Category East Asia

The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships

We state is our post yesterday that “China has the ability land over 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan on the first wave.” Now three different people in our conference on 13 November independently did counts. They all ended up in the 20,000 to 25,000 range. Here is my count:

  • 4 landing ship dock
    • 28 helicopters each
    • 800 troops each
  • 12 amphibious transport docks
    • 8 Yuzhao class (25,000 tons)
      • 800 troops each
  • 32 landing ships tanks
    • 15 Yuting III class (4,800 tons)
      • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
    • 10 or 11 Yuting II class (4,800 tons)
      • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
    • 3 Yukan class (4,170 tons)
      • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
    • 33 landing ship medium
      • 10 Yunshu class (2,000 tons)
        • 500 troops or 5 to 10 tanks
      • 1 Yudeng class (1,850 tons)
        • One platoon and 4 tanks
      • 11 Yubei class (700 tons)
        • 250 troops
      • 12 Yuhai class (700 tons)
        • 350 troops or 2 tanks
      • 1 Yulu class (800 tons)
        • 200 troops


Some math:

  • People: 21,750
    • 4 x 800 = 3,200
    • 8 x 800 = 6,400
    • 10 x 500 = 5,000
    • 11 x 250 = 2,750
    • 12 x 350 = 4,200
    • 1 x 200 = 200
  • Vehicles: 284
    • 15 x 10 = 150
    • 10 x 10 = 100
    • 3 x 10 = 30
    • 1 x 4 = 4

Now, carrying vehicles versus personnel is an either-or proposition. You could choose to carry more people and less vehicles. It is a tradeoff. I made some assumptions, as modern armies don’t like to go to war without vehicles.

Now, all these calculations are too high. You will also want to land supplies and support material in the initial wave. This is not an insignificant portion of the load. In some operations, it has made up to half the load of the initial wave. So, the figure of 20,000 is an upper limit. If they actually did it, the real figures will probably be lower. 

This also assumes that the initial landing wave is not intercepted, attrited, or otherwise seriously attacked. This is hard to do in the current intelligence environment, especially with U.S. support. It is hard to believe that a hostile incoming amphibious wave would not be hit by volleys of missiles and drones.

Further posts will address the rest of the PLA’s amphibious assets.

The Chinese amphibious lift capacity

During the Third HAAC a discussion developed over what is the amphibious lift capacity of the armed forces of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This is, of course, directly related to the issue of whether China can successfully invade and conquer Taiwan. We then held follow-up discussions with some the HAAC attendees on the subject.  This is going to generate some new posts to the blog detailing out what we explored. But, let me summarize the tentative conclusions of the discussion here.

First, China has the ability to land over 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan on the first wave. This is not much considering the defending Taiwanese ground forces consist of over 100,000 active troops. China maybe be able to supplement that with 10,000 airmobile troops, but this is risky in a strong anti-air environment. They may be able to add other troops by use of commercial shipping and other means, but this is pretty uncertain.

Obviously on subsequent days, they can land another 20,000 or more troops, but we are looking at a week to build up an army capable to fully engaging the Taiwanese Army. In the meantime, Taiwan can mobilize hundreds of thousands of reserves. Added to that, Chinese reinforcements and resupply are subject to interdiction. While China has a lot of aircraft and missiles, so too does Taiwan if it is properly backed up by the United States. This invasion does not appear to be an “iffy” proposition, it appears to be one that will most likely fail.

Now, if China can directly seize a port and/or an airfield, then possibilities develop, but if Taiwan properly defends these locales, this is also a long shot. 

To successfully invade Taiwan China will need to be able to land a whole lot more troops on the first and subsequent waves. Nominally it has that capability with a large number of 50-year old landing craft. These are mostly not active and some are in civilian use as tugs and ferries. Furthermore these small landing craft have to traverse 100 miles of ocean at a speed of 8-12 miles per hour in a hostile environment. This is not promising. There are other options, like using merchant ships (and running them aground?), fishing fleets, etc. None of these are particularly promising for a modern mechanized army. 

