Category Russia

Armata Tank vs M-1 Abrams and TOW: Who Wins?

vdayrehearsal05052016-24_0

Nice four page article from the National Interest: Russia’s Armata Tank vs America’s M-1 Abrams and TOW Missile: Who Wins?

A few points:

  1. The Russia’s Armata family of armored combat vehicles (Tank, IFV and SP Artillery) sort of takes the approach we were using with the Future Combat System (FCS)…(which we did some work on for Boeing, oddly enough using Kursk data).
  2. The Armata has an unmanned turret (it really does help to be able to stick your head out and look around).
  3. They then compare it to the M-1 (still on page 1)
  4. “The tank that sees the enemy first almost always wins the fight”
  5. “Further, there is the question of whether the T-14 can be produced in numbers….given the state of Russia’s economy.”
  6. They then compare it to the U.S. TOW missiles (early on page 2 and covers the rest of the article)….and the Javelin.
  7. Syrian FSA rebels have TOW missiles (but not Javelins).
  8. TOW-2A is wire guided and probably can be defeated by the Armata.
  9. “If only the notorious F-35 could boast a similar record.” (to tie this article back to a previous posting).
  10. TOW-2B can probably defeat an Armata, because of its top attack capability.
  11. I am guessing that so to can the Javelin (they actually don’t address that).
  12. Right now, only 100 Armata’s are slated for production.

 

Lost Decade

russia1

Article in the “Business Insider” on Russia’s emergency fund: One of Russia’s biggest economic problems

Summary: The Russian reserve fund runs out in 2017.

Why this gets my attention: Russia has been maintaining its federal budget by draining their reserve fund. Their presidential election is in March 2018.

A few notes from the article:

  1. In 2014 the fund was 67 billion pounds.
  2. It is now 23 billion pounds ($30.6 billion)
  3. Federal budget was based upon a $50 a barrel price of oil.
  4. Average price in January-August has been only $42.70 a barrel (it is currently around $46).
  5. The budget assumed 1% GDP real growth this year (it has been in decline).
  6. Export duties on oil was 4% of GDP in 2011
    1. Was 2% last year
    2. Now is 1.1% for January-July
  7. Kicker summary: “With real GDP growth averaging only 0.3% since 2008….the Russian economy has already experienced a lost decade. It needs to implement radical changes if it is not to repeat weak performance in years to come.”

I suspect this “lost decade” is going to be very much a part of Putin’s legacy, where instead of actually growing the economy, the Russian leadership instead comfortably rested on the high oil prices to boost their economy and federal budget and let the rest of the economy languish. People were not that far from the mark when they referred to Russia as being “Nigeria with snow.” To date we have not seen any real efforts to change and adjust the economy, including eliminating the widespread corruption and matching the budget to reflect their revenue. Instead the government has been depleting its reserve fund to cover its budget shortfalls. This cannot last forever. It does remind me of the Soviet days, when they had a huge reserve of gold that had been built up over decades. By the end of the 1980s, they had exhausted this, much to everyone’s surprise.

Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine

"Russian Build-Up In and Around Ukraine: August 12, 2016," Institute for the Study of WarOver at Foreign Policy, Michael Kofman, a research scientist at CNA Corp. and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, has analyzed recent Russian troop deployments on Ukraine’s border peripheries and what they imply about the strategic goals of the Russian government in the mid-term. He concludes that the Russians are not massing for a possible invasion in the short-term. Instead, the shifting of forces suggests sustainable, long-term deployments at strategically important locations along the border. The mid-term objective of this is to secure the current status-quo.

The Russian General Staff is not only repositioning these units back where they were before 2009, it’s also rebuilding a capable combat grouping on Crimea — albeit one that’s largely defensive in nature… It also secures the Russian vision for how this conflict ends: In a hypothetical future where the Minsk agreement is actually implemented, Russian forces may withdraw from the separatist enclaves in the Donbass. If the deal fails to hold or Kiev reneges on the terms, Russian divisions ringing the country from its north to very southeast (not including Crimea) would be poised to counter any Ukrainian moves by striking from several directions.

