Category Kursk

Summation of Argument on LSSAH PzRgt Organization in July 1943

In the case of how the LSSAH Panzer Regiment was organized in July 1943 (as there is no clear documentation of this), there are three options:

1) The regiment consisted of only the II Panzer Battalion with 5th, 6th, and 7th panzer companies, and the 13th panzer company for the Tigers.

2) The II Panzer Battalion had the 8th panzer company active.

3) The regiment consisted of the II Panzer Battalion with the 5th, 6th, and 7th panzer companies, and the 143h panzer company for the Tigers, and an ersatz I Panzer Battalion of maybe three companies.

Let me briefly outline the strengths and weaknesses of these three arguments:

  1. The three medium panzer company argument:
    1. Strengths
      1. This is the traditional position.
      2. This is what all the post-war narratives say.
      3. There is nothing that solidly disproves this.
    2. Weaknesses
      1. This makes little sense with 90 Pz III and IVs and 9 Panzer III Command tanks (in addition to the Pz I command tank).
      2. The companies would have had 31 tanks to start the battle with.
        1. But Ribbentrop says they started with 22.
      3. On 12 July, if Ribbentrop had 7 tanks, then the other two companies had at least 22 tanks each. 
  2. The four medium panzer company argument
    1. Strengths
      1. You can almost fit the 90 tanks into four companies at 22 tanks a company.
      2.  Compromise answer that avoids creating an ersatz Panzer battalion.
    2. Weaknesses
      1. Not documented in any unit records I have seen.
      2. The one source mentioning the 8th company specifically states that it was not used for Citadel due to “lack of tanks”.
  3. The two battalion argument
    1. Strengths:
      1. Accounts for all the tanks on 4 July.
      2. Accounts for all the tanks on 11 July (based upon Lehmann’s claim that II Panzer Battalion had 33 tanks).
      3. This is what Das Reich did.
      4. The “I Panzer Battalion” is actually referenced twice on 8 July 1943 in German records.
    2. Weaknesses
      1. Was never mentioned in any of the post-war accounts.

So readers…did the LSSAH Panzer Regiment in July 1943 have 1) only II Battalion of three medium companies, 2) only II Battalion of four medium companies, 3) or an ersatz I Battalion in addition to the II Battalion of three medium panzer companies?

Recent posts on the subject:

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Did II Panzer Battalion LSSAH have 33 tanks on 11 July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Did II Panzer Battalion LSSAH have 33 tanks on 11 July 1943?

There is a post-war account (published in 1990) by the LSSAH Division chief of staff Major Rudolf Lehmann where he states that the II Panzer Battalion had 33 panzers. That is sometimes interpreted as meaning that the afternoon or evening of 11 July 1943 there remained near height 252.2 around 33 panzers. This would be II Panzer Battalion, the Battalion HQ and possibly the Panzer Regiment HQ. He specifically states: “Sturmbannfuehrer Gross [commander of II Panzer Battalion] managed to bring this battle to a successful conclusion despite the crushing numerical superiority of the enemy; he had at this point only thirty-three Panzers.” (page 236). I doubt this is a number he remembered of the top of his head 47 years after the fact, so I assume he got it from a diary or notes or a document from the time. I have not seen this figure documented anywhere else.

Now, this could mean that they had 33 tanks on the evening of the 11th or before the fighting on the 12th or after the fighting on the morning of the 12th. If they had 33 tanks after the fighting on the morning of the 12th, then this may imply that they started the battle with 37 tanks. Now, this quote is placed in the narrative for 12 July right after discussing the 6th panzer company having seven tanks and having lost 4 in their retreat. Regardless it appears the II Panzer Battalion had either 33 or 37 tanks. The problem is that the Panzer Regiment is reported to have 69 tanks on the evening of 11 July.

Height 252.2 is just to the southwest of Prokhorovka. The panzer were then pulled back to behind the tank ditch except for Captain Rudolf von Ribbentrop’s 6th Panzer Company. Captain Ribbentrop was the son of the Nazi foreign minister. So the 6th Panzer Company remained near 252.2 while the 5th and 7th Panzer Companies moved further back to the rear. According to Lehmann, these two panzer companies were located around 800 meters to the rear.