Now China does have dozens of large roll-on, roll-off ferry ships that could be used to supplement their amphibious operations, but, they usually need a dock to unload at. This implies that any amphibious operation will have to start by seizing a port, which can be defended, and if taken, can be denied immediate use. These are really not first wave assets. Nominally they can provide additional over-the-beach lift capacity for an initial wave by loading them up with small landing craft and unloading the small craft offshore at sea, but there are still two limitations here: 1) they need small landing craft or amphibious vehicles, and 2) because they are in commercial use, activating them will give Taiwan weeks, if not months of notice. Taiwan’s reserves are 2.3 million people. See: China’s Secret Weapon in the Invasion of Taiwan: RoRo Ferries

It is clear that while China has maintained a modern Marine force with amphibious capability, they had not maintained the amphibious capability to invade Taiwan. Their Marine force is structured for use elsewhere, not Taiwan. It is clear, based upon their military capabilities, that they currently have no real plans to invade Taiwan.

This, of course, can change if the United States does not continue to support Taiwan or if Taiwan loses the desire to defend itself, but right now, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not really practical given the limited Chinese first wave lift capacity.

We will be discussing the details of this on subsequent days: 

  • Tues: The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships
  • Wed: Other Chinese landing craft
  • Thu: The RoRo Ships
  • Fri: The Chinese fishing fleet as an amphibious asset

 

The Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024

Continuing with a weekly post from Geof Clark, an American currently residing in Japan:

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Title: Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024


Image credit @AfbR681dzgszG1a
https://twitter.com/AfbR681dzgszG1a/status/1858810386805649512/photo/4

Recently, I attended an airshow at the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF) air base in Gifu Prefecture. According to the JASDF, about 65,000 people attended. This included many interesting aircraft, including F-15Js & F-2s fighters, KC-767 tanker, C-1 & C-2 cargo aircraft, and a USMC F/A-18C from the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, among others. It was very impressive, however, the majority of these aircraft are decades old, and while they have been modified and improved over the years, the fundamental capabilities are unchanged. The JASDF and Japanese Maritime SDF (JMSDF) have both invested in F-35A and F-35B stealth aircraft in more recent years, but these were not on display in Gifu.

Perhaps the most modern kit on display was probably the XASM-3. This is a standoff anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) which allows the F-2 aircraft to launch a maritime strike on enemy vessels from outside of their air defense envelope.

“Japan started full-scale development of a missile called XASM-3 in FY2010 that can be operated by (JASDF) F-2 fighter jets. The XASM-3 was an air-launched anti-ship missile (ASM) that cruised at supersonic speeds (above Mach 3) thanks an Integral Rocket Ramjet engine. It had a range of about 200 km (108 nautical miles).”


Four J-20s banks left of the show center. (Image credit: Rin Sakurai)

In contrast, the annual Chinese airshow at Zhuhai this year was very impressive. According to CCTV (the state-operated military news outlet), 600,000 people attended, and new contracts worth 280 billion yuan (about $38.6 billion) were signed. On display a number of impressive new aircraft and capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), from Russia, and available for possible export. The Aviationist has a good list of capabilities revealed. The following list & commentary is by no means exhaustive, but it gives an idea of these capabilities:

• PLA Air Force (PLAAF) – The Shenyang FC-31 prototype has been accepted by the PLAAF and commissioned as the J-35A stealth fighter. A smaller and probably less expensive stealth fighter to complement the J-20A, which is already in service. Is this part of a “high/low mix” with Chinese characteristics? Some claim that some smoke plumes seen illustrate the ongoing challenges China faces trying to match Western & Russian engine capability & quality.
• PLAAF – a J-20 “four ship” (four aircraft) put on a great flying demonstration, and a twin seat J-20S mock-up was on display. I saw one comment on X (twitter) claim that this was the first 5.5 generation fighter, as it is the first twin seat stealth fighter, which purports to better enable the concept of operations (CONOPS) of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). These are the fancy U.S. terms for the rear seat occupant managing flights of drones that accompany or are in close proximity (i.e. line of sight) to the J-20S aircraft. The USAF is progressing with plans for CCA, to be used with the F-22, F-35, possibly F-15EX and ultimately the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) “family of systems”. How much will a second person in the cockpit matter?
• Rosoboronexport (Russian state owned enterprise for arms exports) – an Su-57 (well, actually a T-50 prototype, thanks Millenium 7 …) gave an impressive flight display, complete with stunning acrobatics. The export statistics brochure data for both Su-57E and Su-75 Checkmate are linked here. There was also an announcement that the Su-57E has its first export contract, and speculation that Algeria is the most likely purchasing country, although others are possible … and indeed it might be the next in a long line of contracts that did not materialize …
• The Russian Knights put on an impressive display, returning to Zhuhai after an eight year absence. They flew in formation and solo demonstrations of Su-30SM and Su-35S. While this was certainly impressive, the Flanker family has had some challenges in Ukraine, and we will explore this in detail in a separate blog post soon.
• The PLAAF displayed their J-16D variant of the Flanker, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) displayed a similar J-15D, both of which are dedicated electronic warfare (EW) variants. Many military analysts comparing these to an EA-18G Growler, which might be apt for the J-15D, since both are carrier-borne, but the J-16D is a dedicated EW platform for the PLAAF, and the last time the U.S. Air Force (USAF) has such a platform was the EF-111A, which was retired in 1998.
• PLAN also displayed the J-15T naval variant, now equipped to be launched by catapult by the PLANS-18 (CV-003) Fujian aircraft carrier (CV), and probably future PLAN CVs, as well as being backward compatible with the existing ski-jump CVs. This will provide the capability to launch more rapidly with a much greater payload weight, possibly heralding a maritime strike fighter role, in addition to the air defense role. Other elements of the future air wing are expected to include a naval version of the J-35A mentioned above, and a fixed wing airborne early warning and control (what the U.S. calls AWACS) aircraft with the possible designation of KJ-600 As a side note, the Fujian has departed for sea trial number 5.
• A plethora of un-crewed platforms that were also on static display including …

o CH-7, a peer competitor to US-made RQ-180, “ready to meet navy’s demand for maritime missions”. With a “debut at the airshow in 2018, it was being designed to be a stealth armed reconnaissance UAV that can play a strategic role in combat, so it was bigger and able to conduct strike missions to eliminate a strategic target. However, six years on, the CH-7 project has experienced a change … to [an] advanced tactical drone that is able to conduct various missions due to the development of modern warfare and the changing demand of clients”, Cao Ran of Aerospace CH UAV told the Global Times at the airshow.
o CH-9, a larger sized armed reconnaissance drone
o CH-3D, a smaller, lower cost drone
o CH-YH-1000, a cargo drone
o SS-UAV, or “Smart configuration Support Un-crewed Aerial Vehicle”, is a large, modular drone which according to Jane’s Defense might “undertake multiple missions, including maritime strike, long-range cargo transport, and surveillance.” There was speculation that it might also act as a mothership for multiple “attritable” drones in a swarm.

There are other systems which play a big role in aerial warfare, including the HQ-19 and DF-1000, which we will blog about soon!

Thanks for reading and for your comments!

“The Games the Marine Corps Plays”

An associate strongly recommended I look at this article. I would recommend the same to our readership: The Games the Marine Corps Plays | Military.com

It is written by Gary Anderson of GWU, who I do not know. But, to quote a few lines from the article:

  1. “You do not want prying eyes on your work that might question its rigor or validity.”
  2. “Since the Marines would be hundreds of miles away and irrelevant, they could be safely ignored.”
  3. “First, the Corps hired the most incompetent red team in the history of war-gaming, or their analysts cooked the books” (this sounds like a familiar problem, see:  Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The U.S. Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)).

Anyhow, it is not a long article. Recommend reading it.

