Category War by Numbers

1979 to present

We try to stay away from politics in this blog, which is hard to do when discussing national security policy. Still, there are enough political and opinion piece websites and blogs out there, that we do not wish to add to the noise! This article by Major Danny Sjursen borders on the edge of being overtly political but I found it very interesting regardless: http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/165261

I have not read his book Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge but I did invest parts of two chapters in my book, America’s Modern Wars, discussing the surge in Iraq and its later adaptation to Afghanistan. His book will also be added to my growing reading list (right now I am struggling with getting the final edits to War by Numbers completed on time…and should not be blogging at all).

Anyhow, I do like his theme that U.S. involvement and policies in the Middle East fundamentally started shifted with the events on 1979. I think it is a useful timeline.

 

War by Numbers is on Amazon

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My new book, with a release date of 1 August, is now available on Amazon.com for pre-order: War by Numbers (Amazon)

It is still listed at 498 pages, and I am pretty sure I only wrote 342. I will receive the proofs next month for review, so will have a chance to see how they got there. My Kursk book was over 2,500 pages in Microsoft Word, and we got it down to a mere 1,662 pages in print form. Not sure how this one is heading the other way.

Unlike the Kursk book, there will be a kindle version.

It is already available for pre-order from University of Nebraska Press here: War by Numbers (US)

It is available for pre-order in the UK through Casemate: War by Numbers (UK)

The table of contents for the book is here: War by Numbers: Table of Contents

Like the cover? I did not have a lot to do with it.

We probably need to keep talking about Afghanistan

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Shawn posted a very nice summary a couple of days ago. It is worth reading if you have not already: Meanwhile in Afghanistan

Recent article reports the same trends: Afghan-government-lost-2-percent-territory

A couple of things get my attention in all this:

  1. They are talking about control of territory. I believe control of population is a lot better metric.
    1. One notes in Shawn’s write up that control of population is 68.5% (vice 61.3% of area).
  2. The insurgent level of activity is very high:
    1. 5,523 Afghan Army and police killed (15,000 casualties)
    2. 22,733 incidents from 8/1/2015 to 8/15/2016

Based on Chapter 11 (Estimating Insurgent Force Size) of my book America’s Modern Wars, working backward from this incident data would mean that there are something like 60,000 – 80,000 full-time and part-time insurgents operating. There is a lot comparing apples to oranges to get there: for example, how are they counting incidents in Afghanistan vice how were they counting incidents in the past cases we use for this estimate, what is the mix of full-time and part-time insurgents, how active and motivated are the insurgents, and so forth; but that level of activity is similar to the level of activity in Iraq at its worse (26,033 incidents in 2005, 45,330 in 2006 and 19,125 in 2007 according to one count). We had over 180,000 U.S. and coalition troops there to deal with that. The Afghani’s have 170,000 Army and Air Force or around 320,000 if you count police (and we did not count police in our database unless there were actively involved in counterinsurgent work). The 5,500+ Afghan Army and police killed a year indicates a pretty active insurgency. We lost less than 5,500 for the entire time we were in Iraq. The low wounded-to-killed ratio in the current Afghan data may well be influenced by who they choose to report as wounded and how they address lightly wounded (as discussed in Chapter 15, Casualties, in my upcoming book War by Numbers). Don’t know what current U.S. Army estimates are of Afghan insurgent strength.

Now, in Chapter Six of my book America’s Modern Wars, we developed a force ratio model based upon 83 historical cases (see chart at top of this post). It was very dependent on the cause of the insurgency, whether it was based on a central idea (like nationalism) or was regional or factional, or whether it was based on a overarching idea (like communism). I don’t still don’t really know the nature of the Afghan insurgency, and we were never funded to study this insurgency (we were only funded for Iraq work). So, I have not done the in-depth analysis of the Afghan insurgency that I did for Iraq. But…….nothing here looks particularly positive.