According to Ribbentrop, the 6th panzer company had 7 tanks on the morning of 12 July. Lehmann also states that. One could infer from this that the 5th and 7th panzer companies each had around 12 to 16 tanks, less 2 or 3 tanks for the battalion command (7 + 12 + 12 + 2 = 33 or 7 – 4 + 15 + 16 + 3 = 37)  

Now, according to the Kursk Data Base, as of the evening of 11 July the LSSAH Division had 2 Panzer Is, 4 Panzer IIs, 1 Panzer III short, 4 Panzer III longs, 7 Panzer III Command tanks, 47 Panzer IV longs, and 4 Panzer VIs for a total of 69 tanks in the panzer regiment (see footnote 34, page 165, of The Battle of Prokhorovka).

So, 69 tanks in the panzer regiment and the II Panzer Battalion appears to have had 33 or 37 tanks. There are 4 Tigers for 13th Panzer Company, which was not with them. That would leave 28 to 32 or so tanks for an ersatz I Panzer Battalion and the panzer regiment headquarters (2 or 3 command tanks and probably the 2 Panzer Is and 4 Panzer IIs). This leaves two Panzer III Command, four Panzer III longs and 13 to 18 Panzer IVs for an ersatz I Panzer Battalion.  

Now, I have been arguing for a while that the LSSAH may well have had two operational panzer battalions at Kursk. This debate first started as a series of emails between Niklas Zetterling and I, and continued as a series of posts and debated between Dr. Wheatley and I. If Lehmann’s account is correct, and if Ribbentrop’s account on 12 July is correct, then this would strongly argue that there was indeed an ersatz I Panzer Battalion at Prokhorovka.

My previous post on the subject is:

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

P.S. Lehmann’s book is references in July an 8th Panzer Company. It is identified on page 450 as under command of “Ost. Amberger” with the note “The 8. Kompanie did not take part on Operation Zitadelle because of an insufficient number of panzers.” With the LSSAH Division starting the battle with 90 Panzer IIIs and IVs, this statement does not make sense unless there was an ersatz first panzer battalion.

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943?

This subject has been discussed here before, but I am now preparing a little write-up for Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com) So, as this is a controversial argument, I wanted to present it here again.

———-the write-up———————-

I am of the opinion that the LSSAH Division had more than three medium panzer (tank) companies in action that day. The location of the 5th and 7th panzer companies is known through Ribbentrop’s post-battle account where he states that the other two panzer companies in his battalion were behind the tank ditch. He later reports in his account that the other two panzer companies fired upon the advancing Soviet tanks from behind that ditch.

The LSSAH Panzer Regiment sent its I Panzer Battalion back to German before July 1943 to refit with Panther tanks. This, and other evidence, has led many to conclude the LSSAH Division on 12 July 1943 had only one operational panzer battalion consisted of three medium companies and one heavy (Tiger) company. The issue is that the LSSAH Division on 4 July had 90 Panzer III and IV tanks and 9 Panzer III Command tanks. One cannot fit all these tanks into three companies of 22 tanks each. Twenty-two tanks is the authorized strength of the panzer company and Ribbentrop states that is what his company had on 5 July 1943.

Therefore, as a minimum the LSSAH Division had an 8th company. This company is reported as being in existence on the 20th of July. It may have been in existence before 20 July 1943. It is stated in a book written in 1990 by Rudolf Lehmann, the former chief of staff of the division, that ““The 8 Kompanie did not take part in Operation Zitadelle because of an insufficient number of Panzers.” With operational 90 Panzer III and IV tanks, this statement makes no sense. The statement also indicates that the company was in existence before 20 July. If they used the 8th company, then with a panzer battalion of four medium tank companies, then this comes out to exactly 22 tanks a company, if one assigns 6 tanks to the battalion and regiment commands, ignore five spare Panzer IIIs (the Tiger companies no longer had five Panzer IIIs with them), and places the four Panzer IIs and the three Panzer Is under regimental command. There is no mention made of an 8th company on 12 July 1943.

