Category Russia

Osipov

Back in 1915, a Russian named M. Osipov published a paper in a Tsarist military journal that was Lanchester like: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241534.pdf

He actually tested his equations to historical data, which are presented in his paper. He ended up coming up with something similar to Lanchester equations but it did not have a square law, but got a similar effect by putting things to the 3/2nds power.

As far as we know, because of the time it was published (June-October 1915), it was not influenced or done with any awareness of work that the far more famous Frederick Lanchester had done (and Lanchester was famous for a lot more than just his modeling equations).  Lanchester first published his work in the fall of 1914 (after the Great War had already started). It is possible that Osipov was aware of it, but he does not mention Lanchester. He was probably not aware of Lanchester’s work. It appears to be the case of him independently coming up with the use of differential equations to describe combat attrition. This was also the case with Rear Admiral J. V. Chase, who wrote a classified staff paper for U.S. Navy in 1902 that was not revealed until 1972.

Osipov, after he had written his paper, may have served in World War I, which was already underway at the time it was published. Between the war, the Russian revolutions, the civil war afterwards, the subsequent repressions by Cheka and later Stalin, we do not know what happened to M. Osipov. At the time I was asked by CAA if our Russian research team knew about him. I passed the question to Col. Sverdlov and Col. Vainer and they were not aware of him. It is probably possible to chase him down, but would probably take some effort. Perhaps some industrious researcher will find out more about him.

It does not appear that Osipov had any influence on Soviet operations research or military analysis. It appears that he was ignored or forgotten. His article was re-published in the September 1988  of the Soviet Military-Historical Journal with the propaganda influenced statement that they also had their own “Lanchester.” Of course, this “Soviet Lanchester” was publishing in a Tsarist military journal, hardly a demonstration of the strength of the Soviet system.

 

Soviet OR

There was a sense among some in the Sovietology community in the late 1980s that Soviet Operations Research (OR) was particularly advanced. People had noticed the 300-man Soviet Military History Institute and the Soviet use of the quantified “Correlation of Forces and Means,” which they used in WWII and since. Trevor Dupuy referenced these in his writings. They had noticed a number of OR books by professors at their Frunze Military Academy. In particular, the book Tactical Calculations by Anatoli Vainer was being used by a number of Sovietologists in their works and presentations (including TNDA alumni Col. John Sloan). There was a concern that the Soviet Union was conducting extensive quantitative analysis of its historical operations in World War II and using this to further improve their war fighting capabilities.

This is sort of a case of trying to determine what is going on by looking at the shadows on a cave wall (Plato analogy here). In October 1993 as part of the Kursk project, we meet with our Russian research team headed by Dr. Fyodor Sverdlov (retired Colonel, Soviet WWII veteran, and former head of the Frunze Military Academy History Department). Sitting there as his right hand man was Dr. Anatoli Vainer (also a retired Colonel, a Soviet WWII veteran and a Frunze Military Academy professor).

We had a list of quantitative data that we needed for the Kursk Data Base (KDB). The database was to be used as a validation database for the Center of Army Analysis (CAA) various modeling efforts. As such, we were trying to determine for each unit for each day the unit strength, losses, equipment lists, equipment losses, ammunition levels, ammunition expenditures, fuel levels, fuel expenditures, and so forth. They were stunned. They said that they did not have models like that. We were kind of surprised at that response.

Over the course of several days I got to know these two gentlemen, went swimming with Col. Sverdlov and had dinner over at Col. Vainer’s house. I got to see his personal library and the various books he wrote. Talked to him as much as I could sensitively do so about Soviet OR, and they were pretty adamant that there really wasn’t anything significant occurring. Vainer told me that his primary source for materials for his books was American writings on Operations Research. So, it appeared that we had completed a loop….the Soviets were writing OR books based upon our material and we were reading them and thinking they had a well developed OR structure.

Their historical research was also still primarily based upon one-side data. They simply were not allowed to access the German archives and regardless they knew that they should not be publishing Soviet casualty figures or any negative comparisons. Col. Sverdlov, who had been in the war since Moscow 1941, was well aware of the Soviet losses, and had some sense that the German losses were less, but this they could not publish [Sverdlov: “I was at Prokhorovka after the war, and I didn’t see 100 Tigers there”]. So, they were hardly able to freely conduct historical analysis in an unbiased manner.

In the end, at this time, they had not developed the analytical tools or capability to fully explore their own military history or to conduct operations research.

 

Suwalki Gap

A short video on the Suwalki Gap, the area between Belarus and Kaliningrad that is part of Poland and Lithuania (both NATO countries). There are 1,500 Polish and Lithuanian troops (along with U.S. and UK) drilling there now: https://www.yahoo.com/tv/suwalki-gap-why-nato-worried-212800479.html

Of course, for this to be an actual threat, Belarus would have to agree to allow Russian troops to transit. This has been something that countries have traditionally been hesitant to do.

We do have an older posting on the subject: https://dupuyinstitute.org/2016/06/20/fulda-gap/

 

Russian Economy is Growing

The Russian economy is growing, very slowly granted, and at a rate of only 0.5% annually. Still, this is a lot better than the 3.7% drop they suffered in 2015 (World Bank figures….the article says 2.8%): https://www.yahoo.com/news/russias-gdp-grows-0-5-percent-q1-state-134712641.html

Not only was their economy dropping, but not surprising, they were running significant budget deficits ($21 billion in 2016, or 3% of GDP) and their cash reserves were running low (National Wealth Fund had $72.71 billion as of September 2016). Much of this decline was driven by the price of oil and secondarily, by the limited sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union (and the counter-sanctions issued by Russia). These sanctions are still in place and the price of oil is not something the Russians have control over. I don’t see the sanctions being lifted anytime soon, so Russian economic growth is dependent as the price of oil staying stable or moving up. Putin is up for re-election to his fourth term in March 2018 for a six-year term, so a stable economy would be helpful, although few doubt the outcome of the election. Growth after a recession can sometimes be strong, for example the U.S. economy grew at 2.5% in 2010 after 18 months negative growth. The Russian recovery at 0.5% is a little anemic.