Kofman also sees this strategy as seeking to maintain Russia’s political dominance over Ukraine in the longer term.

The string of divisions, airbases, and brigades will be able to effect conventional deterrence or compellence for years to come… Russia will retain escalation dominance over Ukraine for the foreseeable future. By the end of 2017, its forces will be better positioned to conduct an incursion or threaten regime change in Kiev than they ever were in 2014.

Kofman recommends that the U.S. and its allies carefully think through the implications of this strategy. He believes it will take Ukraine five to 10 years to rebuild an effective military, but even if successful, the future correlation of forces and the aggressive positioning of Russian forces could make the situation more unstable rather than less so.

U.S. policymakers should think about the medium to long term — a timeline that is admittedly not our strong suit. If this conflict is not placed on stable footing by the time both countries feel themselves capable of engaging in a larger fight, it may well result in a conventional war that would dwarf the small set-piece battles we’ve seen so far. Beyond imposing a ceasefire on the current fighting, the West should think about what a rematch might look like several years from now.

Scandinavia and the Baltics

During the Cold War Sweden and Finland were two nations that were democratic and independent but were neutral and not part of NATO. Norway and Denmark were a part of NATO since 1949 and the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) were part of the Soviet Union since 1940. Now the three Baltic states are part of NATO as of 2004 and Sweden and Finland are establishing ties to NATO.

An article on Finland from Michael Peck:   Finland: America’s Next Top Ally?

Article on Lithuania: Ground Zero in the new Cold War

Entirely irrelevant article on Norway: More than 300 reindeer killed lightning in Norway

Just a little demographics: the population of Scandinavia is around 27 million people, that is 5 million in Norway (which has a per capita income higher than the U.S.), 10 million in Sweden, 5.5 million in Finland, over 5.5 million in Denmark, plus Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The population of the three Baltic states is around 6 million people (and includes four major languages, including Russian). The population of Russia is 144 million (with 5 million in St. Petersburg and less than a million in the Kaliningrad Oblast).

We have sold the rights to use our combat model, the TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model) to Sweden and Finland. We have never the rights to use the combat model to a NATO member.

Lawyers at War

There is a new dimension in warfare: legal. For example: Ukraine taking Russia to Court

Ukraine is taking Russia to court in multiple venues. This includes the multiple cases in the International Court of Justice in the Hague and the European Court of Human Rights. Not sure how this all plays out, but in the end, there has to be some additional cost to Russia if the judgments go against it. It is not like the bad old days when one could march into the Rhineland, annex Austria and take the Sudetenland facing only international condemnation. Now one has to deal with law suits!!! I gather these things are going to drag on for years.

Chinese Carriers

Chinese Carriers

There seems to be some buzz out there about Chinese aircraft carriers:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asiatoday/china-likely-to-become-ai_b_11164324.html

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/21/will-china-become-an-aircraft-carrier-superpower/

We usually don’t talk about seapower on this blog but doing a simple count of carriers in the world is useful:

  • Total Carriers (100,000+ tons): 10 (all U.S.)
  • Total Carriers (42,000 – 59,100 tons): 5 (China, Russia, India, U.S., France)
  • Total Carriers (40,000 – 41,649 tons): 8 (all U.S.)
  • Total Carriers (26,000 – 32,800 tons): 7 (Brazil, India, 2 Australian, Italy, Japan, Spain)
  • Total Carriers (11,486 – 21,500 tons): 10 (UK, 3 French, Egypt, 2 Japanese, South Korean, Italy, Thailand)

Summarizing the count (and there is a big difference between a 100,000+ Nimitz class carrier the Thailand’s 11,486 ton Charki Naruebet):

  • U.S. 19 carriers
  • U.S. Allies: 14 carriers
  • Neutrals: 5 carriers (India, Brazil, Egypt, Thailand)
  • Potentially hostile: 2 carriers (China, Russia)
  • Total: 40 carriers

China and Russian both have one carrier of over 55,000 tons. These Kuznetsov class carriers can carry around 36 – 41 aircraft. Each of our ten Nimitz class carriers carry around 80-90 aircraft. Our amphibious assault ships can carry 36 or more aircraft. In all reality, these carriers are their equivalent.