On the other hand, there is a report (twice) in the division and corps records on the 8th of July 1943 of a I Panzer Battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment. This could be a typo, except, the Das Reich SS Division also sent its I Panzer Battalion back to Germany for refit. They substituted an antitank battalion to serve in its place, so that the Das Reich SS Panzer Regiment has two battalions of seven medium panzer companies and one heavy panzer company for its 111 light and medium tanks and 12 Tigers. The Totenkopf SS Panzer Regiment has two battalions of six medium panzer companies and one heavy panzer company for its 114 light and medium tanks and 12 Tigers. The LSSAH Panzer Division records does not state how its armor was organized for June and July of 1943. It would be logical, as they were all under the same command (General Paul Hausser), that the LSSAH was also organized with two battalions of 6 to 8 medium panzer companies for its 106 light and medium tanks. This organization seems more logical than one battalion of three or four panzer companies. This would give the average tank strength of each panzer companies between 12 and 16. For the Das Reich it was an average of around 16 tanks per medium tank company and for the Totenkopf it was an average of around 19 tanks per medium tank company. Did the LSSAH do something radically different (around 30 tanks in a medium tank company) or did they match their two neighboring sister divisions?

There is the added confusion that Ribbentrop reported only 7 tanks on the 12th of July. If he started with 22, then he is looking at 68% losses over the previous week of fighting. Yet the division had 65 operational light and medium tanks (6 light and 7 Panzer III command) on the evening of 11 July. The panzer regiment’s light and medium tanks had been attrited 39%. If the 6th Panzer Company had 7 tanks, then the average of the 5th and 7th Panzer Companies would be at least 22 tanks or the average of a 5th, 7th and 8th Panzer Companies would be at least 15 tanks. Did one tank company take horrendous losses and the rest of the companies were left relatively unscathed? And if so, then why would that much weaker company be the panzer company that was left forward the night before the attack on the 12th? This argues for there being two battalions in the LSSAH Panzer Regiment and that the starting the strength of the 6th Panzer Company and all the other medium panzer companies, were really more like 16 tanks (assuming six medium panzer companies).

It is reported by the division chief of staff, Rudolf Lehmann, in his book that II Battalion commander has only 33 panzers. Other sources claim that they had around 33 panzers at hill 252.2 on the afternoon or evening of the 11th. Losses during the 12th are reported by Lehmann to be four panzers from the 6th company and one from the 7th.  So, depending on whether that figure is a count of 33 panzers from before the start of the engagement or after, it would appear that II Panzer Battalion had 33 to 37 tanks. Yet on the evening of the 11th July the division had 65 operational light and medium tanks.

It has been reported that the entire II Panzer Battalion moved up there on the 11th, and then pulled back their 5th and 7th companies, leaving the 6th company in the area of hill 252.2. The 6th Panzer Company was reported to have only 7 tanks operational on the morning of the 12th. So, II Panzer Battalion may have had three companies of 7-12 tanks each, and the battalion staff with three Panzer III Command tanks. This leaves 32 tanks unaccounted (including regimental command tanks and six light tanks). That could well be the complement of a temporary I Panzer Battalion.

So, it is not known of the LSSAH Panzer Regiment consisted of 1) one panzer battalion of three overstrength medium panzer companies and a heavy tank company, 2) one panzer battalion of four full-strength medium panzer companies and a heavy tank company, or 3) two panzer battalions of six to eight medium panzer companies and a heavy tank company. It is known that the heavy tank company, renamed recently as the 13th panzer company consisted of only four operational Tiger tanks on 12 July 1943 and started the battle in a reserve position.

——end of write-up—————————–

Just for reference:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 – II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Summation of Open Questions on Prokhorovka | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

The Meaning of the Morning Reports – 12 July 1943

This is the follow-up post to “Morning Reports LSSAH”: Morning Reports LSSAH – 12 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The original plan on 12 July was for the Fifth Guards Tank Army to launch it attacks from in front of Prokhorovka at 1000 AM (Moscow time). At the last minute, the Voronezh Front command moved the time up of the attack to 0830. Both the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the Fifth Guards Army stated that they attacked at 0830. The Fifth Guards Army was to the northwest of the Fifth Guards Tank Army and was engaged with Totenkopf SS Division in addition to other German units. The Fifth Guards Tank Army was primarily engaged with the Adolf Hitler SS Division (LSSAH), although it was partly engaged with its neighbor on the left, Totenkopf, and its neighbor on the right, the Das Reich SS Division.

