Tag Cold War

The Cold War Roots of the Integrated U.S./Japan/NATO Air Defense Network

Continental U.S. Air Defense Identifications Zones [MIT Lincoln Laboratory]

My last post detailed how the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 prompted the U.S. to undertake emergency efforts to bolster its continental air defenses, including the concept of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This post will trace the development of this network and its gradual integration with those of Japan and NATO.

In the early 1950s, U.S. continental air defense, designated the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment air defense system or SAGE, resembled a scaled-up version of the Dowding System, pioneered by Great Britain as it faced air attack by the Luftwaffe in 1940. SAGE was initially a rudimentary and analog affair:

The permanent network depended on each radar site to perform GCI [Ground Control & Intercept] functions or pass information to a nearby GCI center. For example, information gathered by North Truro Air Force Station on Cape Cod was transmitted via three dedicated land lines to the GCI center at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, and then on to the ADC Headquarters at Ent AFB, Colorado. The facility at Otis AFB was a regional information clearinghouse that integrated the data from North Truro and other regional radar stations, Navy picket ships, and the all-volunteer GOC [Ground Observer Corps]. The clearinghouse operation was labor intensive. The data had to be manually copied onto Plexiglas plotting boards. The ground controllers used this data to direct defensive fighters to their targets. It was a slow and cumbersome process, fraught with difficulties. Engagement information was passed on to command headquarters by telephone and teletype. At Ent AFB, the information received from the regional clearinghouses was then passed on to enlisted airmen standing on scaffolds behind the world’s largest Plexiglas board. Using grease pencils, these airmen etched the progress of enemy bombers onto the back of the Plexiglas board so that air defense commanders could evaluate and respond. This arrangement impeded rapid response to the air battle.

It is hard to imagine an air defense challenge of the magnitude that potentially faced the U.S. and USSR by 1955. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber fleet peaked at over 2,500 in 1955-1965, with 2,000 B-47s (range of 2,013 statute miles) and 750 B-52s (range of 4,480 statute miles). The range of U.S. bombers was extended considerably by the ~800 KC-135 aerial re-fueling tanker aircraft fleet as well.

In spite of the much publicized “bomber gap,” taking Soviet production numbers (and liberally adding aircraft of shorter range or unavailable until 1962…) produces an approximate estimate for a Soviet bombing fleet:

  • M-4 “Bison” (range of 3480 statute miles) = 93
  • Tu-16 “Badger” (range of 3888 statute miles) = 1507
  • Tu-22 “Blinder” (range of 3000 statute miles) = 250-300
  • Tu-95 “Bear” (range of 9400 statute miles) = 300+

That gave the U.S. an advantage in bombers of 2,750 to ~2,200 over the Soviets. Now, imagine this air battle being conducted with manual tracking on plexiglass with grease pencils…untenable!

Air Defense and Modern Computing

However, the problem proved amenable to solutions provided by the pending computer revolution.

At the Lincoln Laboratory development continued on an automated command and control system centered around the 250-ton Whirlwind II (AN/FSQ-7) computer. Containing some 49,000 vacuum tubes, the Whirlwind II became a central component of the SAGE system. SAGE, a system of analog computer-equipped direction centers, processed information from ground radars, picket ships, early-warning aircraft, and ground observers onto a generated radarscope to create a composite picture of the emerging air battle. Gone were the Plexiglas TM boards and teletype reports. Having an instantaneous view of the air picture over North America, defense commanders would be able to quickly evaluate the threats and effectively deploy interceptors and missiles to meet the threat.

The SAGE system was continually upgraded through the mid-to-late 1950s.

By 1954, with several more radars in the northeast providing data, the Cambridge control center (a prototype SAGE center) gained experience in directing F-86D interceptors against B-47 bombers performing mock raids. Still much development, research, and testing lay ahead. Bringing together long-range radar, communications, microwave electronics, and digital computer technologies required the largest research and development effort since the Manhattan Project. During its first ten years, the government spent $8 billion to develop and deploy SAGE. By 1958, Lincoln Laboratory had a professional staff of 720 with an annual budget of $22.5 million, to conduct SAGE-related work. The contract with IBM to build sixty production models of the Whirlwind II at $30 million each provided about half of the corporation’s revenues for the 1950s and exposed the corporation to technologies that it would use in the 1960s to dominate the computer industry. In the meantime, scientists and electronic engineers in the defense industry strove to install better radars and make these radars invulnerable to electronic countermeasures (ECM), commonly called jamming.

