Category War by Numbers

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 11 (ground actions)

There is really nothing new today. Not sure if that is because there is nothing new, or because the majority of reporters and analysts have the day off. I will put the updated sections of this daily post in italics.

No real change for like the sixth day in the row. Shelling and missile strikes in and around Kiev and Kharkov, but no fighting in the cities that we are aware of. Russia continues to occupy three cities, Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649).

There was a sense that Russia was moving up forces on Kiev and Kharkov to either isolate or assault these cities. So far neither has happed at either city. I gather neither Kiev nor Kharkov are fully isolated. Not sure Russia is going to try to at this stage. They appear to be holding while working on Mariupol.

They have isolated Mariupol. The city has been without power since 1 March. I gather the Russian forces in that area are not overwhelming. Not sure they have the strength to take it or will try. Instead, it appears that they are going to try to starve it out. The vice-mayor said on the morning of 3 March on CNN that they could hold out for five days. This is now a city far enough away from the other fighting grounds, that I assume there will no real attempt to relieve it. 

So, it does appear that this is the first “siege” of the campaign. Is the future of the Russian offensive? Is the next one at Kharkov? 

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol
6. Crimean border/Kherson

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The reinforced Russian Army is in the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl and the large Antonov/Hostomel airport north of Kiev. They appear to be at the northern and eastern outskirts of the city. At one point they were within four miles from the center of the city. The center of the city appears peaceful.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy remains defiantly in Kiev. I gather the city is still open to the west and the south.

Chernigov (pop. 285,234) it located to the NNE of Kiev. The Russians have pushed columns past the city and down to Kiev, but the city remains under Ukrainian control. There is a video of a Russian airplane being shot down there yesterday. So, the forces there are clearly well-enough armed. It is reported that all exits from the city have been mined.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be safe and secure for now. Have seen CNN reports on the morning of 4 March of the locals building up the defenses there.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov is being shelled but it does not look like the Russians have tried to re-enter the city. Not sure it has been completely isolated. There is at least one video-based report of a Ukrainian counterattack outside of Kharkov. Have no idea of its size or success. As I suspect that surrounding and besieging Kharkov will be the next major objective of the Russian Army after they take Mariupol, I do consider this significant. The question is, is it significant enough to keep Kharkov from being encircled.

Sumy (pop. 259,660) looks in danger of being isolated. The Russians have taken Konotop (pop. 84,787).

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: So far, we have not heard much from this area.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Day 5 of the siege. This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Mariupol is partly encircled and the power to the city is down. It appears they are going to keep it isolated and besiege it. The vice-mayor of this city said on 3 March that they can hold out for five days. I do not expect any significant relief columns.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Yesterday Ukraine was claiming that there were still parts of the city under Ukranian control. Not sure if that is the case today. Mikolaiv (pop. 476,101), the city on the Southern Bug River just west of Kherson, is still under Ukranian control. The Russians appear to have gained control of a lot of the area just to the north of Crimea. This may be the end of their expansion in this area for now until they take Mariupol. There are videos showing large Ukrainian protests in Kherson, maybe around 2,000 people. This is in a city that is 20% Russian and 45% Russian speaking (in 2001).  

Russia has taken Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is making everyone nervous. It is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.

I will update this post during the day as I find more information. 

 

The Home Front: Count of detained protesters is claimed to be over 13,000 since the war began, with at least 4,640 people this Sunday. See: OVD-info. Protests continue. At least 800 people have been detained in Belarus. 11,569 medical professionals have signed a letter protesting the war, using their names, title and affiliation. 

Exchange rate: 124.04 as of 9.57 AM EST. Has not changed since yesterday. Not sure what the exchange rate will be if Russia ever opens its stock market. 

Price of oil (Brent crude): $118.05 (at 09:58 AM EST). Has not change since yesterday. The last report I saw, 52% of the Russian government revenue comes from oil (even though it makes up only 7% of their economy). There is a strong desire on the part of the west to bring this price down, as it undercuts their budget.