Berlin time is one hour ahead of Moscow time, so a 0830 attack (Moscow time) occurred at 0730 (Berlin time). Added to that, the times listed are the times the reports were sent or filed, not when they occurred. In some cases, they report the time the event occurred. So for example, at 0740 Totenkopf reports an event at 0630 and another event at 0705. The same occurs at 0822 (event was at 0745), at 0825 (event was at 0740),  at 0955 (event was at 0930), and so on.

So at 0500 (Berlin time) they report hearing “tank noises.”

At 0600 they received a regimental strength attack along the line of Prochorowka-Petrowka. See map below. 

I have no idea what generated this report. This attack is at least a hour-and half before the Soviets claim they attacked. If could be a small recon in force not otherwise reported, a false report and a confused time. 

At 0630 Totenkopf is being infiltrated and fired on (at 0630 or 0740?) and under a very heavy infantry attack at 0705.  Again the 0630 and 0705 Berlin times do not match with the Fifth Guards Army 0830 Moscow time start time.

At 0822 Totenkopf, which can see most of the XVIII Tank Corps attack positions, reports “two enemy regiments and about 40 tanks from the northeast, observed entering Michailowka and hills to the southeast at 0745.” This is clearly the XVIII Tank Corps attack. The report almost perfectly matches with a 0830 Moscow time. Assuming it takes a few minutes from when the orders are given to everything gets moving, spotting this movement at 0745 Berlin time pretty much confirms that the XVIII Tank Corps attack started at 0830 Moscow time. Rotmistrov was at his command post at height 252.4 (it is on the map on the road between Prokhorovka and Voroshilov Sovkhoz). Marshal Vasilevkii, the Stavka representative, was there with him. The XXIX Tank Corps was supposed to start its attack at the same time. From height 252.4, Rotmistrov could see most of the XXIX Tank Corps and parts of the XVIII Tank Corps. So, I am guessing that the XXIX Tank Corps attack also started at 0830.

Just for reference, the Germans held height 252.2 and Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz opposite the XXIX Tank Corps.

Now, I gather one could put together an argument of a later attack by the XXIX Tank Corps from the 1000 hours report from LSSAH that says “Enemy attacks on all fronts (At 0915 hours, 40 tanks from Jamki against Swch. Stalinsk, 35 tanks from Prochorowka along the road to the southwest, 40 tanks from Petrowka against Swch. Iktjabrskiy, and the heaviest artillery support. But… I don’t think this report really does indicate that the XXIX Tank Corps attack started at 1000 Moscow time.

Anyhow, I still don’t see a strong reason to overrule multiple reports by both the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the Fifth Guards Army that they initiated the attack at 0830 Moscow time. It does seem that these German records report spotting the XVIII Tank Corps attack at 0745 Berlin time, which would be 15 minutes after the Soviets said they attacked.

Morning Reports LSSAH – 12 July 1943

Seems like I never quite get away from the Battle of Kursk and move onto other work. As a result of piece I was working on, I ended up checking back in my files. This material below is quoted (translated) from a narrative of events kept by the SS Panzer Corps (file T313, R368). For 12 July 1943 they report:

0500 hours: Morning reports
LSSAH: Contact with Totenkopf established. Numerous tank noises along our front. Heavy enemy air activity.
Das Reich: Night passed quietly. Regiment Deutschland is ready to follow the right wing of LSSAH’s attack.
Totenkopf: Strong artillery and small arms harassing fire, heavy enemy air activity.

0600 hours: Enemy attack in regimental strength along the line Prochorowka-Petrowka drive off on LSSAH’s front.

0740 hours from Totenkopf:
0630 hours slow infiltration of the flank positions at the barracks (west of Klljutschki). Very heavy artillery and salvo-gun fire. Advance to the northeast still not specified.

0740 hours from Totenkopf:
0705, very heavy infantry [attack?] 3 km east of Petrowka.

0822 hours from Totenkopf:
Two enemy regiments and about 40 tanks from the northeast, observed entering Michailowka and hills to the southeast at 0745.

0825 hours from Totenkopf:
0740 hours, an enemy battalion attacking into the Psel area from the north.

0900 hours from Totenkopf:
Last elements crossed over into the bridgehead at 0900. Using the panzer battalion that crossed over yesterday, began advancing against the barracks at 0400 hours. Barracks captured by 0715.