The SAGE development effort became one of the foundations of modern computing, giving IBM the technological capability to dominate for several decades, until it outsourced two key components: hardware to Intel and software to a young Microsoft, both of which became behemoths of the internet age. It is also estimated that this effort brought a price tag which exceeded that of the Manhattan Project. SAGE also transformed the attitude of the USAF towards technology and computerization.

Current Air Defense Networks

In the 1950s and 60s, the U.S. continental air defense network gradually began to expand geographically and integrate with NADGE and JADGE air defense networks of its NATO allies and Japan.

NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE): This was approved by NATO in December 1955, and became operational in 1962 with 18 radar stations. This eventually grew to 84 stations and provided an inter-connected network from Norway to Turkey before being superseded by the NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS) in 1972. NATINADS was further upgraded in the 1980s to include data from the E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft (AEGIS (Airborne Early-warning/Ground Environment Integrated Segment); not to be confused with the USN system with the same acronym.)

Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE): This was the automated system, in the same fashion as SAGE, which replaced the manual system in place with the JASDF since 1960. The requirement was stated in July 1961, and was actually modeled on the Naval Tactical Information System (NTDS), developed by Hughes for the US Navy. This was ordered in December 1964, and operational in March 1969. This was superseded by Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) in July 2009.

Japanese Air Defense and the Cold War Origins of Air Defense Identification Zones

Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the South China Sea [Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa)/Creative Commons/Wikipedia]

My previous posts have discussed the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) and the aircraft used to perform the Defensive Counter Air (DCA) mission. To accomplish this, the JASDF is supported by an extensive air defense system which closely mirrors U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Navy (USN) systems and has co-evolved as technology and threats have changed over time.

Japan’s integrated air defense network and the current challenges it faces are both rooted in the Cold War origins of the modern U.S. air defense network.

On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea, drawing the United States into a war that would last for three years. Believing that the North Korean attack could represent the first phase of a Soviet-inspired general war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Air Force air defense forces to a special alert status. In the process of placing forces on heightened alert, the Air Force uncovered major weaknesses in the coordination of defensive units to defend the nation’s airspace. As a result, an air defense command and control structure began to develop and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) were staked out along the nation’s frontiers. With the establishment of ADIZ, unidentified aircraft approaching North American airspace would be interrogated by radio. If the radio interrogation failed to identify the aircraft, the Air Force launched interceptor aircraft to identify the intruder visually. In addition, the Air Force received Army cooperation. The commander of the Army’s Antiaircraft Artillery Command allowed the Air Force to take operational control of the gun batteries as part of a coordinated defense in the event of attack.

In addition to North America, the U.S. unilaterally declared ADIZs to protect Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan in 1950. This action had no explicit foundation in international law.

Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. While national sovereignty cannot be delegated, the responsibility for the provision of air traffic services can be delegated.… [A] State which delegates to another State the responsibility for providing air traffic services within airspace over its territory does so without derogation of its sovereignty.

This precedent set the stage for China to unilaterally declare ADIZs its own in 2013 that overlap those of Japan in the East China Sea. China’s ADIZs have the same international legal validity as those of the U.S. and Japan, which has muted criticism of China’s actions by those countries.

Recent activity by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and nuclear and missile testing by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) is prompting incremental upgrades and improvements to the Japanese air defense radar network.

In August 2018, six Chinese H-6 bombers passed between Okinawa’s main island and Miyako Island heading north to Kii Peninsula. “The activities by Chinese aircraft in surrounding areas of our country have become more active and expanding its area of operation,” the spokesman [of the Japanese Ministry of Defense] said.… “There were no units placed on the islands on the Pacific Ocean side, such as Ogasawara islands, which conducted monitoring of the area…and the area was without an air defense capability.”