Some National Coronavirus Graphs – update 3

I may continue updating this post for a while. This basically addresses the question of when is the virus mitigated, or even better when it is contained, and eventually when should restrictions be relaxed. So we look at South Korea compared to the three worst plagued countries in the world. We then look at three other countries in East Asia that were near China and had to deal with the virus sooner than most. We then look at a few other countries that appear to getting the virus under control. I think there is considerable value here in comparing results across several countries. All these are simple graphs pulled from the Johns Hopkins CSSE website as of 8:31:22 AM: Johns Hopkins CSSE

Here is the graph for the number of cases in South Korea (10,702 reported cases, only 89 more case than reported around this same time last week):

This is good. This looks like a country that now has the situation under control. Note how long it took (time is on the x-axis).

In comparison, here are the graphs for the United States (842,624 reported cases), Spain (213,024 reported cases) and Italy (187,327 reported cases). It looks like Spain and Italy are reaching their deflection point:

In contrast here are the graphs for three other East Asian nations, Japan (11,950 cases), Taiwan (427 cases) and Vietnam (268 cases, the same as last week). Not sure why Japan does not have the virus under control like South Korea does. This would be worth looking into.

And here is China (83,878 reported cases), although there is still some concern about the accuracy of their statistics:

Finally, let me add the Austria (15,002 reported cases), Norway (7,338 reported cases), Australia (6,547 reported cases and only 85 new cases since last week), the Czech Republic (7,136 reported cases), Iceland (1,785 reported cases and only 58 new cases since last week) and New Zealand (1,451 reported cases and only 50 new cases since last week) to this collection of graphs as it appears that they are now reaching their inflection point and some have started leveling off:

Finally, there is Germany, which has the fifth highest number of reported cases (at 150,773). They also appear to be bringing this under control.

And then there is Singapore. Last week it had 3,614 reported cases. Now it has 11,178 reported cases. It appears that they have lost control of the situation again.

Some National Coronavirus Graphs – update 2

Updating my posts for the last two weeks. This basically addresses the question of when is the virus mitigated, or even better when it is contained, and eventually when should restrictions be relaxed. So we look at South Korea compared to the three worst plagued countries in the world. We then look at three other countries in East Asia that were near China and had to deal with the virus sooner than most. We then look at a few other countries that appear to getting the virus under control. I think there is considerable value here in comparing results across several countries. All these are simple graphs pulled from the Johns Hopkins CSSE website as of 10:36:00 AM: Johns Hopkins CSSE

Here is the graph for the number of cases in South Korea (10,613 reported cases):

In comparison, here are the graphs for the United States (640,014 reported cases), Spain (182,816 reported cases) and Italy (165,155 reported cases). It looks like Spain and Italy are reaching their deflection point:

In contrast here are the graphs for three other East Asian nations, Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam. Note that they have fewer reported cases, 8,626, 395, 268 respectively:

And here is China (83,402 reported cases), although there is still some concern about the accuracy of their statistics:

Finally, let me add the Austria (14,451 reported cases), Norway (6,798 reported cases), Australia (6,462 reported cases), the Czech Republic (6,303 reported cases), Singapore (3,614 reported cases), Iceland (1,727 reported cases) and New Zealand (1,401 reported cases) to this collection of graphs as it appears that they are now reaching their inflection point and some have started leveling off:

There are other people publishing similar graphs. For example: https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/16/world/coronavirus-response-lessons-learned-intl/index.html

 

Some National Coronavirus Graphs – update 1

Just an update on my post last week on this subject:

Here is the graph for the number of cases in South Korea (as of 9:36;11 AM)

In comparison, here is the United States, Spain and Italy:

In contrast here are three other East Asian nations, Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam:

 

And here is China, although there is still some concern about the accuracy of their statistics:

Finally, let me add the Austrian graph to this as it appears that they are now reaching their inflection point and may start leveling off:

The daily increase for Austria is here:

Is the difference leadership?