0910 hours from VIII Air corps:
Two Stuka groups have been dispatched against the enemy group moving southwest from Petrowka.

0955 hours from Totenkopf:
Enemy attacking west from Michailowka with tank support.
At 0930 hours our armored group jumped off from Hill 226.6 to the northeast.

1000 hours from LSSAH:
Enemy attacks on all fronts (At 0915 hours, 40 tanks from Jamki against Swch. Stalinsk, 35 tanks from Prochorowka along the road to the southwest, 40 tanks from Petrowka against Swch. Oktjabrskij, and the heaviest artillery support).

1110 hours from Totenkopf:
Enemy attack in regimental strength out of Wassiljewka to the southwest. Additional attacks south of Wesselyj and Ilinskij.

Aerial reconnaissance reports the advance of additional enemy forces, predominantly infantry, in the area south of Oboojan.

1115 hours from Totenkopf:
We will attempt to cross the Psel at Michailowka and move in behind the enemy that is south of the river.

1130 hours from LSSAH:
Localized enemy breakthrough at Hill 252.2

1145 hours from Das Reich:
Enemy attack against Kalinin and west of Storoshewoje. After repelling this attack, we plan to counterattack to seize Storoshewoje.

1315 hours from LSSAH:
[Enemy] breakthrough taken care of, all infantry attacks driven off.

Just for reference: The LSSAH is the Adolf Hitler SS Panzer Grenadier Division. It was located to the southwest of Prokhorovka. The Das Reich is the Das Reich SS Panzer Grenadier Division which was located to the south (right flank) of LSSAH. Totenkopf is the Totenkopf SS Panzer Grenadier Division which was located to the north (left flank) of LSSAH and was across the Psel River. The Russian names above are as transliterated into German (vice English).

German records were reported in “Berlin time” while Soviet records were reported in “Moscow time.” It is my understanding that at this time of the year in July 1943, Berlin time was one hour behind Moscow time.

Now, I ended up looking this back up because there is an author (Toeppel) who claims that the Soviet attack that their records state occurred at 0830 (Moscow time) actually occurred at 1000. I have in the past been dismissive of this claim, but wanted to make sure I properly examined it. I will address this in more detail in a post tomorrow morning.

Censoring Remarks?

We usually don’t place any restrictions on incoming remarks. So far, this has not been an issue except for one remark a while back that looked suspicious. Our commentators on this blog have always been very respectful. We received another comment the other day that seemed odd. It referenced a paper on Kursk by an author I was not familiar with. A quick glance at the paper clearly showed that this was a bizarre piece not worthy of further attention. So, do I post the remark and let each person make their decision on the referenced paper, or do I decide that this should get no more attention and not post the remark?

Let me quote the third paragraph from the paper which will show why I really don’t want to bring any attention to it:

“To support his enunciation, Kellerhoff quotes only one source – an obscure British historian Ben Wheatley, who allegedly found some obscure aerial photographs in American archives 75 years after the war. And those photographs, allegedly made by the Luftwaffe planes, are Kellerhoff’s only argument for what he called the “disastrous defeat of the Red Army at Prokhorovka.”

Now, I have not read the referenced article by Kellerhoff, but I am familiar with Dr. Wheatley’s work and have blogged about it before. I also went into those same photo files over a decade ago and there is a 32-page aerial photo section in my big Kursk book. He did not reference my work in his paper. I found out about these aerial photo files from John Sloan, a retired Sovietologist who runs the Xenophon Group (link is in our sidebar). So, these files are certainly not “allegedly found” and “allegedly made by Luftwaffe planes.” They are also not that “obscure” (nor is Dr. Wheatley). A couple of Italian Advanced Squad Leader module designers are currently developing their game map sheets from these Luftwaffe aerial photos. See: http://advancingfire.com/

The rest of the article is filled with similar crap. It was bad enough that if I posted it, then I would be obligated to immediately respond to it.  A point-by-point refutation of a ten-page paper would take a while. It sometimes takes more time to refute bad “research” then it takes for the author to make their claims. I do have better and more important, things to do with my time right now. Therefore, I decided not publish the remark and give the referenced article any visibility.