Such actions by the PLAAF and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have provided significant rationale in the Japanese decision to purchase the F-35B and retrofit their Izumo-class helicopter carriers to operate them, as the Pacific Ocean side of Japan is relatively less developed for air defense and airfields for land-based aircraft.

My next post will look at the development of the U.S. air defense network and its eventual integration with those of Japan and NATO

Evolution of the Roles and Missions of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF)

[Sources: IHS Jane’s All the World’s Fighting Aircraft, Wikipedia, militarymachine.com, author’s estimates}

In my previous posts, I explored impact the political aftermath of the Pacific War on Japan and the gradual restoration of sovereignty had on its air power policy. During this time, aircraft and air defense technology changed rapidly and the roles and mission of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) evolved rapidly as well.

The JASDF has been closely tied to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) since its inception. This was true in terms of missions, doctrine, technology and equipment. The primary role of the JASDF has been air defense and the protection of Japanese sovereignty (Defensive Counter Air, DCA), since 1958 when this mission was transitioned back from the USAF. The 1978 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) mandated this, and also prohibited mid-air refueling and precision-strike munitions. These missions were gradually permitted as the threat environment evolved. (See this thesis for a good summary.)

The role of offensive air power (i.e. Offensive Counter Air or OCA; attacking enemy airbases, missile launch sites and similar military facilities) has traditionally been reserved for the USAF due to legal limits on the possible missions by the JASDF. Specifically the U.S. Armed Forces, Japan, 5th Air Force is a considerable force, including the 18th Wing at Kadena, Okinawa with four squadrons of F-15s, and the 35th Wing at Misawa in Northern Japan with four squadrons of F-16s, among other support squadrons to tankers, AWACs, etc.

This posture and division of responsibilities between the JSADF and USAF has gradually changed over time, or “emerging as it really is”:

  • In the early 1980’s, the F-1 attack aircraft had a strike capability against shipping with the ASM-1 and ASM-2 missiles.
  • In the late 1990’s, the F-4EJ upgraded “Kai” version added ground attack and the ability to strike with the ASM-1 and ASM-2 missiles.
  • In the early 2000’s, the F-2 aircraft was introduced, with ground attack with precision-guided munitions and the ability to strike with the ASM-2.
  • Currently, as the F-35A is adopted, it will have state-of-the-art precision strike capabilities, and likely use the Joint Strike Missile (JSM).

Nonetheless, the primary mission of the JASDF remains air superiority and interception. The data visualization above illustrates the different types of air superiority aircraft in service with the JASDF over time. This chart is based on six quantitative measures of analysis, and has a moderate level of information density:

  1. Service Year – on the horizontal axis; when was this type introduced into service by the JASDF? This is often significantly after the similar type was introduced into service with the USAF. In some cases, this is an estimate, or in the case of the hypothetical “F-22J”, alternative history (aka wild speculation).
  2. Aircraft Type – each bubble represents an aircraft type.
  3. Range SMI (statute miles) – the color of the bubble, with darker being longer range; this is a the combat range of the aircraft type, often with optional drop tanks.
  4. Max Speed MPH (statute miles per hour) – the size of the bubble represents the maximum speed of the aircraft, measured from a base of 100 MPH. This is typically at high altitude.
  5. Rate of Climb FPM (feet per minute) – this is the ability of the aircraft to climb to altitude, and a key metric for an interceptor with a mission to rise to bombers which have violated the airspace of a nation.
  6. Thrust to Weight Ratio – this measures the ability to propel the aircraft compared with the loaded weight of the aircraft. This is often used to express the capability to climb, for when an aircraft has a high angle of attack, thrust becomes lift, so when an aircraft has more lift than weight, it can climb, and even accelerate while moving straight up.
  7. Wing Loading LBS/SquareFoot – this measures the size of the wing (and thus by proxy the lift generation capability) as compared to the weight of the aircraft, it is typically used to indicate the ability to turn quickly (i.e. change in degrees per second).

