Category Insurgency & Counterinsurgency

I have not blogged much recently about Afghanistan, although we seem to be reaching a decision point as to what to do with the peace deal negotiated with the Taliban by the previous president that called for the removal of all U.S. troops from there by 1 May.

The country has been in open warfare much of the time since 1979. The latest quarterly report on Afghanistan from the United Nations Secretary General is now available. These are always worth looking at as they appear to have less “spin” then many other reports:

https://unama.unmissions.org/secretary-general-reports

The report was posted 18 March. It is dated 12 March.

1. “The United States reduced it forces in Afghanistan to 2,500 as of the mid-January 2021.” That said, there are also these reports that say we actually have 3,500 there:
   1. U.S. Has 1,000 More Troops in Afghanistan Than it Disclosed
   2. Our troop strength there was around 13,000 a year ago.
   3. There are also around 7,000 NATO and other allied troops in Afghanistan.
2. “The security situation worsened in 2020, during with the United Nations recorded 25,180 security-related incidents, a 10 percent increase from the 22,832 incidents recorded in 2019.” 
   1. See chart below.
   2. “…the number of armed clashes increased…from 13,155 in 2019 to 15,581 in 2020.”
   3. “…the number of detonations caused by improved explosive devices [IEDs] rose…from 1,949 in 2019 to 2,572 in 2020.”
   4. “…assassinations…from 782 in 2019 to 993 in 2020″. 
   5. “The United Nations recorded 7,138 security-related incidents between 13 November and 11 February, a 46.7 per cent increase compared wit the same period in 2020 and contrasting with traditionally lower numbers during the winter season.
      1. “…armed classes accounted for 63.6 per cent of all incidents.
      2. “Anti-government elements initiated 85.7 per cent of all security-related incidents, including 92.1 per cent of armed clashes.”
3. “…the number of airstrikes declined…in 2020…from 1,663 in 2019 to 938 in 2020. 
4. “UNAMA documented 8,820 civilian casualties (3,035 killed, including 390 women and 760 children; and 5,785 injured, including 756 women and 1,859 children) in 2020.” 
   1. This represents a 15 percent decrease compared with 2019, mainly because of fewer civilian casualties from suicide [bombings], from complex attacks carried out by anti-government elements and from air strikes by international military forces.”
   2. “However, UNAMA documented increases in civilian casualties from targeted killings by anti-government elements, Taliban pressure-plate improvised explosive devices, and Afghan Air Force air strikes.”
   3. “In the last quarter of 2020, UNAMA documented a 45 perc ent increase in civilian casualties compared with the same period in 2019.”
   4. “In 2020, the majority of civilian casualties were caused by anti-government elements (62 percent), mainly by the Taliban (45 per cent), ISIL-K (8 per cent) and undetermined anti-government elements (9 percent).”
   5. “A quarter of all civilian casualties were attributed to pro-government forces, mostly caused by Afghan national security forces (22 per cent), followed by international military forces, pro-government armed groups, and undetermined or multiple pro-government forces.”
   6. “Ground engagements were the leading incident type causing the most civilian casualties (36 percent), followed by suicide and non-suicide improvised explosive devices (34 per cent), targeted killings (14 per cent) and air strikes (8 per cent).

              Security           Incidences      Civilian

Year      Incidences       Per Month       Deaths

2008        8,893                  741

2009      11,524                  960

2010      19,403               1,617

2011      22,903               1,909

2012      18,441?             1,537?                             *

2013      20,093               1,674               2,959

2014      22,051               1,838               3,699

2015      22,634               1,886               3,545

2016      23,712               1,976               3,498

2017      23,744               1,979               3,438

2018      22,478               1,873               3,804

2019      22,832               1,903               3,403

2020      25,180               2,098               3,035

Now, on 29 February 2020 in Doha the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement to reduce the number of U.S. forces from 13,000 to 8,600 troops in 135 days with a proportional reduction in the number of coalition forces. It is to be followed by the drawdown of all international forces within another nine and half months. The U.S. is now down to 2,500-3,500 troops. This is subject to the Taliban fulfilling their commitments under the agreement. There is still no agreement between the current government of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

It has been a while since I have posted on the situation in Afghanistan. This post is not about the coronavirus (Afghanistan reported as of Sunday 337 cases with 7 deaths and 15 recovered), but about the never ending war there. The country has been in open warfare much of the time since 1979. The latest quarterly report on Afghanistan from the United Nations Secretary General is now available. These are always worth looking at as they appear to have less “spin” then many other reports:

https://unama.unmissions.org/secretary-general-reports

The report was posted 23 March, although I did not see it on their site at that time (I was looking). It is dated 17 March, which is later then they usually file these reports. Probably because a lot was going on with the attempted peace agreements.