It does appear that the comment is from Russia or a Russian although they use a Chinese appearing name. We will, with some judiciousness, not publish remarks that are obviously deceptive, propaganda-like and based upon poor data. The one other such remark that we did not publish was similar.

More Combat Results Tables from War by Numbers

Now, the purpose of War by Numbers was not to create Combat Results Tables (CRT) for wargames. Its real purpose was to test the theoretical ideas of Clausewitz, and more particularly, Trevor N. Dupuy to actual real-world data. Not as case studies, but as statistical compilations that would show what the norms are. Unfortunately, military history is often the study of exceptions, or exceptional events, and what is often lost to the casual reader it what the norms are. Properly developed statistical database will clearly show what the norms are and how frequent or infrequent these exceptions are. People tend to remember the exceptional cases, they tend to forget the norms, if they even knew what they were to start with.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of War by Numbers is primarily focused on measuring human factors (which some people in the U.S. DOD analytical community seem to think are unmeasurable, even though we are measuring them). As part of that effort I ended up assemble a set of force ratios tables based upon theater and nationality. The first of these, on page 10, was in my previous blog post. Here are a few others, from page 11 of War by Numbers.

Germans attacking Soviets (Battles of Kharkov and Kursk), 1943

 

Force Ratio                          Result                                    Percent Failure   Number of cases

0.63 to 1.06-to-1.00             Attack usually succeeds      20%                        5

1.18 to 1.87-to-1.00             Attack usually succeeds        6%                      17

1.91-to-1.00 and higher      Attacker Advances                 0%                       21

 

Soviets attacking Germans (Battles of Kharkov and Kursk), 1943

 

Force Ratio                          Result                                    Percent Failure   Number of cases

0.40 to 1.05-to-1                  Attack usually fails                70%                      10

1.20 to 1.65-to-1.00             Attack often fails                    50%                      11

1.91 to 2.89-to-1.00             Attack sometimes fails          44%                       9

 

 

 

Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) Data, U.S. attacking Japanese, 1945

 

Force Ratio                          Result                                    Percent Failure   Number of cases

1.40 to 2.89-to-1.00             Attack succeeds                        0%                     20

2.92 to 3.89-to-1.00             Attack usually succeeds        21%                      14

4.35-to-1.00 and higher       Attack usually succeeds          4%                     26

 

Their Wehrmacht was Better than our Army

Poking around the internet, I ran across an article from 1985 by the British journalist and historian Max Hastings, rather provocatively titled “Their Wehrmacht was Better than our Army.” It was published in the Washington Post. I had not seen it before (as I went to work for Trevor Dupuy in 1987):

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1985/05/05/their-wehrmacht-was-better-than-our-army/0b2cfe73-68f4-4bc3-a62d-7626f6382dbd/

A few highlights:

  1. The language in the first couple of paragraphs is also pretty provocative. 
  2. The discussion then goes to Liddell Hart.
  3. The discussion then goes to Trevor Dupuy and Martin Van Creveld.
  4. From Dupuy: “On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.”
  5. From Hastings: “A spirit of military narcissism, nourished by such films as “The Longest Day,” “A Bridge Too Far” and “The Battle of the Bulge,” was perpetuated mythical images of the Allied and German armies.”
  6. From Hastings: “Yet to be a soldier in America has never been the honorable calling, outside a few thousand Army families. It has traditionally been the route by which young men of modest origins…may aspire to build a career.”

It is worthwhile to read the entire article.

Now, these claims were controversial in the 1980s, and a number of U.S. Army officers and people out at Leavenworth personally and professionally went after Trevor Dupuy over this issue. There was a long unpleasant discussion of that story written up by the lawyer Thomas Nutter. He was going to turn into a book, but I gather that effort was never completed.

I do address the subject of the relative performance of armies in combat in Chapters 4 through 7 of my book War by Numbers. 

 

The Soviet General Staff study on Kursk compared to Unit Records (part 3 of 3 – Conclusions)

What we did was a simple comparison of the Soviet General Staff study data on the air fighting in the south compared to the daily records we gathered from the Second and Seventeenth Air Armies. What we found was their were minor differences in the sortie counts, but overall that was close to what was reported in the unit records we had.

