Category Future American Wars

U.S. Army Updates Draft Multi-Domain Battle Operating Concept

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has released a revised draft version of its Multi-Domain Battle operating concept, titled “Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 2025-2040.” Clearly a work in progress, the document is listed as version 1.0, dated October 2017, and as a draft and not for implementation. Sydney J. Freeberg, Jr. has an excellent run-down on the revision at Breaking Defense.

The update is the result of the initial round of work between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force to redefine the scope of the multi-domain battlespace for the Joint Force. More work will be needed to refine the concept, but it shows remarkable cooperation in forging a common warfighting perspective between services long-noted for their independent thinking.

On a related note, Albert Palazzo, an Australian defense thinker and one of the early contributors to the Multi-Domain Battle concept, has published the first of a series of articles at The Strategy Bridge offering constructive criticism of the U.S. military’s approach to defining the concept. Palazzo warns that the U.S. may be over-emphasizing countering potential Russian and Chinese capabilities in its efforts and not enough on the broad general implications of long-range fires with global reach.

What difference can it make if those designing Multi-Domain Battle are acting on possibly the wrong threat diagnosis? Designing a solution for a misdiagnosed problem can result in the inculcation of a way of war unsuited for the wars of the future. One is reminded of the French Army during the interwar period. No one can accuse the French of not thinking seriously about war during these years, but, in the doctrine of the methodical battle, they got it wrong and misread the opportunities presented by mechanisation. There were many factors contributing to France’s defeat, but at their core was a misinterpretation of the art of the possible and a singular focus on a particular way of war. Shaping Multi-Domain Battle for the wrong problem may see the United States similarly sow the seeds for a military disaster that is avoidable.

He suggests that it would be wise for U.S. doctrine writers to take a more considered look at potential implications before venturing too far ahead with specific solutions.

Tanks With Frickin’ Laser Beams On Their Heads

Portent Of The Future: This Mobile High-Energy Laser-equipped Stryker was evaluated during the 2017 Maneuver Fires Integrated Experiment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The MEHEL can shoot a drone out of the sky using a 5kW laser. (Photo Credit: C. Todd Lopez)

As the U.S. Army ponders its Multi-Domain Battle concept for future warfare, it is also considering what types of weapons it will need to conduct it. Among these is a replacement for the venerable M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT), which is now 40 years old. Recent trends in combat are leading some to postulate a next-generation MBT that is lighter and more maneuverable, but equipped with a variety of new defensive capabilities to make them more survivable against modern anti-tank weapons. These include electronic jamming and anti-missile missiles, collectively referred to as Active Protection Systems, as well as unmanned turrets. Manned vehicles will be augmented with unmanned ground vehicles.The Army is also exploring new advanced composite armor and nanotechnology.

Also under consideration are replacements for the traditional MBT long gun, including high-power lasers and railguns. Some of these could be powered by hydrogen power cells and biofuels.

As the U.S. looks toward lighter armored vehicles, some countries appear to going in the other direction. Both Russia and Israel are developing beefed-up versions of existing vehicles designed specifically for fighting in urban environments.

The strategic demands on U.S. ground combat forces don’t allow for the luxury of fielding larger combat vehicles that complicate the challenge of rapid deployment to face global threats. Even as the historical trend toward increasing lethality and greater dispersion on the battlefield continues, the U.S. may have little choice other than to rely on technological innovation to balance the evolving capabilities of potential adversaries.

Trevor Dupuy on Military Innovation

In an article published by the Association of the U.S. Army last November that I missed on the first go around, U.S. Army Colonel Eric E. Aslakson and Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Brown, (ret.) make the argument that “Staff colonels are the Army’s innovation center of gravity.”

The U.S. defense community has settled upon innovation as one of the key methods for overcoming the challenges posed by new technologies and strategies adapted by potential adversaries, as articulated in the Third Offset Strategy developed by the late Obama administration. It is becoming clear however, that a desire to innovate is not the same as actual innovation. Aslakson and Brown make the point that innovation is not simply technological development and identify what they believe is a crucial institutional component of military innovation in the U.S. Army.

Innovation is differentiated from other forms of change such as improvisation and adaptation by the scale, scope and impact of that value creation. Innovation is not about a new widget or process, but the decisive value created and the competitive advantage gained when that new widget or process is applied throughout the Army or joint force…

However, none of these inventions or activities can rise to the level of innovation unless there are skilled professionals within the Army who can convert these ideas into competitive advantage across the enterprise. That is the role of a colonel serving in a major command staff leadership assignment…

These leaders do not typically create the change. But they have the necessary institutional and operational expertise and experience, contacts, resources and risk tolerance to manage processes across the entire framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities, converting invention into competitive advantage.

