Category Kursk

The Soviet General Staff study on Kursk compared to Unit Records (part 1 of 3 – Sortie Counts)

Yak-9 at war memorial, northeast of Yakovlevo, Belrorod-Oboyan road

For my on-going Aces at Kursk book I was asked by the publishers to include a Chapter on the air war in the north from 5-11 July 1943. For the original Kursk project we were able to access the Second and Seventeenth Air Army records in the south. We did not attempt to obtain the Sixteenth Air Army records at that time (1993-1995). Therefore I was forced to rely on the Soviet General Staff study on Kursk that was prepared in March-April 1944 for the count of sorties and losses. As the staff study also reported the sorties and losses from the south, and I had the records for the air armies involved in that, I decided to do a little comparison and added a write-up of this to an appendix of the book.

Sortie Counts (I left out the table of the sortie count from Soviet General Staff study) :

The Soviet General Staff study data on sortie counts is similar to the data we have assembled. The data we have for the Second and Seventeenth Air Armies operations are taken directly from the daily air army reports as drawn from the archives. The Soviet General Staff study may used these same reports, or used higher level reports or other assembled reports for their study. But there are minor differences between ours and their reports, so most likely they used other higher level or assembled reports for their study. For example, we have the Second Air Army flying 1,296 daytime sorties on 5 July. The Soviet General Staff study has them flying 1,274. There are also minor differences the next two days, but the two sets of counts are the same for 8 and 9 July and then vary slightly for most of the subsequent days (except for the 15^th and 16^th, where they again match). After the 5^th, the largest difference is on the 12^th, where our reports record 10 more daytime sorties. These are very minor differences. The Second Air Army nighttime sorties match in all cases between the counts we assembled from the air army daily reports and what the Soviet General Staff study reports.

The Seventeenth Air Army is a little more complex as some of their missions were flown into the battle area while other of their missions were flown completely out of the battle area defended by the Voronezh Front. For the Kursk database project, I ended up reviewing each reported mission as to where it operated and made a judgment as to whether this mission was in the area of the Belgorod offensive or not. It does not appear that the Soviet General Staff study did that. For the 5^th through the 16^th, their estimate more closely matches with the total number of sorties flown by the Seventeenth Air Army than it does with my lower count of the number of sorties flown in the battle area. On eight of those 12 days in question, their totals matches the total we drew from the Seventeenth Air Army daily reports. The day they most differ was on 7 July when they reported 50 more sorties than we counted. We did re-check the original report and our total is 639. Suspect their number of 689 is a typo. As the Soviet General Staff study may have been drawn from a later aggregate report, there are multiple opportunities for typos.

On the other hand, in the table we assembled of Seventeenth Air Army daytime sorties we had a lower count for “only those that were in the Belgorod Area or attacked the VIII Air Corps” (see table in Chapter Four). It is consistently lower from the 5^th through the 16^th, which the worse variance being on the 7th, where we count 588 as valid sorties in the battle area, whereas the Soviet General Staff study reports 689. On the 17^th we count none in the area and on the 18^th we count 12 sorties.

Still there are a couple of observations we can make from this comparison. First, is that the Soviet General Staff study reports of Soviet sorties flown is fairly accurate in that it matches with records we have from the Second and Seventeenth Air Armies. This is important to note as we rely on the Soviet General Staff study for the count of sorties for the Sixteenth Air Army.

Waffen-SS Tiger Crews At Kursk

Christopher A. Lawrence
October 31, 2020

Just wanted to make you aware of a book that has just been released written by Col. French L. Maclean (USA, ret.) called “Waffen-SS Tiger Crews at Kursk” (Schiffer Military, Atlen, PA, 2020). I am graciously listed in his acknowledgements, although my involvement was minimal (a few emails exchanged and one long pleasant meeting for coffee). It may be a while before I actually sit down and go through it, as I am busy finishing up a book about the things that are flying over the Tigers.

When we first set the blog up we decided not to do book reviews on this blog. I will probably hold to that. There are a number of reasons for that: 1) I know of lot of these people, 2) it is hard to review a book if you are not an expert in the area (and there are very few areas I am expert in), 3) it is hard not to find errors in books on subjects that you are an expert (and sometimes it is as often as much as one error a page), 4) if you do know the subject, then it ends up taking a lot of time (man-weeks) as you check and cross-check each point, 5) I tend to be hyper-critical, and 6) I have been known to get somewhat sarcastic and caustic when it is late at night and after a few drinks….so….I don’t review books.

Eastern Front Kursk World War II

Soviet Artillery in Proportion

A miniature wargaming website in the UK came to my attention because he quoted from my Kursk book (actually probably from my blog). The link is here:

https://notquitemechanised.wordpress.com/

Now, this was one of the many asides that I developed during the writing of the book and I felt one of the more significant discussions in the book. I am always concerned that a number of major points in that book were drowned in the 1,662 pages. I am glad he was able to identify and pull that one out.