Casualties: The UN is reporting 364 civilians confirmed dead in the war, 23 in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is claiming over 2,000. Ukraine is reporting over 110 soldiers killed. Russia is claiming to have captured 572 soldiers (which is entirely believable). Russia reported yesterday 498 troops have been killed and 1,597 wounded. This is a 3.21-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio, which seems a little low (see link below). Ukraine is reporting almost 200 Russians captured. U.S. officials are claiming around 2,000 Russian soldiers killed and 3,000 captured. Have no idea of the validity of the U.S. figures but suspect the Russian casualty figures are understated (because they kind of always are).

Note: Wounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Also see Chapter 15 (Casualties) in War by Numbers.

The twitter account @oryxspioenko is reporting on 5 March 99 Russian tanks have been lost by Russia based upon visual confirmation. For 6 March this is now 116. He is also reporting 10 Russian aircraft shot down in the last 26 hours based upon videos of them being shot, been shot down, or their crews captured. This includes five Su-25s, Su-30s and Su-34 jets. Granted Russian has well over a thousand modern jet aircraft, but it does show that the Ukrainians do have some capability to defend their airspace. I gather as more Stingers and other surface-to-air missiles are received and deployed; this is going to become a more dangerous environment. It may serve to contain Russian air.

It is clear that at least 1,500 people have died in this conflict. It may be more like 3,000 deaths. I am not confident in the accuracy of claims like those made by the Ukrainian general staff that more than 11,000 Russian troops were killed in the first 10 days.

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop and @caucasuswar, none of whom are known to me.

End of the War:  While Ukrainian and Russian delegations are talking, I don’t expect much from this in the short term. As Mariupol is supposedly two days away from falling, I suspect the Russians will not be interested in negotiating until they have taken it. It is part of the Donetsk province.

The attached map is from Wikipedia giving the “Military situation as of 6 March 2022.” View with caution.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 9 (ground actions)

There is really nothing surprisingly new today. I will put the updated sections of this daily post in italics.

No real change for like the fourth day in the row. Shelling and missile strikes in and around Kiev and Kharkov, but no fighting in the cities that we are aware of. Russia continues to occupy three cities, Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649).

There was a sense that Russia was moving up forces on Kiev and Kharkov to either isolate or assault these cities. So far neither has happed at either city. I gather neither Kiev nor Kharkov are fully isolated. Not sure Russia is going to try to at this stage. They appear to be holding while working on Mariupol.

They have isolated Mariupol. The city has been without power since 1 March. I gather the Russian forces in that area are not overwhelming. Not sure they have the strength to take it or will try. Instead, it appears that they are going to try to starve it out. The vice-mayor said yesterday morning on CNN that they could hold out for five days. This is now a city far enough away from the other fighting grounds, that I assume there will no real attempt to relieve it. 

So, it does appear that this is the first “siege” of the campaign. Is the future of the Russian offensive? Is the next one at Kharkov? 

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol
6. Crimean border/Kherson

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The reinforced Russian Army is in the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl and the large Antonov/Hostomel airport north of Kiev. They appear to be at the northern and eastern outskirts of the city, maybe four miles from the center of the city. The center of the city appears peaceful.

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky remains defiantly in Kiev. I gather the city is still open to the west and the south.

Chernigov (pop. 285,234) it located to the NNE of Kiev. The Russians have pushed columns past the city and down to Kiev, but the city remains under Ukrainian control. It is reported that all exits from the city have been mined.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be safe and secure for now. Have seen reports yet again this morning of the locals building up the defenses there.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov is being shelled but it does not look like the Russians have tried to re-enter the city. Not sure it has been completely isolated.

Sumy (pop. 259,660) looks in danger of being isolated. The Russians have taken Konotop (pop. 84,787).