In his seminal book, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1980), Trevor Dupuy noted a pattern in the historical relationship between development of weapons of increasing lethality and their incorporation in warfare. He too noted that the crucial factor was not the technology itself, but the organizational approach to using it.

When a radically new weapon appears and is first adopted, it is inherently incongruous with existing weapons and doctrine. This is reflected in a number of ways; uncertainty and hesitation in coordination of the new weapon with earlier ones; inability to use it consistently, effectively, and flexibly in offensive action, which often leads to tactical stalemate; vulnerability of the weapon and of its users to hostile countermeasures; heavy losses incident to the employment of the new weapon, or in attempting to oppose it in combat. From this it is possible to establish the following criteria of assimilation:

  1. Confident employment of the weapon in accordance with a doctrine that assures its coordination with other weapons in a manner compatible with the characteristics of each.
  2. Consistently effective, flexible use of the weapon in offensive warfare, permitting full employment of the advantages of superior leadership and/or superior resources.
  3. Capability of dealing effectively with anticipated and unanticipated countermeasures.
  4. Sharp decline in casualties for those employing the weapon, often combined with a capability for inflicting disproportionately heavy losses on the enemy.

Based on his assessment of this historical pattern, Dupuy derived a set of preconditions necessary for a successful assimilation of new technology into warfare.

  1. An imaginative, knowledgeable leadership focused on military affairs, supported by extensive knowledge of, and competence in, the nature and background of the existing military system.
  2. Effective coordination of the nation’s economic, technological-scientific, and military resources.
    1. There must exist industrial or developmental research institutions, basic research institutions, military staffs and their supporting institutions, together with administrative arrangements for linking these with one another and with top decision-making echelons of government.
    2. These bodies must conduct their research, developmental, and testing activities according to mutually familiar methods so that their personnel can communicate, can be mutually supporting, and can evaluate each other’s results.
    3. The efforts of these institutions—in related matters—must be directed toward a common goal.
  3. Opportunity for battlefield experimentation as a basis for evaluation and analysis.

Does the U.S. defense establishment’s organizational and institutional approach to innovation meet these preconditions? Good question.

Back to the Future

The opening sentence of an article by Dan Goure caught my attention: “Every decade of so since the 1960s, the U.S. Army creates a requirement for what can nominally be described as a light tank.” The article is here: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/its-back-the-future-mobile-protected-firepower-20539?page=show

It reminds me of a meeting we had in late 2000 with Walt Hollis, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research). He started the meeting by telling us that something like “Every now and then, someone seems to want to bring back the light tank.” He then went on to explain that these requirements are being pushed from the top (meaning by the Chief of Staff of the Army) and they should probably have a study done on the subject. He then asked us to do such an effort.

We did and it is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/mwa-2lightarmor.pdf

We decided to examine the effectiveness of lighter-weight armor based upon real-world experience in six possible scenarios:

  1. Conventional conflicts against an armor supported or armor heavy force.
  2. Emergency insertions against an armor support or armor heavy force.
  3. Conventional conflict against a primarily infantry force (as one might encounter in sub-Saharan Africa).
  4. Emergency insertion against a primarily infantry force.
  5. A small to medium insurgency (includes an insurgency that develops during a peacekeeping operation).
  6. A peacekeeping operation or similar Operation Other Than War (OOTW) that has some potential for violence.

Anyhow, I am not going to summarize the report here as that would take too long. I did draft up a chapter on it for inclusion in War by Numbers, but decided to leave it out as it did not fit into the “theory testing” theme of the book. Instead, I am holding it for one of my next books, Future American Wars.

The interesting aspect of the report is that we were at a meeting in 2001 at an Army OR outfit that was reviewing our report, and they told us that the main point of action they drew from the report was that we needed to make sure our armor vehicles were better protected against mines. As our report looked at the type of tank losses being suffered in the insurgencies and OOTWs, there were a lot of vehicles being lost to mines. Apparently they had not fully realized this (and Iraq did not occur until 2003).

Economics of Warfare 15-2

Continuing with the fifteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture addresses the impact of global warming on armed conflict over time. My previous post on the subject concerned a cross-country analysis of the impact of temperature on civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa that was not very convincing, even though it made the rather shocking claim that: “Burke et al. go on to predict 393,000 excess battle deaths caused by climate change…” (my bolding).

Probably the most interesting aspect of the presentation was when Dr. Spagat’s TA used the model to make predictions from the period 2003-2013 and also tested the model with the temperature variable removed from the model. Dr. Spagat’s conclusion was (slide 22) “…They mean that temperature is not very useful for predicting civil war….”

