties. The Germans in WWI and WWII, as well as the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli wars, showcased higher casualty-inflicting rates. 💥 #warfare #combat #effectiveness Pic 2 :@vtchakarova https://t.co/WQR8JwwPfU” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “2/n Historical fortifications like Maginot Line, Mannerheim Line, Siegfried Line, & Bar Lev Line were overcome not due to their failure, but because of a powerful relentless effort. It’s important to recognize context, rather than jumping to conclusions. https://t.co/nV3bxn1KSD https://t.co/ywrGBhFvNP” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “1️⃣st thought from “War by Numbers” by Christopher A Lawrence Tank loss rates are 5 to 7 times higher than personnel casualty rates. This applies to combined arms engagements in which armored forces make up a substantial proportion of fighting strength on one or both sides. https://t.co/Dshm8nopA4” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces @dupuyinstitute @WarMonitors @WarintheFuture @AmosFox6 @VertigoWarrior @warmatters https://t.co/IJHwBVdcrO” / X

 

Also a shout out to Mountain Navy: Mountain Navy 🎲🗺⚔️ on X: “Usually think of Lawrence @dupuyinstitute as Mr. “Tanks at Kursk” so this new #militaryhistory #book looks to be an interesting adjacent read. https://t.co/v7XyyGT6tc” / X

and Robert Gilbey: Robert Gilbey on X: “‘The Battle for Kyiv’ by Christopher A. Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute This is a very insightful & indifferent analysis of the opening invasion of Ukraine, leveraging metrics from OSINT & official sources it breaks down the context, actions & effects of combat ops around Kyiv https://t.co/OMX5C6kYL6” / X

and Amos Fox: Amos Fox on X: “Part I of my conversation with Chris Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute. Part II drops tomorrow. After that the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast will take a 4 week break. https://t.co/fTCrKkoes6” / X

and Mark Galeotti: Mark Galeotti on X: “I then look at 4 books to help explain Russian adaptation: 1. Christopher Lawrence of @dupuyinstitute, The Battle for Kyiv (@Frontline_Books), useful for insights into the various forms of military capability 2/” / X

and Paul Poast: Paul Poast on X: “To identify war outcomes, Stam’s study drew on military histories, notably the encyclopedic volume by Dupuy & Dupuy (cc @dupuyinstitute). https://t.co/oGJR4ZZuNQ” / X

 

I am sure there are a few I missed this year. Only two of these people are known to me. Sorry for anyone I have missed.

 

We are sold out of Attrition

We are sold out of the book Attrition. Oddly enough, in the last two weeks I have received three orders for it. I kind of hate to not respond to a request. So, we are talking to the Dupuy family to find out what it would cost to print another 100-200 copies.

We sold 54 copies over the last nine or so years, and now suddenly have three new orders. I suspect because of the war in Ukraine, more people are looking at the losses in conventional combat. This is about the best summary of the subject out there. We did sell 16 copies in nine months recently. I guess I could write an Attrition II, which I think would have value. Not sure that will be my next book project.

Anyhow, you can kind find Attrition on Amazon for $177 to up to $3,417: Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War by Trevor N. Dupuy (1996-02-03): Trevor N. Dupuy: Amazon.com: Books. We were selling our copies for $19.95. I will sell my desk copy for $3K, if anyone is willing to pay.

Anyhow, I did try to warn everyone it was selling out:

We have sold out of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute

We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute

We do have other books for sale: Books – The Dupuy Institute

We have sold out of Attrition

Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War is no longer for sale by The Dupuy Institute. We sent out our last two copies last week. We still hold copies of everything else listed here: Books – The Dupuy Institute

If you want Attrition, it is available on Amazon.com, but at a hefty price of $180: Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War: Dupuy, Trevor N.: 9780963869234: Amazon.com: Books. We sold our copies for $19.95.

There is little chance we will publish it again. The rights are held by the Dupuy family, not us. We sold 54 copies over the course of 9 years. This hardly justifies a new print run.

You were warned: We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute. We did sell those 16 copies in 9 months.