To be commissioned in the future:

  1. 2016    U.S.                 100,000 tons (CVN-78)
  2. 2016    Egypt                 21,300 tons
  3. 2017    Japan                27,000 tons
  4. 2017    UK                     70,600 tons !!!
  5. 2018    India                  40,000 tons
  6. 2018    U.S.                   45,000 tons
  7. 2019    Russian             14,000 tons
  8. 2019    South Korea      18,800 tons
  9. 2020    UK                     70,600 tons   !!!
  10. 2020    China                 65,000 tons   !!!
  11. 2020    U.S.                 100,000 tons (CVN-79)
  12. 2021    Turkey               26,000 tons
  13. 2022    Italy                 TBD
  14. 2025    India                  65,000 tons
  15. 2025    Russia             100,000 tons !!!
  16. 2025    U.S.                 100,000 tons (CVN-80)
  17. 2028    South Korea      30,000 tons
  18. 2029    Brazil               TBD
  19. 2036    South Korea      30,000 tons
  20. TBD    India                   4 carriers at 30,000 tons
  21. TBD    Singapore        TBD
  22. TBD    U.S.                   7 carriers at 100,000 tons  (CVN 81-87)
  23. TBD    U.S.                   9 carriers at 45,693 tons (LHA 8-16)

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_carriers_in_service

Now, the first article states that the Chinese plan to have six carriers deployed by 2025. There are only two shown in these listings, the active Liaoning (CV-16) and the newly build CV-001A to be commissioned in 2020. So maybe four more 65,000-ton carriers by 2025?

Needless to say, we are probably not looking at a “carrier gap” anytime in the near or mid-term future.

Putin Step Backs

This article had appeared on numerous sites as “Putin Steps Back from Brink of War with Ukraine.” The original article is here: After Crimea incursions Russia and Ukraine step back from all out war

A couple of interesting points here:

 1. He actually has a section called “Metrics.” This is so nice to see. It should be required in all articles about military affairs.

2. “Ukraine has about 100,000 troops deployed in its eastern territories.”

3. “This is roughly on par with the 45,000 pro-Russian separatists and regular Russian troops deployed inside eastern Ukraine and the approximately 45,000 Russian troops staged across the border in western Russia.”

4. “Ukraine has about 10,000 troops deployed in southern territories near the Crimean border; Ukrainian officials estimate Russia has about 45,000 military personnel inside occupied Crimea.” (I would note that a significant of these are naval personnel)

Decent article from Mr. Nolan Peterson.

Twitter exchange on Ukraine

There was a brief exchange on twitter concerning the previous article, which I was not involved in. The initial response to my previous post was: “40,000 professional troops w/combat experience could go through go through 200,000 conscripts like a hot knife through butter.” The discussion continued with more agreement than disagreement. But it does bring up the issue of the relative capability of both armies.

We do not how good and capable each army is. Just a few observations

  1. The Russian Army is a mixed professional and conscript army. They have been using conscripts in the fighting in Ukraine (as the mothers of deceased Russian soldiers continue to remind us).
  2. The Ukrainian Army is a mixed professional and conscript army.
  3. Both armies had the same roots, traditions, training and leadership up through 1991. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, both armies were very similar for several years after that and both were in decline.
  4. After a period of serious decay in the 1990s, the Russian Army began to rebuild itself, including revising its doctrine.
  5. At the same time the Ukrainian Army began to rebuild itself, revising itself to some extent based upon U.S. doctrine. It joined NATO’s partnership-for-peace program in 1994.
  6. The Ukrainian Army suspended its active participation in the NATO partnership-for-peace program after President Yanukovich was elected in February 2010. The army was reduced and conscription ended.
  7. Since Yanukovich has left office in February 2014 (for the second time), the Ukrainian Army has reintroduced conscription and have begun the process of rebuilding themselves.
  8. Both armies have shown gaps in discipline and professionalism at times. For example, both armed forces have managed to each shoot down a civilian airliner.