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: So far, we have not heard much from this area.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Day 3 of the siege? This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Mariupol is partly encircled and the power to the city is down. It appears they are going to keep it isolated and besiege it. The vice-mayor of this city said on 3 March that they can hold out for five days. I do not expect any significant relief columns.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Yesterday Ukraine was claiming that there were still parts of the city under Ukranian control. Not sure if that is the case today. Mikolaiv (pop. 476,101), the city on the Southern Bug River just west of Kherson, is still under Ukranian control. The Russians appear to have gained control of a lot of the area just to the north of Crimea. This may be the end of their expansion in this area for now until they take Mariupol.

Russia has taken Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is making everyone nervous. It is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.

I will update this post during the day as I find more information. 

 

The Home Front: Count of detained protesters is claimed to be 7,359. Protests continue. At least 800 people have been detained in Belarus. 

Update: 11,569 medical professionals have signed a letter protesting the war, using their names, title and affiliation. 

Exchange rate (updated): 107.99 as of 10.42 AM EST. It was 124.75 rubles to a dollar when I checked it this morning, but this was a brief spike. Not sure what the exchange rate will be if Russia ever opens its stock market. 

Price of oil (Brent crude): $113.84 (at 09:03 EST). The last report I saw, 52% of the Russian government revenue comes from oil (even though it makes up only 7% of their economy). There is a strong desire on the part of the west to bring this price down, as it undercuts their budget.

Casualties: The UN is reporting at least 331 civilians dead in the war. Ukraine is claiming over 2,000. Ukraine is reporting over 110 soldiers killed. Russia is claiming to have captured 572 soldiers (which is entirely believable). Russia reported yesterday 498 troops have been killed and 1,597 wounded. This is a 3.21-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio, which seems a little low (see link below). Ukraine is reporting almost 200 Russians captured. U.S. officials are claiming around 2,000 Russian soldiers killed and 3,000 captured. Have no idea of the validity of the U.S. figures but suspect the Russian casualty figures are understated (because they kind of always are).

UpdateWounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Also see Chapter 15 (Casualties) in War by Numbers.

It is clear that at least 1,500 people have died in this conflict. It may get a lot a bloodier if there are direct assaults on Kiev and Kharkov.

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop and @caucasuswar, none of whom are known to me.

End of the War:  While Ukrainian and Russian delegations are talking, I don’t expect much from this in the short term. As Mariupol is supposedly four days away from falling, I suspect the Russians will not be interested in negotiating until they have taken it. It is part of the Donetsk province.

The attached map is from Wikipedia giving the “Military situation as of 4 March 2022.” View with caution.

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 7 (ground actions)

Well, nothing much changing on the ground yet. Some shelling of Kiev and Kharkov, but no fighting in the cities that we are aware of. Russia continues to occupy three cities, Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649).

The big story is what appears to be the coming major attacks on Kiev and Kharkov. These are going to start either today or tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. It does take time to deploy all the reinforcements. This appears to be properly organized and supplied attacks with artillery support, and so forth. So far, they just appear to be shelling them. Not sure for what purpose.

I don’t think Kiev nor Kharkov are fully isolated. CNN is reporting that Kiev is accessible. Is Russia going to try to surround one or both cities before going in (which does take some manpower) or are they just going to try to go in, under the assumption that under major pressure, the Ukrainians will fold? While the Russians are clearly concentrating considerable force to the north of both Kiev and Kharkov, is it not known to this writer how many trained Ukranian forces are defending each of these cities, is it 4,000 or 40,000? 

In a real sense, this first phase of this campaign is over, and Russia clearly did not win it. Having tried for the cheap and easy victory using “forward detachments,” now comes the serious fighting to either isolate and/or take Kiev and Kharkov. This is a new second phase of the campaign. My sense is that if these two cities hold out, then this war will probably be terminated sooner rather than later.

There may also be a push on Mariupol from the forces to the east and the west of it. They already have the city wholly or partially enveloped. Not sure they have the strength to take it or will try.

It does not appear that Belarus has committed any forces to the war, although Russia has been able to freely use their territory and facilities.

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol
6. Crimean border/Kherson

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The reinforced Russian Army is in the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl and the large Antonov/Hostomel airport north of Kiev. They appear to be at the northern and eastern outskirts of the city, maybe four miles from the center of the city. The center of the city appears peaceful.