1. For 2019, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 10,392 civilian casualties (3,403 killed and 6,989 injured), a 5 per decrease compared with 2018, but the sixth year in a row with more than 10,000 documented civilian casualties.
   1. In 2018 the United Nations documented 10,993 civilian casualties (3,804 people killed and 7,189 injured). This was the highest number of civilian deaths recorded in a single year since UNAMA began systematic documentation in 2009, and an increased of 5% compared to 2017.
   2. “Since systematic documentation began in 2009, UNAMA has documented more than 100,000 civilian casualties, with more than 35,000 killed and 65,000 injured.”
   3. Woman and children represented 42 per cent of the civilian casualties in 2019.
   4. “In January, UNAMA documented a significant decrease in civilian casualties in comparison with the same period in 2019.”
   5. “Most civilian casualties (62 per cent) continued to be caused by anti-government elements, 47 per cent attributed to the Taliban, 12 per cent to ISIL-KP and the remainder to undetermined and other anti-government elements.”
   6. “Pro-government forces caused 28 per cent of civilian casualties (including 8 per cent by international military forces).”
      1. “UNAMA documented an 18 per cent increase in civilian casualties attributed to international military forces.”
      2. “Civilian casualties caused by the Afghan National Security and Defence Forces increased by 3 per cent.”
   7. Suicide and non-suicide improvised explosive devices remained the leading cause of civilian casualties, representing 42 per cent of the total, followed by ground engagements (29 percent) and aerial operations (10 per cent).
      1. “In 2019, UNAMA documented a 24 per cent increase in civilian casualties from non-suicide improvised explosive devices by anti-government elements in comparison with 2018.”
      2. “Civilian casualties from pro-government aerial and search operations reached record high levels, with a 3 and a 2 per cent increase, respectively, in comparison with 2018.”
      3. “UNAMA also documented the continued elements, including electoral officials and election-related facilities, judges, prosecutors, health-care workers, and aid workers, as well as continued attacks against the Shi’a Muslim population” (bolding is mine).
      4. “The task force verified 10 attacks against hospitals and protected personnel, a decrease compared with the previous reporting period (26 attacks). Attacks were attributed to the Taliban (eight), and ISIL-KP and the Afghan National Army (one each)…”
      5. “A total of 29 confirmed cases of polio had been reported in 2019….Of these, 25 cases originated inaccessible areas where house-to-house immunization campaigns have been banned by the Taliban since May 2019.”
      6. Explosive remnants of war and anti-personnel mines causes 134 child casualties from November to anuary, killing 49 children and injuring 85.”
2. “Between 8 November and 6 February, UNAMA recorded 4,907 security-related incidents, a similar number as during the same period in the previous year.”
   1. This includes 2,811 armed clashes.
   2. Use of improvise explosive devices was the second highest type of incident.
   3. 8 Suicide attacks this period, compared to 31 in the previous three-month period and 12 in the same period in 2019.
   4. 330 air strikes were conducted by Afghan and international air forces, an 19% decrease compared with the same period in 2019.
   5. “A nationwide reduction in violence commenced on 22 February…”
   6. “In 2018, the United Nations recorded 22,478 security-related incidents, a 5 per cent reduction as compared with the historically high 23,744 security-related incidents recorded in 2017.”
3. Territory was changing hands:
   1. “On 31 December the Taliban reportedly took control of Darzab district in Jawzjan Province following the withdrawal of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.”
   2. “The Taliban also temporarily captures Arghandad district in Zabul Province…”
   3. “…while the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces recaptured Guzargahi Nur district in Baghlan Province, which had been under Taliban control since September 2019.”

              Security           Incidences      Civilian

Year      Incidences       Per Month       Deaths

2008        8,893                  741

2009      11,524                  960

2010      19,403               1,617

2011      22,903               1,909

2012      18,441?             1,537?                             *

2013      20,093               1,674               2,959

2014      22,051               1,838               3,699

2015      22,634               1,886               3,545

2016      23,712               1,976               3,498

2017      23,744               1,979               3,438

2018      22,478               1,873               3,804

As I noted in my post last year: “This war does appear to be flat-lined, with no end in sight.”