The quote is in his blog post, but for the battle we estimated that the Germans fired 51,083 tons of ammunition while the Soviets fired 21,867 tons. I don’t think anyone else have made such a calculation.

For the Soviet rocket launchers (Katyushas) they fired an estimated 2,422 tons of ammo, while for the German rocket launchers (Nebelwerfers) they fired 5,916 tons of ammo.

This is subject that probably could be the basis of a complete stand-alone study or book. I suspect if this was the case at Kursk, where the Soviet army had three months to prepare and stockpile, then it is very much an issue for other, especially more mobile, operations.

P.S. The complete quote is also in this earlier blog post:

German versus Soviet Artillery at Kursk

Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured Longevity on the Eastern Front in 1943-1944

This is a link to a long article by Dr. Ben Wheatley called ‘Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured Longevity on the Eastern Front in 1943-1944.”: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2020.1750841

I have not read it yet and probably will not for a while. I have some other deadlines I am working to. This is a subject we have discussed before on this blog.

Richthofen and Dessloch

In June 1943 Otto Dessloch took over command of the Fourth Air Fleet from Wolfram von Richthofen. Richthofen went off to command the Second Air Fleet in Italy. Although it was supposed to be temporary command, Dessloch remained in command of the Fourth Air Fleet until the middle of 1944.

Dessloch later became infamous for having conducted a retaliatory bombing of Paris in September 1944, after the allies had taken it over. He passed away in Munich in 1977.

Now, I have two dates as to when he took command of the Fourth Air Fleet, either 11 June or 13 June. Right now, I don’t have any solid confirmation for either date, although Wikipedia uses the 11 June date. Does anyone has some clear documentation that establishes what date he took command?

My articles on other blogs

Christopher A. Lawrence
May 12, 2020

Col. General Wolfram Baron von Richthofen, 1942 (Bundesarchive Bild 101I-452-0985-36)

While there are 783 blog posts that I have made to the Mystics and Statistics blog, I do have seven other articles written on other sites, all in 2015 and 2016.

History News Network

While I was writing this blog post a week ago, I noticed a message from nine months ago on the History New Network to this last article. It was from Dr. Andrew Arthy of Australia. Turns out he has a copy of the Wolfram von Richthofen’s notes from a discussion he had with Generaloberst Jeschonnek on 25 May 1943. So finally got confirmation that this was indeed a valid quote from David Iriving.

Small Wars Journal

Airpower: Just Part of the Counterinsurgency Equation

Aberdeen Book Store

Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever?

This is the complete article. The article with the History News Network was abbreviated.

Air Warfare Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base Kursk Kursk Data Bases Russia Vietnam

Von Richthofen and David Irving

A few years ago I wrote an article on the History News Network on my decision to quote from David Irving’s work in my book on Kursk. The article is here: https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/163814

This primarily concerned the conference on 4 May 1943 preceding the Battle of Kursk. This conference is described in some depth by Guderian in his book. Guderian’s account has often been accepted uncritically by some writers. The account provided by David Irving, quoted from Wolfram von Richthofen (the cousin of the famous Red Baron), gives a very different picture of the conference. I do not know which account is more correct, but decided to present them both in my book.

Nine months ago, Dr. Andrew Arthy in Australia commented on that article that he had copies of the notes make by Wolfram von Richthofen. I noticed the comment last week, so looked him up, emailed him and he willingly provided a copy of the memo. It came from Freiburg: BA-MA N 671/10. The image above is the copy he sent me.

Jay Karamales (who is not a native German speaker) provided me with the following translation of it:

1.) Operation Citadel: General Model said he wasn’t strong enough and would likely get stuck or would need a lot of time. The Führer was of the opinion that the attack must smash through in the shortest possible time under all circumstances. Colonel General Guderian held out the prospect that within six weeks he would be able to supply sufficient armored forces that this would be guaranteed. The Führer therefore decided to postpone it for six weeks. To confirm this decision from all directions, discussion with FM von Kluge and FM von Manstein. Initially, they agreed to a postponement; however, when they heard that the Führer had already made the decision along these lines, they promoted [preached, publicized] an immediate start to the attack, apparently so as not to be burdened [encumbered? In legalese “belasten” means incriminated] by the postponement themselves.

Chief of the General Staff has doubts as to whether Guderian’s promises can be kept, above all because a larger number of Tiger deliveries are expected, but it appears that their chassis construction is not in order.