We never did an analysis of stalemated insurgencies. It could be done, although there are not that many cases of these. One could certainly examine any insurgency that lasts more than 15 years for this purpose. Does a long stalemated insurgency mean that the government (or counterinsurgents) eventually win? Or does a long stalemated insurgency mean that the insurgents eventually win? I don’t know. I would have to go back through our database of 100+ cases, update the data, sort out the cases and then I could make some predictions. That takes time and effort, and right now my effort is focused elsewhere. Is anyone inside DOD doing this type of analysis? I doubt it. Apparently a stalemate means that you can now pass the problem onto the next administration. While it solves the immediate political problem, is really does not answer the question of whether we are winning or losing. Is what we are doing good enough that this will revolve in our favor in the next ten years, or do we need to do more? I think this is the question that needs to be addressed.

Wounded-To-Killed Ratios

Some wounded-to-killed ratios drawn from my upcoming book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat. I have an entire chapter on the subject in my book (Chapter Fifteen: Casualties). This first chart is from Trevor Dupuy’s Attrition:

table01

A table I created to compare U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps ratios:

table02

A tabled I created looking at the U.S. units the I Corps area of Vietnam. This is after the Tet offensive, and these units are operating side-by-side and listed from north to south. The 1st Bde, 5th ID was up at the DMZ while the 23rd (Americal) Division was in the southern part of I Corps:

table03

And finally the ratios from Iraq and Afghanistan. Note these are higher ratios compared to what is reported in the previous post for the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga.

table04

This is why the Iraq Army and Peshmerga wounded-to-kill ratio in the previous post caught my attention.

NOTES

[1] Table from Attrition: Forecasting Battles Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War, page 49. The dates for the wars were added by this author.

Light Tanks

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Well, we are back to looking at light tanks: Griffin light tank general dynamics

And also:  http://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/10/m1-tank-120-mm-main-gun-placed-on-demo.html

We did do a report over a decade ago on lighter-weight armor at the request of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army (Operations Research), Walt Hollis.

It is “MWA-2. The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces, 6 August 2001 (CAA) – Pages: 121″ in our publication list: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub3.htm

The pdf download file for it is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/mwa-2lightarmor.pdf

Note that this report, which pre-dates our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, is discussing use of armor in Small Scale Contingency Operations (SSCO) and insurgencies, in addition to conventional wars.

This effort was not discussed in my upcoming book, War by Numbers. It may be picked up in a later book.

 

War by Numbers is in UK

War by Numbers is available in the UK for pre-order through Casemate: War by Numbers

I gather this is where the European customers can order the book. There is some restrictions as to who can sell where.

Interesting marketing blurb. Parts were pulled from the intro to my book and parts from the conclusions. Still no book cover picture, although I have seen a draft. Has a tank on the cover (tanks always sell).

U.S. pre-order sales are here: War by Numbers (U.S.)

TMCI Agenda

The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) latest agenda shows me making two presentations on Monday, October 3: “War by Numbers” and “Data for Wargames.” Dr. Shawn Woodford is presenting on Tuesday with “Studying Combat: Where from Here?”

There are also presentations by Rosser Bobbitt, Roger Mickelson, Gene Visco, John Brinkerhoff, Chuck Hawkins, Alenka Brown, J. Michael Waller, Seyed Rizi, Russ Vane and probably a couple of others.

Contact Roger Mickelson for a copy of the agenda at TMCI6@aol.com

Three Presentations

I will be giving two presentations at the October meeting of The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) and Shawn will be making one presentation there.

On Monday, 3 October, I will be doing a presentation on my book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat, that is going to published in June/August 2017.  This presentation will describe the book. In addition, I will be discussing four or five other book projects that are on-going or I am considering.

The same day I will being making presentation called “Data for Wargames.” This was a course developed for a USMC White Team for a wargaming exercise.

On Tuesday Shawn Woodford will be presenting “Studying Combat: Where to Go from Here.” As he describes it:

Studying Combat: Where To Go From Here?

With Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Robert Work’s recent call for a revitalized war gaming effort to support development of a new national military strategy, it is worth taking stock of the present state of empirical research on combat. I propose to briefly survey work on the subject across relevant fields to get a sense of how much progress has been since TMCI published The Concise Theory of Combat in 1997. This is intended to frame a discussion of where the next steps should be taken and possibilities for promoting work on this subject in the defense and academic communities.