Now, on 29 February in Doha the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement to reduce the number of U.S. forces to 8,600 troops in 135 days with a proportional reduction in the number of coalition forces. It is to be followed by the drawdown of all international forces within another nine and half months. This is subject to the Taliban fulfilling their commitments under the agreement. I have blogged about this before. There is still no agreement between the current government of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

Expected first follow-up post to my previous post. I do have a chapter in my book America’s Modern Wars (2015) on Afghanistan. Most of our work on insurgencies was focused on Iraq. Several years after we did our Iraq casualty estimate (presented on pages 15-31 and 302-307) we were asked to do a briefing or two about Afghanistan. This was a little odd, as it was not something we had studied in depth and we never have. All of our work was on Iraq or on insurgencies in general. We never specifically analyzed on Afghanistan or had a contract to do so. Still, hard to ignore Afghanistan so I ended up with the chapter on it in my book (Chapter 21, pages 253-272).

The final paragraph in that chapter reads (pages 269-270):

Given our unwillingness to step up our commitment, then the only question is whether a slower withdrawal will provide more tangible benefits than a fast withdrawal. This we have not examined. Still, this is not “winning” the war in any sense of the word winning. It is withdrawing with the situation on the ground unresolved and a government that far from democratic or stable. We will be leaving behind trainers and other support people, but limited combat troops. If history is a guide, then this government will be replaced one way or the other several years after we withdraw. What will replace it is hard to determine, but will probably include a return to some extent of the Taliban, or perhaps with them leading the new government. It is also distinctly possible that the country will return back into civil war. None of this fulfills our objectives.

What more do I need to say? I wrote that in 2014 or so…..right now the current Afghan government consist of two people claiming to be the president and the U.S. had just negotiated a complete withdrawal over the next 14 months. The negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government start on 10 March 2020.

Previous post:

Withdrawal and War Termination – 1

I have got a hunch that there will be multiple posts on this subject, so have already labeled this post such. The United States just signed a peace agreement today with the Taliban. The United States had agreed to reduce the presence of U.S. troops to 8,600 within 135 days (around 13 July 2020). It is currently around 13,000. The U.S. also agreed to completely withdraw all troops in 14 months (by April 2021?). In exchange, “the Taliban promise to not let extremists use the country as a staging ground for attacking the U.S. or its allies” (to quote from Yahoo news). The withdrawal is “conditions-based” to quote Secretary of Defense Mark Esper. This is more to this 4-page agreement, which I have yet to see. I may get into later.

There will be a separate peace deal between the Afghan Government and the Taliban will begin on 10 March 2020 which will included a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire” (to quote from the U.S. State Department). We shall see how that goes. On 10 March the U.S. will review its sanctions against the Taliban with the goal of ending them by August 27.

In my book America’s Modern Wars (2015) I have a chapter called “Withdrawal and War Termination.” It is Chapter 19 and covers pages 237-242. It is a short chapter because we never really did any work on the subject. Not that we didn’t want to, but we could never get anyone to fund such work. Most of our customers were U.S. Army or Department of Defense (DOD). They were not particularly interested a decade ago in work on “withdrawal and war termination.” Now I think they should have been, but I don’t get to make those decisions.

My chapter starts:

The missing piece of analysis in both our work and in that of many of the various counterinsurgent theorists is how does one terminate or end these wars, and what is the best way to do so? This is not an insignificant point. We did propose doing exactly such a study in several of our reports, briefings and conversations, but no one expressed a strong interest in examining war termination.

Obviously, if the insurgents are driving tanks through the streets of the capital city, the war had ended, and not favorably for the counterinsurgents. But many insurgencies end with some form of negotiated settlement. Many insurgences end with the slow collapse and disintegration of the insurgency. Many of these end with some form of political compromise. Most of them end with some form of negotiation and political agreement, regardless of victor.

And then there is a multiple page discussion on 1) determining winners and losers (easy to determine insurgent victories, but “around one-third of counterinsurgent wins are clouded, or somewhat less than clear victories“), 2) force draw downs during an insurgency (there are only three cases: Malaysia, Northern Ireland and Vietnam, not counting Iraq and Afghanistan) and 3) then we go to these concluding statements:

A basic examination needs to be done concerning how insurgencies end, how withdrawals are conducted, and what the impact of various approaches towards war termination is. This also needs to address long-term outcome, that is, what happened following war termination.

We have nothing particularly unique and insightful to offer in this regard. Therefore, we will avoid the tendency to pontificate generally and leave this discussion for later. Still, we are currently observing with Afghanistan and Iraq two wars where the intervening power is withdrawing or has withdrawn. These are both interesting cases of war termination strategies, although we do not yet know the outcome in either case.

Anyhow, more to come on this.

I nabbed this graphic from a brief Bloomberg article. The article is here: https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-taliban-stronger-ever-u-144102193.html

It reminded me of another “boom and bust” counterinsurgency effort:

This second chart is from America’s Modern Wars, page 274.