Putin releases captured figures

Update on the number of captured: “At a meeting in St. Petersburg on Wednesday, Putin told the heads of several international news agencies that there are 1,348 Russian troops and officers in captivity in Ukraine compared to the 6,465 Ukrainians in Russian detention.” See: Putin makes rare claim on Ukraine war casualties (msn.com)

Now, I find these figures to be entirely believable. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed as of 30 June 2022 to be holding 6,000 Ukrainians soldiers in captivity. This was partly confirmed in July 2022 when the Ukrainian missing person commissioner stated on TV that more than 7,000 people were missing, including soldiers, National Guardsmen, border guards and intelligence officers. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated on 19 September that the Russians held more prisoners than Ukraine did (see: The Battle for Kyiv, page 185). There were maybe 2,439 that surrendered at Mariupol in late May 2022. There have been other people captured in the two years since then. The prisoner exchanges have traded at least 2,800 Russians soldiers and civilians for 3,001 Ukrainians soldiers and 145 civilians. Plus there were some Ukrainians who died while captivity. Anyhow, it all seems to add up, although it could be on the high side, and the figure of 6,465 probably includes some civilians.

On the other hand, his assertion that he has lost in combat only one Russian for five Ukrainians is absurd. It is as absurd as some of the bizarrely lopsided casualties claims that Ukraine is exchanging casualties at a 3-to-1 to 5-to-1 ratio in their favor. 

Personnel Attrition Rates….

While searching the internet for something else, I ran across this April 1996 report by Dr. Robert L. Helmbold of CAA (Center for Army Analysis). Personnel Attrition Rates in Historical Land Combat Operations: Losses of National Populations, Armed Forces, Army Groups, and Lower Level Land Combat Forces. (dtic.mil)

I am surprised that I have not seen that before. At the time of its publication we were under contract with CAA for work on the Kursk Data Base (KDB). I gather Dr. Helmbold retired shortly thereafter. I was asked if I wanted to take over his slot at CAA, but being the executive officer of TDI, I was not willing to step back down to a non-management position. I had gotten spoilt.

Anyhow, a few notes:

Page 1-1 (page 22 in the pdf file): They list six supporting reports done between 1992-1995. I assume there are all available from DTIC.

Page 2-1 (page 27): This chapter addresses the question of losses in wars as a whole. This might have some value in looking at mobilization levels for Ukraine.

Page 3-1 (page 55): This chapter addresses variation of loses by nationality, theater and major operations or campaigns.

Page 4-1 (page 66): The Chapter addresses losses by Army Groups. This chapter is mostly based upon George Kuhn’s work the LMI, as is some of the next two chapters. Some of George Kuhn’s data was collected under contract with HERO (our predecessor company).

Page 5-1 (page 75): This chapter address losses by Army. This chapter does include a number of graphs from the CDB90 data base (which was built from our work) as does the next chapter.

Page 6-1 (page 99): This chapter addresses losses by Corps.

Anyhow, two Dupuy books are referenced in this report, along with four HERO reports. In the study directive the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) and the Kursk Data Base (KDB) was both referenced but they were not used. I was the program manager for both of those databases.

Top Ten Blog posts in 2023

Happy New Year to all. 2023 is over. Not the best year for many in the world. Wanted to take a moment to list out our top ten blog posts for 2023 (based upon number of hits). They are:

  1. Wounded-to-killed ratios in Ukraine in 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  2. U.S. Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in World War II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – a blog post by Dr. Shawn Woodford from 2016.
  3. How many brigades did Ukraine start with war with? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – this is actually clipped from my book The Battle for Kyiv.
  4. Population over Time (US vs USSR) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – a blog post from 2018. I suspect this gets so many hits because this was the initial entry point for a number of people who periodically check on this blog and they continue to use this post to direct them to our blog.
  5. German versus Soviet Artillery at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – another 2018 blog post.
  6. New WWII German Maps At The National Archives | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – a 2017 blog post by Dr. Shawn Woodford.
  7. How Does the U.S. Army Calculate Combat Power? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – another 2017 blog post by Dr. Shawn Woodford.
  8. Tank Loss Rates in Combat: Then and Now | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – a 2016 blog post by Dr. Shawn Woodford.
  9. U.S. Army Force Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – a 2018 blog post.
  10. The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – a 2017 blog post by Dr. Shawn Woodford. It was the second most popular blog post in 2022.

Honorable mentions:

13. Wounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – this 2016 blog post was our most popular blog post in 2022.

16. Where Did Japan Go? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – this 2018 blog post was sort of the culmination of our series of demographic blog posts. May revisit this subject again this year.

18. The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 560 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) – for a while we did post daily (then two-three times a week) about the war in Ukraine. This was our most popular one of those posts. We will probably restart these again sometime this winter, like when there is a danger of the front lines again moving.

 

Anyhow, the blog has been quieter for the last three months. This was in part because I was on travel and in part because I needed to finish up a book (The Siege of Mariupol). To date, I have not learned how to multi-task and complete a book, so the book has had the priority. Sorry to anyone I have not responded to as a result.

The Battle for Kyiv book will be available in the U.S. on Amazon.com come 18 January 2024.