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky remains defiantly in Kiev. I gather the city is still open to the west and the south.

Update: Chernigov (pop. 285,234) it located to the NNE of Kiev. The Russians have pushed columns past the city and down to Kiev, but the city remains under Ukrainian control. It is reported that all exits from the city have been mined.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be safe and secure for now. Have seen reports of the locals building up the defenses there.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov is being shelled but it does not look like the Russians have tried to re-enter the city. Not sure if it has been completely isolated.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: So far, we have not heard much from this area.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. There was an amphibious landing of at least 2,000 troops behind it and they have occupied Berdyansk and Melitipol. Mariupol is partly encircled and the power to the city is down. Not sure if Russia is going to attack it. 

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): I gather Kherson fell to Russia over the last two days. I gather it was contested through, and there are still parts of the city under Ukranian control. Mikolaiv (pop. 476,101), the city on the Southern Bug River just west of Kherson, is still under Ukranian control. The Russians appear to have gained control of a lot of the area just to the north of Crimea. Not sure how secure is that control. There are Ukrainian protesters in Berdyansk. A certain amount of Russian occupation forces are going to be tied down. They didn’t have overwhelming force to start the offensive.

 

I will update this post during the day as I find more information. 

 

The Home Front: Count of detained protesters is 6,817. Protests continue. At least 800 people have been detained in Belarus. 

Exhange rate: 104.4 rubles to a dollar. 

Price of oil (Brent crude): $112.66 (at 08:48 EST)

Casualties: The UN is reporting at least 136 civilians dead in the war (the previous day they reported 406). Ukraine is claiming over 2,000. Ukraine is reporting over 110 soldiers killed. Russia is claiming to have captured 572 soldiers (which is entirely believable). Update: Russia reports 498 troops have been killed and 1,597 wounded. This is a 3.21-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio, which seems a little low (see link below). Ukraine is reporting almost 200 Russians captured. U.S. officials are claiming around 2,000 Russian soldiers killed and 3,000 captured. Have no idea of the validity of the U.S. figures.

Update: Wounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Also see Chapter 15 (Casualties) in War by Numbers.

Update: Russian Troop Deaths Expose a Potential Weakness of Putin’s Strategy

It is clear that at least 1,000 people have died in this conflict. It may get a lot a bloodier if there are direct assaults on Kiev and Kharkov.

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop and @caucasuswar, none of whom are known to me.

The attached map is from Wikipedia giving the military situation as of 13:36 (UTC), Wednesday, March 2, 2022. View with caution.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 1

My opinion of this potential conflict is summarized in these two posts.  

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The first post “Russian Invasions” was made on 5 December 2021. The next one was done on 22 January 2022. Over the last two months, nothing that has happened has changed my opinion. 

If I was going to invade Ukraine, I would use surprise, overwhelming force and hit them during good weather. This is not what is happening right now. So, I still have a hard time believing we are about to see a major conventional war starting this month. 

On the other hand, a lot of people are saying something very different. Let me address a few of their points:

Time:

Apparently, the current U.S. administration is saying that the attack may happen in the second half of this month. To quote from the New York Times article by Helen Cooper and David E. Sanger that I found here: U.S. Warns of Grim Toll if Putin Pursues Full Invasion of Ukraine

“Should Mr. Putin decide to invade, American officials believe he is not likely to move until the second half of February.”

So, maybe a five-week campaign season? Two weeks in February and maybe three weeks in March. In 1943, the German offensive past Belgorod was called off around 24 March 1943 because of mud. Don’t know if “mud season” arrives sooner now and have not done any analysis of the currently mobility of the modern Russian army in poor weather conditions, but I am guessing it will still be a problem. The “American officials” quote in the NYT article are apparently aware of this with their next sentence “By that point, more ground will have frozen, making it easier to move heavy vehicles and equipment….”

So… five, maybe six, weeks campaign season, then mud. 