The Chief of Luftflotte 4 takes the position that postponement was wrong under all circumstances. The Russians can (and do) deploy more defense systems in six weeks than we can attack weapons. The attack will go slowly if we wait to start it in mid-June. [If we launch it] At the beginning of May we might not get to Kursk in the scheduled time of 48 hours, but certainly within 4 days. The Russian had defensive structures only on the fronts and not as deep as now. The Russian forces were still in the process of freshening up and realigning, while the Russian is now strong and ready. Our own troops (army corps and divisions) had total confidence and absolute success. This has definitely been undermined by all the back and forth and the waiting [delays]. The postponement gives the Russian the opportunity to take the initiative, even if this is not likely. In any case, it is impossible to predict how the postponement of the operation and its probably much slower progress will affect the plan [intentions] in the northern part of the Eastern Front.

David Irving’s translation (and he does his own translation), from his book Hitler’s War, reads:

[On 27 April] General Model declared he was not strong enough and would probably get bogged down or take too long. The Fuehrer took the view that the attack must be punched through without fail in shortest time possible. [Early in May.] General Guderian offered to furnish enough tank units within six weeks to guarantee this. The Fuehrer thus decided on a postponement of six weeks. To get the blessing of all sides on this decision, he called a conference [on 4 May] with Field Marshals von Kluge and von Manstein. At first they agreed on a postponement; but when they heard that the Fuehrer had already made his mind up to that effect, they spoke out for an immediate opening of the attack—apparently in order to avoid the odium of being blamed for the postponement themselves.

Annoying Disclaimer (that I probably should not need to make): The fact that I have referenced David Irving’s work in an area where he correctly quoted someone does not mean that I agree with or in any way support other claims or work that he has done.

P.S. Dr. Andrew Arthy is currently working on: https://airwarpublications.com/air-war-courland-writing-begun/

P.P.S. Another translation of the same passage is provided in Christer Bergstrom’s newly released Black Cross, Red Star, Volume 5 book, page 181. It reads:

They initially agreed to a postponement; however, when they heard that the Fuhrer had already made a decision in this sense, they propagated an immediate commencement of the attack, apparently so as not to be burdened by the shift themselves.”

Is this my last Kursk book?

The Aces at Kursk book may be my last Kursk book I will do for a while, depending on demand. From my original mega-book I have prepared two books, The Battle of Prokhorovka and Aces at Kursk. From the original book I can prepare two more books: The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Belgorod Offensive. These four books would effectively complete the serialization of my original book. I could also create one additional book, which would be a 300-page book for a more general audience addressing the entire battle in the south.

Also in my files are the German and Soviet research materials and draft texts to produce two or three others books covering the Soviet offensive to take Kharkov in February 1943, the German counteroffensive to retake Kharkov in March 1943 and the Soviet offensive to take Kharkov in August 1943. As part of our urban warfare work, we pulled up the unit records for both sides for the three battles in and around Kharkov in 1943. The fighting in February and March of 1943 was the fighting that immediately preceded the Battle of Kursk. They are probably best covered in a single book. The fighting in August 1943 is a continuation of the Battle of Kursk and is considered part of the Battle of Kursk by Soviet historians.

This would potentially allow for a series of six to eight books covering most of the fighting on the Russian Front in the south from February to August 1943. But I am not sure whether I should do that or move onto other projects. Right now, leaning towards moving onto other projects.

Looking for a publisher for Aces at Kursk

I do have a completed book of around 400 pages called Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War. It is a book about the actual air battles, as opposed to yet another picture book. The air battles at Kursk were larger than the Battle of Britain, yet there is not a single comprehensive book addressing it.

I have contacted a number of publishers and am still waiting for a response from some of them. A couple of them made a counter offer than I do picture book. But, it is probably time to go out and look for other publishers. If someone knows a publisher that this book is a particularly good fit for please let me know. If a publisher has a strong interest in this book, please contact me directly.

Thanks

Aces at Kursk – Chapters

Aces at Kursk – Summation

Measuring Human Factors based upon Casualty Effectiveness

This issue was addressed in multiple chapters of my book War by Numbers, so we will just present a few tables related to casualty effectiveness drawn from that book. They are simple comparisons of the average force ratios for attacks compared to the average loss ratios for these attacks. First, table compares the Soviet Union versus the German Army.

……………………………………………………….Average…………..Average

……………………………………………………….Force Ratio………Loss Ratio

All Soviet Attacks (18 cases)……………………..1.42-to-1…………..5.63-to-1

Soviet Low-odds Attacks (12 cases)…………….1.00-to-1…………..4.83-to-1

…..0.51- to 1.34-to-1

All German Attacks (31 cases)…………………..1.66-to-1………….0.30-to-1

German Low-odds Attacks (21 cases)…………..0.93-to-1………….0.41-to-1

….0.63- to 1.42-to-1

This shows a very significant casualty effectiveness advantage on the part of the Germans. When the Soviets attacked, they lost an average of 5.63 men for every German lost. When the Germans attacked, the lost .30 men for every man the Soviets lost, or inflicted 3.33 casualties for every 1 they lost. The difference between the effectiveness of the Germans when attacking versus defending is probably explained by the advantages of defense, terrain, etc. When the “odds are even,” which is roughly approximated by the low odds attacks, the Soviets attacked at an average odds of 1-to-1, yet lost almost five men for every one the Germans lost. The Germans attacks at less than 1-to-1, and caused almost 2.5 losses per one of their own (from War by Numbers, page 42)