A few insights become clear when visualizing the data in this way. First, the F-104J in the role of interceptor was a huge leap in capability over the F-86 Sabre types. In many ways the F-104J set the standard to which later aircraft would match. Next, the linear progression between 1960 and 1980 of aircraft performance capability reached an apex with the F-15J, with a period of upgrades reflected in the “Kai” versions. Also, with some knowledge of these airframes, it can be seen that the Japanese market for military aircraft has been dominated by the Americans as opposed to the Europeans (or Russians). There are many aspects of these aircraft which are not captured in this chart, including weaponry, sensors, and stealth. I have discussed the relevance of these metrics in previous blog posts.

Today, the JSDF operates a wide range of aircraft, specialized in missions ranging across the spectrum of domains, with modern air force capabilities. A list of aircraft currently operated by force, and with numbers is presented in the annex, based upon the most current authoritative sources, but also updated for recent decisions by the Japanese government on procurement.

An “F-22J” is included as an “alternative history” in the chart above since the Japanese government has repeatedly sought to purchase this aircraft from Lockheed Martin for the JASDF. They have been stymied by the Obey amendment to the 1998 Defense Appropriations Act, which specifically forbade the export of the F-22 in order to protect the secrecy of its advanced technology.

Japan’s Grand Strategy And The Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) (III)

[Nippon.com]

Modern air forces require significant capital investments (surpassed only by naval capital investment requirements) and also require significant technological capability. Both of these aspects of modern military power require a strong economic foundation for support. Japan has a long history of investing in its own military industrial capability.

During the Meiji era (1868 to 1912), Japan economic doctrine was summed up in a motto: fukoku kyōhei, meaning “Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Armed Forces.” This phrase actually comes from an ancient Chinese book named Zhan Guo Ce (“Strategies of the Warring States”), from the 5th – 3rd century B.C. period of the same name in Chinese history. This is an excellent example of how for both Japan and China reference their own historical experiences to inform current decision-making.

The post-World War II Japanese body politic had lived through the devastation of war and became focused on economic recovery. The original motto was thus shortened to eliminate kyōhei (“strong army”), leaving only fukoku (“enrich the country”). The resulting single-minded focus paid dividends as the Japanese “economic miracle” enabled it to become the first Asian nation to “catch” the West (see image above). This policy is sometimes referred to as the “Yoshida Doctrine.” Coined in 1977 by Masashi Nishihara and summarized by Professor Sugita of Osaka University, the main elements of the doctrine are:

  1. Japan ensures its national security through an alliance with the United States;
  2. Japan maintains a low capacity for self-defense;
  3. Japan spends resources conserved by the first and second policies on economic activities to develop the country as a trading nation.

In December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced “Abenomics”, a multi-faceted approach to revive Japan’s sluggish economy and to restore Japan’s geopolitical influence as a counterbalance to China’s rise. Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have re-invoked the term fukoku kyōhei, acknowledging that a strong economy and a strong military will be needed in this endeavor.

Japan’s Grand Strategy And The Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) (II)

Hypothetical occupation zones for post-war Japan had the Allies decided to divide the country. [Pinterest]

In previous posts, I have explored the political and strategic context for the role of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). Now I will look at the political reasons why the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) is restricted in its operating concepts and capabilities.

After the Pacific War (which for Japan lasted from 1931 to 1945), the devastation of the war and backlash against militarism became conventional wisdom among Japanese. At the Moscow Conference of December 1945, the Allies agreed that since Japan had fallen to the United States, that country would be allowed to conduct the post-war occupation. (Hungary had fallen to the Red Army and thus was occupied by the Soviet Union alone.) This decision saved Japan from a division like Germany or Korea, although the Soviets still had plans for a Japanese communist state (see below). The map above is a hypothetical division of Japan, developed by a wargamer.

The greater Japanese empire, however was divided among the Allies, with many natural choices, such as the former British colonial possessions being returned (e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong, etc.), former French colonial possessions being returned (Indochina), South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands going to the Soviets, and Taiwan and the Pescadores returning to China (although which China became a key question in 1949). Notably, Korea was divided into North and South, with the Soviets in control of the former, and the other Allies (primarily the US and UK) managing the later.

In Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur governed and imposed a new post-war constitution, which came into force in May 1947, and is technically an amendment to the original Meiji-era constitution of 1889. Article 9 of which reads as below:

(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

As early as 1946, however, planners in the the Joint Staff, under the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), began to consider the re-armament of Japan, anticipating a Soviet attack against Japan. The actual Soviet war plan to attack Hokkaido on August 24th 1945 was published by the Wilson center in 2015, and some say that strategic nuclear deterrence was what saved Japan from the same fate as divided Germany.

In March 1948, when Washington considered starting peace treaty negotiations with Japan, Under Secretary of the Army William Draper stated that the War Department was generally in favor of Japanese rearmament. In response to an inquiry by the secretary of defense, the JCS stated: ‘Solely from the military viewpoint, the establishment of Japanese armed forces is desirable’ to offset ‘our own limited manpower.’

The American vision of an unarmed and pacifist Japan, as rapidly enshrined in the constitution, was nearly dead on arrival, as international events unfolded rapidly in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s:

  • 1947, March – President Harry Truman addressed Congress and the U.S. public, announcing the policy of containment, and establishing the Truman Doctrine.
  • June 1948 – the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin, resulting in the famous airlift.
  • October 1949 – Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China were defeated by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Red Army, founding the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
  • June 1950 – North Korea, a Soviet satellite state since 1945, invaded South Korea, fracturing the post-war territorial division.

Thus, by 1950 when John Foster Dulles was appointed to begin negotiating a peace treaty with Japan to conclude the American occupation, he and most other American policy makers had come to see Japan as very important to the defense of American interests and democracy in the Far East.

  • September 1951 – The Treaty of San Francisco was signed, establishing peace between Japan and many Allied nations, but notably not the Soviet Union, China as Republic of China (Taiwan), or People’s Republic of China (mainland), or North nor South Korea.
  • September 1951 – The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed on the same date, but entered into force in April 1952. This ended the military occupation, restored sovereignty to the Japanese government, but also clarified the ongoing US military presence in Japan, originally the Far East Command (FEC) from 1947 until 1957 when the United States Forces Japan (USFJ).
  • March 1954 – The original Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, “contained provisions that permitted the United States to act for the sake of maintaining peace in East Asia and even exert its power on Japanese domestic quarrels.” (Wikipedia)
  • October 1956 – The Soviet Union and Japan signed the Joint Declaration, a bi-lateral agreement short of a peace treaty. This normalized relations between the countries since the Soviet Union did not sign the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. This agreement breaks news today, as Japan and Russia are currently moving towards a peace treaty.
  • 1958 – The U.S. Air Force (USAF) handed over airspace responsibility to JASDF. Threats to Japanese airspace were dealt with in the same way that they were in the U.S. prior to the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system, much like they were by the British in 1940 (see Dowding System), by manual means. It would be more than a decade until Japan had its own version of SAGE, known as Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) in English, and 自動警戒管制組織 (jidou keikai kansei soshiki) ”Automatic Warning and Control Organization” in Japanese. [More on this in a future post.]
  • January 1960 – Two key documents were updated, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. To alleviate the unequal status, removed the provision to intervene in Japanese domestic quarrels, included articles to delineate mutual defense obligations, and U.S. obligations to pre-inform Japan in times of the U.S. military mobilization. The ratification of this treaty was greeted with widespread protests by the Japanese public, who opposed nuclear weapons in Japan, and were concerned about being on the front line in a possible nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union.

Some Useful Resources for Post-World War II U.S. Army Doctrine Development

This list originated in response to a Twitter query discussing the history of post-World War II U.S. Army doctrine development. It is hardly exhaustive but it does include titles and resources that may not be widely known.

The first two are books:

Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford University Press, 2016)

Jensen focused on the institutional processes shaping the Army’s continual post-war World War II efforts to reform its doctrine in response to changes in the character of modern warfare.

Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (Routledge, 1997)

In an excellent overview of the evolution of operational thought through the 20th century, Naveh devoted two chapters to the Army’s transition to Active Defense in the 70s and then to AirLand Battle in the 80s.