As they note in the NYT article “…the officials warned that if Mr. Putin chose the most aggressive of his options, he could quickly surround or capture Kyiv…” 

Maybe. Back in 1943, the Russians during the Battle of Kursk started their offensive north of Belgorod on 3 August 1943 and took Kiev on 6 November 1943. I am assuming that the 170,000+ Ukrainian Army will have some ability to slow the Russians down (unlike the Afghani army in August of last year). 

Force Levels:

I gather Russia currently has around 110,000 troops and according to NYT “…the Russian military had assembled 70 percent of the forces it would need to mount a full invasion of Ukraine…who assessed that Mr. Putin had concluded that he would need some 150,000 troops from 110 battalion tactical groups to conquer Ukraine….”

So, they will have 150,000 troops “…to conquer Ukraine…”. I gather this includes the “Thirty thousand troops…now in Belarus.”

The Ukrainian Army is 170,000+. Now, I do not know how good the Ukrainian Army is relative to the Russian Army. Suspect the Russian communications, recon, spotting and artillery are pretty good (see: The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). They will certainly have air superiority (unless NATO decides to directly support Ukraine). So, they will have the advantage. The range of casualty estimates (see below) seem to give credit the Russians with a 1.7-to-1 to 2.5-to-1 advantage in casualty effectiveness.

Still, I do expect the Ukrainian army, on the defensive, in prepared positions, fully warned, recently supplemented, and maybe somewhat motivated to defend their homeland, is something more than just speed bumps. I don’t really see how Russia is going to take Kiev in a five-week campaign.

Casualties:

This one gives me real heartburn. My suspicion is that the officials briefed “casualties” and it ended up in the NYT as killed. Keep in mind “casualties” include killed, wounded, wounded and later died of wounds, missing and captured (and deserters). The number of wounded usually outnumbers the number killed by 3- or 4-to-1 and sometimes as high as 10-to-1. I do have a full chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers. 

The NYT says “…potential deaths…of 5,000 to 25,000 members of the Ukrainian military…”

25,000 deaths times three wounded per person killed is 100,000 casualties. 100,000 casualties from a force of 170,000 is almost 60% losses. Are they really talking about an army-level force taking 60% losses in a five-week campaign? That has not happened a lot. Do those losses include the various reserves and militias that Ukraine can call up? If so, the numbers mesh together better.

The armed forces of Ukraine are 215,000 active (2022). Their reserves are 250,000 (2022). Available for military service is 11,139,646, ages 16-49 (2015). Fit for military service is 6,979,035 (2015). Reaching military age annually is 470,406 (2021). So, how big of a Ukrainian military are we talking about here? 170K in ground forces, or half-million or more counting reserves, militia and new call-ups? If Ukraine calls up its reserves and draft militia, is Russia really going to take (and hold) a lot of Ukraine with an army of 150,000? Anyhow, a lot of things don’t match up here. Perhaps that is because the NYT did not properly quote the “officials,” perhaps because of the details of some of the scenarios they drafted (which may be improbable), or perhaps because they have garbled their calculations (this has happened before, remember Afghanistan in August 2021).

Anyhow, it is hard for me to evaluate the data in the NYT article. In the meantime, I will stick to my opinions given in my first two blog posts on the subject.

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine?

Based upon on the buzz lately in the news and comments by some Western politicians, it appears that is only a question of when, not if, that Russia is going to attack Ukraine. Yet, Russia is saying they are not going to attack. So… who is right?

It still doesn’t look to me like they are going to attack. This opinion is not based upon any inside knowledge or deep understanding of the situation. I only know what I read in the news. But a few things get my attention:

Force Ratios: First of all, Russia has amassed a 100K+ troops along the border, plus some forces are in a training exercise in Belarus. I gather the actual figure is on the low side of 100,000, vice being near 200,000. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army, before mobilization is almost 200,000. So, is Russia really massing so it can attack while outnumbered?

Now, there are a few other factors in what is not that simple of a comparison. First of all, Russia can move more troops into the area(s) of interest on short notice. So that buildup of 100K+ could quickly turn into 300K+. If Russia had more than 300K troops in the area, I would become very concerned. But right now, they do not.