The ruble is at 57 to a dollar.

Oil Prices Dropping

By the way, the price of oil is dropping:

http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/05/01/oil-inches-down-on-china-economy-worries.html

I gather the reasons are because of a slow down of demand in China (which is interesting in and of itself) and Libyan oil returning to the market (which is a good sign). Brent Crude is now getting near $50 a barrel, whereas several weeks ago it was at $58.

This, of course, has a big impact in countries like Russia, where oil is a major percent of the government budget (ruble is at 57 to a dollar today) and Venezuela, which is currently in turmoil.

 

Probably Doesn’t Mean Much…but….

Probably doesn’t mean much but 7,000 protestors is a pretty big protest by Russian standards. Still, it appears that the authorities were concerned enough that they put it down quickly with hundreds of arrests (500?). There were times when they were less concerned about opposition. Next presidential election is in 2018.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/hundreds-arrested-mass-protests-against-172123608.html

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-police-detain-opposition-leader-dozens-protesters-134233383.html

 

Ukraine (Avdiivka)

Kind of mystified why things are suddenly being stirred up in Ukraine. To me, this does not seem to work to Russia’s advantage, as they are trying to convince the new U.S. administration to remove some sanctions. Anyhow a couple of relevant articles:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/global-alarm-over-ukraine-fighting-death-toll-hits-104743721.html

https://www.strategypage.com/on_point/20170131225224.aspx

Main points:

  1. Death toll up to 19 in recent fighting centered around a town called Avdiivka.
  2. This has been going on for 4 days.
  3. Ukraine lost 3 soldiers.
  4. At least one shell was a dud.
  5. Conflict has killed nearly 10,000 people since it started in April 2014
    1. More than half of them civilians
    2. We have not confirmed the accuracy of these figures

Anyhow, from my perspective, the timing of this looks odd.

Gas Wars

By the way, there is still a very complex conflict in Ukraine. This article does a nice job of summarizing the problem: Russia is Hoping to Freeze Ukraine into Submission

Some major points:

  1. Ukraine has avoided using Russian natural gas for the last two years
  2. It is now a particularly cold winter there and it appears that they will run out of their own gas by the end of February or mid-March.
  3. Therefore, they will probably have to buy from Russia…but….
  4. They owe Russia $3 Billion that Russia loaned to the ousted Yanukovich regime.
  5. Also Gazprom is claiming from Ukraine:
    1. $32 billion for breach of contract lawsuit.
    2. $5.3 billion owed for a take-or-pay clause in their contract.
    3. Bills for sending gas to the separatist regions of Lugansk and Donetsk.
  6. Ukraine is paid $2 billion a year for the transit of Russian natural gas to the EU.

Russia is trying to bill Ukraine for gas delivered to a separatist movement that Russia supported. I am surprised they are not charging them for building the bridge across the Kerch Strait to Crimea (expected to be operational in 2019).

U.S. Relations with Russia

Suspect the basic nature of U.S. relations with Russia is going to be a issue for while. Note that in early December 27 Senators (12 Republicans and 15 Democrats) sent a letter to Trump: “The senators urged Trump to maintain sanctions against Russia “until key provisions of the Minsk Agreement are met,” and, notably, urges providing “defensive lethal assistance” to Ukraine.”

Link: 27-senators-12-republicans-statement-trump-ukraine-russia

Republican Senator John McCain spent this New Years in Kiev: us-ukraine-crisis-McCain

Earlier this week he was in the Baltic States (which are members of NATO).

The Senate is split 52-48 (Republican/Democrat). It takes only a handful of Republican senators working with the Democrats to influence, modify or overturn something they disagree with that the incoming administration would do. Trump, has indicated a more favorable position relative to Russia, as have several of his advisors like Flynn (nominated National Security Advisor) and Tillerson (nominated Secretary of State). This could end up generating an interesting (perhaps behind the scenes) tug-of-war between the President and Congress over our Russian policy. And then there is also the Russian hacking allegations.

…

P.S. A few more quotes from the early December letter written by 27 Senators:

Almost three years after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern Ukraine, daily ceasefire violations along the line of contact make a mockery of the Minsk Agreement and demonstrate that this conflict in the heart of Europe is far from over. 

Quite simply, Russia has launched a military land-grab in Ukraine that is unprecedented in modern European history. These actions in Crimea and other areas of eastern Ukraine dangerously upend well-established diplomatic, legal, and security norms that the United States and its NATO allies painstakingly built over decades.

Pivot to Russia?

This is an interesting article on the U.S. deliberately pivoting from China to Russia: 45-years-ago-kissinger-envisioned-a-pivot-to-russia-will-trump-make-it-happen?

I am not sure I buy into any of it !!!…..but it got my attention.

The argument:
  1. 45 years ago Kissinger told Nixon that the next president would have to pivot towards Russia in 20 years.
  2. In effect, he envisioned the United States playing a balance of power role between China and Russia, moving back and forth between the two.
  3. Is this what Trump is doing with his recent negative comments on China and positive comments on Russia?
Factiods that got my attention:
  1. “As a means to block the spread of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, Carter administration officials approved of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which occurred shortly after Deng Xiaoping concluded the first trip of a Chinese leader to the United States in January 1979.” …..Really?
  2. “China’s economy was once a fraction of the Soviet economy; now it’s about five times larger.” …….it is always useful to look at GDP.