There are several interesting monographs that are available online:

Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (NDU Press, 1986)

Paul Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Combat Studies Institute, 1988)

John Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: the Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982 (TRADOC, 1984)

John Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (TRADOC, 1997)

John Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (TRADOC, 1997)

A really useful place to browse is the Army Command and General Staff College’s online Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). It is loaded with old manuals and student papers and theses addressing a wide variety of topics related to the nuts and bolts of doctrine.

Another good place to browse is the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), which is a huge digital library of government sponsored research. I recommend searches on publications by the Army’s defunct operations research organizations: Operations Research Office (ORO), Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), and the Special Operations Research Office (SORO). The Combat Operations Research Group (CORG), particularly a series of studies of Army force structure from squads to theater HQ’s by Virgil Ney. There is much more to find in DTIC.

Two other excellent places to browse for material on doctrine are the Combat Studies Institute Press publications on CARL and the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s publications.

Some journals with useful research include the Journal of Cold War Studies and the Journal of Strategic Studies.

If anyone else has suggestions, let me know.

The Great 3-1 Rule Debate

coldwarmap3[This piece was originally posted on 13 July 2016.]

Trevor Dupuy’s article cited in my previous post, “Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule,” was the final salvo in a roaring, multi-year debate between two highly regarded members of the U.S. strategic and security studies academic communities, political scientist John Mearsheimer and military analyst/polymath Joshua Epstein. Carried out primarily in the pages of the academic journal International Security, Epstein and Mearsheimer argued the validity of the 3-1 rule and other analytical models with respect the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance in Europe in the 1980s. Epstein cited Dupuy’s empirical research in support of his criticism of Mearsheimer’s reliance on the 3-1 rule. In turn, Mearsheimer questioned Dupuy’s data and conclusions to refute Epstein. Dupuy’s article defended his research and pointed out the errors in Mearsheimer’s assertions. With the publication of Dupuy’s rebuttal, the International Security editors called a time out on the debate thread.

The Epstein/Mearsheimer debate was itself part of a larger political debate over U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the administration of Ronald Reagan. This interdisciplinary argument, which has since become legendary in security and strategic studies circles, drew in some of the biggest names in these fields, including Eliot Cohen, Barry Posen, the late Samuel Huntington, and Stephen Biddle. As Jeffery Friedman observed,

These debates played a prominent role in the “renaissance of security studies” because they brought together scholars with different theoretical, methodological, and professional backgrounds to push forward a cohesive line of research that had clear implications for the conduct of contemporary defense policy. Just as importantly, the debate forced scholars to engage broader, fundamental issues. Is “military power” something that can be studied using static measures like force ratios, or does it require a more dynamic analysis? How should analysts evaluate the role of doctrine, or politics, or military strategy in determining the appropriate “balance”? What role should formal modeling play in formulating defense policy? What is the place for empirical analysis, and what are the strengths and limitations of existing data?[1]

It is well worth the time to revisit the contributions to the 1980s debate. I have included a bibliography below that is not exhaustive, but is a place to start. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War diminished the intensity of the debates, which simmered through the 1990s and then were obscured during the counterterrorism/ counterinsurgency conflicts of the post-9/11 era. It is possible that the challenges posed by China and Russia amidst the ongoing “hybrid” conflict in Syria and Iraq may revive interest in interrogating the bases of military analyses in the U.S and the West. It is a discussion that is long overdue and potentially quite illuminating.

NOTES

[1] Jeffery A. Friedman, “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine,” Security Studies 20 (2011)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Note: Some of these are behind paywalls, but some are available in PDF format. Mearsheimer has made many of his publications freely available here.)