Weather: People are making noise like something will happen in February. It is freakin’ cold at that time of year. There is snow on the ground. Do they really want to attack then? I would wait until after the spring thaw, like the Germans did in 1941, 1942 and 1943, when you have a nice long summer for your campaign.

Warning: Surprise is a nice force multiplier. I have a chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers. It is now no surprise if an attack comes. Furthermore, they even lack strategic surprise, so Ukraine has been able to lobby for more aid and has received more weapons. Why would Russia help their potential adversary get prepared, which is what has happened over the last couple of months? Ukraine is receiving weaponry and support that is probably would not have otherwise received. So, did Russia really choose to give Ukraine 2-3 months of warning to prepare before they attack them? This seems counter-intuitive.

Again, I go back to my original post, which is here:

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

I may be proven wrong come February and Russia suddenly comes swarming across the border to take the rest of “New Russia,” to take Kharkov (the second largest city in Ukraine) and to cross the Pripet marshes and Chernobyl/Pripyat area to threaten Kiev, but right now, I am not sure this is the real scenario.

I still think the threats are part of a larger negotiation strategy (although I don’t rule out that the Russia government has simply made a mistake).

Casualty Effectiveness versus Combat Effectiveness

I have been involved in an off-line discussion related to combat modeling. This is a discussion relevant to that conversation. It is from page 56, Chapter 7: Measuring Human Factors in Combat, of War by Numbers.

 

Casualty Effectiveness versus Combat Effectiveness

            Much of the above analysis was based upon a measurement of casualty effectiveness. This is an outcome. The actual factor we are trying to measure is combat effectiveness. We have no means of directly measuring that. For his combat models, Trevor Dupuy was able to produce a Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV) based upon comparing the results of the model runs to the historical outcomes. The CEV served as a force multiplier for one side. As such, if a force with the CEV of two was attacking at even odds, it would be treated the same as if it was attacking at two-to-one odds. This would then result in better outcomes, more favorable casualty exchange ratios, and higher advance rates. While there was a not a direct linear relationship in the model between combat effectiveness and casualty effectiveness, a higher combat effectiveness value clearly improved casualty effectiveness. Casualty effectiveness was usually higher than the combat effectiveness value.

            There is a sense that one can determine “combat effectiveness” as the square root of casualty effectiveness. In this construct, a casualty effectiveness of four would mean a combat effectiveness value of two. In effect, being twice as good as your opponent results in a favorable casualty exchange being four times better. This has not been systematically tested.[1]

            Added to that there are some armies that are “casualty insensitive.” This certainly describes the Soviet Army in World War II, which was more than willing to take casualties for the sake of completing the mission or fulfilling their orders. The failure to encourage individual initiative at the lower levels and the insistence that orders must be followed regardless just amplified this tendency. It appears that the Soviet Army rather needlessly suffered additional casualties above and beyond that which other armies would suffer in the same scenario, and that this “casualty insensitive” regime also influenced the casualty effectiveness figures. This certainly also applies to the Japanese Army in World War II, especially with their “banzai charges” and tendency to fight until exterminated.

            Still, casualty effectiveness is an important metric and one that gets the analyst closer to combat effectiveness; it is just not a perfect measure.

 

[1] And we do not know how to test this outside of using a combat model structure.

Mark Perry – part 2 (and Landmine Restrictions)

Last week author Mark Perry passed away. I had not talked to him in over a decade, but we worked with him 20 years ago. Links to articles on him:

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/death-of-an-american-original-mark-perry-1950-2021/

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/08/08/rip-mark-perry-an-extraordinary-journalist-in-extraordinary-times/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Perry_(author)

Mark Perry, working with the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), had arranged to have our original 1997 report that we did for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the “Military Consequences of Landmine Restrictions” published and distributed, along with the letters exchanged between TDI President Nick Krawciw (MG, USA, ret) to General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is discussed in our previous blog post:

Mark Perry | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

That earlier report used to be on line. It does not appear that VVAF maintains its website any more. As dozens, if not hundreds of the report were printed and distributed, I assume there is a copy of in the Library of Congress, but it does not seem to otherwise be available. Of course, it can be ordered from us. I probably need to make it available on line.  Here some links to it:

MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF LANDMINE RESTRICTIONS : THE DUPUY INSTITUTE’S RESEARCH STUDY VVAF MONOGRAPH SERIES, VOL. 1, NUMBER 2, SPRING 2000 | Dupuy Institute (secondstorybooks.com)

SIPRI Library and Documentation catalog › Details for: Military consequences of landmine restrictions

The Dupuy Institute’s Research Study: Military Consequences of Landmine Restrictions by The Dupuy Institute – Paperback – 2000 – from Ground Zero Books, Ltd. (SKU: 52962) (biblio.com)

After that report was published, Mark Perry, who lived down the road from our office in McLean, Va., kept coming over to our office and asking us for additional information. This ended up turning into three small reports (M-3, M-4, M5).

TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications

M-3. An Analysis of Rapid Mine Emplacement in a Threat Environment (1 June 2000) (VVAF) – Pages: 89

and two of these are available on-line:

Microsoft Word – M-4 Landmines in the Gulf War.doc (dupuyinstitute.org)

Microsoft Word – M-5 Brief Survey of Mine Breaching.doc (dupuyinstitute.org)

We do make a few of our reports available on line and I should probably make more… but this is an administrative task that is not high on my to-do list (most administrative tasks are not high on my to-do list): TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications

These were all contracted for, although we insisted on complete freedom in research and results (which we always do), especially as we were doing work for an advocacy group.

And then he contracted us to look at a complete landmine ban (both anti-personnel and anti-tank). Then of course, there is a big different between “dumb” mines, and “smart” and scatterable mines. This report is here:

Microsoft Word – THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF A COMPLETE.doc (dupuyinstitute.org)

I gather a number of people at VVAF were pushing for a complete landmine ban. As we state in Executive Summary of our report:

“TDI believes that its analysis is accurate enough to support conclusions that a total “dumb” landmine ban, including all antitank mines of that nature, would make operational sense and should be part of the revolution in military affairs. Such a move would enhance US dynamic battlefield capabilities, would lessen the logistic burden, and may well reduce American casualties. For similar operations effectiveness reasons, the United States should also study the consequences of eventually supporting a ban on scatterable mines. That may have to be conditional on other major manufacturing nations joining such an initiative.”

And to grab the main points from our conclusions:

  1. The Dupuy Institute reiterates its recommendation that the United State support current efforts to implement an antipersonnel landmine ban.
  2. The Dupuy Institute is quite comfortable with extending the ban to include “dumb” antitank mines. Such a ban would not significantly reduce US capabilities. Furthermore, these weapons have already been effectively removed from US doctrinal use. The “dumb” mine is a weapon that will be used against US forces, rather than one that US forces will use.
  3. The banning of antitank SCATMINE systems is a more difficult issue. There is no question that there will be some loss of capability, although the degree is not easy to measure (more on this point in a subsequent post).
  4. If a revolution in military affairs is occurring, with the United States on the leading edge of the revolution, then the deployment of any conventional mine system is to our disadvantage. Fundamentally mines have more value to technologically inferior forces. They remain a simple, cheap, and easy means of attacking technologically sophisticated weapons systems while incurring little risk to the user.
  5. Because of the nature of most US operations, the US is more often on the offense in conventional warfare than it is on the defense. Furthermore, they are not weapons that the US, as a conventional force, would have much use for in a guerilla war.  It is not a weapon that the US has any use for in contingency operations, peacekeeping operations and operations other than war. The mine is still primarily a weapon of the defender and the guerilla. As such, any landmine bans fundamentally favor the US military and reduce casualties.
  6. The “Korean exception” appears to be a “red herring.” It appears that the prime reason for the US Army maintaining “dumb” antipersonnel mines in Korea is to stockpile them for South Korean use and that any planned use of the stockpiled mines by US forces is a very secondary consideration. Korea is not a strong argument for refusing to participate in a landmine ban.
  7. There appears to be a fairly clear dividing line between a mine and command detonated munition. Hornet and Claymore (as configured for US forces) would not be covered under a landmine ban. As such, banning landmines does not open the possibility that other US antipersonnel or antitank weapons would be lost in such a ban.