Then starting slide 23, the presentation looks at an effort by O’Loughlin et al. to look the impact of temperature and precipitation not by cross-country analysis, but by looking at local variations. They divided up East Africa into grid that are about 100 by 100 kilometers. They then measured it to a dependent variable that was the number of violent incidents. They then tested it using a “negative binomial regression model” (another methodology I have no experience using). They ran five different simple models, of which only one produced a statistically significant measure, and it was negative (meaning more rain = less violence). A sixth model he ran (“GAM splines”) did provide some fits by using different sized deviations and fitting a smoothed curve to these estimates (I really haven’t take the time to figure out what he did). The end result was that this last model provided some indication that:

  1. Wet weather reduce violent incidents
  2. Large warn deviations (unusually warm weather) increase violent incidents.

The O’Loughlin paper is here: http://www.pnas.org/content/109/45/18344.full

All the papers discussed are in the Dr. Spagat’s slides, so you can see the original. Just to grab a few quotes from the O’Loughlin paper:

  1. “Recent studies concerning the possible relationship between climate trends and the risks of violent conflict have yielded contradictory results….”
  2. “Sweeping generalizations have undermined a genuine understanding of any climate–conflict link, whereas cumulative results from the numerous studies of individual communities are difficult to summarize.”

This, of course, harkens back to my first observations over a decade ago when I saw the CNA study that was predicting increased wars, violence and problems (and perhaps increased U.S. intervention) as a result of climate change. Again….we really do not know if this is the case. Added to that, some of the areas that may be most affected by climate change are the areas that the United States are not likely to get heavily involved in (read: Sub-Sahara Africa). So, while climate change may be a very real problem, it may not have a huge impact on our defense policy and planning in the next couple of decades outside of the Arctic (and the Arctic is a whole separate discussion). We should be careful not to assume a significant cause-and-effect (climate change = many more wars) when there is not strong evidence to do so.

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2015.pdf

Economics of Warfare 15-1

Moving onto the fifteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture addresses the impact of global warming on armed conflict over time. If you happen to be one of those who believes that global warming is pseudo-science/a scientific hoax/an excuse to troll for research $$$/an invention of Al Gore/a liberal plot/a religion/a Chinese plot/obviously false because it was cold yesterday/and so forth…..then probably best to stop reading. On the other hand, we have done some proposals on measuring the impact of climate change on violence and consider this a legitimate area of study. Our attention was drawn to the subject over a decade ago when a CNA (Center for Naval Analysis) paper came out that postulated that global warming could result in more violence. This conclusion does not appear to have been based upon any analysis of data, just the assumption that as things get worse (in the environment) then things are going to get worse (with armed conflict). Of course, going back to Feierabend & Feierabend (and I do go back to them a lot)….poorer counties had less political violence than developing countries. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that worse environmental and economics conditions results in more violence. The effect may be the reverse, which is that declining conditions may actually result in a reduction of violence. We really don’t know. Trying to examine these effects analytically was the gist of my proposals on the subject, but sequestration happened and budget for anything seemed to disappear.

So….first two sentences of Dr. Spagat’s slides are

“There is a strong scientific consensus that the Earth is getting warmer over time.”

“It is reasonable to imagine that a side effect of global warming could be an increase in armed conflict over time.”

Slide 2 looks at possible channels that could lead to conflict

  1. Dwindling food supply
  2. Dwindling water supply
  3. Sea Level changes causing migration.

On slide 3 he then addresses a study by Burke and others that attempt to address these concerns using a cross-country regression approach and linear probability model.

On slide 5 the results are summarized as “…an increase of 1 degree centigrade for a  particularly country in a particular year is associated with a 0.0447 increase in the probability of there being an ongoing civil war….”

and on slide 11 as: “This means that Burke et al. predict that 15.8-17.1% of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2030 will suffer from big civil wars rather than the 11% that would occur without the warming climate.”

and on slide 16 as: “Burke et al. go on to predict 393,000 excess battle deaths caused by climate change…” (my bolding). Dr. Spagat then examines this number in the next two slides. It doesn’t sound like he fully accepts it.

Now, Burke based his study on the period from 1981-2002. One of Dr. Spagat’s TAs then used the model to make predictions from the period 2003-2013. There is nothing like trying to use a model to predict the past. It sort of shows whether it really works or not. This was the reasoning because the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base and the Kursk Data Base that we did (they were model validation data bases). It is related in concept to what I did in America’s Modern War, pages 65-68 when I tested my logistics probability model back to the 68 cases used to create the model and tried to figure out for each case why the model was predicting wrong. Once you have a model, there are lots of things to test it to in the past. If you can’t predict the past, you may not be able to predict the future.

Anyhow, the results are on slide 19 and summarized in slide 20 as

  1. “There are 414 “no war” predictions…A war actually happens in 11 out of these 414 cases.”
  2. “There are 37 predictions of “war”. War actually happens in 7 out of these 37 cases.”