War by Numbers Release Date

University of Nebraska Press (which owns Potomac Books) just posted the following announcement on War by Numbers: War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat

It is part of their spring/summer releases. The book may be in the warehouse and available for sale by mid-June.

According to U. of N. Press, the book is 498 pages, 231 tables, 2 charts and 49 graphs. Not sure that this is the final page count as my manuscript is only 342 pages and 121,094 words. I have not seen the final edited manuscript.

I have developed a course from this book called “Data for Wargames.” Will be giving presentations on the book and the course in early October at The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) meeting in Alexandria, VA (more on this later).

Lanchester equations have been weighed….

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There have been a number of tests of Lanchester equations to historical data over the years. Versions of Lanchester equations were implemented in various ground combat models in the late 1960s and early 1970s without any rigorous testing. As John Stockfish of RAND stated in 1975 in his report: Models, Data, and War: A Critique of the Study of Conventional Forces:

However Lanchester is presently esteemed for his ‘combat model,’ and specifically his ‘N-square law’ of combat, which is nothing more than a mathematical formulation of the age-old military principal of force concentration. That there is no clear empirical verification of this law, or that Lanchester’s model or present versions of it may in fact be incapable of verification, have not detracted from this source of his luster.”

Since John Stockfish’s report in 1975 the tests of Lanchester have included:

(1) Janice B. Fain, “The Lanchester Equations and Historical Warfare: An Analysis of Sixty World War II Land Engagements.” Combat Data Subscription Service (HERO, Arlington, VA, Spring 1977);

(2) D. S. Hartley and R. L. Helmbold, “Validating Lanchester’s Square Law and Other Attrition Models,” in Warfare Modeling, J. Bracken, M. Kress, and R. E. Rosenthal, ed., (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995) and originally published in 1993;

(3) Jerome Bracken, “Lanchester Models of the Ardennes Campaign in Warfare Modeling (John Wiley & sons, Danvers, MA, 1995);

(4) R. D. Fricker, “Attrition Models of the Ardennes Campaign,” Naval Research Logistics, vol. 45, no. 1, January 1997;

(5) S. C. Clemens, “The Application of Lanchester Models to the Battle of Kursk” (unpublished manuscript, May 1997);

(6) 1LT Turker Turkes, Turkish Army, “Fitting Lanchester and Other Equations to the Battle of Kursk Data,” Dissertation for MS in Operations Research, March 2000;

(7) Captain John Dinges, U.S. Army, “Exploring the Validation of Lanchester Equations for the Battle of Kursk,” MS in Operations Research, June 2001;

(8) Tom Lucas and Turker Turkes, “Fitting Lanchester Equations to the Battles of Kursk and Ardennes,” Naval Research Logistics, 51, February 2004, pp. 95-116;

(9) Thomas W. Lucas and John A. Dinges, “The Effect of Battle Circumstances on Fitting Lanchester Equations to the Battle of Kursk,” forthcoming in Military Operations Research.

In all cases, it was from different data sets developed by us, with eight of the tests conducted completely independently of us and without our knowledge.

In all cases, they could not establish a Lanchester square law and really could not establish the Lanchester linear law. That is nine separate and independent tests in a row with basically no result. Furthermore, there has never been a test to historical data (meaning real-world combat data) that establishes Lanchester does apply to ground combat. This is added to the fact that Lanchester himself did not think it should. It does not get any clearer than that.

As Morse & Kimball stated in 1951 in Methods of Operations Research

Occasionally, however, it is useful to insert these constants into differential equations, to see what would happen in the long run if conditions were to remain the same, as far as the constants go. These differential equations, in order to be soluble, will have to represent extremely simplified forms of warfare; and therefore their range of applicability will be small.

And later they state:

Indeed an important problem in operations research for any type of warfare is the investigation, both theoretical and statistical, as to how nearly Lanchester’s laws apply.

I think this has now been done for land warfare, at last. Therefore, I conclude: Lanchester equations have been weighed, they have been measured, and they have been found wanting.