John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982)

Samuel P. Huntington, “Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,” International Security 8, no. 3 (Winter 1983/84)

Joshua Epstein, Strategy and Force Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1987)

Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” International Security 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988)

John J. Mearsheimer, “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance,” International Security 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988)

Stephen Biddle, “The European Conventional Balance,” Survival 30, no. 2 (March/April 1988)

Eliot A. Cohen, “Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,International Security Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988)

Joshua M. Epstein, “The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies,” International Security 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989)

John J. Mearsheimer, “Assessing the Conventional Balance,” International Security 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989)

John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, “Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment,” International Security 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989)

Trevor N. Dupuy, “Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule,” International Security 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989)

Stephen Biddle et al., Defense at Low Force Levels (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991)

The Third World War of 1985

Hackett

[This article was originally posted on 5 August 2016]

The seeming military resurgence of Vladimir Putin’s Russia has renewed concerns about the military balance between East and West in Europe. These concerns have evoked memories of the decades-long Cold War confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact along the inner-German frontier. One of the most popular expressions of this conflict came in the form of a book titled The Third World War: August 1985, by British General Sir John Hackett. The book, a hypothetical account of a war between the Soviet Union, the United States, and assorted allies set in the near future, became an international best-seller.

Jeffrey H Michaels, a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at the British the Joint Services Command and Staff College, has published a detailed look at how Hackett and several senior NATO and diplomatic colleagues constructed the scenario portrayed in the book. Scenario construction is an important aspect of institutional war gaming. A war game will only be as useful if the assumptions that underpin it are valid. As Michaels points out,

Regrettably, far too many scenarios and models, whether developed by military organizations, political scientists, or fiction writers, tend to focus their attention on the battlefield and the clash of armies, navies, air forces, and especially their weapons systems.  By contrast, the broader context of the war – the reasons why hostilities erupted, the political and military objectives, the limits placed on military action, and so on – are given much less serious attention, often because they are viewed by the script-writers as a distraction from the main activity that occurs on the battlefield.

Modelers and war gamers always need to keep in mind the fundamental importance of context in designing their simulations.

It is quite easy to project how one weapon system might fare against another, but taken out of a broader strategic context, such a projection is practically meaningless (apart from its marketing value), or worse, misleading.  In this sense, even if less entertaining or exciting, the degree of realism of the political aspects of the scenario, particularly policymakers’ rationality and cost-benefit calculus, and the key decisions that are taken about going to war, the objectives being sought, the limits placed on military action, and the willingness to incur the risks of escalation, should receive more critical attention than the purely battlefield dimensions of the future conflict.

These are crucially important points to consider when deciding how to asses the outcomes of hypothetical scenarios.

Of Nuclear Buttons: Presidential Authority To Use Nuclear Weapons

[The Adventures of Buckaroo Banzai Across The 8th Dimension (1984)]

While the need for the president of the United States to respond swiftly to a nuclear emergency is clear, should there be limits on the commander in chief’s authority to order use of nuclear weapons in situations that fall below the threshold of existential threat? The question has arisen because the administration of President Donald Trump has challenged the existing taboos against nuclear use.

Last November, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing to investigate the topic, which congress had not considered since the height of the Cold War in the mid-1970s. Called at the behest of Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), the committee chairman, the hearing appeared intended to address congressional concerns over rumors of consideration of a preemptive U.S. attack on North Korea that could include nuclear strikes.

The consensus of the witnesses called to testify was that as presently construed, there is little statutory limit on the president’s power to authorize nuclear weapon use. The witnesses also questioned the wisdom of legislating changes to the existing setup.

Professor Peter Fever of Duke University, a noted scholar on nuclear issues and former National Security Council advisor, caveated between presidential authority to respond to a “bolt from the blue” surprise nuclear strike by an adversary, which was unquestioned, and the legitimacy of unilaterally ordering the use of nuclear weapons in a non-emergency scenario, which would be far more dubious. He conceded that there is no formal test for legality; the only real constraint would lie in the judgement of U.S. military personnel whether or not to carry out a presidential order of uncertain lawfulness.

There is no existing statutory framework undergirding the existing arrangement; it is an artifact of the urgency of the Cold War nuclear arms race. Under the Atomic Energy Act, congress gave responsibility for development, production, and custody of nuclear weapons to the executive branch, but has passed no laws defining the circumstances under which they may or may not be used. Harry S. Truman alone decided to use atomic bombs against Japan in 1945. In the late-1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower secretly pre-delegated authority to use nuclear weapons in certain emergency situations to some U.S. theater commanders; these instructions were also adopted by John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Several presidents authorized secret deployment of nuclear weapons to overseas storage locations.