On the other hand, the reports on casualties was not. There were outrageously incorrect estimations of enemy losses, which is typical of Soviet accounts. But as significant, the reports of their own losses were low. In particular, our count of Second Air Army losses from 5-18 July was 481, their count was 371. This Soviet General Staff study only reported 77% of their losses. Does this mean that if I draw losses reports from the Sixteenth Air Army from the Soviet General Staff study (as I don’t have the unit records), should I “inflate” them by 30%? (the inverse of 0.77).

Added to that, they simply left out the Seventeenth Air Army losses (182 aircraft). It may have been an oversight or a deliberate effort to downplay their losses.

But, just to focus on the Second Air Army losses, the staff study has the total losses for the 5th – 18th as 371: 172 fighters, 31 bombers, and 168 assault. We have the Second Air Army’s losses for 5 to 18 July 1943, taken from their daily reports, as 481 (See Table IV.32 of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka). This includes 248 fighters, 48 bombers, 180 assault and 5 night bombers. So actual losses of the Second Air Army were 30% higher than what was reported in the Soviet General Staff study, or 28% if one leaves out the night bombers.

One does wonder about the process where even the internal classified post-operation staff studies understate their losses (in addition to many other errors). They did have the unit records available to them. In particular, their table is vastly off on the 5th of July when the Second Air Army lost 114 planes and the Soviet General Staff study reports only 78, but it consistently underreports for every single day. They also do not report the losses for the Seventeenth Air Army, which according to our count was another 182 or 221 planes lost (see Tables IV.34 and Tables IV.35). This does argue that the reported losses for the Sixteenth Air Army may be low compared to reality.

In the bigger picture, the Soviet General Staff studies are secondary sources, not primary sources. Furthermore they are secondary sources with considerable bias and errors. They invariably (grossly) overplay German losses and seemed to try to minimize their own losses. Furthermore their narrative of accounts often downplays certain aspects of their operations. They do have be used with extreme caution, as opposed to treating them as somewhat authoritative.

Now, Niklas Zetterling & Anders Frankson offer a similar discussion of the problems of relying on the Soviet General Staff studies in their book The Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944. It is clear that these are secondary sources with biases that must be used with considerable caution.

The Soviet General Staff study on Kursk compared to Unit Records (part 2 of 3 – Airplane Losses)

This is the second part of my comparison of the data provided in the Soviet General Staff study on Kursk that was prepared in March-April 1944 compared to the Second and Seventeenth Air Army records that I have.

Losses:

            There are one table on losses in the Soviet General Staff study on Kursk that relate to the Second and Seventeenth Air Army. They are provided below. I have broken it into two tables for this blog:

The Air Struggle Along the Enemy’s Main Axis

                             Air          Enemy Losses:

                             Battles   Fighter   Bomber  Total

5 July                       81           71           83         154

6 July                       64           40           65         105 

7 July                       74           44           78         122  

8 July                       65           54           52         106

9 July                       62           49           22           71

10-14 July              152         112           93         205

15-18 July               43           45           27           72

Totals                     541         415         420         835

 

                            Second Air Army Losses:   

                            Fighter  Bomber  Assault   Total

5 July                       36           15           27           78

6 July                       23           —             22           45

7 July                       24           —             13           37

8 July                       24             1           16           41

9 July                       16             1           15           32

10-14 July                49           14           75         138

15-18 July              (the figures in the line above cover from 10-18 July)  

Totals                       172           31         168         371

            Now, these figures have been discussed before. The losses of the German VIII Air Corps was 111 planes, vice the 835 claimed here. The losses of the Second Air Army according to the records we reviewed was 481 planes from 5 to 18 July: see Appendix IV, Table II.32 (page 1424) of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka), vice the 371 reported here. This report also does not include Seventeenth Air Army claims or losses. The Seventeenth Air Army’s losses were significant (182 planes). So, it does appear that the Soviet General Staff study basically leaves out 292 out of their 663 airplanes losses (44% of their losses), effectively under reporting their air losses by almost half.

       This is concerning, for it does appear that Soviet General Staff study is understating the Second Air Army losses, omitting the considerable losses from the Seventeenth Air Army and of course, grossly overclaiming the number of German aircraft shot down. This was in an internal classified report that was supposed to be an analysis of the battle. Hard to properly analyze if your data is not correct.