Now these calculations were based on taking an average of the force ratios and the loss ratios (killed, wounded and missing). One can also sum up the total force ratios for all these attacks and compare them to the total losses for all these attacks. In the table below, the force ratio is the sum of the strength of all the cases, compared to the sum of the strength of the opposing forces, while the losses are the total losses for each side, compared to the losses on the opposing side.

………………………………………………………Total……………Total

Kursk Campaign Data…………………………..Force Ratio……Loss Ratio

All Soviet Attacks (18 cases)……………………..1.43-to-1………6.04-to-1

Soviet Low-odds Attacks (12 cases)…………….1.02-to-1………3.92-to-1

….0.51- to 1.34-to-1

All German Attacks (31 cases)………………….1.34-to-1……….0.30-to-1

German Low-odds Attacks (21 cases)…………0.99-to-1……….0.27-to-1

…..0.63- to 1.42-to-1

Notice that using the “weighted averages” did not change the numbers much. These figures still support the contention that there is a casualty effectiveness difference between the Germans and the Soviet of around 4 to 1 (from War by Numbers, page 44).

The 51 division-level engagements from the Arab-Israeli fighting show the following relationship:

………………………………………………………..Average………..Average

………………………………………………………..Force Ratio……Loss Ratio

All Israeli Attacks (33 cases)………………………1.29-to-1……….0.46-to-1

Israeli Low-odds Attacks (26 cases)……………..0.92-to-1……….0.43-to-1

….0.54- to 1.47-to-1

All Arab Attacks (18 cases)………………………..4.09-to-1………3.65-to-1

Arab Low-odds Attacks (2 cases)…………………0.96-to-1………4.91-to-1

….0.87- to 1.09-to-1

……………………………………………………….Total…………….Total

……………………………………………………….Force Ratio……Loss Ratio

All Israeli Attacks (33 cases)……………………..1.04-to-1……….0.31-to-1

Israeli Low-odds Attacks (26 cases)……………..0.89-to-1………0.28-to-1

….0.54 to 1.47 to 1

All Arab Attacks (18 cases)……………………….3.02-to-1………2.81-to-1

Arab Low-odds Attacks (2 cases)………………..0.95-to-1………3.87-to-1

….0.87 to 1.47 to 1

Now, there are probably performance differences between the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi and Palestinian forces, but for the sake of simplicity, all the Arab armies were lumped together. All the Arab attacks, with the exception of Mitla Pass in 1967, are from the 1973 war.

This fighting has the advantage that technologically there was not much difference between the opposing forces. The units were well armed and both sides had considerable armor. The Israeli’s had air superiority although in 1973, the Egyptians had very good air defense. It would appear that the major difference between the two armies was combat effectiveness.

One cannot help but note that the relative combat performance of the Israeli and the Arabs in 1956-1973 was similar in disparity to that between the Germans and the Soviets in 1943. This is not to say that the Germans and the Israelis performed at similar levels, as the only thing we are measuring is the relative combat performance between the two opposing forces. The German army in 1943 could have been superior to the Israeli Army of 1956-1973 and this would have meant that the Soviet Army in 1943 was also superior to the Arab armies in 1956-1973. We do not know if this is the case.

Trevor Dupuy’s analysis, using his model structure, but much of the same data, came to the conclusion that:

“The average Israeli combat effectiveness value (CEV) with respect to the Egyptians in 1967 was found to be 1.75; in other words, a combat effectiveness superiority of almost two-to-one. Following an identical procedure for the 1973 war, the average Israeli CEV with respect to the Egyptians for that war was 1.98…”[1]

As Trevor Dupuy’s combat effectiveness value is a force multiplier in his model of the combat power, then it is not directly comparable to exchange ratios, although it is related. In general, a force multiplier of two in his models will produce a casualty exchange rate of greater than two.[2] For all practical purposes, we are showing the same effect and the same results at roughly the same values.

Still these are forces that are at least competent or motivated enough to engage each other in a back-and-forth conventional engagement. There are many examples of truly one-sided results, like the 1991 Gulf War, and this seems to be typical of lots of operations of the post-World War II world (from War by Numbers, pages 50-51).

[1] Colonel T. N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974 (HERO Books, Fairfax, VA., 1984), page 598.

[2] See the discussion in Chapter 16, “A New Square Law” in Col. T. N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1987), pages 221-235.