South Korea, with an estimated 2020 population of 51,780,5798 million, has had 9,976 cases of coronavirus (as of 10:00:04 AM). They have tested more than 300,000 people and have had 169 deaths. Of those 9,976 cases, 5,828 are reported as recovered leaving them with 3,979 active cases. Outside of China, there are currently twelve countries with more cases than South Korea. They are United States (population 330 million), Italy ( 60 million), Spain (47 million), Germany (83 million), France, (67 million), Iran (83 million), United Kingdom (66 million), Switzerland, (9 million), Turkey (83 million), Netherlands (17 million)  and Austria (9 million). Of those twelve countries, only Austria was less deaths than South Korea (although not per capita). There are an additional five countries with more deaths than South Korea (Belgium, Sweden, Brazil, Portugal and Indonesia). It is clear that South Korea has done a better job at containing the virus than at least 17 other countries.

This appears to be the case for many of the countries bordering China. Japan has 2,384 cases and 57 deaths (population 126 million), Taiwan has 339 cases and 5 deaths (population 23 million), and Vietnam has 227 cases and no reported deaths (population 96 million). Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are three of the five major trading partners of China (the others being the United States and the European Union). They are the closest to the source of the disease, were among the earliest to catch it, and yet they have certainly mitigated the results of the disease, and might even yet contain it. All three countries are democracies. Many other countries have had a longer warning period and do not seem to have done as well at containing the virus.

Is the difference leadership? Is the difference the responsive of the government and their health care system? What has South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam done that the United States, Italy, Spain, Iran and so forth have not done?

The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1

These has been a little rumbling lately in the news about Malaysia and Vietnam asserting their territorial rights in the South China Sea. Of course, part of the area they asserting is part of their 200 mile economic exclusion zone happens to be territory that Red China also claims. These are not the only countries that have such conflicts. Bordering the South China Sea is China, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. There countries with competing claims are China, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. Let us look at their naval assets for a moment.

China has the largest navy in the region. Their fleet (the People’s Liberation Army Navy) consists of:

2 new carriers – 54,500 to 58.600 tons (one commissioned in 2019)

36 Destroyers – 3,670 to 12,000 tons

52 Frigates – 2,000 to 4,200 tons

42 Corvettes – 1,400 tons

109 Missile boats – 170 to 520 tons

94 Submarine chasers

17 gunboats

20 mine countermeasures vessels – 400 to 1,200 tons

6 Amphibious transport docks (LPD) – 25,000 tons

1 Mobile Landing Platform

32 Landing Ship Tanks (LST) – 4,170 to 4,800 tons

31 Landing Ship medium (LSM) – 800 to 2,000 tons

7 Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) – 8,000 to 11,500 tons

12 Nuclear attack Submarines (SSN) – 5,500 to 7,000 tons

55 Attack submarines (SSK) – 2,110 to 4,000 tons

The fleet also includes a 12 replenishment oilers and 232 various auxiliaries. The fleet is definitely growing and will have a third carrier around 2022.

The other countries have:

…………………….Taiwan……Philippines…..Indonesia….Brunei….Malaysia….Vietnam
Destroyers………..4
Frigates…………..22…………..(2)……………..8…………………………..6……………..9

Corvettes………….1…………….1…………….10…………………………..6……………14
Subs (SSK)………4……………..0……………..5……………………………2……………..6

ASW Corvettes…………………………………14

Patrol Vessel……………………11………………………………4…………..8

Patrol ships……….12…………..7……………37……………..9…………..8

Missile boats……..31………………………….15……………………………8

Mine sweepers….10………………………….12…………………………….4……………..8

Patrol boats……………………58…………..104……………23………….17……………54?

LSD…………………..1………….2……………..5

LST…………………..2………….5…………….12

LSM………………………………………………12…………………………………………..6?

Auxiliaries…………..5……….13………………42…………………………..14…………..12

 

The Taiwanese corvette is 567 tons, their patrol ships are 580 tons, their missile boats are 171 tonnes. The small Philippine fleet will get two frigates (2,600 tons) in 2020. Their corvette is 1,200 tons. Their offshore patrol vessels range from 712 to 3,250 tons. The patrol ships range from 140 to 357 tons, their patrol and missile boats are all less than 60 tons. The Indonesian ASW Corvettes 950 tons, East German built (we have a piano from East Germany).

There are some other countries on the periphery of this conflict, like Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia. We will address them in a subsequent post.