Recommendations:

  1. The Dupuy Institute again recommends that the US agree to an antipersonnel landmine ban.
  2. The Dupuy Institute recommends that the US agree to a “dumb” antitank landmine ban.
  3. The Dupuy Institute recommends that the US consider an antitank SCATMINE ban.

.    The Dupuy Institute understands that this would entail some loss in defensive capability, and possibly a minor loss in offensive capability. Still, the overall benefits of such a ban to US offensive capability – lower casualties and a reduced logistics tail – could make such a ban advantageous to US armed forces. This advantage would be predicated on at least partial, but not complete, effectiveness of such ban worldwide. Thus, the US may wish to make its participation in a ban on antitank SCATMINE systems conditional upon the participation of (or the participation of within a set period of time) certain other major manufacturing nations (i.e., Russia, China and India).

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Finally, amid all this mine work, we ended up doing a brief report for Los Alamos (a government laboratory). They had called to ask us some questions, and by the end of the conversation, they decided to give us a small contract. Marketing was so much easier back then.

The Los Alamos report is here: Microsoft Word – M-8 A Measure of the Real-World Value of Mixed Mine System– (dupuyinstitute.org)

So we ended up doing effectively six different reports on landmines for three different customers (JCS, VVAF, Los Alamos). This was going on the same time we were doing our Capture Rate Studies for CAA (which makes up the basis for several of my first chapters in War by Numbers) and were starting first of our three urban warfare studies for them (also two chapters in War by Numbers). It was an interesting collection of work and we greatly appreciated the support from Mark Perry. Since 2001, we have not done any work related to landmines. 

Mark Perry moved on to other tasks. I talked to him a few times after that about Middle East issues, but his focus was now more on political issues and our focus tends to be more on the nuts and bolts of defense issues, so we did not do any further work with him. He was a very good guy to work with. Sorry to see him go.

 

Two other TMCI Reports

The Military Conflict Institute shut down early 2020. An associate of mine has been trying to chase down all of their work.

There are these three reports:

The Three TMCI Reports | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

There was this brief 20-page paper written by the late Roger Mickelson: /tardir/tiffs/a396349.tiff (dtic.mil)

One notes that Roger Mickelson titled this report “War on Terrorists” vice the “War on Terrorism.”

The fifth report or book is not known to me. Is it “The Classics of Military Thought: Appreciations and Agenda.” published in 1985 by John E. Tashjean under the name of the Military Conflict Institute. John Tashjean had written a number of articles on Clausewitz from 1979-1992.

The classics of military thought : apreciations and agenda (Book, 1985) [WorldCat.org]

There is a copy at University of Oxford, only some 3,600 miles from here. Apparently no one else on this planet has a copy. Could any of our UK readers by so kind as to scare up a hard or electronic copy of this?

Thanks.

P.S.: TMCI is officially closing this year | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

Bibliography on Clausewitz

This bibliography on Carl von Clausewitz, a name that I assume is known to most of our readers, was just brought to my attention. It was assembled by Christopher Bassford, who is not known to me. 

Clausewitz Bibliography (English) (clausewitzstudies.org)

A few comments:

  1. He does not list Understanding War by Trevor N. Dupuy. That is kind of big shortfall, especially I think it was the best book of the 90+ that Trevor Dupuy authored or co-authored.
  2. He does not list my War by Numbers, which is built upon Trevor Dupuy’s work and of course, a little of Clausewitz’s.
  3. There are a number of other articles and books by Trevor Dupuy that reference Clausewitz and it applications. Some of these should probably also be picked up, depending on what his standards are for inclusion in his listing.