Not sure I am any smarter at this point, but I am certainly amused.

His final point is “The Burke et al. model seems to be of some use in predicting wars although it seems have a general tendency to predict war too often.”

And then Dr. Spagat TA test how important the temperature variable is for making these predictions, so takes the temperature variable out of the model !!! This produces a table (slide 21) that is almost identical to his original table. The impact of removing the temperature from the model is that it produced five more false positives (predicted wars that did not happen). I am even more amused.

Spagat’s conclusion (slide 22) is “…They mean that temperature is not very useful for predicting civil war….”

This is a good point to stop…I will pick up the rest of this lecture in another post. The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2015.pdf

Frickin’ Laser Beams

This is a fascinating short advertising video from British Aerospace Engineering Systems (BAE Systems) teasing the potential of laser beam weapons. It addresses the concept of using airborne lasers to create atmospheric lenses by temporarily heating and ionizing the atmosphere to enable long-range aerial surveillance and targeting. The same concept can also be used to counter anti-aircraft laser fire from ground platforms.

BAE Systems has been working on the military applications of lasers for a while, from laser tracking systems, aerial laser-guided rockets, and high energy lasers for shipborne point defense. The U.S. Army is working with General Dynamic to add lasers to its vehicles for point defense as well. Lasers have been used for military purposes for a long time and there is great anticipation for their potential. While the current state of laser technology may have its limitations, the future of warfare may well go pew-pew.

DOD Successfully Tests Micro-Drones

The Defense Department announced yesterday a successful test of the world’s largest micro-drone swarm. Conducted at China Lake, California in October 2016 by the DOD’s Strategic Capabilities Office, in partnership with Naval Air Systems Command, three F/A-18 Super Hornets launched 103 Perdix micro-drones. According to the DOD press release, “the micro-drones demonstrated advanced swarm behaviors such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing.”

The micro-drone swarm comprises an autonomous system.

“Due to the complex nature of combat, Perdix are not pre-programmed synchronized individuals, they are a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature,” said [Strategic Capabilities Office] Director William Roper. “Because every Perdix communicates and collaborates with every other Perdix, the swarm has no leader and can gracefully adapt to drones entering or exiting the team.”

The Perdix micro-drones were originally designed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology engineering students, and modified for military use by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory in 2013.

To get an idea of the military potential of this technology, watch the demo video tracking the simulated mission.

In related news, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and Georgia Technical Institute is developing the capability for soldiers in the field to 3D-print swarms of mini-drones to specific specifications within 24 hours. As reported by Defense One,

“A soldier with a mission need uses a computer terminal to rapidly design a suitable [drone],” says a poster by project chief engineer Zacarhy Fisher. “That design is then manufactured using automated processes such as laser cutting and 3D printing. The solution is sent back to the soldier and is deployed.”

Inspired by the modular adaptability of Legos, Fisher says the each drone could be fabricated in less than a day, with total turnaround time of less than three days.

Light Tanks

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Well, we are back to looking at light tanks: Griffin light tank general dynamics

And also:  http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/10/m1-tank-120-mm-main-gun-placed-on-demo.html

We did do a report over a decade ago on lighter-weight armor at the request of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army (Operations Research), Walt Hollis.

It is “MWA-2. The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces, 6 August 2001 (CAA) – Pages: 121″ in our publication list: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub3.htm

The pdf download file for it is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/mwa-2lightarmor.pdf

Note that this report, which pre-dates our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, is discussing use of armor in Small Scale Contingency Operations (SSCO) and insurgencies, in addition to conventional wars.

This effort was not discussed in my upcoming book, War by Numbers. It may be picked up in a later book.

 

A Losing Record

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Spotted an article today on the History New Network (HNN): Win, Lose, or Draw?

This got my attention because I have outlined a book I may start work on next year (2017) called Future American Wars: Understanding the Next Twenty Years. This book is intended to complete a trio of books, one on understanding insurgencies (American’s Modern Wars), one on understanding conventional combat (War by Numbers — release date still August 2017) and this one covering the situation going forward.

My opening chapter is called: A Losing Record.

What they are recording in this article is that:

  1. For conventional conflict we have 3 wins, 1 loss and 1 tie.
  2. For other conflicts (what they call the “gray zone”) there are 9 wins, 8 losses and 42 draws.

Anyhow, haven’t checked the individual cases, and in some cases it depends on how your interpret win, lose and draw; but it does bring out a fundamental problem that I was partly trying to address in America’s Modern Wars, which is our track record in these conflicts is not great. My book primarily focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, which I why I felt I needed to third book to cover all the other cases of interventions, peacekeeping operations, and so forth.

Anyhow, the SOCOM briefing chart can be blown up to large size and is definitely worth looking at.