My gut reaction is that the Russian Army may be more professional at this moment in time, but certainly not to a degree that would allow 40,000 to conquer a country protected by 200,000. A ratio of 1-to-5 for conducting a major invasion is rarely seen in history. It was certainly not the case when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941.

Two more points:

  1. There is invasion and there is occupation. For example, in 2003 the U.S. invaded Iraq, a country of 24 million, with 75,000 troops. The occupation over the next couple of years did not go well, as an insurgency blossomed in that poor security environment. The population of Ukraine is around 42 million.
  2. The best time to invade a country is at the start of the summer (like Germany did with France in 1940 and the Soviet Union in 1941). Waiting until August does not make a lot of sense. Fall operations have been done (World War I started in August 1914 and Poland was invaded in September 1939), but in general, you want the longest period of good campaign weather.

My conclusion is that there is almost no chance of a full-scale Russian invasion at this stage. They would need a couple of hundred thousand troops to do so. They have not massed those forces yet and almost certainly will not this year.

On the other hand, they do have enough force to do something more limited, like take Mariupol, or cause problems around Kharkiv/Kharkov. Kharkiv is the second largest city in Ukraine (population 1.4 million) and has a large Russian-speaking population. It was the failure of the pro-Yanukovich/pro-Russian forces to obtain a foothold there in 2014 that severely limited the effects of the revolt in eastern Ukraine. I suspect that now doing anything significant against Kharkiv would be difficult.

Mariupol seems to the “prize” that everyone is focusing on. Even then, it is only another city (population: around 460,000). While it is the major port for the Donetsk province, it does not connect the Russians overland to Crimea. There is another 250 of so miles to make a land bridge all the way to Crimea. This is a lot of territory to take and a lot of territory to then have to protect.

My tentative conclusion as this this conflict for now is effectively stalemated, with perhaps only Mariupol in the balance. This does not mean it will remain peaceful, as there is regularly violence there, and this does mean that there will not be significant increases in violence, but other than the threat to Mariupol, I do not see any other major territorial shifts occurring between now and next spring (2017).

There is a lot you can do with 40,000 troops…

There is a lot you can do with 40,000 troops, but conquering Ukraine is not one of them.

This article does not state that, but it does lay out an overly frightful scenario: 40000 Russian Troops are Preparing for War in Crimea

The scenario they lay out towards the end of the article is “…a full-scale Russian military offensive likely would aim to seize key military-industrial area such as tank plant at Kharkiv, the missile factory at Dnepropetrovsk, the shipyard at Mykolyev, and the port of Odessa. Russian forces also could drive into Ukraine from the northeast to the outskirts of Kiev and place the capital within artillery range in a bid to force a change of government.”

As the article notes: “Still, Russia does not appear to have all the forces in place for a major military operation…”

So how big is the Ukrainian Army? Well, according to Wikipedia they had 250,000 active armed forces personnel in March 2016. Their source was a Reuters article: Reuters

According to Wikipedia the ground forces were 204,000 in 2009 (Air Force was 36,300 in 2009 and Navy was 6,500 in August 2015).  In October 2013 President Yanukovich ended conscription (both the Ukrainian and Russian armies rely heavily on conscripts), but it was reinstated in 2014 after Russia intervened in Ukraine. As Wikipedia notes in a dated posting: “Due to the reintroduction of conscription, and partial mobilization, Ukraine’s armed forces is expected to nearly double from approximately 130,000 personnel in December 2014 to approximately 250,000 personnel in 2015.”

Anyhow, not the best and most current data, but safe to say that the Ukrainians probably have 200,000 or more ground troops available. Numbers do matter, and while 40,000 Russian troops are certainly a threat to Ukrainian security and stability, it is not a force that ready to march to the outskirts of Kiev or take Odessa. It would require a very serious mobilization effort on the part of Russia to do that.