We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition

Just to give you all a heads-up, we are down to our last 16 copies of Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War. Hard to predict how long those remaining copies will last. It is still affordable at $19.95. Right now, Amazon is selling it used for $50 – $400. See: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org).

I do not control the rights to reprint it.

Ordering info is here: TDI Purchasing Publications (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

The New York Times casualty reports

Turns out the New York Times, based upon citations of unnamed U.S. officials, is providing the following estimates of losses:

1. Russia: up to 120,000 killed and 170,000 to 180,000 wounded.
2. Ukraine: close to 70,000 killed with 100,000 to 120,000 wounded.

I have lots of heartburn with these figures.

First… wounded-to-killed ratios:

The wounded-to-killed ratio for WWII was 3:1. The wounded-to-killed ratio for Soviets troops at the Battle of Kursk (1943) was around 2.5:1 (2.48-to-1). Specifically, in the Voronezh Front from 4-11 July it was 2.29-to-1 and from 12-18 July 1943 it was 2.68-to-1. For the opposing Germans it was 5.11-to-1 and 4.54-to-1 respectively. See Kursk, page 1374 (not too many people can say “see page 1374 of my book”).

Since World War II, wounded-to-killed ratios have risen to 5-to-1 or higher. It was 10-to-1 for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan (and 13-to-1 for the USMC). The Donets People’s Republic (DPR) reported a wounded-to-killed ratio for 2022 of 4-to-1 (4.16-to-1).

So, they have for the Russians a wounded-to-killed of 1.5-to-1. Really? Read my book War by Numbers, Chapter 15, and then come back with some intellectually valid estimates. These are not!

They have the wounded-to-killed ratios for the Ukrainians at between 1.42 or 1.71 to one. Same ballpark as the Russians. Yet the Soviet Union has a wounded-to-killed ratio at Kursk in 1943 of 2.5-to-1. Are you saying that medical care and evacuation in the Russian and Ukrainian armies now are considerably worse that of the Soviet Union in 1943, when they did not have penicillin? The argument is absurd.

Second… Russian killed:

The only systematic reporting of Russian killed that I am aware is the BBC/Medizona reports by name of people killed. As of 11 August, this was a total of 30,003. These figures are gathered from a mix of obituaries, newspaper reports, formal death certificates, contacts with the families, reviewing graveyards and gravestones, and I gather a number of catch-as-catch-can methods. I have not reviewed their data collections efforts in detail. From my correspondence with them, they believe they are accounting for about half of the dead. This seems like a reasonable assumption, although it is an assumption. This would mean that total Russian dead from the war is perhaps 60,000 or more killed. Not sure how we get from there to 120,000.

Third… Ukrainian killed:

The reporting we have on Ukrainian dead is worse than what we have for Russian dead. Now, I am sure the Ukrainians have a better count, but they have not provided any reporting in a very long time (since summer of last year). My sense is that Ukrainian dead is probably less than Russian dead at this point. Maybe 75% of Russian dead, although this is a guesstimate based upon no solid data. So, their estimate of 70,000 Ukrainains versus 120,000 Russian dead sort of matches. It is 58% of the Russian dead or a casualty exchange ratio of 1.71-to-1. I really don’t buy into that. Ukrainian definitely took some casualties in the Kherson operations August-October 2022, possibly more than the Russians. They are on the offensive now against prepared positions. If they have significant artillery superior it is possible they could have a 2-to-1 exchange ratio, but Russia does have some active artillery, as the 47th Mech Bde videos in June showed. So, I do question the 1.71-to-1 exchange ratio.

So, if Russian killed are 60,000, then Ukrainian killed could be 45,000 or higher. I am still guessing that the wounded-to-killed ratio is 4-to-1 or higher. So maybe for Russian 60K killed and 240K wound for 300K casualties (which actually does match the totals in the New York Times article). For Ukraine maybe 45K killed (or more) and at least 180K wounded for a total of 225K casualties or higher.

Of course, these are estimates based upon little actual data. But, while it is hard to tell what the correct estimate is, it is pretty easy to tell if there is an issue with an estimate if they cannot provide a reasonable wounded-to-killed ratio. If they can’t provide a reasonable interpretation of that fairly well documented relationship (again see War by Numbers or Dupuy’s Attrition), then it does make one wonder what can be trusted in such an estimate.

 

P.S. If you take the estimate of 120K Russian killed and assume 4-to-1 wounded, then you end up with 600,000 casualties which is hard to explain in an army that has only deployed 300,000+ to Ukraine. It does appear that people keep dicking with the wounded-to-killed figures so they can report more killed without producing outrageously high total casualty figures.