The U.S. constitution offers no clear guidance. War power are divided between congress, which has the sole authority to declare war and to raise and maintain armed forces, and the president, who is commander in chief of the armed forces. Congress attempted to clarify the circumstances when it was permissible for the president to unilaterally authorize the use of military force in the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It stipulates that the president may commit U.S. military forces abroad only following a congressional declaration of war or authorization to use force, or in response to “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” Successive presidents have held that the resolution is unconstitutional, however, and have ignored its provisions on several occasions.

Congress has traditionally afforded presidents wide deference in the conduct of foreign affairs and military conflicts, albeit under its existing mechanisms of oversight. In waging wars, presidents are subject to U.S. law, including obligations to follow congressionally-approved international conventions defining the laws of war. While the president and congress have disagreed over whether or not to begin or end foreign conflicts, the legislative branch has rarely elected to impose limits on a president’s prerogatives on how to wage such conflicts, to include the choice of weapons to be employed.

The situation in Korea is an interesting case in itself. It was the first post-World War II case where a president committed U.S. military forces to an overseas conflict without seeking a congressional declaration of war. Congress neither authorized U.S. intervention in 1950 nor sanctioned the 1953 armistice that led to a cessation of combat. Truman instead invoked United Nations Security Council resolutions as justification for intervening in what he termed a “police action.”

Legally, the U.S. remains in a state of hostilities with North Korea. The 1953 armistice that halted the fighting was supposed to lead to a formal peace treaty, but an agreement was never consummated. Under such precedents, the Trump administration could well claim that that the president is within his constitutional prerogatives in deciding to employ nuclear weapons there in a case of renewed hostilities.

In all reality, defining the limits of presidential authority over nuclear weapons would be a political matter. While congress possesses the constitutional right to legislate U.S. laws on the subject, actually doing so would likely require a rare bipartisan sense of purpose strong enough to overcome what would undoubtedly be resolute political and institutional opposition. Even if such a law was passed, it is likely every president would view it is an unconstitutional infringement on executive power. Resolving an impasse could provoke a constitutional crisis. Leaving it unresolved could also easily result in catastrophic confusion in the military chain of command in an emergency. Redefining presidential nuclear authority would also probably require an expensive retooling of the nuclear command and control system. It would also introduce unforeseen second and third order effects into American foreign policy and military strategy.

In the end, a better solution to the problem might simply be for the American people to exercise due care in electing presidents to trust with decisions of existential consequence. Or they could decide to mitigate the risk by drastically reducing or abolishing the nuclear stockpile.

 

Saigon, 1965

The American RAND staff and Vietnamese interviewers on the front porch of the villa on Rue Pasteur. Courtesy of Hanh Easterbrook. [Revisionist History]

Although this blog focuses on quantitative historical analysis, it is probably a good idea to consider from time to time that the analysis is being done by human beings. As objective as analysts try to be about the subjects they study, they cannot avoid interpreting what they see through the lenses of their own personal biases, experiences, and perspectives. This is not a bad thing, as each analyst can bring something new to the process and find things that other perhaps cannot.

The U.S. experience in Vietnam offers a number of examples of this. Recently, journalist and writer Malcolm Gladwell presented a podcast exploring an effort by the RAND Corporation initiated in the early 1960s to interview and assess the morale of captured Viet Cong fighters and defectors. His story centers on two RAND analysts, Leon Gouré and Konrad Kellen, and one of their Vietnamese interpreters, Mai Elliott. The podcast traces the origins and history of the project, how Gouré, Kellen, and Elliott brought very different perspectives to their work, and how they developed differing interpretations of the evidence they collected. Despite the relevance of the subject and the influence the research had on decision-making at high levels, the study ended inconclusively and ambivalently for all involved. (Elliott would go on to write an account of RAND’s activities in Southeast Asia and several other books.)

Gladwell presents an interesting human story as well as some insight into the human element of social science analysis. It is a unique take on one aspect of the Vietnam War and definitely worth the time to listen to. The podcast is part of his Revisionist History series.